The sale here by the Messrs. Minturn was made under the direction of the Port Wardens. The plaintiff was served with a notice that the sale would take place unless the freight and expenses were paid. After the sale to Thompson, he employed a cartman to remove the molasses, and had removed two casks, and was removing a third, when the sheriff interfered and took possession of the balance. The court charged the jury at great length, chiefly on points of law, and directed them to find specially.

The jury found for the plaintiff, and specially that the purchaser (Thompson) did not take possession of the molasses at the sale. For the plaintiff, E. Griffin, sen. For the defence, H. Ketcham.

TARIFF DUTIES, ETC.

TWIST NOT LIABLE TO THE PAYMENT OF DUTY.-In the United States Circuit Court, before Judge Betts, the case of Samuel F. Dorr v. Jesse Hoyt, Collector of the port of New York, was an action brought by the plaintiff, an extensive importer of French goods, against the defendant, the collector of this port, to recover back the sum of $88 60, being the amount of duties charged on an importation of twist.

These duties had been charged under the decision of the comptroller of the treasury of 1833, and the entry was made and the duties levied, as upon sewing silk, at the rate of $2 28 per pound.

The plaintiff contended, that this particular article, twist, was not in itself silk, but that it was composed of goat or mohair and silk, and that it would not serve the same purpose as sewing silk, and that under the tariff it was provided, that articles of importation of which silk forms a component part, were free of duty; and it was farther contended, that, according to mercantile usage, twist was not sewing silk, under which class the duty had been claimed and exacted. The entry and payment of the duty, under protest, were admitted, and the plaintiff called a manufacturer of twist, who testified to the article being composed partly of goat or mohair, and partly of silk.

For the defence it was contended and appeared that, under the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury of 1833, this article had been entered as all goods of the like kind, and classified as sewing silk by the custom house authorities. On cross examination, however, of the defendant's witness, it came out that the component parts of the article twist, were as contended by the plaintiff.

The court said that all articles manufactured partly of silk, or of which silk was a component part, were entitled to be admitted free of duty. The custom house department had established, as it appeared by the testimony adduced in this case, a rule which the merchants had protested against, and this was a question for the jury to pass upon.

The jury, without leaving their seats, found a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount claimed, namely, $88 60; thus sustaining the protest of the merchants, that twist is not liable to payment of duty. For the plaintiff, Daniel Lord, Jun.; for the defendant, B. F. Butler, Esq.

FORFEITURE OF GOODS FOR UNDERVALUATION.

In the United States District Court, at the January term, 1839, a suit was instituted by the United States v. Eight Cases of Lamps, imported from France in June, 1838, per ship Louis Phillip, and consigned to Augustine

Draconi.

The articles were what are called mechanical lamps, having in the inte

rior of the lamp a machinery and movements similar to those of a clock, by which the oil is at all times so forced up to the wick, that the lamp gives a much brighter and more beautiful light than ordinary lamps. The bodies of the lamps were entered in the invoice at thirty francs each, and the suspension frames, globes, and other appendages, were all entered in the invoice at various specific prices, all of which it was alleged were 100 per cent below the appraised value and the current price of such articles, and that therefore the invoice had been fraudulently made up to defraud the revenue of the United States.

In support of these allegations, several appraisers and other attaches of the Custom House testified that they had examined the articles, and that the value put upon them in the invoice was from 70 to 100 per cent below their current price. But it appeared that not one of the Custom House officers who had examined the articles, had any practical knowledge of the value of or price of such articles, and had formed their opinion only from inference, founded on information they obtained from others. There were also some witnesses called who dealt in lamps, but not in the peculiar sort of lamps now in question, which have been rarely imported into this country. The witnesses could therefore decide upon their value only inferentially, and in this way they set a much higher value on some of the articles, than they had been set down in the invoice.

On the part of the claimant, witnesses were produced, who are practically acquainted with the value of such lamps, and they valued some of them below the invoice price and others a little above it.

The Court charged the Jury. It would be necessary for them to take the invoice and the appraisment, and compare them together, and then compare these papers with the testimony, and see how far the evidence supported and upheld the invoice or the appraisement. After the Jury had done this, they would apply the facts, and draw the proper inferences.

It was necessary for the Court to lay down the principles of law by which the Jury were to be guided in giving their verdict, in order that they should know what they had to decide. It was said that the property in question had been imported in violation of the revenue laws, in as much as that the importer, in making out his invoice, had entered the articles at a false valuation. The question then for their inquiry was simply, was the invoice made up with intent to defraud the revenue, by charging the property under its value?

The government had given no direct evidence on the subject. It was competent for them to have shown what the articles cost the importer abroad; and if the price in the invoice was shown to be less than the purchase, this would have been direct testimony to show that the invoice was false, and if the party was to have derived advantage from it, the Jury would be necessarily called in to say that he had committed a fraud to cheat the revenue. There had been however no direct evidence given by the government, and they had endeavored to show that the market value was more than the invoice, and if that had been shown it was ground for a fair inference that the party had bought them at the current market value, and it would be then incumbent on him to show at what price he had actually purchased them, and, if he did not so do, it would be fair for the Jury to infer that the invoice was falsely made up.

The case rested mainly on whether the invoice was charged below the fair market value. And the government had endeavored to prove this in

various ways. First they showed the value set upon it by the appraisers. And although this was, in the first instance, prima facie evidence, to a certain extent, it was not, invariably, evidence of the highest character, as it was not to be supposed that the appraisers were acquainted with the value of all articles which came into this port. And in the present instance it appeared that the appraisers, had never been engaged in the sale or manufacture of such articles, or had any practical knowledge of their value, and made it up only from general inquiries. And supposing that the judgment formed from such sources showed a different value to that in the invoice, still that would not be sufficient to prove a fraud. For if the market or adjudged value of the articles was not much greater than what was in the invoice, then the jury had a right to consider whether the deviations were greater than the ordinary fluctuations of the market, or what might arise from the necessities of the seller, the state of the times, or any other occurrence incidental to mercantile affairs. And if the testimony showed that the invoice was as nearly right as wrong, then it was the duty of the Jury to consider that the importer intended to act rightly towards the government, and they should not impute a fraud to him which the testimony had not clearly established. Verdict for the claimant.

BANK CHARTER CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE STATES.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana decided, at New Orleans, in the case of the Atchafalaya Bank v. Dawson, that the forfeiture of bank charters by the suspension of specie payments does not accrue to individuals, or to any person or party, but to the State which gave them; and it alone can avail of forfeiture and take away the charters. That although by a clause in the charter of the Atchafalaya Bank and some others, in case of a suspension of specie payments for 90 days, the charter is ipso facto forfeited, yet the Bank continues to exist and can sue and be sued until the State choose to institute proceedings and take from it its charter. In other words, that bank charters are contracts between the State which grants, and the corporators or stockholders who accept and receive them.

LIABILITY OF SHIPPING AGENTS.

The case of William H. Bentley & Co. v. Stark W. Lewis, was an action recently brought in the Superior Court, before Judge Oakley, to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract, committed under the following circumstances:

The plaintiffs are a mercantile firm doing business in Baltimore, and the defendant belongs to this city, and is agent for the schooner Mohican, trading between this port and Baltimore. On the 14th of March, 1837, Messrs. W. G. Bull & Co. of this city, agents for the plaintiffs, shipped on board the Mohican 50 hhds. of sugar for Baltimore. The vessel being advertised to sail with immediate despatch, it was expected that the sugars would arrive out in season to sell for the then existing high prices of the article. It was afterwards learned that the vessel did not sail till after the 20th of March, and did not arrive at Baltimore till the 15th of April. The consequence was, that the shipment of the sugar, instead of fetching the "top of the market," as was anticipated, the sale was made at the full decline of the article, which made a difference in the result of some $200 per hundred weight to the plaintiffs. It was to recover this difference in price that the present suit was brought. The bill of lading for the sugar was produced and admitted.

For the defence, it was contended that the voyage had been prosecuted with all due and reasonable diligence. And proof was adduced to show that after the 14th of March a storm of some ten days duration occurred, which caused a corresponding delay in the voyage.

Counsel for

The jury, under a brief charge by the court, rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs of the amount claimed, with interest, viz. $512 73 the plaintiffs, D. Lord, jr., for the defendant, Griffin, sen.

COLLISION.

The case of Benjamin Lowry v. The Steamer Portland, in the United States District Court, before Judge Davis, was decided on the 22d of January, 1839. In this case, the libellant claimed to recover about $600, for damages, sustained by the schooner Cygnet, of 83 tons burden, in consequence of a collision with the steamer, on the night of November 17, 1838, when passing through the passage between Thacher's Island, and the Londoner-the schooner being bound from Bangor, (Maine,) to Medford, (Mass.,) with a cargo of lumber, and the steamer being on her way to Portland from Boston.

It appeared, that while the schooner was passing through the abovementioned passage, steering S.S.W., with a moderate breeze from the N.N.W., those on board her discovered the Portland about one point on the weather bow, three or four miles distant. The schooner was then kept off about one point, and shortly afterwards another point, to the southward. The steamer was then steering a little to the eastward of N.N.E., thus bringing the schooner nearly ahead, and she was discovered by those on board the steamer, at a distance of about three fourths of a mile in that direction. Soon after discovering the schooner, the course of the steamer was changed to the Eastwardthe necessary measures taken to diminish her speed, and, when the danger of collision became imminent, the machinery was reversed so as nearly to stop her way before the two vessels came in contact.

The main question in the case was, as to who was in fault.

Judge Davis, in the course of the investigation, called in three experienced men-Benjamin Rich, William Sturgiss, and Francis Dewson-to hear the evidence, and answer certain questions to be propounded to them.

They accordingly, after hearing the evidence, delivered their opinion on the following points, to wit:

1. The general practice, both upon our coasts and elsewhere, is, that when two vessels approach each other, both having a free or fair wind, the one with the starboard tacks aboard keeps on her course, or if any change is made, she luffs, so as to pass to windward of the other, or in other words, each vessel passes to the right.

This rule should govern vessels, too, sailing on the wind and approaching each other, when it is doubtful which is to windward, but if the vessel on the larboard tack is so far to windward that if both persist in their course, the other will strike her on the leeward side, abaft the beam, or near the stern; in such case the vessel on the starboard tack must give way, as she can do so with greater facility, and less loss of time and distance than the other. These rules are particularly intended to govern vessels approaching each other under circumstances that prevent their course and movements being readily ascertained with accuracy; for instance, in a dark night or dense fog. At other times, circumstances may render it expedient to depart from them.

2. A steamer is considered as always sailing with a fair wind, and is, therefore, bound to do whatever a sailing vessel, going free, or with a fair wind, would be required to do, under similar circumstances, in relation to any vessel she may meet.

3. There was a deviation from the common usuage by those on board the schooner, in keeping her off when she should have been kept on her course or luffed. Had the schooner kept on her original course, S. S. W., she would have passed to the windward of the steamer, and no collision would have taken place.

4. The course taken by the steamer was in conformity to what may be considered the usage in such cases, and those on board of her did all they ought to have done to avoid collision.

5. The collision was the consequence of the change in the course of the schooner, which ought not to have been made in that direction.

After hearing the opinion of the referees, Judge Davis took time to consider, and yesterday he delivered his own opinion, in which he adopted, substantially their views, and ordered the libel to be dismissed, but without

costs.

ART. IX.-BOOKKEEPING-PRINCIPLES OF DOUBLE

ENTRY.

The American Institute lately appointed a committee to examine a new method of teaching the theory of bookkeeping, by Mr. Thomas Jones, a gentleman associated with Mr. B. F. Foster, and from a report of the investigation, which is published in their journal, it would appear that the elementary part of the instruction is accomplished by Mr. Jones in a way that is entirely original, and which has manifestly a great advantage over the ordinary method of proceeding. The main features of Mr. Jones's method are, that he begins at once to analyze the plan of a leger, and thus develop the principles on which it has been made; whereas by the old method, the pupil has been set to make a leger without knowing any thing of its plan, object, or principles, he has therefore been guided by rules, and left to discover principles in the best way he could.

In this analysis Mr. Jones has opened a new field of inquiry, and our readers cannot fail to be interested with the discovery of the double arrangement, embraced in the double set of accounts, the debit of one set being the credit of the other, thus explaining at once why a debit and a credit are always required. The division of accounts into real, personal, and fictitious, is, therefore, exploded, for no one who has once seen Mr. Jones's natural division, in which each set is proved to be one history of the business, would listen for a moment to a division which confounds the cash accounts with merchandise. The analysis at once shows these two accounts to be opposed -to be the very reverse of each other, and totally different in their object; and that any classification of the accounts into more than two sorts, must produce confusion, and entirely frustrate all attempts to describe or demonstrate the theory. We will, however, let Mr. Jones speak for himself; the following we abstract from a manuscript he has furnished to us:

The terms Debtor and Creditor, seem to have proved the stumbling block of every author who has undertaken to explain their application.