mon carrier shall also file with said Commission copies of all contracts, agreements, or arrangements with other common carriers in relation to any traffic affected by the provisions of this act to which it may be a party." The Act affords no warrant for the argument that it abrogates this contract. Even in England where the power of Parliament is supreme, the courts have ruled that the legislative intention to annul a contract should appear by express enactment or be necessarily required by the language of the act strictly construed. S. E. R. Co. v. R. Com'rs L. R., Queen's B. Div. 231. But the Ohio & Mississippi railway says, through the petitioner, "the act to regulate commerce has created a new right, and by claiming that I can absolve myself from the obligation of my contract, and compel those with whom I contracted to support me in my course and enter into new and different relations with me.' The answer is that the law does not authorize this to be done, and that the new right is not absolute, but in a measure conditional. Laws do not favor violations of contracts, but punish parties that break them. If it be said that the contract remains valid, but the defendant must submit to a breach of it and lose its benefits and resort to an action of damages for redress, that imputes to the law the paradox that the contract is valid, but binds no one, and a suit may be brought for the breach of an agreement that may be lawfully broken. If the contract is valid, as it clearly is, the direct and simple mode of dealing with it is to regard it as a satisfactory and valid objection to the demand of the Ohio & Mississippi rail way for a new traffic arrangement under different circumstances. It is not reasonable, pending this contract, which confessedly affords reasonable, proper, and equal facilities to all concerned, to sustain a demand for a different mode of interchange involving a necessity for other agreements, and to be followed by litigation to settle disputed rights. It was urged on the argument, and it is manifest, that though this proceeding is nominally for a through route over Through rates the petitioner's bridge, its ultimate object is for as object of through rates by that route. The pleadings do not proceeding. distinctly make an issue for a rate, and the evidence furnishes no íoundation for an order on that subiect. But the question has been brought into the discussion, it would seem, with the view of eliciting some ruling or expression with regard to the right to a through rate. And if the right to the route be allowed it may be difficult to distinguish the right to the rate. The argument that finds support for the one demand in the requirement for equal facilities, as an uncon ditional right, applies with great force to the other, if a through rate is to be construed as a facility under our statute. The English statute in terms enumerates through rates as one of the facilities to be afforded. But under the English statute the right to a route or rate, if objected to, must be determined by the Commission in view of its reasonable ness. The act provides that "if objection be made to the granting of the rate, or to the route, the Commissioners shall consider whether the granting of the rate is a due and reasonable facility in the interest of the public, and whether, having regard to the circumstances, the route proposed is a reasonable route, and shall allow or refuse the rate accordingly." The Commission in apportioning the through rates shall take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including any special expense incurred in respect of the construction, maintenance, and making of the route, or any part of the route, as well as any special charges which any company may have been entitled to make in respect thereof." Our statute contains no such enactments. But it is plain from the language of the third section in the clause requiring carriers to "afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities that authority to decide upon the reasonableness of the facility demanded, whether a route with interchanges, or a rate, is lodged somewhere, and is one of the powers conferred upon the Commission. And in determining the reasonableness of the facility demanded whatever ligitimately and lawfully affects the question is to be considered, as well as the corporate and physical power to comply. In view of the vast network of railways in this country and the great extent of territory traversed by them, the diversities that characterize the roads, their differences in length, and in cost of construction and operation, the character of traffic they carry, their financial condition, and many other things, it is obvious that very many considerations enter into the making of continous routes or joint through rates, and that the corporate and physical power of doing so is only one, and not the most important. As an illustration, if a line from the seaboard to Chicago, like the Pennsylvania line, should have a connection for through business, on joint rates to St. Paul, and the other six lines between Chicago and St. Paul should demand equal facilities, would the physical possibility of affording them alone control, or would the circumstances materially effecting the reasonableness of compliance be lawfully entitled to consideration? Chief Justice Waite states as the judgment of the Court in 110 U. S. Rep: 66 At common law a carrier is not bound to carry except on his own line, and we think it quite clear that if he contracts to go beyond he may, in the absence of statutory regulations to the contrary, determine for himself what agencies he will employ. His contract is equivalent to an extension of his line for the purposes of the contract, and if he holds himself out as a carrier beyond the line, so that he may be required to carry in that way for all alike, he may nevertheless confine himself in carrying to the particular route he chooses to use. He puts himself in no worse position by extending his route with the help of others than he would if the means of transportation were all his own. He certainly may select his own agencies and his own associates for doing his own business." How much of the rights thus declared remain under the "statutory regulations to the contrary" of the act to regulate commerce is an important question. If through rates are included in the equal facilities to be afforded the reasonableness of the mode of affording them would seem to remain. And in that respect considerations are involved of a like nature as in the interchange of traffic. In this case there is no refusal by the defendant of interchanges of traffic with the Ohio and Mississippi road, nor of a through rate upon the traffic interchanged. The contention is concerning the mode of interchange. The defendant insists that in view of its contract obligations and the other reasons given it should be done over the Louisville bridge and at its own yards and stations, where the defendant makes exchanges with other companies and "takes on and lets off passengers and property for others," and which "in the exercise of its legal discretion it located for its own convenience and that of the public. The demand in the behalf of the Ohio & Mississippi road is for a mode of interchange including a through rate, that the defendant deems unreasonable and unlawful. It appears that the interchanges have gone on without interruption for sixteen years, that the public has been adequately served, and that the defendant is willing and desirous to continue the same mode of conducting a through business which is in fact equal to all. The only reason given for changing this mode is that the Ohio and Mississippi road desires to use another bridge. The defendant has an equal right to use the bridge to which its depots and business facilities are adapted. This important fact, together with its large pecuniary interest in that bridge, and its contract relations to it, furnish reasonable and lawful grounds to support its position. Upon the question of interchanges with the Ohio & Mississippi road the order of the Commission should therefore be that the defendant's position is sustained. SCOFIELD et al. ข. LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN SOUTHERN R. Co. (Interstate Commerce Commission, July 19, 1888.) Interstate Commerce-Freight Rates-Carload Lots-Discrimination.— In an application by certain oil refiners, it appeared that a railroad company was in the habit of charging a rate on oil shipped in barrels in less than carload lots, which was twice as great as the charge upon oil shipped in carload lots. The evidence showed that when oil was shipped in carload lots, it went directly to its destination; that it was loaded by the shipper and unloaded by the consignor and consignee, that only one entry upon the bill of lading was made and that the time occupied in transportation was far less than in the case of shipments in less than carload quantities. When the shipment was made in less than carload quantities, a separate entry for each item had to be made upon the bill of lading and way bill; the shipment was by local freight trains, which stopped at every station for which there was freight, the freight was loaded and unloaded by the company, there were as many collections for charge of freight as there were different parcels, and the time occupied in transportation was usually two or three times as long as in the case of the carload shipments. It also appeared that it occupied the whole car, the material being such that no other could be carried along with it. It was also shown that there was a considerable element of danger in handling the oil in small lots,. such lots being unloaded by, the carrier and placed in the local station house, while carload lots were usually unloaded by the consignee at a distance from the depot building, and immediately removed from the companies' premises. Held, that in view of all the facts, the rate charged for the transportation of oil in less than carload lots was not unreasonable when compared with the rate for carload lots. Same-Tank Cars-Carload Lots in Barrels.-The evidence showed that the rate per barrel charged for oil when shipped in barrels in carload lots, was from one third to one fourth higher than the rate per barrel when shipped in bulk in tank-cars. It also appeared that when shipped to the West in barrels, stock-cars were used for which there was usually a return load, but when shipped in bulk in tank-cars there was no return Íoad upon Western shipments. It was shown that the largest number of barrels hauled in the tank-car was 96 barrels, and in the stock-car the number of barrels was only 61. In both cases the cars were loaded by the shipper and unloaded by the consignee. Held, that the rates as charged, operated unjustly in favor of shippers of oil in bulk in tank-cars, and that the carrier must in each case make the rate by weight, which should be by the 100 lbs. instead of by the barrel, the carrier of course charging for the weight of the barrel as part of the freight. Same-Haulage of Tank-Cars. The carrier may arrange with a shipper of oil that the latter shall furnish cars for the shipment at terms agreed upon between him and the carrier, but in doing so the carrier is charged with the duty of seeing at his peril that neither directly nor indirectly is a higher rate given to such shipper than to others who are engaged in the same business, who are dependent on the carrier for cars. Same--Tank Cars-Power of Commission.-Under the act to regulate Commerce, the Interstate Commerce Commission has not the power of directing a carrier to supply itself with an equipment of cars for the transportation of freight upon its line, and hence the commission has no authority to order a railroad company to furnish with tank-cars to shippers for transportation of oil. Same Car Rental-Reasonableness.-A rate of three fourths of one cent per mile for the rental of cars supplied by another than the carrier is a reasonable rate, such having been the rate in use for many years, and being generally charged by car furnishing companies. COMPLAINT by William C. Scofield, Daniel Shurmer, John Teagle, and Charles W. Scofield, partners under the firm name and style of Scofield, Shurmer and Teagle; James R. Timmins and Andrew R. Timmins, partners under the firm name and style of J. R. Timmins & Co.; Christian J. Wurwage, doing business under the name and style of The Manufacturers' Oil Co.; John W. Fawcett and Thomas F. Wright, partners under the name and style of J. W. Fawcett & Co.; Alfred Whitaker, doing business under the name and style of The Brooks Oil Co.; William F. Vliet, Willard L. Nutt and Martin P. Case, partners under the name and style of Vliet, Nutt & Co.; W. Carroll Lawrence, Felix Burgert, Henry. C. Meyers and August E. Schade, partners under the name and style of The Merchants' Oil Co.; The Excelsior Refining Co., a corporation organized under the laws of Ohio; The Globe Oil Co., a corporation organized under the laws of Ohio; The Cleveland Refining Co., a corporation organized under the laws of Ohio; Louis C. Carran, doing business under the name and style of L. C. Carran & Co., against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co., complaining of an unjust discrimination of rates in the transportation of oil. The question in issue appear in the opinion. Averments contained in BRAGG, C.-The complaint contains the following averments: That William C. Scofield, Daniel Shurmer, John Teagle, and Charles W. Scofield are partners under the name and style of Scofield, Shurmer complaint. and Teagle; that James R. Timmins and Andrew R. Timmins are partners under the name and style of James R. Timmins & Co.; that Christian J. Wurwage is doing business under the name and style of The Manufacturer's Oil Co.; that John W. Fawcett and Thomas F. Wright are part |