would be going far, that would not be enough. The plaintiff recovered, or, under the instructions stated at the beginning of this decision, at least may have recovered, notwithstanding his knowledge and appreciation of the danger, on the strength of a doctrine the peculiarity and difficulties of which are elaborately displayed in the treatise of Mr. Labatt. 1 Labatt, Master & Servant, ch. 22, esp. § 424. To say that a promise to repair or replace throws the risk on the master until the time for performance has gone by, or that it does away with or leaves to the jury what otherwise would be negligence as matter of law is evidence of the great consideration with which workmen are treated here, but cannot be deemed a necessary incident of all civilized codes. It could not be assumed without proof that the defendant was subject to such a rule.

There was some suggestion below that there would be hardship in requiring the plaintiff to prove his case. But it should be remembered that parties do not enter into civil relations in foreign jurisdictions in reliance upon our courts. They could not complain if our courts refused to meddle with their affairs and remitted them to the place that established and would enforce their rights. A discretion is asserted in some cases even when the policy of our law is not opposed to the claim. The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435. The only just ground for complaint would be if their rights and liabilities, when enforced by our courts, should be measured by a different rule from that under which the parties dealt.

Judgment reversed.

222 U.S.

Opinion of the Court.

PORTO RICO SUGAR COMPANY v. LORENZO.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.

No. 154. Argued December 22, 1911.-Decided January 9, 1912.

A contract will be read in the light of well known conditions; a contract made in Porto Rico to grind sugar cane will be presumed to be a contract to grind in the grinding season.

What the grinding season is in a particular locality may be established by parol evidence.

Nothing in the contract under consideration in this case takes it out of the ordinary rule that performance of an absolute undertaking is not excused by such occurrences as breaking of machinery, etc. 5 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 96, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the construction of sugar grinding contracts in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion. Plaintiff in error was defendant below.

Mr. Hannis Taylor, with whom Mr. C. M. Boerman was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

There was no brief filed for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action upon notarial contracts to grind all the plaintiff's sugar cane raised upon specified plantations let to him for a certain number of zafras or grinding seasons ending in 1912. The breaches alleged are failure to grind the cane, 'during the months of January to June,' 1908, and to furnish the necessary cars and men to handle the cane as agreed. At the trial it was proved that the cane was ready to be ground and should have been ground between the months of January and the first weeks of June, but that a large part of the crop was ground in the latter part of June and through July VOL. CCXXII-31

to the great damage of the plaintiff. A failure to furnish the proper number of cars for a part of the time also was established. The contract did not fix a period within which the grinding should be done otherwise than by refference to the zafras to which it extended, and it was objected by demurrer, requests for ruling and exceptions to evidence that as the written agreement was silent it could not be made more definite by parol. But the court ruled the other way and sustained a verdict of $15,000 for the plaintiff, whereupon the case was brought to this court.

It appears to us not to need extended argument to show that the court was right. A contract to grind sugar cane implies on its face, if read with any knowledge of the business, that it has reference to seasons, and that it is more definite than a simple grammatical interpretation of the words would express. An illustration suggested at the argument brings it home to those of us whose experience has been in the North. A contract to reap a field of wheat with no mention of time would not leave the contractor free to choose his own time. The grinding of cane must be done in the grinding season, and a contract to grind is a contract to grind in the grinding season. Parol evidence may be necessary to show what that season is in a given place, as it constantly is in order to translate words and the implications of words into things; but the season when ascertained is the limit by the very meaning of the words used, when used in a business contract made with regard to one of the great industries of the world.

A part of the delay seems to have been caused by the repeated breaking down of the machinery, but nothing appears to take the case out of the ordinary rule that performance of an absolute undertaking is not excused by facts of that sort. Nothing else in the case seem to us to call for remark. The trial was conducted fairly and intelligently, and the defendant must bear the loss. Judgment affirmed.

222 U.S.

Syllabus.

PETERS v. BROWARD.1

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

No. 49. Argued November 8, 1911.-Decided January 9, 1912.

Under the law of Florida, as declared by its highest court, where there is a variance between the title of a bill as enrolled and promulgated and the title of the act as shown by the journals, the latter will control.

While the judgment of the highest court of the State in a case may not be res judicata of the case at bar, the parties and land affected not being the same, if in deciding it the court announces what the law of the State is and whether a particular statute was or was not validly enacted under the state constitution, this court will follow it as an authoritative announcement of the law of the State.

Whether a particular state law has been passed by the legislature in such manner as to become a valid law under the state constitution is a state and not a Federal question, and Federal courts must follow the adjudications of the state court.

Although the decision of the state court holding a particular law to be unconstitutional may not have been rendered until after rights based thereon had arisen, if the highest court simply followed a rule laid down before such rights had arisen, the decision in the later case is binding upon the Federal courts.

Where the state courts have held that the journals of the legislature

can be examined to determine whether an act has been validly passed, it is the duty of one proposing to rely upon the act to examine the journals, and he cannot plead ignorance of the law as an excuse for not doing so.

This court cannot hold that an act is constitutional under the state law because the defect on which the state court declared it to be unconstitutional occurred through mistake, when the state court has passed on that question and held the act unconstitutional even under such condition.

Although the case may be a hard one, those who expend money on the faith of an invalid act cannot obtain redress from the courts but must apply to the legislature.

1 Original docket title Peters v. Gilchrist.

Argument for Appellant.

222 U.S.

An act of the State of Florida, incorporating a railroad company and granting it aid, having been held unconstitutional by the highest court of that State because the journal showed that it was an act to incorporate only, and only one subject can be embraced in one act, the Federal courts are bound to follow that decision, and to hold that Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund had no power to convey land under that act, and that the grantees have no title to any of the lands claimed thereunder.

THE facts, which involve the title to land in Florida under an act of the legislature of that State, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John Stevens Maxwell, with whom Mr. Thomas F. McGarry was on the brief, for appellant:

In order to entitle the defendants to raise the question here raised, a plea alleging matter, which, if appearing on the face of the bill, would have been a good cause of demurrer, should have been resorted to, or the bill should have been answered. Griffing v. Gibb, 2 Black,519.

Even if plaintiff's rights are to be determined entirely by the validity, or invalidity of the act of May 24, 1893, and the journals of the legislature are to control or furnish the evidence of its title and the regularity of its enactment, or otherwise, proof must be taken as to what constitutes the journals and the entries required to be made therein by the constitution of the State; and any errors, or mistakes, may be shown in order to conform the journals to the exact facts. State v. Mason, 9 So. Rep. 776, 787, 804; Koehler v. Hill, 14 N. W. Rep. 738, 742.

To overcome the presumption that the act was properly enacted the contrary must be shown by clear and indisputable proof.

In those jurisdictions where resort may be had to the legislative journals and where enrolled bills signed by the presiding officers and governor are not conclusive when