forcement of a state statute otherwise constitutional is incidental only, it will not render the statute unconstitutional under the commerce clause of the Constitution. Martin v. West, 191., 3. Commerce clause; state statute incidentally affecting use of vessel engaged in interstate commerce, not invalid. A state statute which gives a lien upon all vessels, whether domestic or foreign and whether engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, for injuries committed to persons and property within the State and providing that the lien for non-maritime torts be enforced in the state courts and which is not in conflict with any act of Congress, does not offend the commerce clause of the Constitution because it incidentally affects the use of a vessel engaged in interstate commerce; and so held as to §§ 5953 and 5954 of the Code of the State of Washington. Ib. See STATES, 2, 3. Contracts. See STATES, 5. 4. Due process of law; validity of statute of limitations. A state statute of limitations allowing only a little more than a year for the institution of a suit to recover his personal property by a party who has not been heard from for fourteen years and for whose property a receiver has been appointed is not unconstitutional as depriving him of his property without due process of law; and so held as to the provisions to that effect of the Revised Laws of Massachusetts, c. 144, for distribution of estates of persons not heard of for fourteen years and presumably dead. Blinn v. Nelson, 1. 5. Due process of law; legislation for maintenance of social order; what constitutes. Legislation reasonably adapted to the maintenance of social order, affording hearing before judgment, and not affirmatively forbidden by any constitutional provision, does not deny due process of law. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 313. 6. Due process of law; equal protection of the law; validity of the mob and riot indemnity law of Illinois. The act of Illinois of 1887 indemnifying owners of property for damages by mobs and riots is not unconstitutional as depriving cities of their property without due process of law because liability is imposed irrespective of the power of the city to have prevented the violence; nor is it unconstitutional as denying equal protec tion of the law because it discriminates between cities and unincorporated subdivisions of a county. Ib. 7. Due process of law; equal protection of the law; validity of New York transfer tax law of 1896. The statute of New York of 1896, providing for a transfer tax on prop erty passing by deed of a resident intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor, is not unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law nor does it deny the equal protection of the law by arbitrary classification of the subject-matter or by different rates of taxation depending on the relationship of the beneficiaries to the grantor. Keeney v. New York, 525. 8. Due process of law; equal protection of the laws; validity of Massachusetts statute regulating assignments of future wages. The statute of Massachusetts making invalid assignments for security for debts of less than $200 of wages to be earned unless accepted in writing by the employer, consented to by the wife of the assignor, and filed in a public office, is not unconstitutional as depriving the borrower or the lender of his property without due process of law, nor is it unconstitutional, as denying equal protection of the law, because certain classes of financial institutions are exempted from its provisions. It is a legitimate exercise of the police power and there is a basis for the classification. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 225. See Infra, 27, 29. 9. Equal protection of the law; recognition of degrees of evil. Legislation may recognize degrees of evil without denying equal protection of the laws. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 225. 10. Equal protection of the laws; classification within. Whether a state statute denies equal protection of the laws by reason of classification depends upon whether there is a basis for the classification. Finley v. California, 28. 11. Equal protection of the laws; classification of punishment for crimes within. There is a proper basis for classification of punishment for crimes between convicts serving life terms in the state prison and convicts serving lesser terms. Ib. 12. Equal protection of the laws; classification of punishment for crime; validity of § 246 of California Penal Code. Section 246 of the Penal Code of California inflicting the death penalty for assaults with intent to kill committed by life term convicts in the state prison is not unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because its provisions are not applicable to convicts serving lesser terms. Ib. 13. Equal protection of the laws; classification not offensive to provision. Whether or not a classification merely between all corporations and partnerships and individuals offends the equal protection clause, a classification of corporations operating railroads and individuals does not offend that provision of the Constitution. Aluminum Co. v. Ramsey, 251. 14. Equal protection of the laws; classification not offensive to provision. Although the state court may have applied the statute to plaintiff in error merely as a corporation, if the record shows that it is a corporation of a kind properly classified by the statute and there is equality within that class, the statute will not be held invalid as repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Ib. 15. Equal protection of the law; validity of graduated tax on transfers. A State may impose a graduated tax on transfers of personal property by instrument taking effect on the grantor's death without violating the equal protection clause. Keeney v. New York, 525. -16. Equal protection of the law; differences to justify classification. While there can be no arbitrary classification without denying equal protection of the law, there need not be great or conspicuous differences in order to justify a classification. Ib. 17. Equal protection of the law; classification in taxation. The Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to tax all transfers because it taxes some transfers. Ib. 18. Equal protection of the law; exceptions in police statute; validity of Kansas black powder law. The Kansas statute regulating sales of black powder is not unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the law because it excepts from its operation sales made under existing contracts; but whether it offends the commerce clause cannot be determined in a suit in which it does not appear that the party raising the question was affected in that respect. Williams v. Walsh, 415. 19. Equal protection of the law; application of Fourteenth Amendment to statutory changes. A classification as to time that is not arbitrary is not repugnant to The Fourteenth Amentment does not forbid the Constitution. е statutory changes to have a beginning and thus discriminate between rights of an earlier and later time. (Sperry & Hutchinson v. Rhodes, 220 U. S. 502.) Ib. 20. Equal protection of the law; police statute; validity of exceptions in. A state police statute regulating sales, otherwise constitutional, is not unconstitutional under the equal protection clause because it excepts from its operation sales made under existing contracts. Ib. 21. Equal protection of the law; validity of classification between cities and unincorporated subdivisions of a county. Equal protection of the law is not denied where the classification is not so unreasonable and extravagant as to be merely an arbitrary mandate. A classification between cities and unincorporated subdivisions of a county is a reasonable one within the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 313. 22. Fallibility of. See Supra, 6, 7, 8; STATES, 1. Constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances of occasionally inflicting injustice in extraordinary cases. Blinn v. Nelson, 1. Fourth Amendment. See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. 23. Self-incrimination; measure of protection provided by Fifth Amend ment. 5 The constitutional guarantee of the Fifth Amendment does not deprive the law-making authority of the power to compel the giving of testimony, even though the testimony when given may serve to incriminate the witness provided complete immunity be accorded. Glickstein v. United States, 139. 24. Self-incrimination; punishment for perjury not within immunity. The sanction of an oath and imposition of punishment for false swearing are inherent parts of the power to compel giving testimony and are prohibited by immunity as to self-incrimination. Ib. 25. Self-incrimination; immunity not a license to commit perjury. The immunity afforded by the Fifth Amendment relates to the past; it is not a license to the person testifying to commit perjury either under the provisions as to the giving of testimony in § 860, Rev. Stat., or of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Ib. 26. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment on power over local officer. The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to determine what duties may be performed by local officers, nor whether they shall be appointed, or elected by the people. Soliah v. Heskin, 522. 27. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate act providing for creation of drains and assessments therefor. The Fourteenth Amendment does not invalidate an act authorizing an appointed board to determine whether a proposed drain will be of public benefit, and to create a drainage district consisting of land which it decides will be benefited by such drain, and to make special assessments accordingly, if, as in this case, notice is given and an opportunity to be heard afforded the landowner before the assessment becomes a lien against his property. Ib. 28. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment to deprive State of taxing power. The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to compel a township, as one of its political subdivisions, to levy and collect taxes for the purpose of paying the amount assessed against such township for the public benefits accruing from the construction of the drain. Ib. 29. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment on taxing powers of. The Fourteenth Amendment does not diminish the taxing power of the State or deprive the State of the power to select subjects for taxation, but only requires that the citizen be given opportunity to be heard on questions of liability and value, and be not arbitrarily denied equal protection. Keeney v. New York, 525. See STATES. 30. Generally; test of constitutionality of power. Whether a power is within constitutional limits is to be determined by what can be done under it, not what may be done. Curtin v. Benson, 78. See SAFETY APPLIANCE ACTS, 1. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. |