EASEMENT.

See DEDICATION; WAY.

ENDORSER.

See BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES, 1.

ERROR.

See FRAUDULENT DEBTORS ACT, 2; JUSTICES COURTS, 2, 4, 5 7; PLEADINGS, 2.

ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

ESTOPPEL.

See MORTGAGE, 4, 5, 6; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 2.

EVIDENCE.

1. Where two plaintiffs sue upon contract, it is not error in the court to admit in evidence a letter from defendant to one of the plaintiffs, and which is claimed by them to relate to the business in which they were engaged for defendant. Plaintiffs have a right to introduce it, and to follow it up with evidence to show that it does relate to such business. - Shaw v. Davis, 318.

2. Where a letter is introduced in evidence, it is error to exclude another letter referred to in the one admitted, and to which that is an answer. -Lester v. Sutton, 329.

3. Where, in plaintiff's absence, his clerk received of his debtor a draft, and accepted the same to be applied, when paid, on the debtor's account, and after the draft fell due the plaintiff wrote the debtor respecting it, not repudiating the act of the clerk, and, on subsequently suing the debtor, offered to return the unpaid draft, Held, that these facts furnished evidence from which a jury might infer a ratification by plaintiff of the acts of the clerk. Jennison v. Parker, 355.

4. Under rule 79 of the Circuit Courts, a promissory note, a copy

of which was attached to and served with the declaration, may be read in evidence under the common counts, without proof of the signature, where its execution is not denied on oath. -Hoard v. Little, 468.

5. Where the entry in a justice's docket does not show the day of service of a summons, and the files are lost, the time of service may be proved by the justice - the statute not requiring the time to be entered on the docket. Van Kleek

v. Eggleston, 511.

See BONA FIDE PURCHASER, 1, 3; GARNISHEES, 2, 3, 4, 5; MORTGAGE, 1, 4, 5; PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW, 3, 4; RECEIVERS BY FOREIGN APPOINTMENT, 3; WITNESS.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

1. The statute authorizing executors and administrators to take possession of lands of a deceased person, does not exclude the possessory right of heirs or devisees, but merely permits the executors or administrators to claim and have possession, if they see fit to demand it. - Streeter v. Paton, 341.

EXEMPTION.

See HOMESTEAD.

FACT, QUESTIONS OF.

See CONTRACT, 1; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 1, 2, 5, 6

FALSE DESCRIPTION.

See CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDS.

FEME COVERT.

See HOMESTEAD, 8.

FENCES.

See RAILROAD CORPORATIONS, 1 to 5.

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGES.

1. Bill by assignee of mortgage to foreclose the same. A subsequent encumbrancer made a party defendant, answered, setting up the defense of usury. The mortgagee was sworn as a witness, and testified that the mortgage was made to him, and assigned to complainant, at the request of one of the mortgagors, and without any consideration moving from or to him for the mortgage or assignment. -Held, that this evidence cast upon complainant the burden of proof to show a consideration for the mortgage, and that, in the absence of any further evidence, the bill should be dismissed as to such subsequent encumbrancer. - Bishop v. Felch, 371.

See MORTGAGE.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

See JUSTICES' COURTS, 3.

FOREIGN RECEIVERS.

See RECEIVERS BY FOREIGN APPOINTMENT.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

1. Where it was shown that the mortgagee of a stock of goods left the same in the hands of the mortgagor, with power to sell and dispose of the same in the usual course of business, for cash or upon credit, and the mortgagor applied the proceeds of sales in the purchase of other goods to keep up the stock, in the support of himself, and in paying debts other than that secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee not asserting a right to the possession of the property, or the specific proceeds of the sales thereof, or preventing or prohibiting such sales: -Held, That it was not the duty of the court to instruct the jury that such mortgage must be held absolutely void as against creditors of the mortgagor, notwithstanding it was valid on its face, and was made without any actual fraudulent intent. -Oliver v. Eaton, 108.

2. Where an instrument contains illegal provisions, or such as are not reconcilable, on any possible hypothesis, with an honest or legal intent, the law declares it void on its face, because no evidence can change its character. But in all other cases where property is transferred with the alleged intent to hin

3.

der, delay, or defraud creditors, the question of fraudulent intent is one of fact for the jury, and the law can not determine for them that the showing, in a specified case, conclusively establishes such fraudulent intent. — Ibid.

Where one of two co-partners sold out his interest in the copartnership assets to the other, taking back an agreement that the purchaser would pay the partnership debts, and the latter, instead of paying them, caused them to be bought up in the name or a confederate, and judgments to be obtained thereon, on which the lands of the other co-partner were sold to such confederate, -Held, that these sales should be set aside as fraudulent and void, on behalf of one to whom the owner had conveyed the lands, and that it was not necessary for the complainant to show that he had purchased and paid a valuable consideration for the lands. -- Reed v. Wessel, 139.

4. Where a contract in violation of law has been carried into effect, the law will not aid either party to undo what has been done, and divest a title that has passed. -Bagg v. Jerome,

145.

5. Where a chattel mortgage contains no unlawful provisions, it can only be avoided by proof of fraud in fact, which is exclusively a question for the jury. If it were void on its face, it would be the duty of the court to pronounce it so; but the court can not look at facts outside the instrument, and treat them, when found by the jury, as a part of the instru ment itself, or instruct the jury if they find such facts, that the mortgage is void; since to do so would be a mere evasion of the statute which refers the question of fraud, to the jury.-Ibid.

6.

7.

That a chattel mortgage is given to a trustee to secure demands in favor of several creditors, instead of being given to the creditors themselves, and that it contains a provision that the trustee shall be liable in the premises for his own default or neglect only, are matters the jury may take into account in determining the question of actual fraud, but they do not render the instrument fraudulent in law.-Ibid.

Where a creditor seeks in chancery to reach property alleged to have been purchased with the money of his debtor, and conveyed to the debtor's wife to keep the same beyond the reach of creditors, his bill will be demurable unless it shows, by clear and sufficient allegations, either: That his debt existed at the time of the conveyance: or that the debtor was embarrassed at the time, or, at least, indebted to others, and

MICH. 7-2N

that the purchase money was paid by him, and the deed tken to the wife for the actual fraudulent purpose to hinder, delay or defraud the then existing creditors: or that the purchase money was paid by the debtor, and the conveyance taken to the wife, for the purpose of defrauding future creditors. Hopson v. Payne, 334.

8. Where a bill alleged in one place, that the purchase price of the property "was paid in cash," by the said wife, and, in another, that the husband "paid the purchase money for said premises, or that he furnished the money wherewith the same was purchased, to the said" wife.-Held, that as the law presumes honesty rather than fraud, it was to be inferred from these allegations, that the wife paid for the land with her own money, rather than the contrary.-Ibid.

9. The courts will not infer a dishonest meaning from a written instrument, where an honest one is possible, and consistent with the whole tenor of the instrument.-Gay v. Bidwell, 519. 10. A chattel mortgage of a stock of goods, which leaves the mortgagor in possession, and by inference authorizes him to sell in the usual course of business, is good between the parties, and not necessarily fraudulent as to creditors.-Ibid.

11. Being good between the parties, such a mortgage could not be fraudulent on its face against creditors, since it would not show there were any creditors, or if it did, it would not appear but that they had assented to it, or were themselves sufficiently secured. —Ibid.

12. A creditor who does not show that he was such at the time of the giving of such a mortgage, is not in position to attack it as fraudulent, on the ground that it allows the mortgagor to remain in possession and dispose of the mortgaged property.-Ibid.

FRAUDULENT DEBTORS ACT.

1. Whether the fraudulent acts of a debtor, occurring without the state, can be made the basis of proceedings against him in this state, under the Fraudulent Debtors' Act,-Quere; The court being equally divided in opinion on the question. - Bromley v. People, 472.

2. The Supreme Court will not on certorari to a commissioner in a case under this act, undertake to weigh the evidence. It is sufficient that there was evidence upon which the commissioner