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a pistol, or to go into particulars as to what sued appellees, Alcks, McFarland, and Mche had done in his past life. The examina- Carty, in the circuit court for trespass, tion should have been confined to the wit- alleged in the petition to have been comness' character for truthfulness or his gen. mitted by cutting and removing timber from eral moral character.
land in McLean county of which Alice CheatBy the incompetent evidence above re- bam claims to be the owner and Robards ferred to the impression, no doubt, was left and Kennedy in possession as her tenants. upon the minds of the Jury that there was Upon the ground of the alleged insolvency an apprehension among his neighbors that of the appellees, an injunction was obtained appellant would hurt somebody about his by appellants to prevent the further cutting wife, and this impression was fortified by of timber from the land by them. The apthe improper examination to which we have pellee Hicks answered, denying appellant's referred. When this impression was fasten- ownership of the land from which the timed upon the minds of the jurors, a founda- ber was cut and removed, averring that it tion was laid for them to conclude that it is owned by and in the possession of one was probable that he had killed Bryant be Charles Hofferberth, setting forth the boundcause he was jealous of him. While we ary of the entire tract claimed by Hofferwould not reverse the judgment for the con- berth, of which that in controversy is alleged duct of the commonwealth attorney, which to be a part, and justifying his cutting of was not objected to, and might not reverse the timber upon the ground that it was aufor the admission of the evidence which was thorized by Hofferberth, the alleged owner. objected to, if the proof was clear as to the By an amended petition, in the nature of a defendant's guilt and the trial was otherwise bill quia timet, filed by the appellant Cheatfair, still the evidence was prejudicial, and ham, appellee Hofferberth was then made a being given undue weight by the matters party to the action, following which he also indicated, may have had great effect upon answered, denying appellant Cheatham's tithe jury. In view of the inconclusiveness tle or possession of the land described in the of the evidence against the defendant, and petition, setting up title in himself to the in view of the conduct of the commonwealth land in question, and averring that it attorney in asking the questions above re- was a part of a large tract owned by him, ferred to, we cannot say that the defendant the boundary of which was given in the anhas had a fair trial, or that upon the whole swer by metes and bounds and courses and case there was no substantial error to his distances. His answer also contained the prejudice.
a verments: That he and those under whom Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. he claims the land in controversy had, at the with directions to grant appellant a time of the institution of the action, been trial.
in the actual adverse possession of it and claiming to a well-defined and marked bound.
ary for more than 15 years continuously, and, CHEATHAM et al. v. HICKS et al.
further, that during the lifetime of George (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Sept. 28, W. Scantland, father of appellant Alice 1905.)
Cheatham, from whom the land descended to 1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-BOUNDARIES-AGREE- her, he (Scantland) claimed the land now in MENT AS TO LINE-VALIDITY-EFFECT. Where adjoining landowners orally agree
controversy, which was also then, as now, upon a boundary line and occupy according to
claimed by appellee Hofferberth; and to setthe agreement, it is not within the statute of tle the dispute between them as to the line frauds, but is enforceable in equity as against dividing their lands and prevent litigation subsequent owners.
they agreed that the true line between their (Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 23, lands was as follows: “Beginning at three Cent. Dig. Frauds, Statute of, § 112.)
maples on the bank of Green river, running 2. TRESPASS-CUTTING TIMBER-EVIDENCE.
thence to a stake, with a burr oak pointer, In trespass for cutting and removing timber from plaintiff's land, evidence held not to
near a pin oak stump.” And the line was show plaintiff to be the owner of the land on
thus established. That this agreement was which the alleged trespass was committed. made more than 25 years before the action Appeal from Circuit Court, McLean Coun
was brought, and the line of division thus agreed upon and designated was thereafter
always recognized by appellee and Scantland "Not to be officially reportel"
as the true line between their lands, and was Action by Alice Cheatham and others
so recognized by appellant until about the against Byrd C. Hicks and others. From a
time of the institution of her action. That judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.
the line thus established left to appellee on Affirmed.
his side of the line, and as part of the entire R. H. Cunningham, for appellants. W. W. tract claimed by him, the land in controIreland, W. B. Noe, Geo. D. Heilman, and versy. The agreement as to the dividing Andrew J. Clark, for appellees.
line, and the marking and fixing of same in
pursuance thereof, was relied (1) appellee SETTLE, J. The appellants, Alice Cheat- in his answer as a bar to g.
action. bam, R. H. Robards, and F. H. Kennedy, Replies were filed by ap
majority of those present voting for same on both passages, the yeas and nays being called and entered upon the journal: Provided, however, that all ordinances requiring the improvement of streets and alleys, or the construction of sewers, or fixing salaries, or prescribing penalties, or fixing the rate of taxation, or amount of licenses, or appropriating money, where the amount appropriated is in excess of one hundred dollars, shall, on each passage, receive the votes of two-thirds of all the councilmen then elected, the yeas and nays being called and entered on the journal.”
It is insisted that the petition is insufficient, because it is a verred in it that the ordinance was read and passed by the council on September 1, 1903, and it is not shown that it was twice publicly read and passed by the common council at two sessions held on different days; a majority of those present voting for it on both passages. The rule is that a general allegation that the council passed the ordinance is sufficient; it being presumed that the council did its duty. It is to be presumed that the pleader refers to the final passage of the ordinance, when he says that it was read and passed on September 1st. In Preston v. Roberts, 75 Ky. 579, the court said: “The allegation that an ordinance was passed was not the mere pleading of a conclusion, but of a fact, just as an allegation that a party executed à deed, a note, or other writing, or is the holder and owner of a bill of exchange, or the like, without alleging the facts which show that he did execute the writing or which make him the owner and holder of the bill." See Lexington v. Woolfolk, 78 S. W. 910, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1817. If the defendant wishes to take issue as to the passage of the ordinance, he can do so by his answer, by traversing the allegations of the petition, and then, as the certified ordinance which is filed with the petition makes out a prima facie case for the plaintiff, the burden is on him to show that the council did not do its duty or conform in its proceedings to the statute.
It is a verred in the petition that the work was accepted by the common council. It is stated in the petition that a copy of the resolution of the common council receiving the work as done according to the contract is filed therewith as part thereof, marked "E." The answer of the defendant does not traverse the allegations of the petition on this subject, and, when the case was submitted and was on trial, during the argument of the plaintiff's attorney, it appearing that exhibit E was not in the papers, the court allowed the city to file a copy of the exhibit. The paper so filed is not a copy of the resolution of the council receiving the work. Perhaps a mistake was made in getting the right paper; but, however this
may be, the defendant not having traversed the allegation of the petition that the work was accepted by the council, there was no issue between the parties on this subject, and it was admitted of record that the work had been accepted by the council. Section 3453, Ky. St. 1903, among other things, provides: “The liens given for the purposes named in the last four sections may be enforced by filing a petition in equity in favor of the contractor, or his assignee, against any or all the persons liable for the cost of said work, and it shall only be necessary for the plaintiff in the action to file a copy of the ordinance of the common council requiring the work to be done, a copy of the contract for doing the same, a copy of the engineer's report showing the respective liability of each person sued, a copy of the order or each resolution of the common council receiving the work as done according to the contract, which shall be, together with the corresponding allegations in the petition, prima facie evidence of the plaintiff's right of recovery, and in such cases the defendant shall not be allowed to make the defense that the work was not done according to contract, as against said plaintiff in the action."
It is insisted for appellant that, as a copy of the resolution accepting the work was not filed with the petition, the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case. Waiving the question whether it should be presumed under the pleadings that the exhibit was in fact filed with the petition and had simply been lost from the record, we think that where no issue is made as to a fact alleged in the pleading, and the fact is thus conceded of record, the failure to file an exhibit showing the fact is immaterial; and, the other papers required by the statute to make out a prima facie case being filed, there was a substantial compliance with the statute. Under section 134 of the Civil Code of Practice a judgment shall not be reversed for an error not affecting the substantial rights of the adverse party.
There is nothing in the record to raise the question of spoliation, or to show that anything more was assessed against the de fendant's property than should have been assessed against it.
BARRET et al. v. GWYN et al. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 4, 1905.) 1. WILLS-CONSTRUCTION.
Where a will provided for the division of testator's residuary estate into equal shares, to be held in trust for testator's brothers and sisters, and at their death paid to their children, an only child of one of the sisters, who after his mother's death was paid a part of her share of the estate, took such share absolutely, so that when he died, his property passed under the law of descent and not under the will.
2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS — IN.
SOLVENCY-LOSS OF ASSETS OF ESTATE By WHOM BORNE.
A will directed testator's residuary, estate to be divided into equal portions and held in trust for testator's brothers and sisters; the share of each to be paid after the death of such brother or sister to his or her children. After a portion of their shares had been paid to the descendants of four of the legatees, the executor became insolvent, and part of the estate was thereby lost. Held, that the loss was to be borne by the whole estate, and not wholly by the shares which had not been paid, and hence, in making further payments from assets in process of collection, no payments should be made to those beneficiaries who had received partial payments until the payments to those who had received none of the principal should equal the amounts which had been paid to those who had received partial payments. 3. PLEADING-ANSWER-REPLY.
Where the answer of certain defendants is not made a cross-petition against their com defendants, the latter are not required to reply.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Chancery Branch, First Division.
"Not to be officially reported.”
Action by Henry W. Barret and others against Hugh G. Gwyn and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.
Alex G. Barrett and R. H. Blain, for appellants. Nathan J. Kahn, Chas. F. Taylor, and Guy H. Herdman, for appellees.
HOBSON, C. J. James Garvin died, a resident of Louisville, about the year 1859, the owner of a considerable estate. He had no children, and left a will by which he de vised his entire estate to his executors, in trust for his two brothers, Samuel and William Garvin, five sisters, and the children of a deceased sister, to each one-eighth. Wil. liam Garvin's share was left to him absolutely, but the shares of the other brother and the sisters were to be held by the executors during their lives, the income to be paid to them, and at their death the principal to be paid to their children, or, if any of them died without children or descendants, to the remaining brothers and sisters or their issue. The will also directed that the execụtors, as soon as in their judgment it was practicable to make a proper and judicious division of the residue of the estate, should divide it into eight shares, and upon making the division they should pay the income of each part to the person entitled to receive it, and upon the death of the brother or sisters to pay over to the lawful issue of the decedent forthwith the portion set apart for the parent. He also directed that, as soon as the division was made, the portion assigned to the children of the dead sister should be paid to them. He appointed his friends, John Bell and Samuel Gwyn, executors of the will. Gwyn only qualified, and on April 30, 1861, filed his petition in the Louisville chancery court, asking a construction of the will and the direction of the court in the execution of his trust. Settlements were made by him from time to time with the commissioner. Finally, in
March, 1865, it appeared that the executor had in his hands the sum of about $61,000, and thereupon the court entered a judgment construing the will, and directing the executor to pay over to William Garvin one-eighth of the sum in his hands, $7,625.19, and that he should pay the same amount to the children of the sister who was dead at the death of the testator, and also to the children of another sister who had since died. The order concludes with these words: "The other five-eighths of said residuary estate the executor will still hold in trust in accordance with the provisions of the testator's will.”
Later it was made to appear to the court that M. J. Brown, another sister, had died, and the executor paid to her children another one eighth of the fund, leaving in his hands something over $30,500. He had continued to collect the assets of the estate, and it appeared that he had in his hands the sum of $7,240.80 since the division was made in 1865; and he was ordered to hold this general fund. He reported to the court, before he paid Mrs. Brown's share, that $38,125.89 was invested in a house and lot in Brooklyn, certain bank stock, and some notes of the heirs which he had taken. After this the executor became insolvent, and R. H. Blain was appointed, in the year 1875, as administrator with the will annexed. Blain found the house and lot in Brooklyn incumbered by tax liens, the bank stock pledged for the personal debts of Gwyn, and the general fund of $7,240.80, which remained in the hands of the executor undivided, had disappeared. Blain finally sold the house in Brooklyn for $6,000 or $7,000. He succeeded in getting $3,000 or $4,000 from the bank stock, and $3,000 or $4,000 from the heirs to whom money had been loaned, making the total of the estate in his hands about $16,000. The testator owned 33 surveys of land in Texas, of 320 acres each, on which there were also unpaid taxes, and perhaps some of the land had been sold for taxes. Blain paid off the taxes in Texas, and, as directed by the court, paid out the income on the estate in his hands, until he finally resigned and settled his accounts in the year 1880. D. M. Rodman was thereupon appointed as trustee in his stead, and received the estate which Blain had in his hands. Rodman remained trustee until about the year 1888, paying out the income to the heirs, and in 1888 he fail. ed, and the Louisville Trust Company was then appointed trustee.
The chief thing that the trust company got from the estate in Rodman's hands was a piece of Louisville property which belonged to Thomas Kennedy, his surety, and is yet in the hands of the trust company. What this property is worth does not clearly appear from the record. During the administration of Blain some of the Texas lands were sold and some were also sold during the administration of Rodman. Quite number of sales have been made by the trust
company, so that now more than one-half of the land has been sold. One of the three sisters whose part of the estate was left in the executor's hands, Mrs. Kerr, died, a re sident of Memphis, Tenn., about the year 1875, leaving an only son, John L. Kerr, who died shortly after his mother, intestate. At Mrs. Kerr's death, Blain, as trustee, held a note secured by a mortgage on property in Memphis amounting to $4,080. Under the order of the court Blain released the mortgage, and took Kerr's receipt for the amount of the debt as so much distributed to him from the estate. Nothing since has been paid to this interest. About the year 1880 (the exact date is not shown) Samuel Garvin died without issue. At his death Mrs. Barret and Mrs. Hunter were the only two sisters living, and the trustee seems to have paid them the entire income on the estate from that time forward. They are now dead, and, all of the brothers and sisters of the testator being dead, the circuit court was called upon to adjust the rights of the parties in the estate in the hands of the trust company. At the time of the judgment there was only a balance of $5,092.36 in the trustee's hands, and it is not shown what will probably be realized from the remaining assets of the estate. The case presents several questions, by no means easy of solution, on which we will give our conclusions, without elaborating our reasons for them, as this would unduly lengthen this opinion,
1. The testator's will indicates a manifest purpose to equalize his brothers and sisters. He goes to great length to show that he intends to place them on an absolute equality. The spirit of the will forbids that any of them should be given an advantage over the others. When Samuel Garvin died without issue, his share did not descend to the surviving sisters, but to them and the descendants of those who were dead; that is, the descendants of those who were dead took their parents' shares, just as the parents would have taken them if living. When Mrs. Kerr died her son took her share absolutely, and when he died his property passed, not under the will, but under the law of descent.
2. In so far as the special fund of $30,569, which was left in the hands of the executor after paying off four of the heirs, has been lost by the insolvency of Gwyn or the insolvency of Rodman, the loss must fall upon the estate, and not upon the four shares alone that received nothing in the distribution. To hold otherwise would be to defeat that equality which the testator aimed to maintain. The order of the court simply directed the executor to hold the fund as directed by the will, and when it was lost in the executor's hands the case should be treated simply is one where some of the devisees have receiv
money from the executor, who became ivent before he distributed to the other sees, Before anything more is paid
upon the four shares, who received each $7,625.19, Kerr, who only received $4,080, must be made equal with them, and Samuel Garvin's heirs, who have received nothing, must receive $7,625.19. Mrs. Barret and Mrs. Hunter must also be made equal with the first four heirs before they receive anything further.
It is insisted for appellees that the case should now be settled by an application of the maxim that “in equity that will be treated as done which ought to have been done." But, if that had been done which ought to have been done, there would have been no case to settle. In that event the $30,569 would have been kept intact, and the yearly in. come paid to those entitled to it. When Mrs. Kerr died, her fourth would have been paid to her son, and not $4,080 merely. When Samuel Garvin died, his fourth would have been paid to his heirs, and the income on the remainder of the fund would have been divid. ed between Mrs. Barret and Mrs. Hunter. If that had been done which ought to have been done, the general fund of $7,247.80 left in the executor's hands would have been kept intact. The taxes would have been paid out of it, and this fund would have been swelled with the proceeds of the sales of the Texas lands. The surplus income from this fund, thus augmented, after paying taxes, should have been distributed to all eight of the devisees or their representatives. The trouble in the case is, where so much was left undone that should have been done, how shall the rights of the parties be adjusted to work out justice between them as near as it can be now done?
" Rodman sola Texas land to the amount of
$2,587, and paid taxes on it to the amount of $1,328. So, considering what Blain paid out on this account and interest, we have not a large balance either way. Rodman paid as income to Mrs. Hunter $2,543.44, and to Mrs. Barret the same amount. As nothing had been paid to Samuel Garvin's heirs on account of principal, and as practically one-fourth of the fund in the hands of the trustee had been paid John S. Kerr's heirs, this income should have been divided be tween the remaining three, and one-third of it should have been paid to Samuel Garvia's heirs. Since the trust company took charge it has paid to Mrs. Hunter and her heirs $8,536.77, to Mrs. Barret and her heirs $8,560.10, and nothing to any of the other devisees. Of the amount paid Mrs. Hunter's heirs $2,000 was paid on account of principal, and of the amount paid Mrs. Barret's heirs $2,312.52 was paid on account of principal ; so that the amount paid Mrs.Hunter and her heirs on acount of income was $6,536.77, and the amount paid Mrs. Barret and her heirs on account of income was $6,247.78. Samuel Garvin was paid his share of income by Blain; but it must be presumed nothing has paid thereon since his death from the facts shown in the record. The trust
company received some money from Rod- cluded by falling to reply to appellee's anman and Kennedy, his surety. It sold Texas swer ; for it was not made a cross-petition lands for $19,449, and out of this paid on the against them, and they were not required Louisville land obtained from Kennedy, in to reply to the answer of their codefendants. taxes, costs, apportionment warrants, etc., The judgment is reversed on the original $8,318.63. The income which it received and cross-appeal, and cause remanded for was derived mainly from the proceeds of the further proceedings consistent herewith. Texas lands which it sold. The income Each party will pay his own costs in this which the trust company received should court. The transcript fee will be paid by the have been divided equally between Mrs. Hun- trustee out of the trust estate. ter, Mrs. Barret, and Samuel Garvin's heirs, as they had received no part of the principal of the estate, and the losses of the special
CRAFT v. BARRON. fund must in equity be borne by the estate and not by them alone.
(Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 4, 1905.) The total amount of income paid to Mrs.
1. PLEADING-ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD-SUFHunter, Mrs. Barret, and their heirs by
FICIENCY-MOTION TO MAKE SPECIFIC. Rodman and the trust company, as we figure good, without specifying the facts constituting
A general plea of fraud in an answer is it, is $17,871.43, and the third of this sum go- the fraud, though it is better pleading to set ing to Samuel Garvin's heirs is $5,957.14, out the facts, and on a motion to make more which should be paid back to them by Mrs.
specific this should be required, when necessary
to enable the plaintiff to prepare his case. Hunter's and Mrs. Barret's heirs, without in
[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 23, terest, out of any funds hereafter falling to Cent. Dig. Fraud, $ 37; vol. 39, Cent. Dig. them, before anything more is in fact paid to Pleading, $ 2842.] Mrs. Hunter's or Mrs. Barret's heirs. Out 2. APPEAL-HARMLESS ERBOB. of the $5,092.36 now on hand for distribution, Where an answer pleaded fraud generally, the chancellor will distribute $3,000 to
but a former answer, which had been required
to be reformed, had set out the specific facts, Samuel Garvin's heirs, $1,000 Mrs. Hunter's and both plaintiff and defendant had taken the heirs, and $687.68 to Mrs. Barret's heirs, to depositions of plaintiff's agent, who, it was bring them up to $3,000. But the amount
alleged, had made the fraudulent statements,
the overruling of a motion to make the comabove adjudged to Mrs. Hunter's or Mrs.
plaint more specific was not reversible error, Barret's heirs, or that may be coming to under the Code provision that a judgment shall them from the estate of Samuel Garvin,
not be reversed for an error not affecting the
substantial rights of the party complaining. will not be paid to them, but will be applied
3. CONTINUANCE-SURPRISE. to pay what they owe to that estate on account of income received by them; and as ositions of witness attacking the character of they own one-third interest in Samuel Gar- one of plaintiff's witnessess for truth and vein's estate, they should be required to pay
racity. After a ruling that the plaintiff would
not be compelled to go to trial without time out of their own funds only two-thirds of the to take proof to meet these depositions, the amount they owe to the estate, and the two- defendant agreed to withdraw the depositions thirds so paid by them should be divided
and the trial proceeded. While it was in progbetween the other four heirs of Samuel Gar
ress, plaintiff saw the deponents in the court
rooin and moved for a continuance, but filed vin's estate. In future distributions Sam- no affidavit of surprise, and did not show that, uel Garvin, Mrs. Hunter, and Mrs. Barret if given time, he could sustain the character will be made up to Kerr's estate, $4,080, and
of his witness, and did not ask a continuance
at his cost. Held, that the court properly reafter that the surplus will be divided among fused to continue the case. the four, until they are made equal to the 4. WITNESSES-IMPEACHMENT-REPUTATION. other four ($7,625,19), and after that there Evidence that the reputation of a witness will be an equal division in eight parts
for truth and veracity was bad at places where
he had resided some time before trial is admisof the surplus. But Mrs. Hunter's and Mrs.
sible, in connection with similar testimony, as Barret's heirs must in fact be paid noth- to his reputation at a place where he resided ing until their debt to Samuel Garvin's estate at the time of trial, but for only a short time
before. is settled, and, as Mrs. Hunter received more of the income than Mrs. Barret, the
[Ed. Note.-- For cases in point, see vol. 50,
Cent. Dig. Witnesses, $ 1124.) chancellor, after the debt to Samuel Garyin's
5. TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS-INVASION OF PROV. estate is paid, will, if necessary, require
INCE OF JURY. Mrs. Hunter's heirs to pay Mrs. Barret's In an action on a contract which defendheirs a sum sufficient to equalize them.
ant claimed he was induced to enter into 3. The note against William Garvin will be
through fraudulent misrepresentations of plain
liff's agent, instructions that, if the representacharged to Mrs. Weston, without interest tions were substantially untrue, and by reason after his death; no demand having been of them the defendant was induced to make made for its payment, properly verified, in
the contract, relying on the statements and
believing them to be true, the jury should find one year from that time. It will be deduct- for defendant, while, if the agent only made ed from the first money coming to her. the statements as matters of opinion, they 4. The questions raised on the appeal are
should find for plaintiff, were not objectionable,
on the ground that they took from the jury not concluded by any of the judgment en
the power to judge of the materiality of the tered in the case. Appellants are not con- misrepresentations
8. Shortly before triar, defendant took the dep