will be to repudiate formally the now exploded doctrine laid down in the Declaration of Independence, that 'Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.'

The point of view from which the Southerners undertook the war cannot be more clearly or vividly stated than it is in an able work upon Confederate Secession, which has recently issued from the pen of the Marquis of Lothian. It leaves upon the mind of the reader a clearer idea of the process by which the animosity was engendered between North and South, which ultimately bore fruit in secession, than any that has been published upon this vexed controversy. Others have been more elaborately full; but for that very reason have been less intelligible. It is a just remark of the author that

"The abundance of proof which exists on this subject has done the Southern cause more harm than good; for its advocates, desirous of leaving nothing unsaid which might strengthen their case, have laid so much stress upon what Virginia said when she joined the Union, and what Kentucky said when she did so, and upon the way in which Washington and Hamilton, Madison and Jefferson, expressed themselves about it, that they have run the risk of entangling their rights as free men in a maze of technicalities.'

The truth is that the grievances of the South against the North, like the grievances of all people who ultimately quarrel, are very numerous, and differ widely in value. Some are clearly only the offspring of the bitterness that has been bred by others. A full statement, therefore, of all the griefs a Southerner is ready to enumerate against the North, only tends to weaken his case. The complaints that are obviously hollow have the effect of throwing doubt on those which are intrinsically sound. Enough, however, remains, after all deductions, to make out abundant grounds for a divorce. The process of legislative suction by which the North drained her partner's life-blood-the steady, ruthless use of a congressional majority to transfer all trade, all manufacture, all government expenditure to the North, and to leave to the South nothing but the privilege of paying an enormous proportion of the taxes are effectively depicted in Lord Lothian's pages; and they furnish an impressive warning against a reliance upon the generosity the generosity or the justice of a pure democracy, which, it is to be hoped, will not be lost on trustful spirits on this side of the Atlantic. It would be ridiculous to assert that slavery has nothing to do with the present conflict; but it is still more absurd to assert either that it is now the object of the war on either side, or that it was the original cause of quarrel. It had just that connection with the disruption that the last drop has with the overflowing of the cup. The South had suffered

many

many injustices from the numerical majority of the North. When they saw Mr. Lincoln elected upon the cry of Abolition, and saw that he took for his chief adviser Mr. Seward, who had given his approval to a proposal to abolish without compensation, they thought that this time they would not wait till the injustice was carried through and the new hostile rule was riveted firmly on their necks. But then, deluded people, they believed, with Franklin, and Hamilton and Jefferson, and all the Fathers of the Revolution, that it is a self-evident truth that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.'

But who cares now for the cause of the war? What value do the Federals themselves set upon even the show of legality in their proceedings? They tell foreign powers that an insurrection exists in certain portions of the United States. But they are themselves on the point of inaugurating a revolutionary government. By no possible construction of any clause in the constitution can a President be chosen by only a fraction of the States. And yet Mr. Lincoln is about to take office for another term in virtue of an election in which nine of the States have not voted, or been invited to vote. Still more flagrant is the breach of the constitution which the President elect is proposing to his Congress to commit. He suggests to them to abolish slavery by an amendment of the constitution. In other words, he proposed to amend the constitution without even consulting a third part of the States. It is obvious that discussions turning on presumed legality are out of place in criticising a government like this. It is a revolutionary government, bent on the conquest of the Southern States as an end, and reckless of the means by which that end is to be gained. The only question that is of much interest now is, whether that end will be gained? When the death-feud is raging between two communities, it is idle to enquire how it began. The only question that it concerns us to solve is, how will it end?

There has been no more curious circumstance incident to this war than the utter falsification of all prophecies that have been hazarded concerning it. The first point upon which every one was agreed was that the Northerners were far too faithful votaries of the dollar ever to plunge into a war for the sake of territory. The next point upon which opinion was equally unanimous was, that the very moment any armed force invaded the South there would be a universal revolt among the slaves. Before the battle of Bull's-run took place, the general idea was that the North would not have much difficulty in overrunning the South; but that its difficulties would commence with the restoration of a nominal peace. After the battle of Bull's-run it was assumed with

with equal hastiness that it would be impossible to find Northern troops who would stand fire, or Northern generals to lead them. Certain disruption has been prophesied for the North with as much confidence as certain starvation for the South. All Pitt's belief in the omnipotence of finance has reappeared in the confident predictions of the partisans of each side, that its antagonist must give way under the bankruptcy that was impending. The Americans flatter themselves that all these forecasts have proved false, because they are a peculiar people, whose ways are not to be measured by the experience of the worn-out Old World. But the truth has been really in the other direction. We in Europe have misjudged the Americans more because we have assumed them not to be men of like passions with ourselves, and have tried to construct a peculiar philosophy for their special behoof. If we had judged of the Confederates as we should of any very gallant European people-such as the Swiss, or the Scotch, or the Goths of Spain, or the mountaineers of the Caucasus-we should have foreseen a resistance scarcely less heroic than that which they have actually made. If we had judged of the North, as of a European mob, without capable rulers to guide it, we should have credited it with most of the qualities it has displayed-fortitude, determination, blind ferocity, and an equal inability to produce statesmen of power to conduct the struggle with success, or prudence to close it without dishonour.

Such failures are not encouraging to further attempts at prophecy; and it may be observed that they are now generally avoided with prudent care. The utmost that any observer can safely do is to draw conclusions from the past experience of the war as to its future course. Two facts stand out strongly upon the surface of the various operations which have occupied the last three years and a half. One of them is that the Confederates are powerless to struggle with the Federals upon the water. Their attempts to form a navy, renewed again and again with the perseverance of Bruce's spider, have been uniformly unfortunate. No ship that they have yet constructed either at home or abroad but has been destined to an early and disastrous fate. The attacks of the gunboats of the Federals upon the land fortifications of their antagonists have met with a more chequered success. On the Mississippi and upon the tributaries of that river they have scarcely ever failed. Upon the seaboard and at the mouths of the rivers that flow into the Atlantic, their success has been rarer, and as yet utterly barren. The other fact is that they have not yet contrived to maintain a single post in the enemy's country at a distance from their watercommunications. For a time it seemed that Sherman had

achieved

achieved a splendid exception to this rule. Atlanta was a real land conquest, gained with no aid from sheltering gunboats; but a few weeks showed that the rule was invariable, and that the apparent exception was but a hollow and transitory triumph. The capture of Atlanta had been due, perhaps, to the inopportune caution of Johnston, and to the perilous audacity which the necessities of a Presidential contest had compelled Sherman to assume. But the first movement of his adversary proved it to be an untenable position; and the manœuvres by which he has repaired his error, though creditable to his military talent, have brought no advantage, setting aside mere desolation, to his cause, which could not have been gained by naval operations. For the present, therefore, it may be taken as established by the experience of the war, that the Federals cannot effect a lodgement at a distance from their water-communications; and that those communications are limited to the sea, the Mississippi, and its tributaries. If the war should continue to be waged upon its present conditions, and this rule should hold good, the limits of the future Confederacy are marked out with tolerable decision by the hand of nature. The natural boundary will be the range of mountains which extends from a point near Memphis on the Mississippi to Harper's Ferry on the Potomac, and which cuts off between itself and the sea the larger part of Virginia, all the Carolinas, all Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, except a narrow margin, and a small portion of Tennessee. The conquest of Louisiana and Arkansas is probably within the power of the Federals to achieve, if they concentrated a large proportion of their force upon those points. But if they are once brought to consent to the severance of the other Southern States, it is not likely that they will make any struggle for dominion over a population that is bitterly hostile to them, except so far as is necessary to secure the free navigation of the Mississippi.

But the Federals at present contemplate a very different termination for the war. They have abandoned the dream of 'latent Union feeling in the South.' They know that if ever the Cotton States are ruled again from Washington, it will be by sheer, despotic, overwhelming force. We have seen that they calmly propose to themselves to oust from the possession of the land the whole existing population, and to supply their places by immigrants from the North. But they do not flatter themselves now that this will be possible so long as the Southern armies remain in a state of efficiency. The ninety days' delusion has disappeared at last. It is now confessed that the suppression of the rebellion, in the official language peculiar to the Washington Government, is a big job.' They have learned enough of the

stuff

stuff of which Southern generals are made, to have renounced the hope of terminating the war by any series of brilliant and decisive victories; but they trust to their ability to break down the military power of the South.' They are preparing to fight upon the principle followed by some chess-players, who, when they have by any contrivance obtained the advantage of a piece or a pawn over their adversaries, clear the board by exchanging pieces, and remain masters of the game with that simple piece or pawn. The Federal population is twenty millions. The Southern white population is certainly not more than five. If every two Federals can contrive to kill one Southerner, it is clear that the surviving Federals will find no difficulty in taking possession of the devastated Southern lands. There is no gainsaying the numerical preponderance of the Federals; and there is no denying that, abstractedly speaking, two Federals are equal to the slaughter of one Confederate. If human nature were so composed that wars could be settled by this inexorable arithmetic, it would be better that the requisite number of victims on each side should be set to work and kill each other off at once, and settle the matter without further waste of time. But conscripts, though a patient race, have never hitherto consented to submit themselves to the operations of this kind of international clearing-house. Human beings have in all ages shown a marvellous readiness for self-sacrifice; but when this quality has been exhibited upon a large scale, it has always been in obedience to a motive of adequate power. Before we can count upon its exhibition we must ascertain that the motive of which it is the effect and index is present in sufficient force. In balancing, therefore, the fighting power of two communities in order to ascertain the result in which their conflicts are likely to issue, it is not enough simply to compare the numbers and the wealth of the respective populations. The motives in operation upon each side are a material element in the computation, and their disproportion may well outweigh a large disproportion of numerical force. If both sides were really to fight to the bitter end,' there can be little doubt that the scanty remnant that would be left of the North would be entitled to claim a nominal and disastrous triumph. But we know very well by the teaching of history that the contest will not be literally fought out to the bitter end. The very gist and kernel of the question then is, Which will be tired of it first? And to answer this question we must weigh the motives by which each combatant is actuated.

6

The motives of the South are not difficult to estimate. They are the most powerful by which human beings can be moved. Submission presents to them, in its darkest form, the prospect of the fate that men in all ages have counted as far more terrible Vol. 117.-No. 233. than