Its signification in the present connection is a gift from a parent to a child, which is supposed to be intended when the purchasemoney is paid by the parent, and the conveyance is taken in the name of the child. The ordinary presumption of a resulting trust, already described, is in such a case rebutted by the supposed intention to benefit the child; and instead of the latter holding as trustee for the parent, he will be construed to take beneficially by advancement.1 Dyer v. Dyer, already cited, is an authority upon this particular branch of the law of resulting trusts. In that case copyhold premises were granted to Simon Dyer, and Mary his wife, and his son William, to take in succession for their lives, and to the longest liver of them, the purchase-money having been paid by the father. The wife died, and then the father, leaving surviving him William and another son, to whom he had devised the copyhold estate. Upon a bill filed by this younger son against his brother William, it was held that the latter could not be treated as a trustee of the legal title for the benefit of his father's devisee, but that he took beneficially by way of advancement; and the bill was dismissed. The doctrine of advancement is firmly established in the United States as well as in England; and the general rule may be stated to be that a purchase in the name of a child will be regarded prima facie as an advancement, and not as a resulting trust for the father. The rule applies to other relations than those of father and child. A purchase by any one in the name of another to whom the purchaser stands in loco parentis will be treated as an advancement. Thus the rule has been held to apply to grandfather and grandchild ;* to mother and daughter;5 As the general doctrine of resulting trusts is analogous to the common law rule that where there is a feoffment without consideration, the use results to the feoffor; so the exception as to advancements, now under consideration, is in accordance with the legal principle that where there is a feoffment from a father to a son the consideration of blood would settle the use on the son. Grey v. Grey, 2 Swans. 598. Ante, p. 91. 3 Page v. Page, 8 N. Hamp. 187; Denison v. Goehring, 7 Barr, 180, note; Taylor v. James, 4 Dess. 1; Douglass v. 4 Ebrand v. Dancer, 1 Coll. N. C. C. 265 n. 5 Murphy v. Nathans, 10 Wright (Pa.) 508; Sayre v. Hughes, L. R. 5 Eq. 376; though see In re de Visme, 2 De G. J. & Sm. 17. to husband and wife; and to a purchase in the name of a son-inlaw. A purchase in the name of a brother will not be considered an advancement;3 unless the purchaser stands in loco parentis towards his brother.1 It seems to be doubtful whether a purchase in the name of an illegitimate child is to be treated as an advancement; although the weight of authority is in favor of so treating it.5 Where the money is advanced by a son and the title taken in the name of the father, the presumption will be in favor of a resulting trust, and not an advancement." Whether a purchase made by a father in the joint names of himself and son will be considered as an advancement has been a doubtful question; but the more recent authorities are in favor of considering it an advancement.7 The presumption of advancement being, as Chief Justice Eyre said in Dyer v. Dyer, a mere circumstance of evidence, may be rebutted by other evidence or other presumptions tending to show an intention that the child was to hold as a trustee. Thus the relation of solicitor and client has been held to prevent the presumption of an advancement which would otherwise have arisen.8 And where the deed is taken in the name of a wife for the purpose of defrauding the husband's creditors, a trust will result to the husband so as to make the property liable to his debts." 85. It remains to be noticed that resulting trusts of the kind now under discussion have been abolished in certain States of the Union by statute. Such is the case in New York, Michigan, and Wisconsin. So, also, in Massachusetts, Maine, and Indiana.10 1 Kline's Appeal, 3 Wright (Pa.), 463. 2 Baker v. Leathers, 3 Porter (Ind.), 558. liams v. Williams, 32 Beav. 370; Sugd. V. and P. 704 (8th Am. ed.). 8 Garrett v. Wilkinson, 2 De G. & Sm. 3 Edwards v. Edwards, 3 Wright (Pa.), 244. See, also, Wallace v. Bowers, 28 377. 4 Forrest v. Forrest, 34 L. J. Ch. 428. 5 Beckford v. Beckford, Loft. 490; Soar v. Foster, 4 K. & J. 152; Tucker v. Burrow, 2 Hem. & M. 515. 6 Howell v. Howell, 2 McCart. 75. Grey v. Grey, 2 Swanst. 599; Wil Verm. 638; Dudley v. Bosworth, 10 Hump. 12; Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 John. 91; Taylor v. Taylor, 4 Gilm. 303. 9 Belford v. Crane, 1 C. E. Green, 265; post, Part II., Chap. II. 10 See Glidewell v. Spaugh, 26 Ind. 319. 86. The second class of resulting trusts is where a trustee or other fiduciary purchases property with trust funds and takes the title in his own name. In such a case a trust will result by operation of law for the benefit of the trust estate, as the trustee will be presumed to have intended that the purchase should enure to the benefit of the estate. Trust funds may in this way be followed into any property into which they have been invested or converted by the trustee; and this is constantly done by the courts for the benefit and redress of injured cestuis qui trust.1 The rule above stated applies to purchases by a trustee, by a partner,3 an agent employed to buy, or trustees of a corporation, or an executor, or a committee of a lunatic, or a guardian,8 or a husband purchasing with avails of his wife's separate estate, or a mortgagor.10 A resulting trust will also arise when a trustee mixes trust funds with his own, for it will then become the trustee's duty to establish how much of his own money went to the purchase, or the cestui qui trust will take the whole. This is in accordance with the usual rule upon the subject of confusion of goods." It 1 Perry on Trusts, & 127. 2 Oliver v. Piatt, 3 Howard, 401; Harrisburg Bank v. Tyler, 3 Watts & Serg. 373; Martin v. Greer, 1 Geo. Dec. 118; Moffitt v. McDonald, 11 Hump. 457; Day v. Roth, 18 N. Y. 448; Lathrop v. Gilbert, 2 Stockt. 345; Pugh v. Pugh, 9 Ind. 132. 3 Philips v. Crammond, 2 Wash. C. C. 441; Piatt v. Oliver, 2 McLean, 267; 3 Howard, 401; Coder v. Huling, 3 Casey, 84; Baldwin v. Johnson, Saxt. 441; Edgar v. Donnelly, 2 Munf. 387; Pugh v. Currie, 5 Ala. 446. 4 Church v. Sterling, 16 Conn. 388; Eshleman. Lewis, 13 Wright (Penna.), 410. See, also, Hutchinson v Hutchinson 4 Dess. 77; Follansbe v. Kilbreth, 17 Ill. 522; Chastain v. Smith, 30 Georgia, 96. 5 Methodist Church v. Wood, 5 Hamm. 283. 6 Claussen v. La Franz, 1 Clarke, 226; McCrory v. Foster, Id. 271; Wallace v. Duffield, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 521; Harper 7 Reid v. Fitch, 11 Barb. S. C. 399. 9 Methodist Church v. Jaques, 1 John. has been doubted, however, whether the cestui qui trust in such cases has anything more than a lien on the property to the extent of the money belonging to the trust estate; but the general rule in America is in favor of a resulting trust.' 87. The third of the classes into which resulting trusts have been divided embraces those cases in which there is a disposition of property upon trust, but no trust is declared, or is only partially declared, or wholly or partially fails. "There is no equitable principle more firmly established than that where a voluntary disposition of property by deed or will is made to a person as trustee, and the trust is not declared at all, or is ineffectually declared, or does not extend to the whole interest given to the trustee, or it fails either wholly or in part by lapse or otherwise; the interest so undisposed of will be held by the trustee, not for his own benefit, but as a resulting trust for the donor himself, or for his heir-at-law or next of kin, according to the nature of his estate." The rule above stated applies, it will be observed, to voluntary dispositions and not to those based upon a valuable consideration, and it is called into operation in the case of wills more frequently than in deeds. The presumption of a resulting trust is, indeed, stronger in a case of a disposition of property by conveyance inter vivos, than in a testamentary disposition, which always implies bounty; but the limitations of beneficial interests are usually more precise and exhaustive in deeds than in wills, and a case of an interest undisposed of is not, therefore, so likely to arise. The plainest case of a trust of the kind now attempted to be explained, is that in which a gift is made upon trust but no trusts are declared. Of this a striking example is the case of the Corporation of Gloucester v. Wood,5 where a testator gave & G. 372. See, also, Commonwealth v. 1 Wallace v. Duffield, 2 Serg & Rawle, 4 Sidney v. Shelley, 19 Ves. 358. £200,000 to his executors "for the purposes I have before named," but no purposes had been named, and it was held that there was a resulting trust in favor of the residuary legatees. An insufficient declaration of trust will have the same effect as an entire failure to declare.1 88. A more difficult question not unfrequently arises in those cases in which the gift is made upon trusts which are effectively declared, but which do not exhaust the entire beneficial interest. Here, if the intention is plain that the donee is not to take the undisposed residue beneficially, there will, of course, be a resulting trust in favor of the next of kin, or the heir-at-law, according to the nature of the property; but the difficult point to determine is whether the donee was intended to take the undisposed interest beneficially. Many authorities exist upon this point, and many fine distinctions have been drawn. In Barrs v. Fewkes, however, the result of the cases is thus stated by the (then) Vice-Chancellor, Wood: 1st, where there is a gift to A. to enable him to do something, where he has a choice whether he will do it or not, then the gift is for his own benefit, the motive why it is given to him being stated; 2d, where you find the gift is for the general purposes of the will, then the person who takes the estate cannot take the surplus, after satisfying the trust, for his own benefit; and, 3d, where a charge is created by the will, the devisee takes the surplus for his own benefit, no trust being implied. Another instance of the class of resulting trusts now under consideration is that which arises out of the failure of a gift by lapse. Where, for example, a testator declares a trust in favor of A., and A. dies in the testator's lifetime, the trustee will hold the property for the benefit of the testator's real or personal representatives, according to the nature of the property. So too where a gift is void ab initio because of its violation of some statutory provision (e. g. the statutes against excessive accumu 1 Hill on Trustees, 116; Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399; 10 Ves. 522. See, also, Lomax v. Ripley, 3 Sm. & Giff. 48; King v. Mitchell, 8 Peters, 326; Shaeffer's Appeal, 8 Barr, 38. See, however, Benning v. Benning's Exr., 14 B. Mon. 585. 2 2 Hem. & M. 60. See, also, Ellcock, v. Mapp, 3 H. L. Cas. 492; King v. Denison, 1 V. & B. 272; William v. Roberts, 4 Jur. N. S. 18; Hill on Trustees, 119. 3 Hill on Trustees, 135, 136. |