after passing the coal house on the road, was unobstructed for a distance of a mile or so; but the view before reaching that spot was somewhat limited, and at the time of the accident a strong south wind was blowing. It appeared from the testimony of Walker, who was plaintiffs' principal witness, that they stopped before reaching the crossing and looked both ways, but did not see the approaching train or hear any noise of the same until the moment they were struck. Other evidence was given that the parties stopped and looked before approaching the crossing, but the evidence was quite conflicting as to the spot where they stopped; the principal part of this evidence was fairly reviewed by the judge in his charge to the jury. The defendant, inter alia, presented the following points: 1. That under all the evidence in the case the plaintiffs cannot recover. Ans. We refuse to charge as requested in this point. Pa. R. R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 509; North Pa. R. R. Co. v. Heilman, 49 Pa. 60; Cent. R. R. Co. of N. J. v. Feller, 84 Pa. 227; Catawissa R. R. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. 193. Messrs. Evans & Maynard, and Rodney A. Mercur, for defendants in error: The rule is that where there is any evidence which alone would justify an inference of the disputed fact, it must go to the jury, no matter how strong or persuasive may be the countervailing proof. Howard Express Co. v. Wile, 64 Pa. 205; Phila. etc. R. R. Co. v. Yeager, 73 Pa. 125; Maynes v. Atwater, 88 Pa. 497; Egbert v. Payne, 99 Pa. 245; First Nat. Bank of Easton v. Wirebach, 106 Pa. 47; Hill v. Nat. Trust Co. 108 Pa. 3; First Nat. Bank of Du Bois City v. First Nat. Bank of Williamsport, 5 Cent. Rep. 194. The judge at the trial charged that "The rule is imperative that his duty was to stop, look and listen before driving on the track. If he approached the track without having stopped and looked and listened, he cannot recover, be2. That unless the jury find from the evidence cause it was negligence per se." Again: "The that Huff or Walker stopped their team after evidence of the other witnesses bearing upon passing the coal house, and looked in the direc- this question you will call into consideration in tion in which the train was coming, it was neg- determining this question whether they did ligence per se, and the plaintiffs cannot re-stop; because if they did not stop west of the coal house, then it was their duty to have stopped down by the track; and if their view was obstructed there and they could not see, it was their duty to get out and see if there was a train coming. It has been said in one case that when the view is obstructed so they cannot see, it is the duty of the person or traveler to get out and take his horse by its head and look.' cover. Ans. This point is affirmed, if you find that Mr. Huff did not stop, look and listen west of the coal house. Even if he did, I submit to you to say whether it was a proper place for him to stop, look and listen, with the wind blowing from the south, and the view to the north obstructed by the orchard; if it was not, it was negligence to drive on the track without stopping and looking east of the coal house; and the plaintiffs cannot recover. 4. That, unless the jury find from the evidence that Walker looked up the track after passing the coal house and before the accident, the plaintiffs cannot recover. Ans. The point is refused. The undisputed evidence is he did not look up the track at this point. If they had not stopped, looked and listened west of the coal house, it was negligence to drive on the track, as sworn to by Walker, and the plaintiffs cannot recover. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs for $5,750. After hearing of motion for a new trial the court ordered plaintiffs "to remit from the verdict all in excess of $2,500 and file no bill of costs; rule for a new trial to be discharged: otherwise, to be made absolute and a new trial granted.' "" The plaintiffs remitted all in excess of $2,500; and judgment was entered accordingly. The assignments of error specified the action of the court in refusing the motion for a compulsory nonsuit and the answers to defendant's points given above. Messrs. Davies & Hall, and Henry Streeter, for plaintiff in error: It is uncontradicted that there is a practically level piece of ground, 17 feet wide, between the coal house and the west rail, on the approach to the track from the cross road upon which Mr. Huff and Walker were traveling. It was their plain duty to have stopped at that place; and the learned court should have said so in plain, unmistakable language. 3 PA. C. R., V. VII. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Brandtmaier, 5 Cent. Rep. 144; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. 71; Schum v. Pa. R. R. Co. 107 Pa. 8. It is the duty of the company to give timely and sufficient notice of the approach of trains where highways cross the railroad tracks. Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Dunn, 56 Pa. 280; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. 259; Phila. etc. R. R. Co. v. Killips, 88 Pa. 412; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Horst, 16 W. N. C. 567. It is the duty of the engineer, when his train approaches a public highway, to give warning by sounding whistle or other sufficient alarm. Phila. etc. R. R. Co. v. Stinger, 78 Pa. 225. Also to give proper and timely warning of the approach of its trains. Longnecker v. Pa. R. R. Co. 105 Pa. 332. Also to give sufficient long and loud warning of some kind. Pa. R. R. Co. v. Coon, 2 Cent. Rep. 323, 111 Pa. 438. Such warning must be reasonable and timely. Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 Ů. S. 164 (Bk. 24, L. ed. 405, and note). The failure of an engineer approaching a highway to give warning is negligence per se. Phila. etc. R. R. Co. v. Stinger, and Longnecker v. Pa. R. R. Co. supra; Strong v. Placerville R. R. Co. 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas, 273. This warning must be nearer than 300 yards from the crossing. R. R. Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 442. It must be given continuously when approaching a crossing. 13. Smedis v. Brooklyn etc. R. R. Co. 88 N. Y. where the plaintiff stopped, looked and listened | pended by the plaintiff on account of the de at varying distances from the track. fendant. Pa. R. R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. 60 (80 ft.); Pa. R. R. Co. v. Ackerman, 74 Pa. 265 (10 ft.); Pa. R. R. Co. v. Bock, 93 Pa. 427 (60 ft.); Phila. etc. R. R. Co. v. Hagan, 47 Pa. 244 (40 ft.). If the train was a special one, it was more incumbent upon the Company to slacken their speed and sound the whistle and ring the bell, than if the train were running on regular time. Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, supra. Per Curiam: It would clearly have been error for the court to have taken this case from the jury. Henry Huff was killed while attempting to ride over the railroad at a public crossing. The unques tioned evidence is that when he approached the railroad he stopped, looked and listened. The contention was whether the place where he stopped was a suitable one to see and hear, and whether due effort was made to ascertain if a train was approaching. The evidence as to this was well submitted by the court and justified the finding of the jury. We see no error in the charge nor in the answers to the points. Judgment affirmed. Alex. DE BARIL, Piff. in Err., v. Tomas CAMPOY Y PARDO. 1. If a writing which is in the possession of the opposite party is required to be given in evidence, notice to produce the original must be given to him or his attorney; and without proof of such notice secondary evidence of the contents of the writing cannot be given. 2. The fact that the opposite party is in a foreign country, where he resides, does not affect the application of the rule. 3. Evidence of agency insufficient to submit to the jury. (Argued March 30, Decided April 11, 1887.) JANUARY Term, 1886, No. 304, E. D., beMercur, Ch. J., Trunkey, Sterrett, Green, and Clark, JJ. Error to Common Pleas No. 4 of Philadelphia County, to review a judgment on a verdict for the defendant in an action of assumpsit. Affirmed. The facts as they appeared at the trial are stated in the opinion of the court on a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted, by ARNOLD, J.: This is an action of assumpsit commenced May 19, 1884, by a writ of foreign attachment. The defendant is a citizen and resident of Spain. The plaintiff claimed commissions on a contract for the sale of 16,000 tons of iron ore by the defendant to Alfred Earnshaw, the garnishee, which sale the plaintiff alleged that he negotiated; also for services in translating the contract from the Spanish to the English language; and also for money loaned and ex The plaintiff's dealings were not with the defendant in person, but with his son, Tomas Campoy, Jr.; and the main question in dispute was whether the son was the general agent of his father. In order to prove the agency the plaintiff compelled the attendance of the son of the defendant by a subpena duces tecum, requiring him to produce all the letters which he had received from his father since he arrived in. America, in August, 1881. The son produced a large bundle of letters, from which the plaintiff extracted and used two, one of them dated April 13, 1882, and the other May 13, 1882. It was then asserted by the plaintiff that there was another letter bearing upon the question of agency, dated December 3, or 4, 1881. The son testified that he had produced all the letters from his father which he had in his possession; that his letters had been in the possession of a Mr. Mares, of Baltimore; that he did not remember whether there was a letter from his father dated in December, 1881, but that if there was, Mr. Mares must have it; that he had not asked Mr. Mares for his letters since October, 1883; and that the last time he saw them was within the last year, when Mr. Mares produced them in the Court of Common Pleas No. 2, of this county, and they were read to the jury in a case then being tried in that court. Mr. Earnshaw testified that he entered into a contract with the defendant for the purchase of the iron ore, and that the plaintiff translated the contract; and that by direction from the defendant, he paid the commissions to his son. The plaintiff then proposed to prove by his own testimony, the contents of a letter from the defendant to his son, dated December 3, or 4, 1881, and that he had read the letter, to which objection was made on the ground that notice to produce the letter had not been given to the defendant. The evidence was rejected. In order to enable the plaintiff to produce the letter or prove it it by depositions on a commission, or to give notice to the defendant to produce it, so as to prepare the way for the reception of secondary evidence at another trial, I told the plaintiff that I would withdraw a juror and continue the case; but he, acting on his own judgment, refused to accept the offer, and insisted on going to the jury. It is laid down as elementary law that if a writing, which is in the possession of the opposite party is required to be given in evidence, notice to produce the original must be given to him, or, as is more proper, to his attorney. 2 Phil. Ev. 10th ed. p. 525. If the instrument is in the possession of the adverse party, before secondary evidence of its contents can be admitted it must be shown that he has received notice to produce it. Id. p. 519. In certain cases, although the instrument which is required is not in the possession of the party to the suit, but in the possession of a third person, yet, if there is a privity between such third person and the party, or if the instrument may be considered as under the control of the party, it is deemed to be virtually in his possession; and therefore a notice to produce it, given to the party himself, will, in such cases, be sufficient. Id. pp. 521, 522. In general it may be said that the fact of agency cannot be proved by parol while the written evidence of it exists; M'Kinney v. Leacock, 1 Serg. & R. 27; James v. Gordon, 1 Wash. C. C. 333; May v. May, 1 Porter (Ala.) 229; nor can the declarations and acts of a man be given in evidence to prove that he is the agent of another. Plumsted v. Rudebagh, 1 Yeates, 502; James v. Stookey, 1 Wash. C. C. 330; Whiting v. Lake, 91 Pa. 349; Owen v. Evans, 40 Legal Int. 26. It does not follow that on notice being given, | in the syllabus, that it would have been so even the party is compellable to give evidence against without notice to the attorney, must be confined himself; or that, if he refuses to produce the to the agent and not to the principal, as to paper required, such a circumstance is con- whom notice is not dispensed with. sidered as conclusive against him; but the consequence will be that the other party, who has done all in his power to supply the best evidence, will be allowed to go into evidence of an inferior kind, and may read an examined copy, or give parol evidence of the contents. Without proof of notice to the opposite party to produce the original writing, which is in his possession, secondary evidence of its contents cannot, in general, be given. This rule has been made with good reason, that parties may obtain the best evidence in their power. When it is traced to the hands of the opposite party, no further evidence can be given of it, without a notice to produce. Id. pp. 525, 526. These are the elementary rules. The application of them in the myriad of reported cases shows no material deviation from them. Where a paper was traced to the hands of an agent of a party, and notice had been given to produce it, and the party showed that it had been delivered by the agent to the stamp officer to have it stamped, the other party was allowed to give parol evidence of its contents. Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1 Carr. & P. 582. It will be observed that in this case notice to produce the paper had been given; and it appearing that the notice had not been served in time, the matter was disposed of on that ground. If a check drawn by a party to a cause is proved to be in the hands of his banker (having been paid), the other party may call for it under a notice to produce; and he need not call the banker's clerk. Burton v. Payne, 2 Carr & P. 520. And a paper deposited in a court of equity by a party who has leave to withdraw it is sufficiently under his control and power to let in secondary evidence of its contents, after notice and refusal to produce it. Rush v Peacock, 2 Moody & Rob. 162; Jackson v. Shearman*, 6 Johns. 19; but it is otherwise if the document is held by a stakeholder between the party in the cause and a third person. Perry v. Mays, 1 Hill (S. C.) 76. Where it appeared that the muniments of the plaintiff's title were in the hands of his counsel at a former trial, it was held that the conclusion was that he could have produced them if he had pleased; and notice to produce the papers having been served a reasonable time beforehand, it was further held that the defendant had done all that the law required of him to entitle him to give secondary evidence of the execution and contents of the papers. M'Kellip v. M'Ilhenny, 4 Watts, 317. It will be observed that in that case the court said that the defendant, by giving the notice to produce, had done all that the law required of him; from which the converse may be fairly deduced: that if he had not given the notice, he had not done all that the law required of him before offering secondary evidence. To the same effect is Irwin v. Lever, 2 Foster & F. 296. The semble which the reporters put *See digested citations at end of case, Lawyers' edition. [Ed.] There are, however, some exceptions to this; as, for instance, when the defendant alleged that he had settled with the agent, who was also the wife of the plaintiff, and offered a witness to prove that he saw the power of attorney and what its contents were, it was held that while the defendant must produce the writing or give notice to produce it, so as to entitle him to give secondary evidence of its contents, yet he might give evidence of the plaintiff's admission that he had given the power: Curtis v. Ingham, 2 Vt. 289; and this without previous notice to produce it; but as to this last, the learned annotator to 1 Phillipps on Evidence puts a query on page 515, note 143; and so where it is plain that the notice would have been unavailing, as in the case where it is proved that the power of attorney has been destroyed by fire, in that case the person to whom the power was given was admitted to prove its contents; Jackson v. Neely, 10 Johns. 374; Cornett [Nash] v. Williams, 20 Wall. 226 [87 U. S. bk. 22, L. ed. 254]; and also where the paper is proved to be lost or destroyed: Fox v. Wood, 1 Rawle, 143; Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 125 [87 U. S. bk. 22, L. ed. 299]; but the loss of the power of attorney must be first proved, before receiving secondary evidence of the declarations of the principal as to its contents. De Haven v. Henderson, 1 Dall. 424 [1 U. S. bk. 1, L. ed. 206]; Vanhorn v. Frick, 3 Serg. & R. 278. The statement in Burton v. Driggs, supra (that if books or papers, necessary as evidence, be in the possession of a person living in another State, secondary evidence may be given to prove the contents of such papers, and that notice to produce them is unnecessary), must be confined to cases like that, in which the books and papers were in the hands of a third person, who was not subject to the control of the opposite party; in which case notice would be useless, and of which books and papers the evidence offered was a copy of a lost deposition which proved the contents thereof. In this State the rule has always been strictly adhered to; and if a party desires to prove the contents of a paper which is in the hands of his adversary, notice to produce it must be given. Alexander v. Coulter, 2 Serg. & R. 494; Eilbert v. Finkbeiner, 68 Pa. 243. But to this there are some exceptions, as in trover, replevin and detinue, and other actions directly upon the paper, the plaintiff may give parol evidence of its contents, without giving notice to produce the paper, because the form of the action gives all the notice that is required. M'Clean v. Hertzog, 6 Serg. & R. 154. And so it is in England; Hammond v. Plank, Peake's Add. Cas. 90; Scott v. Jones, 4 Taunt. | by requiring its production, on notice, or proof 865; How v. Hall, 14 East, 274; Bucher v. Jar- under a commission, before receiving secondratt, 3 Bos. & Pull. 143; and against a carrier ary evidence of its contents, is to save the party for the nondelivery of written instruments: to be affected by it from a parti-colored account Jolley v. Taylor, 1 Čamp. N. P. 143; and so on of the paper, when better evidence can be had. an indictment for stealing a bill no obligatory Dwyer v. Collins, 7 Exch. 639. proof of its contents may be given without notice to produce, differing in this respect from the English rule. Commonwealth v. Messinger, 1 Binn. 273. And on an indictment for forging bank notes, parol evidence of letters received by the defendant from an accomplice may be given without a notice to produce them; U. S. v. Doebler, 1 Baldw. 519; because otherwise guilty persons might escape, as it is not in the power of the Government to withdraw the case from the jury and put the defendant in jeopardy a second time. Where the party to be affected by a letter is a merchant, it will be presumed that he kept a letter book, which would have afforded better evidence than mere parol proof of the contents of the letter; therefore, when sufficient notice to produce the letter book has not been given, an extract from a lost letter cannot be given in evidence. Dennis v. Barber, 6 Serg. & R. 420; Coxe v. England, 65 Pa. 212. The present is a case in which the wisdom and justice of the rule are so plain that they cannot be gainsaid. The defendant is in Spain, where he resides. His case here is defended by his counsel, who is without a client to advise or witnesses to assist him. He can do nothing but look on and see that his client is condemned on legal evidence only, and to prevent the reception of any evidence which is improper. If, as the plaintiff alleges, the son of the defendant was also his agent, his counsel was entitled to reasonable notice to produce the letter which is said to have been written, but not proved to be lost, which vitally affects the case, and which is potentially in his possession or control; and of which he may be presumed to have a copy which he could have produced, in case he could not get the original; otherwise, he might be overwhelmed by what Mr. Justice Woodward, in Ellis v. Guggenheim, 20 Pa. 287, called the "compendious criticism" of a witness, himself an interested party, who would give his interpretation of the letter, rather than its contents. The question whether proof that a paper is out of the State will, alone, be a sufficient foundation for secondary evidence of its contents, without further efforts to obtain it, has been decided in the negative in Connecticut and Louisiana. Townsend v. Atwater, 5 Day (Conn.) 298; Lewis v. Beatty, 8 Martin (La.) N. S. 287. In Kentucky secondary evidence of a paper proved to be out of the State was admitted, the court likening the case to that of a subscribing witness who is absent from the State. The fact that there was such a paper came out on cross examination; and the question whether notice to produce it was required was not moot-ims that one agent cannot lawfully appoint aned. Boone v. Dyke, 3 T. B. Mon. 532. In New York a paper so situated is allowed to be proved on a commission, without requiring it to be produced in court. Bailey v. Johnson, 9 Cow. 115. In South Carolina a party offered parol evidence of a paper which was in the hands of his agent, who had gone to another State; and it was held inadmissible, because no commission had been sent to examine the agent or ascertain what had become of the paper, and there was, besides, some reason for suspecting a design to suppress it. The question whether notice to produce was necessary did not arise, as the evidence was offered by the principal; but the judgment is important in this respect, it attributes the suppression of the paper to the principal, because it was presumed to be in his control; and if the other party had offered the evidence, it would have been admitted, provided notice to produce it had been given. Bunch v. Hurst, 3 Desau. Eq. 290. See also, as to whom the consequence of the suppression of a paper is to be imputed, Hart v. Yunt, 1 Watts, 253. In this State a deposition which went to prove the contents of a paper was rejected, because it was not shown that the paper was unattainable. M'Kee v. Reiff, 4 Yeates, 340. The great desire of the court in insisting upon the best evidence of the contents of a paper, The letters of April 13, and May 13, 1882, do not prove that the defendant's son was his general agent. They merely show that the defendant authorized his son to sell the iron ore on a commission fixed by the letters. It seems too plain to require any citation of authority to show that an agent authorized to sell on a commission is not a general agent, and that he has no power to employ other agents under him at the expense of his principal; nevertheless, if authority be wanted, the principle may be found in the max other in his place, for a delegated authority cannot be redelegated; Broom, Legal Maxims, *839-40; and the application of the principle may be found in Hill v. Canfield, 63 Pa. 77. If the agent does employ another, he is responsible for the acts of his substitute or assistant; Bradstreet v. Everson, 72 Pa. 124; Morgan v. Tener, 3 W. N. C. 398; and consequently liable for his compensation. The commissions agreed to be paid include all that the principal is liable for, and they cannot be increased without his consent; Freeman v. Shreve, 86 Pa. 135; otherwise he might be called upon to pay away the entire proceeds of his property to a succession of brokers not selected by himself, but depending upon each other for authority. The letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, dated February 4, 1882, is simply an expression of thanks for the kindness of the plaintiff to the defendant's son, and the solicitude of the father for the welfare of his son. It contains nothing of a contractual nature, nor any admission that the son was invested with unlimited authority to bind his father. If such letters are to be perverted so as to raise an obligation to pay for the amenities of life, the writing of letters of courtesy and interchanges of civility must cease, unless they are accompanied with a protest that they are not intended as an acknowledgment of a liability to pay for the amenities bestowed, and are concluded with a nota bene that they | I do not speak to him (particularly on business), are sent "without prejudice.' As there is nothing in the evidence to prove that Tomas Campoy, Jr., was the general agent of the defendant, the claim of the plaintiff lacks this material prop to support it, and the jury were properly instructed to render a verdict for the defendant. The following are the letters of April 13, May 13, and February 4, 1882, heretofore referred to, written by Tomas Campoy y Pardo to his son: Translations of inclosures in letter of Tomas Campoy y Pardo to his son, dated Portman, April 13, 1882. Private. "Tomas, the business that you do with Mares, I cannot give more than what I tell you both in the letter, on account of furnishing you superior ore; but if the offer which I sent you is accepted by a good house, whether it be for the whole amount which I say or for one half of it, you may count on it that I will give you for commission five cents per ton and besides five cents per unit gained over 50 per cent. You see this is half of the profits for you, and the other half for me. Keep all this to your self; and whenever those conditions are accepted you must rely on what I said. Now try to do business; but the most important is to deal with good houses. Tomas, be careful of what you are doing on account of your being there. All parties here have contracts for minerals except myself. Preparing for your transactions I have accumulated stocks, but am in need of funds; tell me how much money you have received this year from Messrs. Holloway Bros. Make Mares, if you both want me to send some cargoes besides the one I am going to send, remit drafts on Barcelona on signing bills of lading. If not I cannot send you any more than the one cargo. Your brothers-in-law all have gone away, as they consider it humiliating to stay with me earning a salary. If the contract is accepted, telegraph me. Tomas, I approve with pleasure your arrangements with Mr. Mares, and you may rest easy that if you have little business and I make any contract with Earnshaw direct, I will write him, particularly if I obtain two reals more per ton, and will tell him what he has to give you apart of what I give you both for commission. You will understand that the letter will be in a form to be presented to Mr. Mares and Earnshaw. It is convenient to hurry, stirring up business for next year, but in some way not showing great audacity." "Portman, May 13, 1882. "Dear Son: I have received yours of the 25, April, and I am informed of its contents, seeing that you are well, and, thank God, we are the same at present. Tomas, what you tell me, referring to business, that you have formed a partnership with Mr. Mares, is all right; and it is necessary that you notify me in time if at any time you should make any contracts that any document that you should require to be sent, whether it is to be named or entitled Campoy & Mares or Mares & Campoy, for me to have an understanding of all the business. In reference to what you say, that I must speak to Bapata, to ask him to fix a commission for you. I as you know how mean he is; and in this bad season that I am passing through, he has injured somewhat my business; still I have sent him word through his nephew. What you ought to do is to address him a letter, as though you had not heard from me, saying that on account of having formed a copartnership with a gentleman of that place (without telling him who he is), that it is necessary for him to fix a commission, as otherwise you will not be able to attend to his business; but I must warn you that when he replies to you or to Mr. Mares, with the purpose of doing business direct with you both, and you should accept some contract, I would withdraw my connection with you immediately, because you know as well as I do that he would establish opposition to me at the mines. To make the business a success it would be convenient that you both should take hold of all the foundries possible, as I have most of the mines and animals necessary. You had better tell this to Mr. Mares, for him to bear in mind all these convenient particulars, because these indications are the principal bases to obtain good minerals, which could not be done without several parties. Your question about what commission I will give you both, I have told you on several occasions that for both to have a success I cannot give you the minerals at less than thirtyfour reals per ton, alongside of vessels; and with that idea I have closed for two years the Escondrigo, which is the best of the mines, as you know very well that it costs there fifteen reals per ton, fifteen reals transportation and four reals shipment. I have no other advantages than the proximity of the mines and what I may earn in shipments and advances in dispatch money, as I have established four gangs, and when the opportunity is offered I can ship 600 tons or more in a working day, and you can make the difference in price, besides half of the percentage gained over 50% and half of the dispatch money as this is the custom here. Do not Jew me down too much in the arrangements, as you know that this would prevent me from procuring good minerals, and the prejudice would be against me and you also. Above all, do not be ambitious, because to become rich does not require haste. Do not forget in making contracts that the moisture is to be deducted from the weight and not from the units. Nothing else at present. Our compliments to Mr. Mares, and love for you from all the family. Your Father, "My Dear Sir: Tomas Campoy." February 4, 1882. I received yours dated January 11, by which I see with pleasure the pleasant relations which my son has together with yourself; because, as you may understand, my desire is that he avail himself of friends that will not deceive him, and will advise him and guide him in what he is ignorant of; consequently your assurance has filled me with satisfaction. With respect to what you tell me with regard to business, my object in sending him there has been solely for that purpose, and the only thing that delays me in pushing this business is the waiting till he is acquainted with the language and cus |