to relations determined by Statute of Dis. tributions. CHAP. XXIX. where a testator devised all his freehold estates to his wife for life, and, at her decease, to be equally divided Objects of a gift among his relations on his side; and it was held, that the three first cousins of the testator, who were his next of kin at his death, were entitled. A counter claim was made by the heir at law, who was the child of a deceased first cousin, and who contended, that the devise was void for uncertainty. One of the first cousins, who was the nearest paternal relation, also claimed the whole, as being designated by the words "on my side;" but the Court was of opinion, that those words did not exclude the maternal relations, they being as nearly related to the testator as the relations ex parte paternâ. To "relation" in the singular. Distribution, The rule which makes the Statute of Distributions the guide in these cases, is not departed from on slight grounds. Thus, the exception out of a bequest to relations, of a nephew of the testator (who was the son of a living sister), was not considered a valid ground for holding the gift to include other persons in the same degree of relationship, and thereby let in the children of a living sister, to claim concurrently with their parent, and other surviving brothers, sisters, and the children of a deceased brother of the testator (m). There is, it seems, no difference in effect between a gift to relations in the plural, and relation in the singular; the former would apply to a single individual, and the latter to any larger number; the term relation being regarded as nomen collectivum. And this construction obtained in one case (n) where the expression was "my nearest relation of the name of the Pyots." The Statute of Distributions not only determines the stirpes or per objects of a gift to relations, but also regulates the pro whether per capita. (m) Rayner v. Mowbray, 3 B. C. C. 234. (n) Pyot v. Pyot, 1 Ves. sen. 337. portions in which they take, the gift being held to apply CHAP. XXIX. to the next of kin, and the persons whom the Statute admits by representation, the whole taking per stirpes, not per capita; that is, the property is distributed proportionably among the stocks, not equally among the several individual objects of every degree. Thus, if a testator bequeaths personal estate to his relations, and dies leaving a child and two grandchildren, the children of a deceased child, and also a great grandchild sprung from the same stock, but whose parent is dead, the property is divisible into moieties; one of which goes to the surviving child of the testator, and the other is again divided into thirds, two of which belong to the two surviving grandchildren of the testator, and the remaining third to the child of the deceased grandchild; as the statute allows representation among lineal descendants through all the degrees indefinitely. If, however, the testator had himself left no descendant, and the facts above suggested were applicable to the family of a deceased brother, the second moiety would have been distributable solely among the two surviving grandchildren of the deceased (i. e. the testator's great nephews,) to the exclusion of the great grandchildren, (i. e. the testator's great-great-nephews;) as the Statute of Distributions does not admit of representation among collaterals beyond brothers' and sisters' children. If, however, the testator has introduced into the gift expressions pointing at equality of participation, of course the statutory mode of distribution is excluded, and all the objects of every degree are entitled in equal shares (o). And even in the absence of any expressions of this nature, such is the destination of the property in analogy (0) Thomas v. Hole, Cas. temp. Talb. 251; Green v. Howard, 1 B C. C. 31; Rayner v. Mowbray, 3 Id. Shares regula ted by statutory distribution. Effect of words directing an equal distribu tion. CHAP. XXIX. "Near" and lations. Nearest rela t'ons, 66 as sis ters nephews, to the statutory rule, unders a gift to relations, where all the objects within the line are of equal degree; for instance, if the testator left no child but nine grandchildren descended from two stocks, the property would be divisible, not (as in the case before suggested) into moieties, one to the children of each deceased child, but among all the grandchildren pari passu, i. e. each would take one-ninth; the distribution in the one case being per stirpes, and in the other per capita. The objects of a gift to "relations" are not varied by "nearest" re- its being associated with the word "near" (p). But where the gift is to the "nearest relations," the next of kin will take, to the exclusion of those who, under the statute, would have been entitled by representation. Thus, surviving brothers and sisters would exclude the children of deceased brothers and sisters (q), or a living child or grandchild, the issue of a deceased child or grandchild. Where, however, the testator added to a devise to nearest relations, the words " as sisters, nephews, and nieces," Sir Lloyd Kenyon, M. R., directed a distribution according to the statute; and they were held to take per stirpes, though it was contended, that all the relations specified should take per capita, including the children of a living sister. His Honor, however, thought that the testator had a distribution according to the statute in his view; at all events, that the contrary was not sufficiently clear to induce him to depart from the common rule. The children of the living sister, therefore, were excluded (r). and nieces." Relations of the half-blood. As relations by the half-blood are within the statute, so they are comprehended in gifts to next of kin and to (p) Whithorne v. Harris, 2 Ves. sen. 527. See also 19 Ves. 403. (q) Pyot v. Pyot, 1 Ves. sen. 335; Marsh v. Marsh, 1 B. C. C. 293; Smith v. Campbell, 19 Ves. 400; S. C. (r) Stampe v. Cooke, 1 Cox, 234. relations; and a bequest to the next of kin of A. " of her CHAP. XXIX. own blood and family as if she had died sole, unmarried, and intestate," has received the same construction (s). affinity. A gift to next of kin or relations, of course, does not Relations by extend to relations by affinity (t), unless the testator has subjoined to the gift expressions declaratory of an intention to include them. Such, obviously, is the effect of a bequest expressly to relations "by blood or marriage," which lets in all persons married to relations (u). It is clear that a gift to next of kin or relations does not include a husband (a) or wife (y); and such has been also the adjudged construction of a bequest to "my next of kin, as if I had died intestate (z);" the latter words being considered not to indicate an intention to give to the persons entitled under the statute at all events; i. e. whether next of kin or not. Gifts "to poor construed. A difficulty in construing the word relations sometimes relations," how arises from the testator having superadded a qualification of an indefinite pature; as where the gift is to the most deserving of his relations; or to his poor or necessitous relations. In the former case, the addition is disregarded, as being too uncertain (a); and the better opinion, according to the authorities is, that the word poor also is inoperative to vary the construction, though the cases are somewhat conflicting (b). In an early case (c) CHAP. XXIX. it was said that the word "poor" was frequently used as a term of endearment and compassion; as one often says, my poor father, &c.; and accordingly a countess (but who, it seems, had not an estate equal to her rank) was held to be entitled under such a bequest. In Widmore v. Woodroffe (d), a testator bequeathed two-thirds of his property to the most necessitous of his relations by his father's and mother's side; and Lord Camden said the bequest would stand upon the word relations alone, the word poor being added, made no difference; there was no distinguishing between the degrees of poverty. This decision may be considered to have overruled the earlier cases of Jones v. Beale (e), and Attorney-General v. Buckland (g), in each of which a gift to poor relations was extended to necessitous relations beyond the Statutes of Distribution. Gifts to poor relations, regarded as charity. In several cases, gifts to poor relations seem to have been regarded as charitable dispositions. Thus in the case of Isaac v. Defriez (h), where the bequest was to the testator's own and his wife's "poorest relations," to be distributed proportionably, share and share alike, at the discretion of his executors, it seems to have been considered as a charity, but was confined to persons who were within the Statutes of Distribution. So in Brunsden v. Woolredge (i), where B. bequeathed £500 on a certain event, to be distributed among his mother's poor relations. Also W., (the brother of B.,) devised real estates to A. and his heirs, in trust to sell to pay debts, and pay the overplus to such of his mother's poor relations, as A., his heirs, &c., should think objects of charity; Sir Thomas Sewell, M. R., held, that the true (d) Amb. 636. (e) 2 Vern. 381. (g) Cited 1 Ves. sen. 231. (h) Amb. 595; more correctly, 17 Ves. 373, n. (i) Amb. 507; S. C. Dick. 380, |