1. Bouv. Law Dict.

"The proper signification of the word 'company,' when applied to persons engaged in trade, denotes those united for the same purpose or in a joint concern. It is so commonly used in this sense, or as indicating a partnership, that few persons accustomed to purchase goods at shops where they are sold by retail would misapprehend that such was its meaning." Palmer v. Pinkham, 33 Me. 52.

An unincorporated company is "an association of individuals not forming a corporation, but carrying on business under a corporate name, and having certain qualities resembling those of incorporated companies." Rap. & Lawr. Law Dict.

A club is not a company within wind ing-up acts. In re St. James's Club, 16 Jur. 1075.

Incorporated Company in an embezzlement act was held to mean one composed of individuals associated together for private purposes. Coats v. People, 22

N. Y. 245.

Joint-stock Company and "corporation organized under general laws" are convertible terms in Massachusetts legislation. Atty.-Gen. v. Merc. Ins. Co., 121 Mass. 524.

Manufacturing Company.-One which makes goods and wares from raw materials. A company which makes castings and machinery from melted pig and old iron is not an "iron-manufacturing company." The iron is manufactured before the castings are made. People v. Holdridge, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 511.

An aqueduct company whose business it is to distribute water is not a manufacturing company. Dudley v. Aqueduct Corp., 100 Mass. 185.

Persons Composing the Company, in an act making such liable to the extent of their respective shares of stock for the debts of the company, are all persons who own stock. Rosevelt v. Brown, II N. Y. 148.

Said Company.-A bond of indemnity given to the trustees of an incorporated insurance company, conditioned for the good conduct of a clerk while in the service of the said company, remains in force as long as the clerk serves the company, although there are changes among the individuals composing the company. It is otherwise in an ordinary partnership. Metcalf v. Bruin, 2 Camp. 422.

In an act incorporating a dock company the phrase "the dock or wharf now owned by the said company" must be construed to mean by the individuals composing the said company. Steamboat Co. v. Transportation Co., 3 C. E. Gr. (N. J.) 13, 511.

Ship's Company or crew does not include a mere passenger. U. S. v. Libby, 1 W. & M. (C. C.) 221.

The Company-Where a person delivered a message to a telegraph company to be sent to a point beyond its terminus, and the company sent the message to its terminus, where it was delivered for transmission to another company, and upon the blank upon which the message was written there was a stipulation that "this company" would not be responsible for error or delay of any other company, and limiting the liability of "the company," held, in a suit against the second company, that "the company" meant the first company, and the limitation did not extend to the second. Squire v. W. U. Tel. Co., 98 Mass. 232.

Trading or Other Public Company does not include a private partnership. In re Griffith, 12 Ch. Div. 655.

Transportation Company.-A company engaged in the removal of petroleum from place to place by means of pipes is a transportation company within a tax act. Columbia Conduit Co. v. Com., 90 Pa. St. 307.

Turnpike Company in a tax law includes a plank-road company. State v. Haight,

tory Neg., pp. 82 and 83, note 4, and 55 Am. Dec., note p. 671, for reference to other cases.

1. In the case of C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 512; s. c., 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 225, 232, the supreme court of Illinois clearly and unequivocally state this doctrine, and define the legal meaning of the terms slight, ordinary, and gross negligence, saying: "In holding the plaintiff may recover in an action for negligence, notwithstanding he has been guilty of contributive negligence, where his negligence is but slight, and that of the defendant gross in comparison with each other, it must, of course, be understood that the terms slight negligence' and 'gross negligence' are used in their legal sense, as defined by common-law judges and text writers, for otherwise the terms would convey no idea of a definite legal rule. As defined by those judges and writers, these terms express the extremes of negligence. Beyond gross, or less than slight, there is no degree of negligence. 'Gross gross,' 'grosser gross, and 'grossest gross,' and 'slight slight,' 'slighter slight,' and 'slightest slight,' are absurd and, in a legal sense, impossible terms. What is less than slight negligence the law takes no cognizance of as a ground of action; and beyond gross negligence the law, while recognizing that there may be liability for a trespass because of a particular intention to do wrong, or of a degree of wilful and wanton recklessness which authorizes the presumption of a general intention to do wrong, recognizes no degree of negligence. The definition of gross negli gence itself proves that it is not intended to be the subject of comparison. It is the want of slight diligence.' Slight negligence is 'the want of great diligence,' and intermediate there is ordinary negligence, which is defined to be 'the want of ordinary diligence.' The court then cites Story on Bailments, $17; Shearman & Redfield on Neg. (2d Ed.) $ 16, 17; Cooley on Torts, 631; Central Military Tract R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541; and a little further on

say: "The word 'diligence,' as used in the definitions of the degrees of negligence to which we have referred, is synonymous with 'care.' This is shown by the text in Story immediately following the definitions quoted. It is there said: 'For he who is only less diligent than very careful men cannot be said to be more than slightly inattentive; he who omits ordinary care is a little more negligent than men ordinarily are; and he who omits even slight diligence fails in the lowest degree of prudence, and is deemed grossly negligent."" By many Illinois lawyers the doctrines of the Johnson case were looked upon as revolutionizing, if not abandoning, the rule of comparative negligence as previously understood and declared by the supreme court. Gilbert, Railroads and the Courts, 127-138. And Mr.. Justice Dickey, while concurring in the result arrived at in the Johnson case, dissented from the reasoning of the court, and insisted that the terms slight,' 'ordinary," and "gross" negligence should have their popular meaning, and that they had been so used in the Jacobs case (20 Ill. 478), in which the rule of comparative negligence was first enunciated. 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 235; s. c., 103 Ill. 512. But notwithstanding the criticisms to which it has been subjected, the Johnson case has been several times approved and followed in subsequent cases, and the rules laid down therein seem in harmony with the better considered cases in Illinois. Rockford, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 196; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 308; City of Chicago v. Stearns, 105 Ill. 557; s. c., 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 594; C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harwood, 90 Ill. 427; I. C. R. Co. v. Hammer, 72 Ill. 351; E. St. L. P. & P. Co. v. Hightower, 92 Ill. 141.

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2. The terms slight' and 'gross' negligence, when used in an instruction, do not sufficiently institute the comparison required to be made. The decision in the Johnson case, 103 Ill. 512, was not intended to eliminate from the doctrine of comparative negligence the very element that makes it available to the plaintiff, where both parties have been

guilty of negligence contributing to the injury, the relative degree of guilt of the respective parties,-as it has in subsequent cases been recognized, defined, and upheld as still existing under the same limitations as before the Johnson case was decided." City of Chicago v. Stearns, 105 Ill. 554; s. c., 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 594.

An instruction which requires the jury to find whether the negligence of the plaintiff was slight and that of the defendant gross, but does not require the jury to compare the negligence of the parties, and determine from such comparison whether the one is slight and the other gross, is erroneous. Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Dillon, 17 Bradw. (Ill.) 355.

"The jury must be told that to authorize a recovery it must appear from the evidence that the negligence of the plaintiff is slight,' and that of the defendant 'gross,' in comparison with each other." C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harwood, So Ill. 88; s. c., go Ill. 427. And there are many other cases enunciating the same doctrine, among which are: St. L. & T. H. R. Co. v. Manly, 58 Ill. 306; I. C. R. Co. v. Goddard, 72 Ill. 568; R., R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 308; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Van Patten, 64 Ill. 510; T., W. & W. R. Co. v. Spencer, 66 Ill. 528; I. C. R. Co. v. Hall, 72 Ill. 225; C. & N. W. R. Co. v. Dimick, 96 Ill. 42. Perhaps the very clearest statement of this qualification is in the Johnson case (8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 233), where it is said: "In applying the measure of slight and gross negligence to the acts of the respective parties charged to have been negligent, it is of course always to be held in remembrance that the term 'negligence' is itself relative, and its application depends on the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose.' Cooley on Torts, 630. The question therefore, in the present instance, related to the measure of care, 3 C. of L.-24.

under the circumstances shown by the evidence to have existed, imposed upon the respective parties. It was to that measure of care that these instructions related, and if they had related to any other, they would, for that cause alone, have been erroneous.

1. "Surely it needs no demonstration that if, as to a particular act, the negli gence of the plaintiff was ordinary, and that of the defendant gross, their relation is not changed by comparing them with each other. The same evidence that determines the one is gross and the other ordinary, fixes their relative degrees with reference to each other." C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 512; s. c., 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 234.

2. Assuming the terms "slight" and "gross" negligence to have been used in the Jacobs case, 20 Ill. 478, in their legal sense, that case, which was the first declaration of the law of comparative negligence, was also the first case to lay down the limitations governing the plaintiff's right of recovery where the law of comparative negligence prevails. In that case it was said: "We say, then, that in this, as in all like cases, the degrees of negligence must be measured and considered, and wherever it shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight, and that of the defendant gross, he shall not be deprived of his action. 20 Ill. 496, 497. But whatever may have been the meaning of "slight" and gross" negligence in the Jacobs case, a long line of recent Illinois cases, including the latest, fully support the text. Even though the plaintiff is guilty of only slight negligence, he cannot recover unless defendant's negligence is gross, or the injury is wanton or wilful." Winchester v. Case, 5 Bradw. (Ill.) 486. And he cannot recover when his negligence is ordinary, and that of the defendant only gross, and not wilful. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hetherington, 83 Ill. 510; Earlville v. Carter, 6 Bradw. (Ill.) 421.

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