need not reach any of the constitutional questions in order to decide that an injunction may not issue. In such a practical matter as the granting or withholding of an injunction, the formal concession of government counsel, repeated in three courts, that suit may be brought and that no defense of lack of jurisdiction can or will be raised, should be sufficient. See Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 115 C. Cls. 626, affirmed, 341 U. S. 114. But even on the theoretical level, plaintiffs need have no fears. For, however one may formulate the rule that unauthorized takings cannot provide the basis for a Tucker Act suit, the qualification has always been recognized that the Court of Claims does have undoubted cognizance of cases, such as this, where a taking of the claimant's property is authorized by statute, although the particular method of taking actually employed by the government official may be claimed to be illegal. In addition, it may now be the law that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of suits for just compensation for eminent domain takings without regard to whether a taking was legislatively authorized. 1. Even if we accept at face value the doctrine, asserted by plaintiffs, that the Court of Claims remedy depends strictly upon an authorized taking, it is clear that statutory warrant does exist for a taking by the President and, therefore, that plaintiffs have an indisputable cause of action in that court. Rather than alleging a total absence of any authority in the President to seize the plants, the companies themselves suggest that there are statutes under which the plants could have been seized, but that, since the procedure provided for in those acts has not been followed, they are now entitled to affirmative relief. It is settled, however, that where a taking has been authorized, the use of another method of seizure and the failure to employ the statutory procedure will neither defeat the remedy in the Court of Claims nor justify the issuance of injunctive relief. The Youngstown and United States Steel complaints both refer to Section 18 of the Selective Service Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 625, 50 U. S. C. App., Supp. IV, 468) (par. 6, R. 2, and par. 12, R. 83, respectively), authorizing the President to place vital defense orders with a manufacturer and to seize his plant if he refuses or fails to fill the order. The United States Steel complaint (par. 12, R. 83) also refers to Section 201 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 as amended (64 Stat. 799, 65 Stat. 132, 50 U. S. C. A. App. 2081), which authorizes the President, whenever he deems it necessary in the interest of national defense, to acquire personal property by requisition and "real property, including facilities, temporary use thereof, or other interest therein" by way of condemnation. The statute provides that if the property is to be acquired by condemnation the court shall not require the party in possession to surrender possession, unless a declaration of taking has been filed and the amount estimated to be just compensation has been deposited." The complaints correctly allege that the Government has not complied with the procedural requirements of either statute, but it is undeniable that the President acted for the same public purpose for which the two Acts envisage that private enterprises might have to be taken. Section 201, for instance, authorizes the President to acquire property whenever he deems it necessary in the interest of national defense. Executive Order 10340 (R. 6-9) contains findings to the effect that a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and that seizure of the steel industry was necessary in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the present emergency. Hence, conditions existed which would have warranted use of Section 201 (b) if that procedure has not been much too cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand. 43 This provision is analogous to the one contained in the Declaration of Taking Act (Act of Feb. 26, 1931, 46 Stat. 1421, 40 U. S. C. 258a). As originally enacted, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (P. L. No. 774, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.) assimilated real to personal property and provided that both should be compulsorily acquired by the process of requisition, i. e., by an administrative taking to be followed by a suit for just compensation brought by the claimant. For reasons of convenfence and efficiency, and in order to follow the traditional practice in the condemnation of realty, the Department of Justice proposed an amendment providing that real property be condemned in accordance with the Declaration of Taking Act and the general condemnation statutes. This change was adopted in the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951 (P. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.). The amendment was plainly not intended to hamper or obstruct the acquisition of interests in real property. See H. Rept. No. 639, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 23-24, 36. Thus, the President had undoubted statutory power to seize the plaintiffs' properties for temporary use. Congress had itself authorized a taking by the President, even if it had not provided for this kind or method of taking. Once it is shown that the seizing officer had such general authority to take, the Court of Claims' just compensation jurisdiction is undeniable, whether or not the statutory procedures were followed. The most common instance is furnished by the Tucker Act flooding cases. In each, instead of bringing an ordinary condemnation suit under the Act of August 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 357, 40 T. S. C. 257, a statutory authority similar to Section 201, the government officers proceeded with their rivers and harbors works until the owners' lands were flooded and thereby taken. The owners have repeatedly sued and received just compensation in the Court of Claims for the taking. See the cases cited in fn. 42, supra, p. 55. They have not been defeated by any contention that condemnation proceedings should have been followed. On the contrary, the Court held in Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16: The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of duty to pay imposed by the Amendment. The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of the United States. And the Court only recently reaffirmed the interchangeability of the two proceedings in flooding cases. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 747–748. The same interchangeability exists where dry land is taken. See, e. g., United States v. North American Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U. S. 330, 333; Stubbs v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 1007 (M. D. N. C.); Tilden v. Unietd States, 10 F. Supp. 377 (W. D. La.). In all of these numerous instances, a statutory method of condemnation was provided, and in many, the authorizing statute provided that the land be acquired by condemnation proceedings; but instead of using that mechanism the officials appropriated the property by direct invasion. In each case, a suit for just compensation under the Tucker Act was entertained. Further examples of Tucker Act jurisdiction on the basis of informal eminent domain are the cases in which a normal condemnation suit has been instituted and possession taken, but the suit has later been abandoned by the Government or held not to include certain tracts. The dispossessed owners have their remedy in the Court of Claims or in the District Court under the Tucker Act. State Road Department of Florida v. United States, 166 F. 2d 843 (C. A. 5); Moody v. Wickard, 136 F. 2d 801, 803–804 (C. A. D. C.), certiorari denied, 320 T. S. 775; cf. United States v. Merchants Transfer & Storage Co., 144 F. 2d 324, 327 (C. A. 9). And this Court has emphatically declared that after a taking has been consummated, the right to recover compensation cannot be defeated because of a technical defect in the authority of the official who took the property. See International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 406, infra, p. 71. Applying these principles and directly controlling is Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 C. S. 95, in which the Court refused to grant an injunction in circumstances apposite here. Kincaid sought to enjoin Secretary of War Hurley from constructing certain flood control work on the Mississippi River which would subjeet Kincaid's property to flooding, unless the Government first acquired an easement on his property by condemnation. The applicable statues," analogous to Section 201 (b) of the Defense Production Act, provided that before the Cnited States acquired possession it had to file a condemnation petition in court and deposit an amount of money approved by the court as assuring certain and adequate provision for the payment of just compensation. The Government had omplied with none of those provisions. Instead, the officers of the Corps of Engineers were about to undertake construction which, Kincaid claimed, would lt in the flooding of his land. He sought to stop the work until the officers complied with the applicable condemnation procedure." The Mississippi River Flood Control Act of May 15, 1928, sec. 4, 45 Stat. 536, and the Ever and Harbor Act of 1918, sec. 5, 40 Stat. 911. Kincaid's brief in this Court urged, as the plaintiffs do here, that the statutory procete for condemnation was exclusive and had to be followed if a taking was to be effected. See Brief for Respondent, No. 457, Oct. Term, 1931, at pp. 59, 72. need not rege injunction In such a the formal e may be brou should be st 341 U. S. 1 For, howev provide th recognized such as t although ment offi that the eminent authori 1. E the Co clear fore, t than plant the in th It i ano Wi of 1 18 46 P a I ་* as entitled to an injunction. It torized by the statutes cited above medy in the Court of Claims. Herion to condemn prior to the erive relief. Said the Court (at p. rain in such a proceeding [under the which might have been awarded had ation proceedings which it is const material to inquire now whether -n of the defendants are acting illegally, ced without first acquiring flowage he illegality, on complainant's own rez compensate him for the taking, f such compensation may be proAmendment does not entitle him ting authorities]. eve relief is not whether or not the ory taking procedure," but whether the f Claims. Such a remedy is available Nation." the Hurley v. Kincaid principle we Cans would have jurisdiction of a just ven though no statute existed authorizing se that it has often been said or assumed es for just compensation presupposes that property rights had authority to do so. as rule in Tucker Act suits have not been recent cases, particularly in the Court of cerity in favor of assuming jurisdiction yaysical taking and where the Constitution jeersions which ground the asserted rule are mień States, 218 U. S. 322, involved an express see Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Com* 24a a factor which is usually absent and The precedential value on this point of United . S. 330, is lessened by the circumstance 22 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 18, Sex 299 U. S. 476, 497), including the element * dave been barred by the statute of limitase the property had been authorized to do so. saet Packer Act cases seem to make the right to „ein ez? not upon the taking officer's authority but hove the Government retains the benefit of seized we mpensation without showing that the seizure Our Mines, Inc. v. United States, 118 C. Cls. 8 the Court of Claims stated "that the Govpleading that it lacked authority to take If Order L-208 resulted in an unauwang of which the Government retained the benefit eccoge be obligated to pay". In Foster v. United 2. C's), certiorari denied, 342 U. S. 919, the same at act on for just compensation would lie in every gergy is kept from him by the United States for its he court declared that in cases where a regulapca Lival as violative of due process, just compensation Na » Beld of damages. The owner the property, which has ute 20 is admitted by the answer to have been done by authority [Emphasis supplied.] may still be decreed "if an actual taking [has] been alleged, proved, and loss established * *" Idaho Maryland Mines Corp. v. United States, C. Cls. No. 50182, decided May 6, 1952, slip op. p. 10." See also, for cases disregarding or omitting consideration of the taker's authority but nevertheless awarding just compensation, Forest of Dean Iron Ore Co. v. United States, 106 C. Cls. 250, 25-7; Niagara Falls Bridge Commission v. United States, 111 C. Cls. 338, 352-3; Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 109 C. Cls. 810, 830-832; International Harrester Co. v. United States, 72 C. Cls. 707; Thayer v. United States, 20 C. Cls. 137. The lessened stress which appears to be placed on the issue of authority, and the heightened concern with providing a Court of Claims remedy for a taking, is also revealed in recent decisions of this Court. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, involved the taking of an easement over property adjoining an airfield by frequent flights at low altitude. This Court held the owner of the land entitled to compensation without discussing the authority of the military to make such low flights or to appropriate the easement. This disposition of the case is in marked contrast with the decision in Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327, which involved the analogous situation of artillery fire over private property. There, the Court expressly indicated that the plaintiff could recover only if it established "authority on the part of those who did the act" (at 330). Azain, in United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, this issue which, if material, would be of a jurisdictional nature (see Hooe v. United States, 218 T. S. 322, 336) was not explicitly passed upon by the Court. It is true that in Perce the Government had not defended on the ground that the taking was unauthorized (cf. Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 115 C. Cls. 626, 676), but the Government's brief before this Court disclosed that the seizure had not been based on any specific statutory authority," and jurisdictional issues may he noticed on a court's own motion (United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 440; United States v. Wheelock Bros., Inc., 341 U. S. 319).o1 51 Another facet of the same concern with providing, rather than denying, a just Compensation remedy is shown by Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U. S. 330, 35-6 (affirming 189 F. 2d 744, 747 (C. A. 2), and Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U. S. 469, 479-480 (affirming 156 F. 2d 793, 797 (C. A. 2)), both of which Construed the Tucker Act as available to persons from whom property was taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act but whose remedy under that Act was deemed too narrow. See also Sherr v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F. 2d 680, 1-2 (if statute cutting off informer's right of action deprived him of "vested right", suit for just compensation was available in the Court of Claims); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 697, fn. 18 (“Where the action against which specific relief is sought is a taking or holding of the plaintiff's property, the availability of a suit for compensation against the sovereign [in the Court of Claims] will defeat a contention that the action is unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth Amendment"); Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, -22 (Tucker Act remedy available instead of suit against Government rep resentatives alleged to have taken the plaintiff's property); Fay v. Miller, 183 F.2d 986, 989 (C. A. D. C.) th). Whatever may be the ultimate general principle distilled from these lattercay developments in the jurisprudence of the Tucker Act, we suggest that in the case the broad doctrine which plaintiffs proclaim should not be applied. Perhaps the most important reason for insisting that an unauthorized taking annot subject the United States to liability is to prevent executive officials from eating express prohibitions imposed by Congress. See Hooe v. United States, C. S. 322, supra, p. 64. A second purpose is, perhaps, to forestall minor Scials from seizing property unnecessarily or for personal reasons or through allusion. Neither of these ends is served by requiring the President's authority in this ase to be fully vindicated before suit can be properly maintained under the Tacker Act. Congress has not prohibited the President from doing what he has done here. And it is the President himself, acting in a grave national emergency The court also said (slip op., p. 10): "A regulation which is unconstitutional as violative of due process, because arbitrary, may well result in a taking of the property effected for which just compensation would be due to the extent of the value of the property rights so taken.' See Government's Brief in No. 168, October Term, 1950, pp. 42-44. As we point out below (pp. 140-141), the Pewee decision may also be read as holding that a taking like this one is valid and authorized. and for the most public of purposes, who has seized the plaintiff's plants, not a minor subordinate acting on his own. 28 U. S. C. 1491 (fn. 41, supra, p. 55) may be said to recognize this distinction between executive action founded on a formal order or regulation and independent action taken by subordinates. That section gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims "founded upon any regulation of an executive department" [Sec. 1491 (3)], and it does not add that the regulation must be valid or authorized. Here, the Executive Order would be the basis of the plaintiffs' claim, and since it orders a taking and contemplates just compensation, the Court of Claims would appear to have full jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 1491 (3), regardless of the constitutional validity of the President's taking.52 3. A further word should also be said as to the practical probabilities of plaintiffs' not having a remedy in the Court of Claims. Government counsel have assured them and the courts that, if an injunction is not issued, no objection will be raised to the Court of Claims' jurisdiction on the ground that the taking was invalid. The Pewee case shows that this is not an idle promise, but established Government policy. It is certainly not to the plaintiffs' interest to raise the point of validity in the Court of Claims. Their sole fear is that future Government counsel will make such a defense or that present counsel will change their position. But if that should happen, the courts have a ready answer in the pungent words of Mr. Justice Holmes in International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 406: The Government has urged different defenses with varying energy at different stages of the case. The latest to be pressed is that it does not appear that the action of the Secretary was authorized by Congress. We shall give scant consideration to such a repudiation of responsibility. The Secretary of War in the name of the President, with the power of the country behind him, in critical time of war, requisitioned what was needed and got it. Nobody doubts, we presume, that if any technical defect of authority had been pointed out it would have been remedied at once. The Government exercised its power in the interest of the country in an important matter,without difficulty, so far as appears, until the time comes to pay for what it has had. The doubt is rather late. We shall accept as sufficient answer the reference of the petitioner to the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, c. 134, § 120, 39 Stat. 166, 213; U. S. Code, Title 50, § 80, giving the President in time of war power to place an obligatory order with any corporation for such product as may be required, which is of the kind usually produced by such corporation. (See also United States v. Georgia Marble Co., 106 F. 2d 955, 957 (C. A. 5)). We do not believe that either the Court of Claims or this Court will have greater difficulty with the future “repudiation of responsibility" which plaintiffs say they fear. 4. The legal remedy which plaintiffs have in the Court of Claims is plainly adequate. There is a short answer to the possible argument that damages in the Court of Claims are an inadequate remedy in view of the uniqueness of the interests taken, the difficulties of assessing damages, and the circumstance that some injuries are incapable of monetary compensation. Plaintiffs' remedy in the Court of Claims is the same as under an award in eminent domain proceedings (Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16). And it is one of the inherent liabilities of private property that it is always subject to the exercise of the paramount rights of eminent domain (United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 465), and that the owner is merely entitled to such monetary compensation as will indemnify him fairly and justly. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 306; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16-17. Such monetary compensation will clearly be adequate in the present case. The asserted damage which plaintiffs principally allege consists in a trespass or taking, an interference with plaintiff's right to bargain collectively with their employees, and a fear that defendant will impose some or all of the recommenda 53 Conversely, the Tort Claims Act (28 U. S. C. 2680 (a)) exempts from the coverage of that statute a claim "based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid ** |