after judgment, object to the power of such court, and a federal court cannot then assume jurisdiction. (Scott & Nasse v. Kelly, Sheriff, 12 N. B. R. 96.) But a state court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the assignee from collecting a debt due to the bankrupt. (Southern et al. v. Fisher, Trustee, 16 N. B. R. 414.)

Suits against trustees.- A suit against the assignee is the proper proceeding to establish a claim which has been rejected by the district court on his objection. (Adams v. Meyers, 8 N. B. R. 214; Fed. Cas. 62.) An action for the wrongful taking and conversion of property will not lie against the assignee, where a sheriff has delivered the property held by him under an execution levy to the marshal, who in turn delivered it to the assignee. (Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Pratt, Ass., etc., 16 N. B. R. 170; In re Wagner et al. v. Wagner et al., 5 N. B. R. 23; 2 Hughes, 355; Fed. Cas. 14174.) Where a claim to property in the hands of the assignee is set up, and the validity of the claim is denied by the assignee, who asserts title to be in himself as such assignee, the claimant cannot proceed by summary petition. (Hurst v. Teft, Ass., 13 N. B. R. 108; 12 Blatchf. 217; Fed. Cas. 6339; In re Linforth et al., 16 N. B. R. 435; 4 Sawy. 370; Fed. Cas. 8389.) After the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, even though a suit was pending in the state court when the proceedings were instituted, a writ of sequestration cannot be issued to take property from the possession of the assignee. (Hewett, Ex'r, v. Norton, Ass., 13 N. B. R. 276; 1 Woods, 68; 1 N. Y. Weekly Dig. 525; Fed. Cas. 6441.)

Parties to suit.- Where a junior mortgagee files a bill against a mortgagor or his assignee, prior incumbrancers are necessary parties where there is substantial doubt as to the amounts which are due, or the property covered by their liens. (Sutherland et al. v. Lake Superior Ship Canal, Railroad & Iron Co., 9 N. B. R. 298; 1 Cent. Law J. 127; Fed. Cas. 13643.) A bankrupt before bankruptcy, or his assignee thereafter, is a necessary party to a suit in equity on an order on a general fund obtained or given by the bankrupt before bankruptcy. (Walker, Ass., v. Seigel et al., 12 N. B. R. 394; 2 Cent. Law J. 508; Fed. Cas. 17085.) It has been held that in a suit brought to set aside a voluntary assignment as void, the subject of the assignment being properly transferable and vested in the assignee, all persons having an interest therein to be affected by a decree are properly joined as defendants. (Onley, etc. v. Tanner et al., 19 N. B. R. 178; Fed. Cas. 10506.)

The proper remedy of a creditor to compel an assignee to institute proceedings to reach property fraudulently concealed or conveyed by the bankrupt is by petition to a court to enforce action by the assignee. (Glenny v. Langdon et al., 19 N. B. R. 24; 98 U. S. 20.)

Costs.-The assignee is liable for costs, personally, only where guilty of misconduct or bad faith (Hall, Ass., etc. v. Waterbury, 19 N. B. R. 15); but if this is not shown, the costs should be paid out of the bank

rupt's estate. (Coxe v. Hale, 8 N. B. R. 562; 21 Pittsb. Leg. J. 77; Fed. Cas. 3310.) Where a creditor calls for an investigation of the conduct of an assignee, alleging fraud in a sale of the bankrupt's property, it is proper that he should be required to give security for the costs which may be adjudged against him. (In re Peabody, 16 N. B. R. 243; 9 Chi. Leg. News, 243; Fed. Cas. 10866.)

d. Suits shall not be brought by or against a trustee of a bankrupt estate subsequent to two years after the estate has been closed.

[Act of 1867. SEO. 14. . . No person shall be entitled to maintain an action against an assignee in bankruptcy for anything done by him as such assignee, without previously giving him twenty days' notice of such action, specifying the cause thereof, to the end that such assignee may have an opportunity of tendering amends, should he see fit to do so.]

Courts of bankruptcy may close estates whenever they have been fully administered, though they may be re-opened whenever it appears that they were closed before being fully administered (sec. 3-8); in which event it would seem that, although the two years had commenced to run, the fact that an estate was re-opened would cause the two-year period to run from the time it was last closed.

Limitation. An action must be brought within two years from the time the cause of action accrued, either by or against the assignee, and the assignee cannot, by amendment, be made a party more than two years after his appointment, to a suit brought by or against the bankrupt. (Cogdell, Ass., v. Exum, 10 N. B. R. 327.)

There is some question as to whether the limitation of two years will affect actions by the assignee to recover property fraudulently conveyed by a debtor in view of impending bankruptcy, where the fraud was not discovered within such period, and the action is brought only after the fraud is discovered, it having been held in one case that, under such circumstances, the action may be brought after the lapse of two years. (Bailey, Ass., v. Weir, 12 N. B. R. 24; 21 Wall 342.) It has also been held that this limitation of the Bankrupt Act applies only to cases where suit is brought in regard to property held adversely to the bankrupt and assignee, or to cases where suit is brought to recover any debt that may be due the bankrupt (Pickett, Ass., v. McGavick, 14 N. B. R. 236; 3 Cent. Law J. 303; 13 Alb. Law J. 218, 400; 2 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 378; Fed. Cas. 11126; Smith v. Crawford, 9 N. B. R. 38; 6 Ben. 497; Fed. Cas. 13030); and in other cases, that the limitation is a bar to a recovery by the assignee, although he has no notice of the existence of the property

sought to be recovered. (Freelander et al. v. Holloman et al., 9 N. B. R. 331; Fed. Cas. 5081; Bean v. Brookmire, 4 N. B. R. 57; 10 Amer. Law Reg. (N. S.) 181; 4 West. Jur. 392; Fed. Cas. 1168.)

Under the law of 1867, the statute began to run when the estate vested in the assignee as such (Foreman, Ass., v. Bigelow, 18 N. B. R. 457; 7 Reporter, 137; 26 Pittsb. Leg. J. 128; Fed. Cas. 4934); but under the present law it does not begin to run until the estate has been closed. It has been held that, although the suit may have been commenced within proper time, if the summons does not issue until the expiration of the time prescribed by the statute, the action is barred. (Walker, Ass., etc. v. Towner, 16 N. B. R. 285; 4 Dill. 165; 5 Cent. Law J. 206; Fed. Cas. 17089.) In an action by the purchaser at an assignee's sale to recover possession, the two years' limitation cannot be pleaded. (Steele v. Moody, 16 N. B. R. 558.) And where an assignee files a bill in equity asking to have a mortgage on real estate owned by the bankrupt declared void, and it is so declared, and four years later the defendant files a bill of review, the assignee cannot plead the statute of limitations, as the bill of review is not a suit within the meaning of the limitation section of the bankrupt law. (Wilt v. Stickney, Ass., 15 N. B. R. 23; 5 Amer. Law Rec. 630; Fed. Cas. 17854.)

Sec. 12. Compositions, when confirmed.-a. A bankrupt may offer terms of composition to his creditors after, but not before, he has been examined in open court or at a meeting of his creditors and filed in court the schedule of his property and list of his creditors, required to be filed by bankrupts.

The right of composition provided by this section is mainly in the interest of the honest bankrupt and permits him to compromise claims of his creditors. Unless waived, at least ten days' notice by mail of all hearings upon application for the confirmation of compositions must be given. (Sec. 58a.) The confirmation of a composition discharges a bankrupt from his debts, other than those agreed to be paid by the terms of the composition and those not affected by a discharge (sec. 14c), and revests him with the title to his property. (Sec. 70f.) Questions arising out of the application of bankrupts for compositions must be heard by courts of bankruptcy and not by referees. (Sec. 38-4) No provision analogous to this section appears in the act of 1867, but one is found in the act of June 22, 1874 (18 St. L. 182, § 17).

Petition of debtor for composition. Upon filing of a petition by a debtor for a composition, the court will direct register to call a meeting of creditors, and issue notices therefor. (In re Spades, In re Muir and Foley, 13 N. B. R. 72; 6 Biss. 448; 8 Chi. Leg. News, 33; Fed. Cas. 13196.) And where petition in bankruptcy was filed alleging sufficient facts to

show jurisdiction, it was held that the court had jurisdiction to approve a composition. (In re Wronkow et al., 18 N. B. R. 81; 26 Pittsb. Leg. T. 2; Fed. Cas. 18105.) Under the amendment of the act of 1867, although verification of petition is defective, a case is pending, and defect is waived if debtor calls a meeting for composition. (Ex parte Jewett, In re Morris, 11 N. B. R. 443; 2 Lowell, 393; 12 N. B. R. 170; Fed. Cas. 7303.)

First creditors' meeting.—At the first meeting a creditor presented himself and filed proof of claim. He was not present at the session when the vote was taken on a composition. It was held that he was to be counted as voting against the resolution. (In re Richmond et al., 18 N. B. R. 362; Fed. Cas. 11798.)

Examination of bankrupts. See EVIDENCE, Sec. 21, post, p. 178.

The statement or schedules.-In statement of composition, the statement should conform to schedule in bankruptcy (In re Haskell, 11 N. B. R. 164; 1 Cent. Law J. 531; Fed. Cas. 6192); but if the bankrupt in composition understates one debt, but not intentionally (Beebe v. Pyle, 18 N. B. R. 162), or has omitted a claim which he believes on advice of counsel to be worthless (In re Reiman et al., 13 N. B. R. 128; 12 Blatchf. 562; Fed. Cas. 11675), such mistake or omission will not avoid composition; nor is composition rendered void by the omission of an asset from the statement, when such omission was without fraud and with knowledge of the creditors. The testimony under oath of debtor at meeting of creditors is considered as part of his statement (In re Reiman et al., 13 N. B. R. 128; 12 Blatchf. 562; Fed. Cas. 11675); also a mistake without fraud, made by debtor in statement of amount due creditor, will not vitiate composition (Ex parte Trafton, In re Trafton, 14 N. B. R. 507; 2 Lowell, 505; Fed. Cas. 14133); and the fact also that schedules stated the real estate of the debtor as of unknown value is not a good objection to a composition. (In re Welles, 18 N. B. R. 525; Fed. Cas. 17377.)

Rights of litigating creditors.—Attaching creditors have no right to participate in a composition meeting (In re Shields, 15 N. B. R. 532; 5 Dill 588; 4 Cent. Law J. 557; 24 Pittsb. Leg. J. 190; Fed. Cas. 12784), unless they should first relinquish their security (In re Scott, Collins & Co., 15 N B. R. 73; 4 Cent. Law J. 29; Fed. Cas. 12519); but when the debtor files petition in bankruptcy and also for composition and is not adjudicated, and a creditor begins suit before composition approved, the debtor is not entitled to restrain creditor. (In re Tifft, 18 N. B. R. 78; Fed. Cas. 14031.)

b. An application for the confirmation of a composition may be filed in the court of bankruptcy after, but not before, it has been accepted in writing by a majority in number of all creditors whose claims have been allowed, which number must represent a majority in amount of such claims,

and the consideration to be paid by the bankrupt to his creditors, and the money necessary to pay all debts which have priority and the cost of the proceedings, have been deposited in such place as shall be designated by and subject to the order of the judge.

Confirmation of composition.-Upon the adoption of a resolution of composition, a reasonable time may be given in which to secure the additional signatures necessary to confirm it (In re Spades, In re Muir and Foley, 13 N. B. R. 72; 6 Biss. 448; 8 Chi. Leg. News, 33: Fed. Cas. 13196), and delay in obtaining requisite signatures, unaccompanied by laches, will not defeat resolution (In re Cavan et al., 19 N. B. R. 303; Fed. Cas. 2528); but the creditors affixing signatures to the resolution of composition need not have been present at the creditors' meeting (In re Scott, Collins & Co., 15 N. B. R. 73; 4 Cent. Law J. 29; Fed. Cas. 12519); but their names must have been attached at or before the hearing. (In re Scott, Collins & Co., 15 N. B. R. 73; 4 Cent. Law J. 29; Fed. Cas. 12519.) A resolution of composition which provides that the payment shall be guarantied by a satisfactory bond to committee of creditors may be confirmed. (In re Lewis et al., 14 N. B. R. 144; Fed. Cas. 8314.) A creditor is not bound to accede to compromise, nor is he legally, because he refuses to unite with others, nor morally censurable, if his refusal proceeds from a want of confidence in the debtor (Bean v. Brookmire & Rankin, 7 N. B. R. 568; 2 Dill. 108; 5 Chi. Leg. News, 314; 2 Amer. Law Rec. 222; 7 West. Jur. 324; Fed. Cas. 1170); but a minority of creditors will not be permitted to defeat a proposed composition because, if de feated, some special benefit will accrue to them. (In re Scott et al., 15 N. B. R. 73; 4 Cent. Law J. 29; Fed. Cas. 12519.)

Minority of creditors.-It must appear that wrong has been done minority creditors by the vote of the majority on composition before the court will interfere (In re Wronkow et al., 18 N. B. R. 81; 26 Pittsb. Leg. J. 2; Fed. Cas. 18105); and the determination of the court, that a proper proportion of the creditors have confirmed composition, cannot be impeached in a collateral action. (Smith et al. v. Engle et al., 14 N. B. R. 481.)

Proof of claim.-It has been held that the form of oath prescribed for proving debts in bankruptcy need not be followed in proofs of claim for composition. (In re Morris, 12 N. B. R. 170.) See also sec. 57.

Qualified votes at composition meeting.- Only those who prove their claims can take part or vote (In re Keller et al., 1 N. B. R. 331; Fed. Cas. 7654; In re Matthews et al., 17 N. B. R. 225; Fed. Cas. 9274); but in involuntary proceedings the creditors are not bound to prove anew (In re Scott et al., 15 N. B. R. 73; 4 Cent. Law J. 29; Fed. Cas. 12519), although creditors who have not proved have been permitted to intervene