largely, if not wholly, to his intelligent supervision and industry, property purchased out of the profits in the name of the wife was subject to the husband's debts. Blackburn v. Thompson, W. & Co. (1902) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1723, 56 L.R.A. 938, 66 S. W. 5.

Where the husband gave his entire time and attention to a business carried on in the name of his wife, and profits had accumulated from the business, it was said that if the wife could in any case shield the profits of the business from the claims of the husband's creditors, it was only where, with some degree of certainty, she could trace her money into the business. Carson v. Jones (1893) 14 Ky. L. Rep. 667.

While a married woman may make her husband her agent for the management of her property, and he may perform all ordinary and reasonable services for her without compensation, without subjecting her property to the claims of his creditors, yet she cannot, under the guise of such an agency, appropriate to herself the results of the time, labor, and skill of the debtor in manipulating real estate. the legal title to which was ostensibly in him, but which the wife claimed he was holding in trust for her, to the exclusion of his creditors. Torrey v. Dickinson (1904) 213 Ill. 36, 72 N. E. 703.

It was said in Hamilton v. Lightner (1880) 53 Iowa, 470, 5 N. W. 603, that a husband could not bestow all the accumulations of his industry and success in business upon his wife, so as to defeat his creditors.

And see Scott v. Hudson (Ind.) II. supra; Sharp v. Fitzhugh (Ark.) and Bongard v. Core (III.), supra, III. b.

It was said in Waddingham v. Loker (1869) 44 Mo. 132, 100 Am. Dec. 260, that a debtor would not be permitted to devote his industry to the accumulation of property to be held by some third person for his own use, or for that of his family, to the exclusion of his creditors; but that question was not actually involved in this case.

And it has been held that it is a matter for the jury to determine whether fraud has been committed on

a husband's creditors, where the wife had purchased a saloon, which she was operating through the agency of her husband, a professional saloon keeper, who gave his services to the wife gratuitously. O'Leary v. Walton (1871) 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 439.

It was said in Talcott v. Arnold (1896) 54 N. J. Eq. 570, 35 Atl. 532, that in no case has the New Jersey court upheld the right of the husband to give to his wife, unrestrictedly, all profits of his labor or talent.

IV. Gift to corporation in which wife is stockholder.

In the reported case (GRAND LODGE, A. F. & A. M. v. ALLEN, ante, 1043) it is held that the gift by an insolvent husband, of his labor and services in the conduct and management of a corporation in which his wife was a large stockholder, presents no analogy to a donation of property which is subject to the claims of creditors, so that the rules of law governing fraudulent conveyances can have no application, although the object of the husband in donating his services to the corporation was that the benefits of his labor should accrue to his wife by way of dividends, so that his earnings might not be subject to the payment of his debts. The court says that it is thoroughly settled that a debtor can give his services as a gratuity to another, and when he chooses to do so his creditors cannot subject the profits or proceeds of such services to the satisfaction of his debts, or in any way charge the donee therewith.

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In Greene v. Levinson (1923) Wash., 212 Pac. 569, where the wife owned all the stock in an investment company with the exception of one share, and this company was managed by the husband, so far as appears. without compensation, it was held that the accumulation of profits, due entirely to the good judgment and keen business ability of the husband in conducting the business, was community property, and not the separate property of the wife, so that the trustee in bankruptcy for the husband can

require the corporation to transfer to him the property acquired through the operations of the company and the net income received from such property since the adjudication of bankruptcy.

And it has been held that profits accruing from the corporate stock owned by a married woman are not rendered liable for the husband's debts by reason of the fact that such profits result from his successful management of the corporate business. First Nat. Bank v. Rice (1910) 12 Ohio C. D. 121, 22 Ohio C. C. 183. It does not appear in this case whether the husband, who was president of the corporation, was receiving compensation for his services or not.

V. Gift of services to person other than wife.

There are but few cases which have involved the question as to the right of a debtor, as against his creditors, to give his services to one other than his wife. It has been held, however, that an insolvent debtor may give his services to his daughter (Holdship v. Patterson (1838) 7 Watts (Pa.) 547, supra, II.), or he may donate his labor gratuitously to his sister (Winfrey v. Winfrey (1912) 150 Ky. 138, 150 S. W. 42, holding that no fraud was committed upon the creditors of bankrupts, so as to subject to the payment of the bankrupts' debts real estate and personal property owned by their sister, by reason of the fact

that the brothers, after becoming bankrupt, labored on her farm without compensation, and through their efforts caused the sister to realize large profits, they having an unqualified right to dispose of their labor upon any terms acceptable to them). And see the reported case GRAND LODGE, A. F. & A. M. v. ALLEN, ante, 1043).

Some of the cases in which the services were given to the wife contain dicta to the effect that a debtor may gratuitously give his services and labor to a stranger, without committing any fraud upon his creditors. See Abbey v. Deyo (N. Y.), Holdship v. Patterson (Pa.), and Eilers v. Conradt (Minn.), supra, II.; Shircliffe v. Casebeer (1904) 122 Iowa, 618, 98 N. W. 486, supra, III. a.

In Worthington & Co. v. Jones (1851) 23 Vt. 546, trustee process against the son of a debtor, where it was held that an agreement by which the debtor agreed to labor for the trustee in return for the support of himself and his family, with the further agreement that should such services be worth more than such support the excess should be applied to the payment of his debts, was not fraudulent, the court said that it might be conceded that a debtor did not have the right to place his future earnings beyond the reach of his creditors, and a contract made with such intent would doubtless be held fraudulent. G. S. G.

complies with the other terms of the agreement between the parties set forth in the bill of complaint."

The facts agreed to and succinctly stated are that the defendant on and prior to August 3, 1921, held the legal title to the premises at 1049 Beacon street; that the premises on that day were occupied by the plaintiff with the permission of the defendant, as a sublessee of one Brown, who held under a written lease which terminated by limitation of time on September 1, 1921; that up to the expiration of the lease Brown paid the rent to the defendant and the plaintiff paid his rent to Brown; that while the plaintiff was occupying the premises under his sublease the defendant entered into an agreement whereby the defendant was to sell and the plaintiff to buy the premises in question; that said agreement expired on September 1, 1921, by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to make a payment which he was required to make by that day; that the defendant on September 16, 1921, began ejectment proceedings by writ returnable to the municipal court on September 24, 1921; that on September 21, 1921, after a telephonic communication with an attorney for the plaintiff, the defendant through her agent, Frank A. Russell, wrote a letter to that attorney which reads. as follows:

"Dear Sir: Confirming telephone conversation just had with you, the owner of 1049 Beacon street, Brookline, is willing to make a new agreement with Walter L. Barrell for the purchase by him of said house, as of October 1st, next, on substantially the same terms as the old agreement which expired on September 1, 1921, by reason of the failure of said Barrell to make the payment of $1,500 then due, provided said Barrell has paid into my hands, as agent, before 4 P. M. Friday, next, the sum of $300 on account of the purchase plus $18.70 for legal services to date of Daniel A. Rollins.

"He must further agree in writing to pay $1,200 more on account

of purchase and $150 rent for the month of September on or before September 30, 1921, with the understanding that, if this payment is not made, the $318.70 previously paid shall be forfeited and the premises vacated not later than October 5, 1921.

"He must further agree to show the premises to prospective buyers in the meantime, subject, of course, to his prior right of purchase upon fulfilment of the terms above recited.

"The balance of the purchase money is to be paid at the rate of $250 quarterly on account of principal with interest on deferred payments at the rate of 7 per cent per annum also payable quarterly on the terms stated in the original receipt, which Mr. Barrell holds for the $500 paid August 3, 1921, which $500 shall be considered, in case the new agreement is consummated, as part of the total purchase price of $17,000.

"Nothing above stated shall be regarded as in any way reinstating the old agreement above referred to as having expired September 1, 1921."

Under date of September 22, 1921, the plaintiff sent a letter to the said Russell, agent for the defendant, which reads:

"Dear Sir: Your letter dated September 21, 1921, addressed to my attorney, William R. Bigelow, at 15 State street, Boston, has been received by him and submitted to me. I have read said letter and hereby accept terms of the agreement therein contained with reference to the purchase of 1049 Beacon street in Brookline."

The agreement of August 3, 1921, while not reinstated upon the making of the new agreement, in substance, by express reference, was incorporated therein. It reads as follows: lows: "Agrees to buy 1049 Beacon St., Brookline, Mass., for $17,000; $2,000 in cash on or before Sept. 1, '21, and balance at the rate of $250 quarterly on principal and 7 per cent per annum, payable quar

terly on deferred payments; $500 of this $2,000 payment to be paid today and held by Frank A. Russell, Agt., and forfeited as liquidated damages if balance of $2,000 is not paid by Sept. 1, '21. Title to be good subject to a first mortgage held by Cambridge Savings Bank on which $7,000 principal remains unpaid."

The plaintiff thereafter has continued in occupation of the premises and has made the payments required to be made under the terms of the agreement until the day of the filing of the bill in this suit.

On November 1, 1921, the defendant sent the plaintiff a bill or statement for taxes and insurance premiums due on the premises. The plaintiff declined to pay the taxes and insurance and his attorney sent a letter to the agent of the defendant wherein he said: "I have advised Mr. Barrell that under the terms of this receipt the title is to be kept free from encumbrances by you, except for restrictions and mortgage of $7,000, until $5,000 has been paid on the principal. This seems to be the plain purport of the agreement, and therefore Mr. Barrell is not liable to you for any taxes or insurance on the property until he takes the title after payment of $5,000 on the principal."

The defendant in reply said: "In this letter you reach the conclusion that under the written agreement the property is Miss Britton's and the title remains in her until at least $5,000 has been paid on the purchase price, and that, therefore, it is Miss Britton's duty to pay the taxes and insurance. I must agree with you in this conclusion, but wish to call your attention to the fact that since Miss Britton is the owner of the property, and since there was nothing in the written contract giving Mr. Barrell the right to occupy the premises, some arrangement satisfactory to Miss Britton must be made relative to Mr. Barrell's paying her for such occupancy. If Mr. Barrell wishes to continue to occupy the premises he

should pay rent at $150 per month therefor for the period beginning October 1, 1921, and should enter into a satisfactory written lease to cover the period until he shall have a right to possession."

The plaintiff in reply denied that he had "reached the conclusion that under the written agreement the property is Miss Britton's," and asserted that "in equity Mr. Barrell owns the premises conditioned upon his performance of the terms of the agreement." The plaintiff has not paid or offered to pay any taxes, insurance, or any money for the use and occupation of the premises.

On May 18, 1922, the defendant caused the following notice to be served by a deputy sheriff upon the plaintiff :

May 17, 1922.

Mr. Walter L. Barrell, 1049 Beacon Street, Brookline, Mass.

Dear Sir:

I hereby demand that you forthwith give me possession of the premises, 1049 Beacon street, Brookline, Mass., now occupied by you, and that you forthwith vacate said premises.

Oliver H. Britton, Owner of Said Premises,

by Daniel A. Rollins, Attorney. On May 27, 1922, this bill was filed, and by order of the court was made returnable at Boston on June 5, 1922, to show cause why an injunction should not issue as prayed for in the plaintiff's bill.

Upon the facts narrated the question of law presented is, Was the defendant after the demand upon the plaintiff to vacate the premises entitled in law to the possession of them, and had he the right to seek to obtain such possession by any appropriate writ? The relation between the plaintiff and the defendant when the agreement of purchase and sale was made, on September 21, 1921, was not that of landlord and tenant. The agree ment did not make provision for a demise fixing the rights of the parties as to the possession during the