of Virginia. In Rhode Island, their force amounted to 6000 men, making a total of 17,000 men, under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, to co-operate with whom a powerful fleet rode at anchor, ready, at any moment, to transport his forces to any point which promised a successful attack. On the part of the Americans, the grand total of their armies did not exceed 16,000-3,000 under the command of Gates, in New England, and 13,000 on the banks of the North River, where they had been encamped during the winter; 6,000 fit for active service, were posted at Middlebrook, under the command of Washington.

Under this disparity of force, combined with the strong posts occupied by the enemy, Washington determined on a defensive campaign, contenting himself with securing the important passes on the North River, and protecting the adjacent country from the cruel ravages of an unsparing foe: even this defensive system was not unattended with its perils and difficulties."

West Point, being by nature a strong position, had, since the year 1777, been a particular object of attention to the Americans, who had constructed formidable works for its defence, with the intention of rendering it impregnable to the assaults of an enemy.

King's Ferry, a few miles below West Point, near the termination of the Highlands, was the great pass of communication between the eastern and middle States, and is commanded by the two opposite points of land, the most elevated of which, on the west side of the river, is called from its roughness STONEY POINT, while the flat neck of land on the east is denominated Verplanck's Point.

The possession of King's Ferry became, therefore, an important object to both armies. The Americans had constructed a strong post on Verplanck's Point, called Fort Fayette, which was garrisoned by a company under captain Armstrong; but the works on Stoney Point, though considerable, were yet incomplete. The British general now projected a coup de main upon these works. But the Americans, having abandoned Stoney Point, without waiting for an attack, the enemy immediately took possession of it, and soon compelled Fort Fayette, on the opposite shore, to capitulate, the garrison surrendering themselves prisoners of war.

To prevent an attack on West Point, Washington now

followed the enemy with the first division of his army from Middlebrook, but was compelled, from the inferiority of his force, to pursue measures strictly defensive. In the mean time the English completed the fortifications, and left strong garrisons in Stoney Point and Fort Fayette.

In July, the British army made an invasion of Connecticut, but almost immediately returned to the Hudson, without having accomplished any thing decisive in that state.

Washington now conceived the idea of surprising the posts at King's Ferry; a design to which he was impelled by a desire to satisfy public expectation by some distinguished exploit, which would tend to reconcile the people to his plan of defensive warfare, without incurring any great peril to the main army. With this view, he carefully reconnoitred the two posts in person, and employed all the means in his power to obtain information of their real strength. His conclusion was that they could only be carried by surprise; but he resolved to make an attempt on Stoney Point first, which, if successful, would easily command the surrender of Fort Fayette.

This notable achievement was made at twelve o'clock at night of the 15th July, 1779, under the command of General Wayne, who surprised and captured the fort in a manner never surpassed for its daring, its intrepidity, and its coolness. No military exploit in history excels the brilliancy of the capture of Stoney Point.

Washington having thus secured Stony Point, made an unsuccessful attempt upon the opposite post; but Sir Henry Clinton advancing to its relief, the American general determined to evacuate Stoney Point, which could not be maintained without a naval force, and to retire into the highlands, when the British again took possession of it, repaired the fortifications, and manned it with a stronger garrison.

Independent of the splendour of this exploit, it is difficult to conceive the object which prompted its execution, or to approve of a design which, had no miscarriage intervened to obstruct its complete fulfilment, must still have been a useless expense of life, labour and gallantry.

Washington now removed his head quarters to WEST POINT; not deeming himself sufficiently in force to hazard a general engagement. In the same cautious spirit of prudence, he issued orders to the commanders of corps and

detachments not to risk their troops in any partisan engagements but when the occasion of certain victory presented itself.

The British general, wearied with inactivity, now retired to York Island, and engaged himself in giving increased strength to its fortifications; while, despairing of success in any attempt to draw Washington from his strong position, he began to direct his attention to a campaign against the southern States.

On the 18th of August, Major Lee surprised and made prisoners the British garrison at Pawles Hook, opposite New York, on the west bank of the Hudson; an enterprise which, having been achieved under the direction of Washington, received at the time no inconsiderable measure of applause.

Admiral Arbuthnot, a few days after this event, arrived at New York with a reinforcement for the British army; and shortly after, the Count D'Estaing arrived on the southern coast, with a powerful French fleet; upon the news of which, Sir Henry Clinton concentrated his forces in New York.

The campaign of 1779, was not, upon the whole, either very creditable to the cause of Independence, or favourable to the fame and reputation of the commander in chief, so far as it respected any accession of glory, from active operations, or brilliant triumphs; but, as it related to that wisdom and prudence, which looked to the permanent good of his country, he stood higher than at any preceding period, and commanded more veneration in the minds of the judicious and reflecting, for his virtues, talents and patriotism.

Washington closed this campaign, as he had done so many preceding ones, by addressing a remonstrance to Congress against the militia system, and recommending the plan of coercive draughts for one year by the States, as the only efficient method of perfecting the establishment of a permanent army. But Congress seem not only themselves to have been averse to so strong a measure, which caused them to adopt it with tardiness and reluctance, but the States appear to have resisted it, from a natural jealousy of consolidated power; so that the resolutions of Congress in favour of the system recommended by Washington, eventually failed, when they came to be canvassed by the jealous rights of thirteen independent sovereignties.

In December Washington placed his army in winter quarters; one division at West Point, and the other at Morristown, New Jersey, sheltered by huts, and so disposed as to protect the surrounding country from the depredations of the enemy, as at the same time to secure his troops from insult, surprise or defeat.

The subjugation of Georgia by the British, and the unsuccessful attempt of the combined forces of the French and Americans to recover Savannah, and the departure of the French fleet from the continent, justly excited the fears of Washington for the fate of South Carolina, which, combined with the secret intelligence he had received from his spies in New York, that the enemy meditated the South as the scene of the campaign of 1780, awakened all his fears and patriotism for the safety of that section of the union, which now became the theatre of sanguinary and triumphant operations to the British army under Sir Henry Clinton.

On the 12th of May, Charleston capitulated a surrender to the English general. Washington's opinion was adverse to the policy of defending that city, after it had been found impracticable to defend the bar and maintain the harbour. General Lincoln was severely censured for his conduct; but it does not appear that he was so much to blame, as those who, having promised him reinforcements, had inspired delusive hopes, that ended in his ruin.

Lord Cornwallis, with one division of the British army, now advanced upon North Carolina, while other detachments carried their victorious arms through fields of carnage, until the whole south was subjugated by the troops of his Britannic majesty. Emboldened by this unexpected success, Sir Henry Clinton, on the 3d of June, 1780, issued his proclamation, re-establishing, in full force, the royal government; after which, supposing the conquest of the South to be complete, he sailed for New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis with four thousand troops, to extend his victories into North Carolina.

These movements in the south did not escape the vigilant eye of Washington; and in March he sent a detachment of the Maryland and Delaware lines, under the command of the Baron de Kalb, to reinforce the southern army. As these troops entered South Carolina, they were joined by several corps of American militia, who deserted from the colours of Cornwallis, by whom they had been enlisted.

Congress then called General Gates to the command of the southern department, on the 13th of June, 1780, under the idea that the conqueror of Burgoyne would now prove, by his great military talents, the saviour of the southern states. The defeat of the Americans at Camden, on the 16th of August, 1780, demonstrated the fallacy of reposing confidence in a general of the ardent and active genius of Gates, when commanding a raw army, composed of militia, or new recruits. Such bold and impetuous talents were more adapted to lead the disciplined and well drilled battalions of Europe, than the inexperienced and timid recruits of a free government, opposed to constraint, and stubborn in their rights. The rout of the Americans at this battle was complete and overwhelming. The Baron de Kalb was killed at the head of his troops. Congress afterwards directed a monument to his memory. The American loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, was great and fatal, but never precisely ascertained. To this rout of Gates, succeeded the defeat of Sumpter at Catawba Ford, by the bloody and impetuous legion of Tarlton.

The winter quarters of the army under Washington, had not been much improved beyond its condition of preceding years, in respect to rations; the depreciation of the currency having effectually operated to check the certainty of supplies to so great an extent as again to menace the total dissolution of the army; a catastrophe which was solely averted by the patriotism of the people of New Jersey.

A requisition on the States, to supply the treasury of the Union by taxation, was now resorted to; but it did not prove effectual; and the limit of two hundred millions of continental money having been completed, other sources of supply were now to be devised; which consisted in a requisition on the States for their respective quotas of provisions, spirits and forage, for which they were to be finally paid in Spanish milled dollars.

To this system Washington was decidedly opposed, on the ground that the war ought to be conducted on a national, rather than a state system; and, in this opinion, says Marshall, all those who were engaged in high and responsible situations,' coincided. Here, again, we perceive the germ of those parties which arose under the federal constitution, at a subsequent period. The objections of Washington, however, were disregarded, and the new system of State