THE PEOPLE V. TYLER.

This, taken in connection with the grant in the Constitution, of power to define and punish felonies on the high seas, in the enumeration of the powers of Congress, although the judicial power was made to extend to all admiralty cases, strongly supports our position.-See 1 W. & M. 470, 465, citing Stat. Ric.; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 W. C. C. 383.

It is also apparent, from the mode of trial of criminal cases in the United States courts, that these cases are not tried "in admiralty." The procedure is by indictment of a grand jury, and by petit jury, under the Constitution.Const. Art. 3, §2, subd. 3; Amendments V. and VI.

So, also, the common law, and not the admiralty, system of proofs is used.

b. The replication and the question both go upon the idea that some portion of the St. Clair river is within the admiralty jurisdiction.

That the great navigable rivers of the country, the lakes, and the waters connecting them, are, by reason of their navigability, within the original grant of admiralty jurisdiction, and of like character with the sea in respect to maritime legislation and jurisdiction, is fully settled.The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443; Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 20 How. 296; 1 Conkl. Adm. 1' to 33.

This court has adopted and approved the above doctrine, and held such waters not included in the term "inland navigation."-Amer. Trans. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 368.

Compare Rossiter v. Chester (1 Doug. Mich. 169) where the court yields to the then weight of authority, contrary to their expressed views of what ought to be the law.

It remains, then, to inquire whether the civil jurisdiction of the admiralty is ousted if the locality of the tort or service be within the body of a foreign county.

Our position is, that it is not ousted when such is the fact. That, although in England the locality of the marine tort must be out of a domestic county, the rule never was

THE PEOPLE . TYLER.

that it should be out of a foreign county; and that in this country it need not be out of a domestic county.

All the expressions in the statutes of Richard, which originated the infra corpus comitatus rule, are to be construed with reference to the territory over which the statutes extend. The legislators knew nothing of the political divisions of the continent.-See the statutes cited, 1 W. & M. 465.

The Supreme Court has settled the doctrine that the locality of a tort need not be out of a domestic county.— Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 20 How.; Towboat Co. v. R. R. Co. 5 Am. Law Reg. 280; Brig James Gray v. John Fraser, 21 How. 184.

It is also held expressly that it need not be out of a foreign county.-Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 1, 9; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 486, per Woodbury J.; Steele v. Thacher, Ware, 92; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 368. This was a libel for a marine tort, commencing on the Spanish side of Belle River, and terminating in a county of Georgia, analogous to the present case as far as the locality is concerned.

II. But if by the words "admiralty jurisdiction" in the act, criminal admiralty jurisdiction be intended, we say:

1. Admitting fully that it depends upon locality, the rule in respect to where that locality must be, is the same as that of the civil jurisdiction in the case of torts-which rule, we have shown, was, in England, that the place must be out of a domestic, but not out of a foreign county; and is here, that it need not be out of either; then, as a corollary:

2. the place of the crime need not be out of a foreign county, nor out of a domestic county, unless the statute had carefully so directed.

1. As to the first position, That the rule of place is the same as to civil admiralty torts and admiralty crimes:Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 469; Bridge Case, 1 W. & M. 482.

The rule as to both was fixed by the statutes of Rich

THE PEOPLE V. TYLER.

ard, viz.: That the place must be out of a county (1 W. & M. 465); and upon the same ground; that there was a local tribunal.

2. As to the second position,-That the place need not be out of a foreign jurisdiction:

The statutes of Richard never extended to this country.Waring v. Clarke, 4 How. 453, 461; Rossiter v. Chester, 1 Doug. Mich. 165.

The act of 1857 was passed subsequent to these decisions, and as it is held that the English rule does not apply to torts, on principle and analogy it can not apply to crimes.-(Woodbury J.) 1 W. & M. 486.

The fact that Congress has been scrupulous in requiring all crimes punishable in the courts of the United States, to have been committed in places "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," adds great force to this view.

Under such statutes, the place of the offense may be within the jurisdictional limits of a foreign State, and still upon the "high seas," etc.-Griffin & Brailsford's Case, 5 Wheat. 184; U. S. v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624; U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (Marshall Ch. J.); 1 Bish. Cr. Law, §§ 21, 609, 610, 611, 653. Compare U. S. v. Keefe, 3 Mason, 475; U. S. v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482; Story on Const. § 1673.

In Wiltberger's case, the Ch. J. does not refer to the locality within a foreign territory as the difficulty, but to the impossibility of applying section eight to section twelve (Act of '90).

Congress knew that all vessels navigating the lakes and connecting waters from one state to another, or to Canada, are always within "the boundaries" of United States or Canadian counties, and that those waters are common to both nations, for maritime purposes, both by the law of nations and by treaty.-8 Stat. 575, 576; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362; The Atlantic, Ware 121; Campbell J. diss. Magnolia Case, 20 How.

THE PEOPLE . TYLER.

Whether or not the place was within the jurisdiction, is a fact to be found by the jury under the charge; and this the verdict settled. (See III. below.)-Griffin's Case, 5 Wheat. 184; Kessler's Case, 1 Baldwin, 15.

The argument may be stated, then, as a reductio ad absurdum. Either there is admiralty jurisdiction in the county of Lambton, or none the other side of the national boundary line; for the eastern half of the river is all within foreign counties; then, if none in foreign counties, none in domestic, for the rule is the same, it is said; therefore, no admiralty crime can be committed on the river anywhere. But the rule in relation to crimes and torts is the same as to place, on principle and authority; therefore, the United States court can not take cognizance of a collision on this river anywhere; in cases of contract, although the jurisdiction results primarily from the subject-matter, yet the locality is one of the essential elements of an admiralty contract, and jurisdiction to that extent depends upon the place, which must be the same as in torts.-1 Conkl. Adm. 33. It further follows, then, that in towage, affreightment, &c., upon this river, there is no jurisdiction.

III. We come, now, to consider the second question reserved.

The replication admits the former trial upon a good indictment showing jurisdiction, and then sets up a fact alleged to be inconsistent with that jurisdiction. The demurrer says: "You admit the trial upon a good indictment, &c. No matter, then, if the alleged fact be true, it can not now be averred or proved."

We say, then,

1. Where jurisdiction appears upon the face of the record, the court and jury before which the proceeding was had, have the sole determination of the jurisdiction, and the judgment on the verdict can not be collaterally impeached.

The courts of the United States, although of limited

THE PEOPLE V. TYLER.

jurisdiction, are not inferior courts, and their judgments, although the record does not show jurisdiction, are binding everywhere, until reversed; are merely voidable, not void.

When, therefore, the St. Clair court inquires whether the United States court had jurisdiction, in order to make answer it is necessary only to examine the record pleaded in bar, and to reply that no court can look behind it save by appellate power; that it was for that court and jury. to decide upon the existence of facts which give jurisdiction, and that the exercise of it warrants the presumption that the facts necessary to be proved were proved; that the record imports absolute verity, not to be impugned by averment or proof to the contrary.-Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319; Huff v. Hutchinson, 14 How. 586; Voorhies v. U. S. Bank, 10 Pet. 477; Curt. Dig. 301, cases cited; Kemp's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 185; Kennedy v. Ga. State Bank, 8 How. 611; Palmer v. Oakley, 2 Doug. Mich. 475; Erwin v. Lowry, 7 How. 172; Griswold v. Sedgwick, 1 Wend. 131. See, also, Brittain v. Kinnaird, 1 Brod. & Bing. 432 (The Bum-Boat Case); Betts v. Bagley, 12 Pick. 572, et seq.; 2 Phil. Ev. 4th Am. Ed. 161, 162, and cases cited.

The locality of the crime was a fact for the jury, under proper averments.

Here the record shows jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, so that it fully appears affirmatively; and the judgment would not be reversable on error.-Curt. Dig. 302, cases cited; Conkl. Treat. 3d Ed. 142.

2. The phraseology of the second question is also open to some criticism. The act refers to the place, and not to the shooting, as within the admiralty jurisdiction, and the circuit court has no original civil admiralty jurisdiction; and whether it can, with any propriety, be said to be sitting in admiralty when sitting to try an offense unknown to the English admiralty, created by the statute, as properly under the power to regulate commerce as under the admiralty grant, is very