spent its force in an impairment of vision, which was fully compensated, but that the subsequent blindness was caused by choroiditis, independent of the injury. No connection was shown between the cinders in the eye and the disease. The case of Borgsted v. Shults Bread Co. 180 App. Div. 229, 167 N. Y. Supp. 647, really makes for appellee, as it holds. claimant entitled to compensation for the prolonged disability caused by the syphilitic condition of the blood, though refusing it for the loss of vision, as having no causal connection with the accident which caused a broken leg. In Springfield Dist. Coal Min. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 300 Ill. 28, 132 N. E. 752, compensation was sought for an aggravation or acceleration of heart disease, claimed to have resulted from the employee having been caught and squeezed between two coal cars, and it was held that he could recover only upon proof that the disease had been aggravated or accelerated by the accident, which was insufficient in that case; it was a claim of permanent disability. Counsel quotes from that case: "He is not entitled to compensation for a condition resulting from a preexisting disease, and not from an injury suffered in the course of em

ployment and arising out of it. If there is a pre-existing disease the employee is entitled to recover for all the consequences attributable to the injury in the acceleration or aggravation of such disease."

But that is very far from holding that compensation may not be awarded for an increased or prolonged disability occasioned by preexisting disease, where the injury itself brought about the condition, which, in turn, caused the disease to become active. In the case at bar it was not necessary, if, indeed, it was possible, for appellee to show that a disease of the -combination blood had been ag- of injury and gravated by a trauma; it was sufficient to show the trauma and resulting disability, though the latter was contributed to by the disease. The other cases cited (Blackburn v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. 107 Kan. 722, 193 Pac. 353, and George L. Eastman Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 186 Cal. 587, 200 Pac. 20) are distinguishable distinguishable along the same lines.

disease.

We think the disability for which compensation was awarded arose out of and in the course of the employment, and that the decree below is right, and it is affirmed.

I. Introduction, 205.

II. Fits, epilepsy, 205.

III. Fainting, dizziness, 206.

IV. Mental condition, lapse of memory, 206.

[No later decisions herein.]

V. Tuberculosis, 206.

VI. Degenerated blood vessels, 206. VII. Intestinal disease or weakness,

207.

VIII. Hernia, 207.

[No later decisions herein.]

IX. Syphilis, gonorrhea, 207.

This annotation is supplementary to that in 19 A.L.R. 95. As to heart disease, it supplements the annotation in 19 A.L.R. 110.

X. Sensitive or wounded skin, 208.
[No later decisions herein.]

XI. Delirium tremens, 208.

[No later decisions herein.]
XII. Disease of eyes, 208.
XIII. Influenza, 208.
XIV. Gout, 209.

[No later decisions herein.]
XV. Typhoid fever, 209.

[No later decisions herein.]
XVI. Diabetes, Bright's disease, 209.
XVII. [New] Appendicitis, 209.
XVIII. Heart disease, 209.

XIX. [New] Miscellaneous, 210.

As to necessity and sufficiency of evidence that disease contracted by applicant was attributable to employment, see annotation in 20 A.L.R. 4.

I. Introduction.

(Supplementing annotation in 19 A.L.R. 96.)

The established rule (see 19 A.L.R. 96) that the fact that an employee was suffering from a diseased condition does not necessarily bar him. from a right to compensation in case. of an injury and disability, but that an award may be had in case of a disability which was proximately caused by an accident or personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, which accelerated or aggravated an existing disease, has been affirmed in a number of recent cases.

Illinois. W. H. Jones Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1922) 303 Ill. 410, 135 N. E. 755; Alladin Coal & Min. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1923) 308 Ill. 35, 139 N. E. 30; Great Lakes Supply Co. v. Industrial Commission (1923) 309 Ill. 68, 140 N. E. 2; Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (1922) 301 Ill. 418, 134 N. E. 174.

Maine. Webber's Case (1922) 121 Me. 410, 117 Atl. 513; Orff's Case

ily due to disease or to the physical condition of the employee at the time when he was doing his usual and ordinary work, compensation cannot be recovered. California Notion & Toy Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission (1922) — Cal. App. —, 210 Pac. 524; Keller v. Industrial Commission (1922) 302 Ill. 610, 135 N. E. 98; New Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (1922) 304 Ill. 613, 136 N. E. 783; Hicks v. Meridian Lumber Co. (1922) 152 La. 975, 94 So. 903.

-

The evidence necessary to establish that the claimant's disability is due to an aggravation of a pre-existing, dormant, diseased condition must be a preponderance of evidence, as in any other civil case. Hogan v. Twin City Amusement Co. (Minn.) supra, where the court says: "The proof required to establish the relation of cause and effect between an injury and a subsequent ailment must be such as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture, but if the evidence furnishes a reasonable basis for an inference that the injury was the cause of what followed, that is sufficient."

II. Fits, epilepsy. (Supplementing annotation in 19 A.L.R. 97.)

In Baltimore Dry Docks & Shipbuilding Co. v. Webster (1922) 139 Md. 616, 116 Atl. 842, it was held that the death of a carpenter employed in the construction of a ship was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, where, in stooping to pick up tools from the deck of the ship, he was attacked by an epileptic fit which caused him to fall backwards over the stern and fracture his skull. The court, after reviewing the authorities, said: "Upon the authorities, I think the case is clear; an accident does not cease to be such because its remote cause was an idiopathic condition of the injured man. We must dissociate that idiopathic condition from the other facts, and remember he was obliged to run the risk by the very nature of his employment, and that the dan

gerous fall was brought about by the conditions of that employment. I think, therefore, the present case comes within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act."

III. Fainting, dizziness. (Supplementing annotation in 19 A.L.R. 99.)

Where, following an inoculation against influenza which he was induced to undergo by his employer, an employee fainted and fell from his chair at his desk, fracturing his skull, from which injury he died, it was held that his death was caused by an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Freedman v. Spicer Mfg. Corp. (1922) N. J. - 116 Atl. 427.

IV. Mental condition, lapse of memory. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 19 A.L.R. 100.

V. Tuberculosis.

(Supplementing annotation in 19 A.L.R. 100.)

Total disability from tuberculosis, which had been latent for some time, in no way affecting the claimant's earning capacity, but which was aggravated and accelerated when the claimant, in repairing a bulkhead in a flue to a roaster, inhaled poisongas fumes, may be said to have been caused by an accident arising out of the employment, entitling him to compensation. Tintic Mill. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1922) Utah, 23 A.L.R. 325, 206 Pac. 278.

VI. Degenerated blood vessels. (Supplementing annotation in 19 'A.L.R. 101.)

In Carvey v. Young (1922) 218 Mich. 342, 188 N. W. 392, where the claimant, a man sixty years old, fell from his bicycle while making his rounds as a watchman, causing injury to himself, following which he suffered an attack of partial paralysis, it was held that the finding of the commission that the disability was the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, though there was considerable

conflict of testimony as to whether the cerebral hemorrhage which caused the paralysis was due to the pre-existing arteriosclerosis and high blood pressure with which the claimant was afflicted, or to the fall from the bicycle. The court said that "the fact that the plaintiff was predisposed, because of disease, to this form of attack, has nothing to do with the question of whether what befell him is to be regarded as an accident."

And in BECK MIN. Co. v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION (reported herewith) ante, 197, where the evidence showed that the claimant for compensation, an elderly man affected with hardening of the arteries, had to do work which required great physical exertion, and while so engaged suffered a stroke of apoplexy, and there was competent medical testimony that the continuous excessive physical exertion which he had to undergo was a contributing cause of the stroke of apoplexy, it is held that an award for such injury will be affirmed.

And it has been held that, where a workman who was afflicted with arteriosclerosis and high blood pressure was overcome by his exertions in the heat of a molding room, which, as a result of his physical condition, caused a cerebral hemorrhage, resulting in incurable insanity, his insanity was an accidental injury arising out of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. W. A. Jones Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1922) 303 Ill. 410, 135 N. E. 755.

But in California Notion & Toy Co. V. Industrial Acci. Commission (1922) - Cal. App. - 210 Pac. 524, an employee, who, following a fall from a short stepladder, which he used in taking goods from the shelves, in the course of his work, from which he received only slight bruises, became affected by an impediment of speech and unable to think coherently, was held not entitled to recover compensation, the uncontradicted medical testimony be

ing to the effect that the fall and condition of the claimant were due to a vascular cortical lesion, resulting from arteriosclerosis and high blood pressure, from which the claimant was suffering previously to the fall. The court said: "It is the duty and purpose of this court to construe liberally the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance, and Safety Act (Stat. 1917, p. 831), to effectuate its purposes, and to charge to industry injuries to its employees properly chargeable thereto. But we can see neither reason nor justice in laying down a principle which would give to a man stricken with paralysis while at his place of business, the right to throw the financial burden of his disability upon his employer, where the disability was in no measure increased or contributed to by the employment, and the physical conditions causing the same were in no measure due thereto. In such a case, the rights of the employee are greater than they would have been had the attack occurred at his own home, unless it is shown that his disability was in some way increased or affected by the incident of place."

no

In Hicks v. Meridian Lumber Co. (1922) 152 La. 975, 94 So. 903, where a workman died from the rupture of an aneurism of the thoracic aorta, it being alleged that the aneurism was caused, or the rupture accelerated, by a strain claimed to have been received in lifting heavy beams, it was held that, though compensation would be allowed whether the strain caused the aneurism or merely accelerated the inevitable rupture, the evidence in the case, which consisted merely of declarations of the deceased that he had received a strain, and that he had a pain in his chest, which he attributed to the strain, all of which were made several days afterwards, with one exception, a statement made an hour after the alleged strain, in which he said he felt a pain which he "guessed" was caused by the strain of lifting, was "insufficient to show, either that the deceased suffered the alleged accident, or that

No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 19 A.L.R. 102.

IX. Syphilis, gonorrhea. (Supplementing annotation in 19 A.L.R. 104.)

An employee, who in the course of his employment received an injury to his shoulder, in which a pre-existing tubercular and syphilitic condition had localized and become stable, so that it did not incapacitate him in any way and would not have materially progressed without new cause, and as a result of the blow, which would not have incapacitated a normal person, the disease was "lighted up" and aggravated, producing a condition which incapacitated him, was held in Bongilatti v. H. Wales Lines Co. (1922) 97 Conn. 548, 117 Atl. 696, entitled to compensation for his disability, notwithstanding the amendment to the act which provides, . . . but in any case of aggravation of a disease existing prior to such injury, compensation shall be allowed only for such proportion of the disability due to the aggravation of such disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury." The court observed that inasmuch as this provision was a part of a remedial amendment to the act, bringing occupational diseases within its provisions, a reasonable interpretation, in view of its context, was that it only referred to cases involving occupational diseases and was not in

tended to be so drastic an impairment of the act as would be the result if the amendment were held applicable to this case.

And in F. H. GILCREST LUMBER CO. v. RENGLER (reported herewith) ante, 200, it is held that the disability of an employee following slight bruise received while at work, which of itself was insufficient to cause disability, but which, because of a pre-existing syphilitic condition, formed into an ulcer and broke, disabling the claimant from work for a long time, was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, for which he was entitled to compensation. The court observes that while the disease was a contributing factor to the disability, it was the bruise which was the proximate cause, for the evidence was convincing that, without the injury, there would have been no ulceration.

In Miller's Indemnity Underwriters v. Schrieber (1922) Tex. Civ. App. -, 240 S. W. 963, in disposing of a contention that the findings by the jury on a special issue, to the effect that an employee died from the combined effects of syphilis, if any, and the injuries received by a fall in the course of his employment, were SO inconsistent with a finding, on another issue, that the decedent was not afflicted with syphilis, that a judgment could not be entered upon the findings, the court pointed out that even though these findings were inconsistent, still the appellant's position could not be sustained because the existence of the disease, if it did exist, at the time the employee sustained his injury, was, on the findings, only a concurrent cause with the injuries received in producing the death, which would not bar a recovery for compensation for the death under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

A workman is not entitled to compensation for partial blindness following an injury received when a chunk of coal fell on him while in the course of his employment, where the medical testimony shows that the blindness was caused entirely by a

pre-existing syphilitic condition of the claimant, which the injury neither accelerated nor aggravated. Keller v. Industrial Commission (1922) 302 Ill. 610, 135 N. E, 98.

And an employee, who, through an accident within the scope of his employment, fell from a truck on which he was riding, injuring his back, was held in New Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (1922) 304 Ill. 613, 136 N. E. 783, not entitled to recover compensation for disability caused by lumbago, occurring shortly after the injury, where the evidence showed that the syphilitic condition of the claimant, and not the fall from the truck, was the sole cause of the lumbago.

X. Sensitive or wounded skin. For No later decisions herein. earlier cases, see annotation in 19 A.L.R. 105.

XI. Delirium tremens.

No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see 19 A.L.R. 106. XII. Disease of eyes. (Supplementing annotation in 19 A.L.R. 106.)

It was held in Alladin Coal & Min. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1923) 308 Ill. 35, 139 N. E. 30, that the court would not disturb an award for compensation for partial blindness of a workman, following an injury received when a piece of coal struck him in the eye, though prior to such injury he had suffered eye trouble and his eyes were in a diseased condition, as there was expert testimony to the effect that such an injury as the claimant received would aggravate the pre-existing condition of the eyes and cause the blindness with which he was afflicted, though other testimony was offered tending to show that the blindness was caused solely by the pre-existing condition of the eyes.

XIII. Influenza. (Supplementing annotation in 19 A.L.R. 107.)

See Geizel v. Regina Co. (1922) N. J., 116 Atl. 924, infra, XVI.