It will be observed that the account has at its head the date September 22, 1900. But it is agreed that this was the date when the account was made out preparatory to giving notice of the intention to file a lien, and not the date when any of the first material was furnished. Plaintiffs offered the lien claim in evidence at the trial, but the court excluded it. An exception was saved to that ruling. The notice of intention to file a lien was served, according to the return of the sheriff, on the firm of Corl & Murray, by delivering a copy to one member of the firm (G. F. C. Corl). In this action to enforce the lien, personal service of the writ of summons was obtained on J. P. Hayward, who was in Newton county. The defendant Edward B. Stoddard was a resident of Chi

cago, Ill., when the action was instituted, and an affidavit of his nonresidence in the state of Missouri was filed with the petition. A summons was issued to the sheriff of Cook county, Ill., commanding him to serve Stoddard in his bailiwick, and that writ was executed by personally serving Stoddard in Illinois. The trial court stated that it excluded the lien claim because it was defective on its face in respect of dates and items, and could not be amended. Plaintiffs tendered proof of the other allegations of their petition necessary to make a case on the lien account, but all the evidence tendered was excluded. Thereupon the court gave this declaration of law: "The court declares the law, and instructs the jury that, upon the plaintiff's evidence, which tends to

prove the allegations in their petition, the plaintiffs cannot recover, and the verdict must be against the plaintiffs, in favor of Corl & Murray, because the plaintiffs' lien account is not sufficient in law as to dates or items; in favor of Stoddard & Hayward, because there was no service on them in this state to support a personal judgment." An exception was saved to that declaration, and plaintiffs took a nonsuit, with leave to move to set it aside. A motion to set it aside was filed in due time, containing these grounds: "First. The court erred in excluding the plaintiffs' lien account and statement, and claim and evidence. Second. The court erred in holding that evidence of the plaintiffs offered was insufficient to support a judgment in their favor. Third. The court erred in holding that the court had no jurisdiction for personal judgment against Stoddard & Co. Fourth. The court erred in giving a declaration and instruction peremptorily directing a verdict against plaintiffs, against the law and contrary to the evidence adduced and offered by them. Fifth. The court erroneously compelled plaintiffs to take the said nonsuit by its adverse rulings as to the law of the case, and by excluding evidence." The above motion was overruled, and plaintiffs appealed.

Opinion.

1. It is apparent that the learned circuit judge erred in holding there could be no personal judgment against the defendant Hayward. He was a member of the firm of Edward B. Stoddard Company, and was one of the original debtors for the material in controversy. As he was personally served with process in the case, plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against him. The court below was under the impression that Hayward, as well as Stoddard, had been brought into court by constructive service, and therefore was not amenable to a personal judgment. Counsel for the defendants say the court's attention was not called to this erroneous ruling in the motion for new trial, but, by inspecting the grounds of that motion, it will be seen that it was called to the court's attention in a sufficiently definite way. Besides, the declaration of law given by the court explicitly declared there was no service on Stoddard and Hayward in this state to support a personal judgment. That declaration was erroneous as regards Hayward, and the motion for new trial complained of the declaration.

2. The notice of an intention to file a lien was served only on Corl, one of the owners of the premises, and not on his co-owner, Murray. For this reason the contention is preferred that the lien must fail, as the law requires subcontractors to give notice to all the owners of premises of an intention to file a lien. There may be a question as to whether service on Corl would support a judgment enforcing a lien against Murray's

interest in the premises, although the two were partners, and in some sense agents for each other. This question we waive, as it does not call for present decision. We have no doubt that, notice having been served on Corl, the lien can be enforced against his undivided interest.

3. The important and difficult question is whether the lien statement was sufficiently full and definite to satisfy the law. The lower court held it inadequately stated the items, and the dates when they were furnished. We think the description of the items of material furnished meets the requirement of the law. The heading of the first column of each page showed the different items following were lumber, because the word "Lumber" stood at the head of the column. Underneath were numerical and abbreviated verbal designations of the different kinds of lumber furnished. Such abbreviations are understood in trade, and employed constantly in making out bills and stating accounts. It was competent to explain by oral testimony the meaning of the figures and abbreviations. The figures, abbreviated words and initial letters, such as "S. & E," "Com. Flg," "No. 1 Rgh," "Star dp sdg," doubtless can be shown to have a well-known meaning, and to be descriptive of the kinds and sizes of the different lots of lumber furnished. Sometimes the material was named-for instance, "Ruberoid Roofing." The question of the sufficiency of such designations of material in a lien account was passed on by our Supreme Court in Henry v. Plitt, 84 Mo. 237, 241. The court said the heading of the account showed the figures used to designate the items referred to lumber, and, as figures, instead of words, are in common use in trade to indicate articles sold, the statement was good. The same proposition was passed on in Schulenburg v. Werner, 6 Mo. App. 292; Holland v. Cunliff, 96 Mo. App. 67, 69 S. W. 737. In those cases the accounts were no more full and definite in describing the different lots of material than is the present account. We therefore deem it not an open question that this one sufficiently describes the kinds of material furnished to be good under the mechanic's lien statutes.

4. The next point to be considered is the effect of the absence of dates. As to the time the extras were furnished, the months and days of the month are indicated by numbers, as is customary in commercial affairs. These numerical designations could have been explained by testimony, and the time they indicated defined. But the difficulty is that no year is given in the bill of extras, and the part of the account containing the lumber furnished under the original estimate has no notation of dates, either in words or figures. The account itself may be assisted by the affidavit attached to it. Mitchell Planing Mill Co. v. Allison, 138 Mo. 50, 56, 40 S. W. 118, 60 Am. St. Rep. 544. But the

affidavit contains nothing to throw light on when the material was furnished, except the statement that the demand accrued four months prior to the filing of the lien. Stating the months and days, but not the year, leaves the time when the material was furnished uncertain. Therefore the lien paper shows no more than that the demand accrued within four months prior to the filing of the claim in the office of the circuit court. The last extra was furnished Juhe 8th, as is shown by the notation "6/8." The last credit of $500 was entered June 10th (“6/10”). The question for decision is as to whether the statement that the demand accrued within four months, without any showing as to when the first material was furnished, or the extreme dates between which all the material was furnished, or any dates when the different items were furnished, makes a good lien account. In answering this qustion, the first thing to ascertain is what our statutes say on the subject, if anything. The statutes require every original contractor within six months, and every journeyman within sixty days, and every other person seeking a lien within four months, after his indebtedness accrued, to file in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the proper county a just and true account of the demand due him, after all just credits have been given; the same to be verified by oath. Rev. St. 1899, § 4207. The railroad lien law expressly requires dates to be given. Rev. St. 1899, c. 47. art. 4, §§ 4239-4256. The other lien statutes say nothing about dates, and their language exacts nothing in regard to time, except that the lien must be filed within a certain period after the indebtedness accrues. In the case of a subcontractor this period is four months. Now, as the plaintiffs, who were subcontractors, averred in the lien paper that their demand accrued within four months of the filing, they complied with the language of the statutes. If any more in regard to dates or time is necessary, it is on account of the implication arising from the use of the expression "a just and true account." Are the dates of the different items of an account, or of the first and last items, essential ingredients of a just and true account, according to the meaning of that term in the mechanic's lien law? By "just and true" is meant an account which states truth, and not falsehood, and demands no more than, in right and justice, the claimant ought to have. The question comes down, then, to the legal meaning of the word "account"; and, if we turn to the books, we find that the word has no precise and inflexible meaning in law, but is one of diverse significations. Morrisette v. Wood, 128 Ala. 505, 30 South. 630. The primary idea of an account is a statement of debits and credits between parties who have been doing business with each other. Whitwell v. Willard, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 216; Nelson v. Posey Co., 105 Ind. 287, 4 N. E. 703; Purvis v. Kroner, 18 Or. 414, 23

The

Pac. 260; Turgeon v. Cote, 88 Me. 108, 33 Atl. 787. An account has been defined as a written statement of pecuniary transactions; a detailed statement of demands in the nature of debit and credit between parties, arising out of contract or some fiduciary relation. 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 434. Another text-book says an account is no more than a list of items, whether debits or credits; an exhibit of charges and credits growing out of mutual dealings, presented in such form as to facilitate the determination of the balance due by simple calculation; that the term has no clearly defined legal meaning, but the primary idea is that of debit and credit. 1 Cyc. 362. conclusion from these definitions is that giving the dates of various transactions is not indispensable to an account, though dates, we know, are usually affixed in stating a bill of debits and credits. The conclusion is to be derived, also, that the word "account" is not a word of precise technical import, requiring the presumption that the Legislature, in using it, meant to call for a statement of particulars containing essential and wellknown parts. There are technical words which convey a meaning not only definite, but full and precise. For instance, if the word "deed" is used, it imports an instrument possessing certain elements or parts, which at once occur to one of legal training. The courts of this state have had occasion to pass on the term "account" as used in the mechanic's lien law. In McWilliams v. Allan, 45 Mo. 573, it was said there is a broad distinction between an account and the amount due; the balance due is but the reIsult of the debit and credit sides of an account; it implies mutual dealings, without which there could be no balance; what the Legislature intended was that the lienor should exhibit his demand fully, and thereby show the balance sought to be imposed as a lien, instead of merely stating the balance. But the Supreme Court said in Mitchell, etc.. Co. v. Allison, 138 Mo. 50, 40 S. W. 118, 60 Am. St. Rep. 544, that the authority of McWilliams v. Allan had been shaken in regard to the necessity of itemizing an account by the later case of Hilliker v. Francisco, 65 Mo. 598, which went far toward authorizing a lumping charge under certain circumstances. In Coe v. Ritter, 86 Mo. 277, 287, it was said incidentally that the dates of items ought to appear in a lien account; and this ruling was taken in Curless v. Lewis, infra, as establishing the rule that dates are indispensable. That remark was made in a case wherein the question for decision was as to whether a lien for material or a deed of trust on the premises should have priority, and the decision depended on when the material was furnished. A lien attaches in favor of any one who furnishes material for an improvement after it is begun, and the lien enjoys priority over a subsequent incumbrance, but not over an incumbrance

earlier in point of time than the inception of the work. It is obvious that the date when an improvement is started and materials furnished for it is vital when the controversy is concerning which has priority-a lien or an incumbrance. In Coe v. Ritter, supra, the dates when the several lots of material were supplied were stated in the lien account, and, according to those dates, the deed of trust was entitled to precedence. But the right was asserted to show the dates given in the lien paper were incorrect, and that part of the material was furnished earlier than they indicated. This evidence was rejected on the ground that the statutes called for a just and true account, and the tenure of others interested in the premises, who had relied on the statement filed with the circuit clerk, ought not to be jeopardized by contradicting the statement. That decision did not touch the question in hand. It is difficult to see how dates can be important when the controversy is between a proprietor of premises, who contracts in person for an improvement, and a party who supplies material for the improvement. Of course, if the material was supplied more than five years before the action was instituted, and the earlier items were not kept alive by a running account, those items would be barred by the statute of limitations. That, however, would be matter of defense in a suit to enforce the lien, and the necessity of showing it on the face of the lien claim is far from obvious. Mitchell, etc., Co. v. Allison, supra.

As the term "account" has no precise technical meaning, when interpreting a statute in which it is used we should adopt that one of its common meanings which will realize best the main object of the statute. Now, as a statement of debits and credits may either contain dates or not, and still constitute an account, we should not require any fuller showing of dates in a lien account than the language of the lien statutes calls for, or than will aid in accomplishing the purpose of those statutes. To require more would incumber the law with a useless rule. The principal facts to be shown by a lien statement are what material or work the claimant wishes a lien for, and when the indebtedness accrued. Such a showing enables the owner of the premises to ascertain whether the work or material actually went into the improvement, and whether the statement was filed in the time limited. By ascertaining the truth about those matters, the owner will know that his property is or is not liable prima facie for the claim. So much regarding what strikes us as the sound theory of the question. Let us return to the cases.

There has been a diversity of rulings by the appellate courts of this state as to the necessity of dates to a lien account. It may be said that all the decisions hold that a date need not be affixed to every item. The real problem is as to whether the lien paper

must show the extreme dates of the account (that is, the dates of the initial and the final transaction), or whether it suffices to show the demand accrued within four months before the filing of the lien account, or whatever the period may be, depending on the character of the claimant. The decision in Curless v. Lewis, 46 Mo. App. 278, was that a "just and true account" meant an itemized account, with dates, and that a lien paper which did not show the beginning of the account, but did show that the demand accrued within six months prior to the filing (the claim was that of an original contractor) was insufficient. The same court (Kansas City Court of Appeals) declared the same doctrine in Mitchell, etc., Co. v. Allison, 71 Mo. App. 251. The latter case was certified to the Supreme Court as in conflict with the decision of this court in Hayden v. Wulfing, 19 Mo. App. 353. In the following decisions, accounts that gave the initial and the final dates of various transactions, but not the dates of the intermediate items, were held good: Mesker v. Cutler, 51 Mo. App. 341; McDermott v. Claas, 104 Mo. 14, 23, 15 S. W. 995; Ittner v. Hughes, 133 Mo. 679, 684, 34 S. W. 1110. The first and last dates appeared, too, in Mitchell, etc., Co. v. Allison, for, though there was a long account in that case, consisting of many items to which no dates were affixed, the account closed with these words: "Delivered and used in the building above described between April 20, 1893 and July 19, 1893." The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that those words were not enough, and that the lien claim was void, but the Supreme Court took the other view. It will be perceived that as the account in hand lacks the initial date, and fails to show more as to the final date when material was furnished than that the demand accrued within four months of the filing of the lien, the point in decision in the Allison Case is different from the one we are called on to decide. Still the tone of the Supreme Court's decision favors the validity of the present lien. The opinion deals with the meaning of the word "account," and says: "The account which this law contemplates is such a statement of the claim as fairly apprises the owner and the public of the nature and amount of the demand asserted as a lien. The account may consist of one or more items. It may be all on one side, or mutual in its showing. To be valid, however, it must disclose on its face that the demand is of a sort within the terms of the lien law. The affidavit required to verify the account may be considered along with the account itself in ascertaining the sufficiency of the latter." The Supreme Court's opinion pointed out that the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals was in conflict with the decisions of this court in several cases besides Hayden v. Wulfing. If the opinion had held in terms that Hayden v. Wulfing was correctly decided, we would have no difficulty with the