in securing fullest protection, that policy should not be extended by judicial amendment. Ita lex scripta est. Furthermore, as the welfare of the former Indian ward has with his putting on the robe of citizenship ceased to be the peculiar concern of the national government and the restrictions on alienation go along with his investiture of title in severalty, all being uno flatu in the scheme of tribal dissolution, for whose benefit besides that of the Indian, in a public way, is tais governmental plan? It would seem folly to say it was intended more for the benefit of the country at large than for the particular benefit of the state of the Indian's domicile. If so, then the "high and delicate trust" the United States claims to have been vested ment, law or otherwise, which it would have been competent to inake if this act had never been passed." These words seem badly chosen and too sweeping, but we imagine that an Indian that is a full-fledged citizen cannot be generally legislated about, as a person, differently than a white man or a negro. And we further imagine, that his title in allotted land, whatever its character, cannot be taken away from him any more than can any vested right, by any legislative enactment. But let construction go to the uttermost sweep of this proviso and still it should not carry the nation into the state, for the limitless future, as a sort of foreign guardian of its free residents. Nothing should pass by intendment in creating a role for the national government that is with was transferred to the sovereign inherently opposed to state sovereignty. state of Oklahoma. When the tribes and the government determined on such restrictions all were presumed to know that a state is the only competent parens patriae (if there is any) of the citizen as to his property rights and that "the high and delicate trust" would pass from the national government when the territory wherein it was made becomes a state. And this the government seems to recognize in the enabling act for the formation of the state of Oklahoma. But it would require considerable distortion of intent to say, that the proviso in that act carried the United States into the state as a parens patriae for the Indian and thus generally qualified his allegiance and the duties owing to him differently from other citi zens. Here is the language of the proviso: "Provided, that nothing contained in the said constitution shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of persons or property pertaining to the Indians of said territories (so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished), or to limit or affect the authority of the government of the United States to make any law or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, property or other rights by treaties, agree Judge Adams speaks of this decision creating a new head in equity jurisprudence, to which the Debs case not only gives no support, but inferentially condemns. We think, too, he clinches the. reason for his dissent by showing that express legislation requires that in an individual case the Indian grantor must be made a party. In a suit involving two, three or four, ought grantors to be made parties? If the answer be yes, then in its final analysis, jurisdiction of each of these bills depends on the fact that it is against thousands of grantors. But why should the rights of grantors be thus affected, if they have a substantial interest in grantees being brought into court? They have an interest in obtaining affirmative relief, against such grantees, unless these quasi-minors are favored beyond all other people of whom we have any possible conception. As we interpret what Judge Adams says about the federal government interposing as it has in this matter, a court, that is a long distance from the scene, should ask itself whether or not it is advantageous for these Indian citizens to be treated as if they were wholly irresponsible. It is reasonably sure that, if the state courts of Oklahoma are going to deal justly with this class of its citizens, such interposition as has been countenanced is injurious. If their rights, acquired through laws of the United States, are ever invaded by these state courts, a greater tribunal than the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is their sure refuge. NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS AS COURTS CLASSIFYING DICTA THOSE JUDICIAL AND THOSE MERELY OBITER.-When we ascertain that an announcement is made in an opinion that is not necessary to the decision of a question before a court, its utterances ought not even to bind its particular author and much less the tribunal of which he is a member. But this rule has, according to an opinion handed down by the Supreme Court of Vermont its qualificaThat tion. Derosia v. Firland, 76 Atl. 153. opinion says: "Perhaps it cannot be said that the court's statement of the law respecting the right of a party to terminate a contract of hiring, and the resulting liability, was essential to that disposition, yet it was an expression of opinion upon a point argued by counsel and deliberately passed upon by the court; and if it is a dictum, it is a judicial dictum as distinguished from a mere obiter dictum; i. e., an expression originating alone with the judge who writes the opinion, as an argument or illustration. (Rhoads v. Chicago & A. R., 227 Ill. 328, 81 N. E. 371, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623, 10 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 111; Brown v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 102 Wis. 137, 77 N. W. 748, 78 N. W. 771, 44 L. R. A. 579.)" The above distinction is thus expressed in Anderson's Law Dictionary, but, after all, the inference is far from clear that judicial dicta should be classed with binding precedents. That counsel argue certain propositions is not a very satisfactory test. They are supposed to survey the entire horizon of possibilities and to claim results their way both positively and in the alternative of some of their contentions not being accepted. In common parlance no advocate places, unless he has to, all of his eggs in one basket. This thing of an opinion setting forth sever al propositions, either of which standing alone justifies a court's judgment has the potentiality of much confusion-especially when a majority ruling is only attained by some member or members, concurring in the result or concurring specially. It may be that the confusion is a little cleared up by concurrence specifically, but it takes some tediousness of attention to separate the wheat from the chaff. We have noticed in some decisions where paragraphs are assented to and some dissented from, and a case may be decided a certain way with no particular proposition receiving the assent of a majority of the court. It were better to file no opinion at all in a case like that. Lately we noticed a case at page 417 of 70 Cent. L. J., where the opinion went outside of the briefs altogether and, planting itself upon a general ground, remarked, somewhat incidentally, on a purely special feature in the case, sufficient to control the conclusion that was reached. The general ground we thought untenable, and the court admitted it stood quite alone in the view it had taken. Giving a good reason, that pertains particularly to a case before the court, for a conclusion that it reached ought to be sufficient, and no general principle ought to be announced in any case unless the case demands it, and we rather think that where a court is well satisfied with one reason it does not care to explore for others. When, however, it does not feel sure of its ground, it wishes to save itself by relying on something else. In that way we obtain a large grist of indifferently written opinions. Some judges appear to delight in killing a contention and skinning it too. DIVORCE NECESSITY OF CURING DEED BY WOMAN WHERE HER DIVORCE IS NOT RECOGNIZED WHERE LAND LIES.An aftermath of the Haddock case is found in the case of Blondin v. Brooks, 76 Atl. 184, decided by Vermont Supreme Court. Blondin brought suit to quiet title, claiming under a quit-claim deed from Mary E. Chennette. Mrs. Chennette failing to obtain a divorce in Vermont went to New Mexico, living on a ranch with her brother-in-law and sister some eighteen months, obtaining during said period a divorce from a New Mexico court, her husband remaining at the Vermont domicile. Very soon after the divorce was obtained she returned to Vermont and later executed the deed under which complainant claims. The Vermont court finding that the New Mexico decree was obtained by fraud, the New Mexico court being cheated by the claim of bona fide residence, says such a decree being baseless for want of jurisdiction "will not be recognized abroad on any ground, not even that of comity, which is not a rule of law, and, therefore, does not command, but only persuades, and fraud does not persuade but discourages.” It was also held that it was competent for defendants who were strangers to impeach such a decree collaterally, as it affected their interests. All these questions were said to be open to evidence aliunde because, as by the Haddock case, the decree was not protected by the faith and credit clause of the federal constitution, even though the decree might be recognized in New Mexico. But the case was sent back with directions to bring in the husband's renunciation, which by ruling of the trial court had been kept out "and when it is brought in to enter a decree according to the prayer of the will." CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY OF A CHECK AND PROOF OF VALUE.-In State v. Hinton, 109 Pac. 24, the Oregon Supreme Court seems to have about declared that a presumption may be based upon another presumption in the proof of a necessary fact to the establishing of guilt. It needs no great citation of authority to show that this is not allowable, but for a recent holding on this subject, see State v. Jacobs, 134 Mo. App. 182, 113 S. W. 244. The proof in the Hinton case shows that defendant was charged under Oregon statute which declares that if any person shall steal a bill of exchange or other thing in action he shall be deemed guilty of larceny and upon conviction thereof, if the property stolen shall exceed in value $35, the crime shall be a felony, and under that a misdemeanor. The check alleged to have been stolen was for $60.50. The opinion says: "There was no direct evidence that Sterritt (the drawer) had any money to his credit, subject to check in the First National Bank of Heffner, but it appears he had received value to the amount of the face of the check, and until something to the contrary is shown it must be presumed that private transactions are fair and regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been followed. It is not usual or customary for people to give checks upon banks for the payment of money, unless they have the amount thereof to their credit, or have made some special arrangements for credit, against which they may draw. Although no i money may have been in the bank to the credit of the drawer, still the check represents to the payee, from whom it was taken, a chose in action to the amount of its face, for upon its dishonor the holder has his recourse upon the maker to recover the amount of the consideration of the check. It also appears from the defendant's testimony that after he had obtained possession of the check he transferred it to a third party, receiving therefor $50.50 in money and a credit of $10 on his account, thereby evidencing that it possessed that much value in defendant's hands." We hardly remember to have seen so much disregard for a logical technical cause of proof as is here exhibited. Everything is assumed against the defendant, and nothing exhibits this more clearly than the final sentence in the above extract. The exact course taken in disposing of the check would have been taken had it been actually worthless. The inference upon inference in the preceding sentences seems too clear for discussion-even going to the length of allowing the jury to convict had it been shown that the check would not have been honored if presented-upon the presumption that the drawer was financially responsible. The court should have held that no jury would have had the right to say, upon such evidence, that guilt was shown beyond a reasonable doubt. At common law the rule was strict that value must be proved in larceny, and no code system mitigates this when felony depends upon amount. In Wigginton v. Com. (Ky.), 114 S. W. 1185, and Close v. State (Tex. Civ. R.), 117 S. W. 137, show the strictest regularity in proof is required to show grand larceny. In this case certificates of stock were sold in open market, and there was nothing on their face to indicate that the stock was not fully paid, but in fact they were not fully paid for. The court says: "Whatever may be the rule in sister jurisdictions, and We are referred to cases therefrom holding transferee takes them free from any liability for calls for assessments, this is not the rule obtaining in this state." Such certificates are held not to be negotiable securities, and they are held to be subject to assessment for subscription calls. Further, it is said the transferee becomes subject to all the liabilities and obligations of the transferrer respecting the stock. In other words, as we understand the ruling, a transferee stands like a vendee of land expressly assuming a mortgage, but the transferrer is not necessarily released. In Illinois it has been ruled that the transferee becomes thus liable where he has notice of the facts. Moore v. U. S. One Stave Barrel Co., 141 Ill. App. 104; affirmed, 87 N. E. 536. A transferrer has been held to remain liable for unpaid part of subscription, though transferee becomes also liable. McRim v. Glenn, 66 Md. 479, 8 Atl. 130; Hambleton v. Glenn, 72 Md. 331; 20 Atl. 115; Hamilton v. Glenn, 85 Va. 901, 9 S. E. 129. It has also been held that personal liability Messersmith does not accrue to transferee. v. Sharon Law Bk., 96 Pa. St. 440. But he may expressly assume such. Citizens & Miners' Bank v. Gillespie, 115 Pa. 564. LIBEL AND SLANDER-WORDS LIBELOUS PER SE.-In Cole v. Milspaugh, 126 N. W. 626, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the question whether it was libellous and actionable per se to write of a clergyman an applicant for a pulpit: "I would not have anything to do with him or touch him with a ten foot pole." The complainant alleges that these words were written by the defendant maliciously to the members of a committee to prevent their recommending plaintiff's appointment. The court said: "We cannot avoid the conclusion that such a statement so made and emanating from a responsible scurce, might tend to expose a clergyman, situated as was the plaintiff, injury in to contempt and his profession. Therefore under the allegations of the complaint evidence might properly be received which would justify a jury in so finding." Mere "THE THIRD DEGREE"-AN ILLEGAL PROCEDURE. There has recently been much popular discussion of what is known as the "third degree" or "sweatbox" system of obtaining confessions from prisoners held for trial. There can be no room for doubt as to the illegality of this mode of procedure, and there appears likewise to be well nigh a consensus of opinion among fair-minded and intelligent persons that, from a moral and just viewpoint, it must be regarded as an evil that should be suppressed. I shall endeavor to give a statement of the law bearing upon the point in a form that, while fully accurate, may render it intelligible to the popular understanding. It may be premised, that there is nothing at all uncertain as to the law on the subject, and that there should be no trouble about coping with a situation that, if the accounts of the daily press are to be believed, has grown to the dimensions of a scandal. It is a maxim of our law, that every man is presumed innocent of crime. This presumption starts with the accusation and continues until the rendition of the verdict. This is no platitude, no bit of fine speech, designed for mere rhetorical use. It is based upon fundamental concepts of justice, and the provisions of the common law These words seem to us far from imputing designed to enforce its principle are, of all any crime to any one. They might mean almost anything or any number of things perfectly consistent with the moral character and professional reputation of a minister. malice in their employment does not give any certainty to their import, because those to whom publication is made would not for this take them in a different sense. The writer may not have considered him competent as an was not administrator of temporalities, or enamored of his style of preaching, or have thought his disposition was too aggressive or the reverse. The committee was gathering the concensus of opinion as to the kind of minister that would suit, and here was a mere slangy expression of opinion that the applicant was not suitable, when a judgment in this very thing was asked for. This action being somewhat technical in character, the presence of malice does not seem to meet the requirement of its being or not maintainable. the safeguards of the security and rights of the citizen, the most essential. To see these rights and this security habitually invaded and these laws constantly and openly violated by those charged with the active enforcement of law, is a spectacle and an example more degrading and demoralizing in its effects than all the violence and lawlessness of the criminal classes or the escape from conviction and punishment of scores of notorious offenders. It is not the law itself that is at fault. That is positive in its prohibitions and adequate in its sanctions. The care and providence of the law in this regard begin with the moment of arrest of the accused. It is an entire mistake to suppose that the law at any time places a prisoner at the mere mercy of the officer having him in custody, or that the officer has any powers or authority other than to secure the person of the accused, so as to prevent his escape. The common law is plain, clear and positive, that after arrest the accused must, without unreasonable or unnecessary delay, be brought before a magistrate for examination. The officer has no discretion either as to the time during which the prisoner is to be detained or as to the place of detention. In the absence of express statutory provision imprisonment must be in the common jail, and this custody must not be shifted or changed.3 There is no authority in law for holding a prisoner in a special lockup selected by the police for the convenience of "sweating" the accused. Such a detention amounts to a false imprisonment, indictable as a common-law misdemeanor.1 Every confinement of the person, unless it is in manner expressly authorized by law, is illegal and indictable, as well as the subject of an action for damages. The mere question of specific evil intent or wrongful motive is immaterial in this regard." In addition to this, here, as in all other cases of illegal restraint or imprisonment of the person, the courts are fully authorized to afford speedy release from improper confinement by means of the writ of habeas corpus. "Safe custody" and not punishment or needless hardship is the measure and criterion of the authority and powers to be exercised by peace officers in the matter of holding the accused for trial." It is to be further noted, that any physical force unlawfully used against a pris oner by his custodians amounts to assault and battery, and that any oppressive abuse of authority by a public officer of any grade or class is indictable at common law as malfeasance in office. In regard to the specific, matter of extorted confessions it may be observed, that in the just, wise and humane provisions of our common law there can be found remedy of efficacy adequate to meet this abuse. I am firmly convinced, that if the law on this subject, as embraced in clear decisions. of courts of the highest authority, be administered in a broad and liberal spirit, the followers of the gentle sport of "sweating" will find their occupation gone. The law is too well settled to admit of discussion or to require extended citation of authorities, that a confession extorted through any sort of duress or violence, or one procured in consequence of "inducements" held out to the accused, calculated to excite his temporal hopes or fears,10 is inadmissible in evidence. An inducement held out by or proceeding from a person in authority renders a confession following inadmissible, unless it is affirmatively shown, that the inducement did not take effect or had ceased to operate.11 "Person in authority," it may be briefly stated, means one engaged in or about the prosecution of the person charged or having any concern or interest that apparently authorizes him to interfere with the matter.12 An officer making the arrest is such a "person in authority":13 and it has been ruled, that the accused must not be entrapped by him into confessing, or even questioned, without being cautioned against criminating himself.14 This is but a sketch in barest outline of |