THE PEOPLE v. TYLER. where to this day Denmark exacts a toll for passage? If the two greatest commercial nations of the globe have access to the lakes, is there not a theatre for this jurisdiction? Did not Clay claim the St. Lawrence to be a strait? But it is said that by the treaty of Paris of 1763, and by the treaty of 1783, no provision was made for admiralty jurisdiction. Population and commerce exists where there is such jurisdiction. Neither existed on the lakes then; they were as unknown as the Niger. The high contracting parties did not know whether they were fresh or salt. During this century England has furnished an armed vessel on Lake Ontario with fresh water tanks. Now the internal commerce of the lakes exceeds in value the entire foreign commerce of the United States. The Attorney General then says that England restrains admiralty jurisdiction to the tide, and never exercised admiralty jurisdiction anywhere else, or on the lakes, or that part of this river in Canada'; and cites the case of the Thomas Jefferson, and N. O. v. Phoebus, and 2 Haggard. Ergo, this court is asked to hold that the English rule prevails here, and to overrule the United States Supreme Court decisions since 1845. The whole argument against civil admiralty jurisdiction on the other side of the line proves too much; it sweeps away the jurisdiction on this side equally See 20 How, Magnolia Case. But, says the Attorney General, this statute is unconstitutional. Congress has no power, he says, to enact that a crime, committed by one of our citizens in a foreign country, may be punished here. Under what clause, he asks, can the power to pass this statute be found? The power to regulate commerce, we answer. The admiralty power is really the same thing, as McLean J. says in his opinion in the Magnolia Case, 20 How.; and, as before said, by the law of nations. But if it be, says the Attorney General, under this power, then the tonnage and employment of the vessel should have been averred. By no means. The act of 1845 relates solely THE PEOPLE . TYLER. to civil cases of tort and contract, and confers jurisdiction on the district courts. The tonnage and employment upon certain waters give jurisdiction in civil cases over the vessel, and the waters where such vessels are employed become admiralty waters. Any crime committed on an American vessel on these waters, we say, is punishable. The ownership gives jurisdiction, provided the vessel is on admiralty waters. Take the case of the Fashion, 21 How. 244. Suppose a crime committed on that vessel, or any other vessel although plying between ports of the same state; she would be on waters within the admiralty jurisdiction. Does the act of 1845 say employed on the American side of the lakes and connecting waters? The question did not arise in 12 How. As a matter of fact the collision there was on this side. But in Scott v. Young America, 1 Newb., and many other cases, and in the great collision case of the Atlantic and Ogdensburg, 1 Newb. and 21 How., the collisions were in Canada. So in the Appollon case the tort was begun in a foreign country. In the Wiltberger case it is clearly manifest that if the words of the 8th section could have been engrafted on the 12th, the court would have sustained the jurisdiction. But if the doctrine of the Attorney General is true, the act is an absurdity. Where are the "rivers, creeks, havens, basins, and bays," outside of any state, which are not in foreign countries? The place of the shooting is to be without the jurisdiction of the state; not the offense. If the United States has no jurisdiction, because the state has, then the United States can not punish counterfeiting because the state can.-1 Cond. 278; Ch. J. in Bevans' case. How surprising the assertion that if we can legislate for the punishment of citizens returned here for crimes committed abroad, it follows, as a consequence, that we can enact that they shall not be amenable to local laws abroad, and THE PEOPLE V. TYLER. that foreign authorities shall not provide their own criminal code, and that we may set up our own courts abroad! The law of nations, as interpreted by Vattel, Bishop, Story, Wheaton, English and Federal legislation and decisions, Marshall, Johnson, Baldwin, and Hopkinson-the admiralty decisions of the Supreme Court-the very precedents in the form books-recognize the doctrines for which we contend. Wheaton, page 175, is enough to settle the whole matter. The common law is no part of Federal law; but the law of nations is. If there was no power to punish maritime felonies, to regulate commerce, or try admiralty cases, yet by the law of nations as laid down by Wheaton, the United States may punish offences of its own citizens everywhere. Wheat. 175; Story Conf. L. § 540; Vattel cited above; Bish. Cr. L. § 601; 1 Taunt. 26; Reg. v. Sawyer, 2 C. & K. 101; Whart. Prec. 93. Negative answers to the questions of the court below involve the holding the acts of 1825, §5, 1845, and 1857, unconstitutional, and a disregard of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States since 1845. CAMPBELL J.: The facts, as set up in the pleadings, show that Tyler shot Jones on an American vessel on the St. Clair river, within the limits of Canada, and that he died of the wound at Port Huron, on land, within the county of St. Clair, in this state. The question presented for our consideration is, whether Tyler's offense came within the United States laws, and within the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Court. It is much to be regretted that this question was not presented to the consideration of the Circuit Court of the United States, where the trial was had. It is fairly raised here upon the issue of a former conviction, and the very able arguments we have listened to have exhausted the subject. Homicide has always been treated as an offence depending on locality, and it is so regarded by the act of Con THE PEOPLE V. TYLER. gress under which Tyler was indicted. Where death does not immediately follow the mortal blow, and happens in another jurisdiction within the realm, the place of death was generally, under the views taken by the common law authorities, the proper place of jurisdiction; inasmuch as the crime was not complete without it. There is some doubt whether, at the common law, originally such offenses were provided for at all. But, as the blow itself may be made a punishable assault, there is no very good reason for not allowing it to be punished as an assault, qualified by its natural and legiti mate consequences.-1 Bish. Cr. L. §§554, 555. This is the plain design of the act of Congress, which punishes an assault upon the water, when death ensues upon land either within or without the United States. There are very few places in the United States where a crime of violence would come within the Federal jurisdiction. In this case, the place of death being within the state jurisdiction, the authority of Congress to punish the assault could only be deduced from a jurisdiction existing where the assault was committed. And, inasmuch as under our treaties with Great Britain the place was under the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of that country, the case presents the question whether, under this act of Congress, a person who commits the offence charged within a foreign jurisdiction, is made punishable here. Upon the high seas, every vessel, public or private, is, for jurisdictional purposes, a part of the territory of the nation of its owners. An offense committed on board of such vessel, is an offense against the sovereignty of that nation. But, when a private ship enters a foreign jurisdiction, it becomes at once, with all on board (in the absence of treaty stipulations to the contrary), subject to the municipal laws and control of the country it visits.-The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116. Any crime committed there may be punished by the local laws. The right to enter upon and navigate the waters of any country, is subject in all cases to the condition of tem THE PEOPLE V. TYLER. porary obedience to its laws. And, if the laws of Canada made provision for the punishment of such an assault as the one under consideration, no doubt Tyler, if found there, would have been properly amenable to those laws-whether amenable to our laws or not. The matter to be investigated resolves itself into the inquiry whether the act of Congress, under which the trial was had in the United States court, is, upon fair rules of construction, intended to cover just such a case as this. If the case falls within it, an inquiry may then arise into its constitutional validity. By the words of the statute, if taken literally, and without qualification, every person, of whatever nationality, who, upon the waters mentioned in the act, whether in a vessel or not, commits an assault without malice upon any other person, of whatever nationality, and whether in or out of a vessel, of which the assaulted person dies on land, within or without the United States, is guilty of manslaughter, and punishable in the Federal courts. * No one would contend for a moment that the act should be so broadly construed. It would occur at once that there are several classes of objections to such a construction. It is obvious that Congress could by no possibility have power in all these cases. It is also plain that, if any of these places are off the high seas, some provisions which might be valid on the high seas, would not be so elsewhere. And it is further manifest that, whether on or off the seas, the citizenship of the parties might become an important element in the inquiry. Other difficulties might arise, which it is unnecessary to refer to more particularly. It is undoubtedly true that every word which goes to the description of an offense, or the circumstances under which it is punishable, must be regarded; or, in other words, that no one can be held liable unless he comes within all the particulars of the offense described. But there is no rule of construction which requires, when a legislature, out |