squarely presented whether the facts pleaded constitute an equitable estoppel against the plaintiff. As we understand the rule, matters pleaded by way of equitable estoppel must be of such character, and sufficient, as pleaded, to make a cause of action for deceit on the part of the defendant. The rule is stated in language of infinite variety in the many cases that have arisen in the courts. In Branson v. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32, the supreme court of the United States say: "If one person is induced to do an act prejudicial to himself in consequence of the acts or declarations of another on which he had a right to rely, equity will enjoin the latter from asserting his legal rights against the tenor of such acts or declarations." In Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578, upon the same subject the supreme court say: "He who by his language leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted." It is not necessary to quote from other authorities: the rule is easily deducible from these. It is this: In order to create an estoppel of this character, it is necessary that the plaintiff, either by language or conduct, should have-First, falsely represented or concealed a material fact; second, the false representation or concealment must have been knowingly made; third, the party pleading the estoppel must have been ignorant of the facts; fourth, the representation must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon; fifth, the party pleading it must have been misled thereby to his injury in some substantial particular. Tested by this rule. does the matter pleaded as an estoppel in the case at bar fulfill the requirement? We think it is clear that it does not. It may be admitted, for the purpose of this case, that the representation of the plaintiff that it had re-entered and had forfeited the lease was false, and intentionally made to deceive the defendant. There is nowhere a hint in the answer that defendant was ignorant of the real facts. This is a vital matter in any plea of equitable estoppel or complaint for deceit. If the plaintiff knew the truth, he had no right to rely upon a falsehood; and in a plea of this kind it is imperative that he should show his want of knowledge. Then, again, this plea fails to disclose any substantial injury. The only matter of which defendant complained in this regard is that he forbore to construct a building which he contemplated erecting. Whether it would have been to the advantage of the plaintiff or not if he had been permitted to erect the building is left wholly to conjecture. There is nothing in the answer that even intimates that it would have been profitable to defendant to have constructed such building. It may have been greatly to his advantage that he did not build. Suppose the defendant were suing the plaintiff for deceit, and were to allege the making of the lease in this case, and his default in the rent, and then allege that the plaintiff here had represented to him that it would not declare any forfeiture of the lease, and that it had not re-entered; that he considered his lease to be in full effect, and therefore contemplated erecting a building on the premises; but that plaintiff in fact had reentered and forfeited the lease. Would it be claimed for a moment that the complaint stated a cause of action? We think not. The plea in this case must be tested by the same rule. The only defense well pleaded was eviction in May, 1892. This defense was not proved, and, as we have said, was expressly waived in this court. But for this defense, the plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment on the pleadings. We are therefore of opinion that the judgment of the court below should be, and it is, affirmed. BARTCH and KING, JJ., concur. (12 Utah, 13) OGDEN STATE BANK v. BARKER et al. (Supreme Court of Utah. June 3, 1895.) CREDITORS' BILL - To SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-RECITAL OF CONSIDERATION-EF FECT KNOWLEDGE OF GRANTEE. 1. The recital in a debtor's deed to his children that it was made for a nominal consideration is conclusive against him in an action by creditors to set aside the deed for fraud. 2. In an action by creditors to set aside a deed, evidence that it was made by a debtor to his children for services rendered by them is not admissible to contradict a recital that it was made for a nominal consideration, especially where the debtor was legally entitled to such services. 3. A deed made to children for a nominal consideration, whereby the grantor is rendered unable to meet existing debts, is void. 4. A voluntary conveyance of land by a debtor, who is thereby rendered insolvent, is constructively fraudulent as to existing creditors, without proof of actual fraud, though the grantee had no knowledge of the fraud. 5. Where it may be inferred from the whole bill in a suit to set aside a conveyance for fraud that defendant was insolvent at the time of the conveyance, an express allegation to that effect is unnecessary. 6. Under Comp. Laws 1888, § 2838, providing that every conveyance made with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors shall be void, an allegation, in a creditors' bill to set aside a conveyance that the grantor was insolvent at the time of the conveyance, is unneces sary. 7. Where evidence was taken by a master, and reported to the court, it will be presumed that incompetent evidence offered by either party was not considered by the court in rendering its decision on the evidence reported. 8. Evidence which throws any light upon an alleged fraudulent conveyance is admissible in a suit to set it aside. Appeal from district court, Fourth district; before Justice J. A. Miner. Action by the Ogden State Bank against William Barker and others to set aside a certain deed. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order overruling their motion for a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed. Richards Macmillan, for appellants. W. A. Lee and H. H. Henderson, for respondent. BARTCH, J. This is an action in the nature of a creditors' bill, brought by the plaintiff, who is a judgment creditor of William Barker, one of the defendants, to set aside and declare null and void a certain deed by which William Barker and his wife Mary Ann Barker, conveyed certain lands to their sons, the defendants Franklin J. Barker and Leroy Barker, on the ground that said conveyance was fraudulently made for the purpose of hindering and delaying the plaintiff in collecting his judgment. The case was referred to a master in chancery to take and report the testimony. A return of the evidence having been made, the court, after considering the same and hearing arguments of counsel, entered judgment thereon setting aside and canceling the deed, and ordered the property thereby conveyed to be sold to satisfy the judg ment of the plaintiff. A motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and thereupon the defendants appealed both from the judgment and order overruling the motion for a new trial, assigning various errors. judgment against the defendant William Barker, valid and unsatisfied, is denied. Nor is the issuance of the execution against the property of Barker and Iverson, or the return nulla bona, denied. Nor is it denied that defendants William Barker and wife were the owners in fee of the land, or that the conveyance to their sons was made after the debt, which was merged in the judgment, was contracted. All the facts not denied are admitted to be true, and upon the trial the court found all the issues raised in the pleadings, in favor of the plaintiff, as appears from the findings of fact. Under the pleadings and facts thus shown by the record, counsel for the appellants insist that the deed in question was made in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, to pay an honest obligation between parents and children, which, they contend, arose under a contract entered into between the parents and children long before any debt to this plaintiff was contracted or assumed by William Barker. The first question to be considered is whether the conveyance was made for a valuable consideration, in good faith, and not merely to defraud, hinder, or delay the creditors of William Barker. The effect of the consideration expressed in a deed is to estop the grantor from denying that the deed was executed without a consideration, and to prevent its operation as a resulting trust in the grantor. When a consideration, though merely nominal, is expressed, whether founded thereon or not, the deed may be valid and operative, as between the parties; but, when assailed by the creditors of the grantor, it may be void as to them, because not founded on a valuable consideration. Such would be the effect in a case where the demands of the creditors were in existence at the time when the deed was executed, if the operation of the deed would put it beyond the power of the grantor to meet his liabilities; and in such case, if the creditors of the grantor attack the conveyance as fraudulent and made to hinder or delay them in the collection of their claims, the burden of proof is upon the grantee, or those claiming under him, to show such a consideration as will release the conveyance from such im It is alleged in the complaint, substantially, that on September 17, 1892, the plaintiff obtained a judgment in the district court of the Fourth judicial district against the defendant William Barker and one James Iverson for the sum of $4,003.40, in a foreclosure suit; that on October 10, 1892, the mortgaged premises were sold to satisfy said judgment, and $1,700 realized thereon, and on October 12, 1892, a deficiency judgment was docketed, in the sum of $2,375.55; that thereafter, on February 10, 1893, a writ of execution was issued against the property of said Barker and Iverson, which was returned nulla bona; that on April 20, 1892, and after he had contracted the debt upon which the judgment was recovered, William Barker and his wife conveyed the premises described in the deed to their sons; that they so conveyed the same without consideration, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and obstructing the plaintiff in collecting his judgment, all parties knowing that the deed was fraudulent; that said William Barker, after the conveyance, remained in possession of the land; that said Barker and Iverson are insolvent, and plain- | putation, and for such purpose the fact that tiff is without remedy at law; and that the premises, unincumbered, are worth about $3,000, but, if sold with said clouds thereon, would not satisfy the judgment. The defendants, in substance, deny that the grantors remained in possession since the conveyance, or that there was no consideration for the deed, or that the conveyance was made to cheat, defraud, hinder, or delay plaintiff or other creditors, or that the premises are worth more than $1,250, or that William Barker and James Iverson are, or either of them is, insolvent, or that plaintiff is without a remedy at law. It will be observed that neither the corporate existence of the plaintiff, nor his a consideration is recited in the conveyance is not evidence as against creditors whose claims accrued prior to its execution, for such recital is the mere declaration of the grantor. The consideration clause in a deed does not prove that the deed was founded on a valuable consideration, or on any consideration. Hence, where the consideration expressed is one dollar, it may be shown that a larger sum was actually paid. So, where a larger sum is expressed, it may be shown that a less sum was actually paid. But an entirely different consideration from that expressed cannot be shown by parol evidence, when the deed is assailed by creditors, be cause this would be to vary the terms of a contract, the stipulations of which were reduced to writing by the parties. In the absence of mistake or fraud, the written instrument speaks for itself, and, when attacked by creditors, its stipulations are conclusive as to the grantor and grantee; and the instrument cannot be supported by falsifying its recitals, because they must be presumed to have been made and accepted deliberately, and to express the intention of the parties thereto. The law presumes that every man intends the necessary and natural consequences of his own acts, and where the proximate and natural results of a debtor's acts are to hinder, delay, or defraud, creditors, it will be presumed that he intended his acts to produce such results. Snyder v. Free (Mo. Sup.) 21 S. W. 847; Belden v. Seymour, 8 Conn. 304; Houston v. Blackman, 66 Ala. 559; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 753; Goodspeed v. Fuller, 46 Me. 141; Lawson v. Funk, 108 Ill. 502; Maigley v. Hauer, 7 Johns. 341; Grout v. Townsend, 2 Hill, 554; Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17. In the case at bar the consideration expressed in the deed is one dollar, and there is no other consideration mentioned or referred to in the consideration clause. The deed having been assailed by a creditor of the grantor on the ground that it was fraudulent and made to hinder and delay such creditor in collecting his claims, its recitals were conclusive, and at the trial neither the grantor nor the grantee was entitled to show any other consideration than that contained in the instrument. Potter v. Gracie, 58 Ala. 303. The fact that the grantor was permitted on the trial to introduce evidence tending to show that the conveyance was made by Barker to his sons because they had remained at home with him, and had rendered value in work to him, and had agreed to stay with him, cannot change the effect and operation of the consideration expressed in the deed. Such evidence cannot be considered. Nor could it be regarded under the issues raised in the pleadings, or under the facts disclosed by the record. Even if such a promise or agreement was made, it is clear that it was made at a time when the grantor was legally entitled to their services, without compensation, and therefore such services would not constitute a valuable consideration which would avail the grantees as against creditors. The deed was therefore made for a nominal consideration. deed is a mere voluntary conveyance, without consideration, and void as to creditors whose claims existed at the time of its execution, and who would, because of such conveyance, be defrauded of their rights, or hindered or delayed in the collection of their claims. Labor performed by children, during their minority, for their parents, will not entitle such children to compensation, so as to establish the relation of debtor and creditor between them, or to enable the parents Such a to lawfully prefer them to creditors, and to convey their property to them, and place it out of the reach of creditors whose claims were in existence at the time of such conveyance. Nor does the fact, if such be a fact, that the grantees did not participate in any ' fraud against the creditors, or that they accepted the deed in good faith, without intent to defraud them, if they so accepted it, relieve them from the effect and operation of a voluntary conveyance. Where there is no valuable consideration for a deed, one of the material questions is the intent of the grantor, and it is immaterial how innocent the grantees are. They are bound by his acts, and, if he was heavily indebted at the time of making the conveyance, the inference is that the instrument was fraudulently made for the purpose of hindering and delaying his creditors. A voluntary conveyance of land, made by a debtor while he is under embarrassed circumstances, is constructively fraudulent, and will be held void, as to existing creditors, without proof of actual fraud. And this is so although the grantee has no knowledge of a fraudulent intent on the part of the grantor. So even where the debtor has not been shown to be absolutely insolvent, but when the effect of the conveyance is to hinder or delay or defraud the creditors. Bump, Fraud. Conv. pp. 282, 287, 288; Bohannon v. Combs, 79 Mo. 305; Judson v. Lyford, 84 Cal. 505, 24 Pac. 286; Shaw v. Tracy, 83 Mo. 224; Strong v. Lawrence, 58 Iowa, 55, 12 N. W. 74; Matson v. Melchor, 42 Mich. 477, 4 N. W. 200. Counsel for the appellants insist that there is no allegation in the complaint in this case that the debtor was insolvent at the time the conveyance was made, and that, therefore, the respondent cannot prevail. This position is not tenable, for it is alleged in the complaint that an execution was issued, and returned nulla bona, and that both the defendant debtor and his cojudgment debtor "are insolvent." While the allegation as to insolvency is in the present tense, and does not refer directly to the time of the execution of the deed, still the complaint, considered as a whole, is sufficiently certain to admit evidence of insolvency. But even the omission of an allegation of insolvency at the time of the conveyance would not be fatal to the bill, because such insolvency is not a fact of jurisdictional consequence, and is not a condition of relief per se. The legislature has pointed out the facts on which jurisdiction rests, where creditors are concerned, and on which relief must be founded, and insolvency is not mentioned among these facts. Every conveyance made with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors shall be void as to them. Comp. Laws Utah 1888, § 2838. That the facts mentioned in the statute, on which the relief is sought, are sufficiently set out in the bill, there is no question. The case at bar is different from one in which injunctive relief is sought; for there insolvency becomes one of the ultimate facts to be proved, and must be properly alleged. This is not so when resort is had by bill in equity to set aside a conveyance in aid of execution on a judgment. In such case the bill must show that the conveyance was made to delay, hinder, or defraud the creditors of the grantor. "It is not necessary, however, that insolvency should either be proved or presumed, in order to render a voluntary conveyance void. If the indebtedness is so large that the effect of the transfer is to defraud creditors, the conveyance is void. If insolvency, therefore, takes place shortly after the making of the conveyance, that is enough." Bump, Fraud. Conv. pp. 282, 283. While in this case it was not necessary to base the relief demanded on the fact of the insolvency of the grantor at the time of the execution of the deed, still it is apparent from the record that, had the conveyance been valid, such fact would have existed; for it is shown by the evidence that shortly after the making of the deed an execution was issued by the judgment creditor against the property of William Barker, and returned nulla bona, except as to the property in controversy. The judgment and fruitless execution were evidence that such creditor's legal remedies had been exhausted, and conclusive evidence of the debtor's insolvenсу. It was so held by this court in Enright v. Grant, 5 Utah, 334, 15 Pac. 268; Hager v. Shindler, 29 Cal. 48; Case v. Beauregard, 101 U. S. 688. Nor is there anything in the record which indicated that he had any other property at the time he made the deed. While a father may lawfully convey property to his minor children in consideration of love and affection, or for services performed or to be performed, when it does not interfere with the rights of creditors, and while it is commendable for him to make suitable provision for his family when be is solvent and able to pay his debts, still he may not make such conveyance or provision at a time when the effect and operation of the same would be to defraud or cheat his creditors, or to hinder or delay them in the collection of their just claims. Conveyances of this character, being voluntary, and not made for a valuable consideration, must be held to have been executed, delivered, and accepted subject to the rights of the creditors existing at the time they were made. Dowell v. Applegate, 15 Fed. 419; Irish v. Bradford, 64 Iowa, 303, 20 N. W. 447; Rynearson v. Turner, 52 Mich. 7, 17 N. W. 219; Gardner's Adm'r v. Schooley, 25 N. J. Eq. 150. In the case at bar the instrument in question was a voluntary conveyance, having been made without a valuable consideration. The complainant was a judgment creditor. As to him, the conveyance is void, because his claim is paramount to that of the debtor's sons. That a person must be just before he is generous is an invariable rule of law. The claims, under a voluntary conveyance, of those who are bound by the ties of natural affection and duty, must yield to the superior rights of creditors. A settlement of property by a father upon his child, when the father is insolvent or largely indebted, and when he has not sufficient property remaining to satisfy his debts, cannot be sustained. Bump, Fraud. Conv. p. 280; Crawford v. Logan, 97 Ill. 396; Potter v. Gracie, supra. Counsel for the appellants also complain that at the trial certain evidence was improperly admitted. It is not deemed necessary to refer particularly to the evidence complained of, because it was taken by a special mas.ter in chancery, and reported to the court. In such case, in the absence of any ruling on such evidence by the court sitting as a court of chancery, it will be presumed that incompetent evidence offered by either party to the suit was excluded, and not considered by the court in rendering its decision on the evidence reported. It may be observed, however, that in questions of fraud a wide range is allowed in the admission of evidence. Fraud is a creature of secrecy. It assumes many disguises and subterfuges, and, in general, can only be detected by the consideration of circumstances and facts, and these are frequently disconnected, remote, and trivial. Their meaning is often difficult of interpretation, and for this reason the evidence is allowed to assume a wide latitude, and it is sometimes difficult to determine what circumstances should be admitted and what excluded. The true test seems to be whether the testimony offered throws light upon the transaction, or whether it is wholly irrelevant. Applying this test to the evidence in question, which consists of the declarations and acts of the grantor, it is clear that it tends to show the intent with which the conveyance was made, and was therefore admissible, because the intent of the grantor at the time of making the deed is one of the material elements in this case. Such declarations and acts of the grantor, made before and contemporaneous with the transfer, are admissible, at the suit of creditors, against the grantee, as well as in his favor. Fraud. Conv. pp. 579-581, 588, 589. There are other errors specified in the record, and, while they have not escaped our notice, still we do not deem a discussion of them necessary to the decision of this case. The record presents no reversible error. We are of opinion that the deed in question is fraudulent and void as to the complainant, and was properly canceled and set aside by the court. The order directing the property to be sold in satisfaction of the debt was also proper. The judgment is affirmed. Bump, MERRITT, C. J., and SMITH and KING, JJ., concur. (12 Utah, 27) OGDEN STATE BANK v. BARKER et al. (Supreme Court of Utah. June 3, 1895.) FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES. Plaintiff was a creditor of one who con-eyed land to his sons. After the debt had been put into judgment the debtor and his sons joined in a mortgage to defendant to secure the payment of certain notes of the debtor and his son, which defendant held for collection. Both the owner of the notes and defendant acted in good faith, and neither knew of the mortgage until after its execution. Held, that the evidence was insuflicient to set aside the mortgage as being in fraud of appellant. Appeal from district court, Fourth district; before Justice J. A. Miner. Action by Ogden State Bank against William Barker and others to set aside a deed and a mortgage. From a judgment refusing to set aside the mortgage, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. W. A. Lee and H. H. Henderson, for appellant. Evans & Rogers, for respondents. BARTCH, J. The question to be determined on this appeal was raised in the creditors' bill in the case of Ogden State Bank v. Barker (decided at this term) 40 Pac. 765. It appears from the record that the appellant was a judgment creditor of William Barker, that Barker conveyed his land to his sons, and that then all the Barkers joined in a mortgage to the respondent Brough. The appellant sought to have both the deed and mortgage set aside on the ground that they were fraudulent and void, claiming that they were made without consideration, and to hinder and delay the creditors of William Barker. The court canceled the deed, and declared it void, but refused to cancel and set aside the mortgage, and dismissed the action as to Brough. gage, not the notes, was given without a valuable consideration. Nor is there anything to show that the notes were not executed in good faith. If, then, the notes were made for a valuable consideration, upon what theory of law can it be contended that the mortgage given to secure them was void for want of a valuable consideration? The notes, having been given for value, and evidencing the indebtedness of the mortgagor to the real owner of them, constituted a valuable consideration for the mortgage. The mere fact that the mortgagee was not the real owner of the notes, but was simply a trustee or agent for the owner, does not affect the validity of the mortgage. Nor does the fact that the mortgage was executed by all the Barkers, and at a time when the debt which was merged in the judgment of the appellant was in existence, affect its validity. Neither is the validity of the mortgage affected because, among the notes which it secures, there is one which was made by Franklin J. Barker, and for which William Barker was not liable. It is apparent from the record that the notes for which William Barker was liable constituted bona fide existing claims against him. These he had a right to secure, even though the debt which he owed the appellant was in existence at the time of the execution of the mortgage, because he had, a right to prefer as a creditor the owner of the notes. Even if such preference were made with a fraudulent design, or with the intent to hinder and delay the appellant in the collection of his judgment, still, if neither the trustee nor the owner of the notes participated in the fraud, or had any knowledge of it, the validity of the mortgage would not be affected. Pettit v. Parsons, 9 Utah, 223, 33 Pac. 1038. There is no contention that there was any such participation or Counsel for the appellant insist that the knowledge on the part of the trustee or mortmortgage was given to Brough without congagee or owner. Nor does it appear from sideration, in a secret trust, and therefore the evidence that it was a secret trust. It is should be canceled and set aside. This po- shown that the trustee was not present at the sition does not appear to be sustained by the time the mortgage was made, and knew record. It is shown by the evidence, sub-nothing of it until after its execution. We stantially, that Brough was the acting cashier of the Citizens' Bank; that certain notes came into his possession for collection by reason of his position in the bank; that he placed them in the hands of attorneys, and demanded that suit be brought to enforce payment, unless security be given; that the mortgage was given to secure the payment of the notes; that Brough was made trustee in the mortgage without his knowledge; and that neither he nor the owner of the notes knew anything of its execution until after it was made. Each note, on its face, represents a valuable consideration, and there is evidence tending to show such consideration in fact. There is nothing in the record to warrant an assumption that there was no valuable consideration given for these notes. Nor is such the contention of counsel for the appellant, for their contention is that the mortv.40P.no.11-49 are of the opinion that the cancellation of the mortgage was properly denied, and the action properly dismissed as to the respondent Brough. The judgment is affirmed. MERRITT, C. J., and SMITH and KING, JJ., concur. (21 Colo. 275) CHAPPELL v. McKEOUGH. 1. Where a surety on a note pays part thereof at maturity, and then procures a stran ger to take it up by giving their joint note to the holder, the intention being to keep the note alive, such transaction constitutes a purchase, and not a payment of the note; so that, in an action by the purchaser against the other surety to recover the balance due on the note, defenses |