intended to remove all doubts of the application of the limited liability law to all cases of loss and injury caused without the privity or knowledge of the owner. But it is unnecessary to decide this point in the present case. The pendency of the proceedings in the limited liability cause was a sufficient answer to the libel of the appellants."

Touching the wide purpose of Congress as indicated by the various provisions limiting the ship-owner's liability, the court, in the same case, said (p. 549):

"If we look at the ground of the law of limited responsibility of ship-owners, we shall have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that it covers the case of injuries to the person as well as that of injuries to goods and merchandise. That ground is, that for the encouragement of shipbuilding and the employment of ships in commerce, the owners shall not be liable beyond their interest in the ship and freight for the acts of the master or crew done without their privity or knowledge. It extends to liability for every kind of loss, damage and injury. This is the language of the maritime law, and it is the language of our statute which virtually adopts that law."

Neither is it necessary to conclude that the section in question is a repealing act as to any of the qualifications of the preceding limitations found in §§ 4283 et seq., of the Revised Statutes. To so hold would be to attribute to Congress a wider purpose than we have any reason to suppose that of extending the benefits of §§ 4283 et seq., regardless of the owner's knowledge or privity.

That would be to throw the section out of correspondence with the existing limitations.

We therefore conclude that the section in question was intended to add to the enumerated claims of the old law "any and all debts and liabilities" not theretofore included. This is the interpretation suggested in Butler v. Steamship Co., supra. That the section operates as such an amendment of the existing law and not as a repeal of

the qualifications found in that law, is the view adopted by three Circuit Courts of Appeal, in the cases of The Republic, 61 Fed. Rep. 109, in the Second Circuit; The Annie Faxon, 75 Fed. Rep. 312, in the Ninth Circuit, and in Towing Company v. Transportation Company, 155 Fed. Rep. 11, in the Sixth Circuit, as well as by a number of District Courts, among them being the cases of The Amos D. Carver, 35 Fed. Rep. 665, and In re Meyer, 74 Fed. Rep. 881.

Thus construed, the section harmonizes with the policy of limiting the owner's risk to his interest in the ship in respect of all claims arising out of the conduct of the master and crew, whether the liability be strictly maritime or from a tort non-maritime, but leaves him liable for his own fault, neglect and contracts.

If thus the owner's liability for a tort permitted or incurred through the master or crew, although non-maritime because due to a collision between the ship and a structure upon land, be one in respect to which his liability is limited, and he applies for the benefit of such limitation to the proper District Court of the United States, "all proceedings," by the express terms of § 4285, Revised Statutes, "against the owner shall cease." The procedure in any such case is prescribed by the 54th and 55th rules in admiralty, where it is said that the court shall, "on application of the said owner or owners, make an order to restrain the further prosecution of all and any suit or suits against said owner or owners in respect of any such claim or claims." Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578; Butler v. Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527, 549.

The case of Ex parte Phenix Insurance Co., 118 U. S. 610, which was a petition for the benefits of the limited liability act and to stay suits at common law against the owner for liability by fire carried to buildings on land communicated from the ship, has been cited as holding that the limited liability statute did not apply to such a claim, and that a

court of admiralty could not draw to itself jurisdiction. over any such claim. But that liability was incurred on September 20, 1880, a date antecedent to the act of 1884, which act expressly excluded liabilities which arose before its passage. That the decision by this court was not made until November, 1886, and that the opinion makes no reference to the act of 1884 is of no importance, since the act had no application.

The decree is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

THE PORT OF

BRYAN, COLLECTOR OF THE

CHARLESTON v. KER, EXECUTRIX.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

No. 3. Argued October 25, 26, 1911.-Decided November 20, 1911.

Although a writ which the court has power to issue in a proper case may have been irregularly issued, the marshal is authorized and bound to act thereunder if it comes into his hands as an apparently valid writ.

Although the attempted delegation of authority may have been ineffectual to clothe the person signing a writ with power to do so, the marshal is protected in executing it, if it is in the usual form and bears the seal of the court; such an irregularity can be cured by amendment substituting the signature of the person properly authorized.

If process in rem is apparently valid and it does not appear on the face thereof that the libel on which it is issued discloses only a personal action for damages the marshal is protected in executing it. A collector of the port cannot be held responsible for detention of a vessel because he places an inspector thereon with orders to detain her if she attempts to sail, if at the time the vessel is validly in cus

Argument for Respondent.

222 U. S.

tody of the marshal and the inspector is withdrawn before the possession of the marshal terminates.

163 Fed. Rep. 233, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of process of the District Court and the power and duty of the marshal thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Denison, with whom Mr. Loring C. Christie was on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. J. P. Kennedy Bryan for respondent:

The Laurada was illegally detained by the collector. Section 5290, Rev. Stat., did not justify the detention. The policy of the Government is not to make the private citizen bear the damage caused by an unlawful act of this nature; even if there was probable cause, or a direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, or officer of the Government, which did not constitute due process of law, or was not a legal justification, the Government would pay out of its own Treasury the damage to the private citizen. Hendricks v. Gonzales, 67 Fed. Rep. 351; The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 123, 124, 125. See, also, Cruickshank v. Bidwell, 176 U. S. 81, 82, and DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 179; United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 566, 567.

The Laurada was not in the custody of the law, as the marshal was acting under a void warrant issued in the cause, and the court had no jurisdiction, and was himself without any authority of law, and a trespasser equally with the defendant, the collector of the port.

Where there is no jurisdiction or power to issue the warrant in the person issuing it, as in this case, the writ is not voidable but void, affording no protection to the person executing it. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 627; as to who can issue writs see §§ 555, 558, 991, Rev. Stat.; Benedict's Admiralty, p. 231; Hawkins' Pl. C., Bk. 2, c. 13, § 21; 1 Hale Pl. C. 577, 1st ed., 1680, 287, and see

222 U. S.

Argument for Respondent.

also Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 617; State v. Vaughan, Harper (So. Car.), 313; Davis v. Sanders, 40 So. Car. 507; Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 93, 111; Leas v. McVitty, 132 Fed. Rep. 511; Paper Co. v. Rock River Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 252; Gardner v. Lane, 14 No. Car. 53; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176; The Resolute, 168 U. S. 437; Bank v. Mixter, 124 U. S. 721; The Berkeley, 58 Fed. Rep. 920, 923; Erskine v. Hohnbach, 11 Wall. 616; Stutsman Co. v. Wallace, 142 U. S. 309; Railroad Co. v. Kenney, 19 Fed. Cas. 484; Jacob v. Measines, 79 Massachusetts, 74; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 80. The warrant must be from the proper officer, Troup, §§ 756-762; Meechun, §§ 6090 et seq.; Cooley on Torts, 2d ed., §§ 538, 546. For other cases which held that a warrant such as the one involved in this case is void and affords no protection, see Wimbish v. Wofford, 33 Texas, 109. And see 81 Illinois, 34, 39; Greenleaf v. Munford, 19 Abb. Pr. 469, 476; Anderson v. Jouett, 14 La. Ann. 614; Hickman v. Larkey, 6 Gratt. 210. And as to cases where the warrant was lawful on its face, see 79 Massachusetts, 75, and 67 Massachusetts, 45. In fact the warrant was a mere nullity. See 2 N. Y. 473.

The writ could not have been amended under § 954, Rev. Stat., and see Brown v. Pond, 5 Fed. Rep. 31; United States v. Rose, 14 Fed. Rep. 681; United States v. Riley, 88 Fed. Rep. 480; Semmes v. United States, 91 U. S. 25.

Even if the process was amendable as to signature it was void in rem as the court had no jurisdiction and that appears independently of the decree in the suit in which the writ was issued. The J. R. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 11; The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335, 348; Cutler v. Rae, 7 How. 729; Vandewater v. Mills, 19 How. 82; The Schooner Freeman, 18 How. 188; The Lady Franklin, 8 Wall. 325, 329; The Keokuk, 9 Wall. 517; The William Fletcher, 8 Benedict, 537; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 473; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 427.

The action is maintainable against the collector as a