forbade all such enterprises. It might be inferred from this decision that under such a statute, although it expressly provided that an interested person should not become competent by assigning his interest, an interested person might become a competent witness by an assignment of his interest where it did not appear that such assignment was made for the express purpose of rendering him competent.

Under a statute expressly providing that the assignment of a claim by a person who was incompetent to testify for himself should not make him competent to testify for another, it was held in Harpending v. Daniel (1882) 80 Ky. 449; Neale v. Neale (1896) 18 Ky. L. Rep. 343, 36 S. W. 526; Hagins v. Arnett (1901) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 809, 64 S. W. 430; James v. Walker (1902) 24 Ky. L. Rep. 468, 68 S. W. 1106; Huff v. Miniard (1903) 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2272, 73 S. W. 1036, and Davis v. Strange (1913) 156 Ky. 420, 161 S. W. 217, that the assignment by an incompetent witness of his interest did not render him competent to testify for his assignee as to a transaction with a decedent.

One who has assigned his title to the land in controversy after the death of the one in possession thereof cannot testify, in an action of ejectment by his assignee against the heir of the one in possession, that the latter held possession under the witness with his permission, under a statute reading that no assignment, release, or transfer of interest, made after the death of the decedent, shall have the effect to render the transferrer à competent witness. Jones v. Sherman (1879) 56 Miss. 559.

And in Neale v. Neale (1896) 18 Ky. L. Rep. 343, 36 S. W. 526, where it appeared that a note in some way had passed into the possession of the son of the payee, and before her death was assigned by the son to another, and after the death of the payee her administrator brought an action against the maker of the note and the assignee, claiming that the note belonged to the estate of the payee, and the assignee defended upon the ground that the note was assigned by the payee to her son and by her son to him, it was un

successfully contended that the son was a competent witness for the assignee because he had assigned it during the lifetime of his mother and at a time when he would have been a competent witness to testify concerning his transaction with her, on the theory that the provision of the statute that the assignment of a claim by a . person who was incompetent to testify for himself shall not make him competent to testify for another referred only to a person who was incompetent under a preceding provision of the same section, to testify concerning a transaction with a decedent at the time it occurred, but the court held that such contention was not tenable, for the reason that the condition of the disqualification of a person to testify before assigning away his interest in the subject-matter, imposed by the prior provision that no person should. testify for himself concerning a transaction with one who is dead when the testimony is offered to be given, was the fact of the party with whom the transaction was made being "dead at the time the testimony is offered to be given," and that this condition necessarily operated after as well as before the assignment of the interest of the witness in the subject-matter of such transaction, for without it the manifest object of the provision that an assignment should not render a witness competent could easily be defeated.

But in Shoptaw v. Ridgway (1901) 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1495, 60 S. W. 723, an action to enforce a vendor's lien against the administrator of the purchaser, was held that one of the owners of the property, who had assigned his interest in the property as one of the heirs to the other heirs, before its sale to the intestate, was a competent witness to testify to the transaction with the intestate upon the ground that he had not assigned his interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, within the meaning of the statute that the assignment of a claim by a person who is incompetent to testify for himself will not render him competent to testify for another, since such provision was evidently intended to prevent one who had or

claimed some right from a decedent, from subsequently assigning his claim so as to qualify himself as a witness against the decedent.

And in Westbury v. Simmons (1899) 57 S. C. 467, 35 S. E. 764, an action by the administrator of an insured to recover the proceeds of the insurance from one to whom the assignee of the decedent had assigned the policy, the defendant claiming the assignment to have been for the purpose of securing a debt owing to him, and the plaintiff claiming that the assignment was made simply for the purpose of securing the reimbursement of the assignee for premiums paid, under a statute providing that any person who, previous to his examination, has had an interest in the action, however the same may have been transferred to a party to the action, shall not be examined in regard to a transaction between the witness and a decedent, in an action prosecuted or defended by an administrator of the decedent, when such examination or any judgment or determination in the action can in any manner affect the interest of the witness, or the interest previously owned or represented by him, it was held that the assignor of the policy to the defendant was a competent witness, because his testimony as to a transaction with the decedent was not offered for the purpose of promoting the interest previously owned by the witness, and such was not its tendency.

c. Under statute conditionally favoring removal of disqualification.

While, under a statute providing that no person who would, if a party to the suit, be incompetent to testify therein, shall become competent by any assignment of his claim made for the purpose of allowing him to testify, an interested witness does not, of course, become competent by assigning his interest, expressly for the purpose of testifying; there must be some direct evidence in the record that he assigned his interest for the express purpose of testifying, to prevent him from becoming competent by such assignment. Stephens V. Hoffman (1914) 263 III. 197, 104 N. E. 1090,

holding that there was no direct evidence sufficient to satisfy that condition, and that therefore the disqualification was removed. In the reported case (SNYDER V. STEELE, ante, 1), involving a release, it will be observed that the evidence is held to satisfy the condition, and the disqualification was therefore not removed.

Under a statute providing that a witness may become competent by a release of his interest made in good faith, an assignment by a party to a controversy, made only for the purpose of enabling him to sustain the suit by his testimony, is not made in that good faith which such statute intends, and is ineffectual to accomplish. that purpose. Darragh v. Stevenson

(1897) 183 Pa. 397, 39 Atl. 37; Yerstine v. Yeaney (1904) 210 Pa. 109, 59 Atl. 689; Morgan v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. (1906) 215 Pa. 443, 64 Atl. 633.

But the disqualification of a witness, not a party, from interest in the result of the action, may be removed by release or assignment, even though the sole purpose of the instrument is to make the witness competent to testify. Stewart's Estate (1894) 3 Pa. Dist. R. 747, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 380 (assignment).

In Stephens v. Hoffman (1914) 263 Ill. 197, 104 N. E. 1090, supra, one who had quitclaimed all of his interest in the land to the defendant in an action in ejectment by the executors and devisees of a decedent was held a competent witness, upon the ground that while there were some circumstances in the record upon which an argument might be based that such witness deeded away his property for the express purpose of testifying, there was no certain or direct evidence upon that point, it only appearing that, some years before the present action, such witness had brought an action in ejectment against the present plaintiffs, which was twice tried, but the result thereof was not shown; that in the same year the witness quitclaimed half of his interest to his attorney in consideration of legal services, and quitclaimed the other half of his interest, to another person for a past

consideration, and that his grantees went into possession of the property.

But in Dyer v. Hopkins (1884) 112 Ill. 168, a quitclaim deed of land involved in a suit to set aside an adverse title against parties defending as executors and devisees was held to be purely colorable and made as a release of the grantor's interest merely for the purpose of rendering him competent as a witness, where, after he was first examined in the case, and before he was next examined, he had quitclaimed his interest to a third party, who by the same kind of conveyance conveyed it to the witness's wife, and the witness and his wife continued to occupy it as a homestead.

In Zimmer v. Zimmer (1921) 298 Ill. 586, 132 N. E. 216, an action by an heir to have dower assigned to the husband of the intestate and the property partitioned among the heirs, in which a defendant heir claimed title to the entire property, alleging that he purchased the property and that his mother, the intestate, held it only as trustee, and conveyed it to her husband as trustee, who by warranty deed conveyed it to such defendant heir, it was held that the husband was not a competent witness to testify to transactions with the intestate, because he was interested adversely, by reason of his conveyance and his covenant of warranty.

And it was held in Fischer v. Haxtun (1918) 210 Ill. App. 506, as shown by the abstract of the decision, upon a bill by the trustee under a trust deed and the executor of the will of the holder of the note secured by the trust deed against a husband and wife, the signers of the trust deed, to enforce payment of the note by foreclosure of the trust deed, that the fact that, during the pendency of the proceedings, the husband conveyed the mortgaged property to his wife, did not remove the incompetency of both to testify under the statute providing that no party shall be allowed to testify when the adverse party sues or defends as the executor of a deceased person.

But in a suit to annul a mortgage as a cloud on title against the administratrix of the assignee of the mort

gagee, who filed a cross bill to foreclose the mortgage, the mortgagee is not rendered incompetent by the statutory provision relating to the competency of the testimony of interested persons in suits where the adverse party sues or defends as the representative of a decedent. Barton v. Hayden (1916) 199 Ill. App. 37.

In an action, involving the title to land, against the devisee of the former owner by the heir of such owner's deceased wife, who claims through a deed executed by the former owner to her, the husband of another heir of the deceased wife, who has joined with such heir in an assignment of their interest in the property to the plaintiff, is a competent witness under a statutory provision that an incompetent witness shall become competent by a release or extinguishment of his interest. Turner v. Warren (1894) 106 Pa. 336, 28 Atl. 781. The court said that whether the assignment was in good faith was a question for the trial judge, and that the action of the judge, after the testimony of the witness that the assignment was in good faith and that there was to be no reconveyance, in permitting him to be sworn, leaving his credibility to the jury, was in effect a determination by the trial judge that the assignment was made in good faith.

And in an action by the administrator of a decedent to recover a sum reserved as a charge on land in a deed executed by the decedent to the defendant, who defends upon the ground that the charge does not belong to the decedent's estate because it was assigned by the decedent to his grandson, and by the latter to another, the administrator claiming such assignments to be void, the grandson is a competent witness, since he had, during the decedent's lifetime, transferred every particle of interest he could have in the charge. Miller v. Withers (1898) 188 Pa. 128, 41 Atl. 300.

But in DeRoux v. Girard (1898) 90 Fed. 537, controlled by the Pennsylvania statute which provided that a person otherwise incompetent should become competent by a release or ex

tinguishment in good faith of his interest, it was held that his assignments of his interest were not made in good faith so as to render him a competent witness under the statute, where it appeared that both assignments were made at one time and only about two weeks before the assignor was called as a witness, one to his wife, and the other to his brother, that the first was expressed to be in consideration of love and affection and for and in consideration of $1, and the second to be for value received without any more specific statement of the actual consideration, and where it was obvious that the object of making the assignments was not to make a sale for a substantial price, but, if possible, to qualify the witness to testify upon a subject as to which the law expressly commanded that he should not be allowed to testify.

And in Keener v. Zartman (1891) 144 Pa. 179, 22 Atl. 889, an action by an administrator to recover a claim against the administrator of another decedent, where it appeared that the son of the defendant's intestate was deeded a farm by his father, without consideration, during the existence of the debt in controversy, it was held that the incompetency of such son was not removed by his assignment of all his interest in his father's estate under the same statute. The court explained this holding as follows: That the conveyance of the farm was a fraud upon the father's creditors, and, as it appeared that the father left no personal estate, the land could be followed in the son's hands for the satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim if a judgment were recovered in the action, and that, therefore, the son would be interested in preventing a recovery, and his assignment would not cover such interest. The court stated that if the personal estate of

his father was sufficient for the payment of all his debts, the land of the son could not be followed, and, in that event, he, having assigned all his interest in his father's estate, would be a competent witness.

And in Barbour v. Wiehle (1887) 116 Pa. 308, 9 Atl. 520, where it appeared that the owner of mortgaged premises conveyed a part thereof to another, and subsequently the mortgagee executed to the grantor a release of the mortgage from the parcel so conveyed, which release the grantor delivered to his grantee, who failed to record it, and a subsequent assignee of the mortgagee bought in the premises upon foreclosure sale, and then instituted an action of ejectment against the grantee, it was held that the grantor was rendered incompetent to testify for the defendant as to a transaction occurring in the lifetime of the decedent, by the proviso of a statute removing the disqualification of interest that it did not apply to actions by or against executors or administrators.

And in an action to determine the conflicting rights of one succeeding to the title of a decedent and the assignee of the lessee of the deceased, the lessee is incompetent to testify to matters occurring before the death of the decedent, under a statute proving that where any party to a thing or contract in action is dead, and his right has passed to a party on the record, who represents his interest in the subject in controversy, neither any surviving or remaining party to such thing or contract, nor any other person whose interest shall be adverse to the right of such decedent, shall be a competent witness to any matter occurring before the death of the decedent. Duffield v. Hue (1889) 129 Pa. 94, 18 Atl. 566, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 253; Duffield v. Hue (1890) 136 Pa. 602, 20 Atl. 526.

G. V. I.

character

Contempt
ence of injunction.

2. Disobedience of an order entered at the suit of a private litigant enjoining the erection of a building is a criminal contempt.

Holiday service of writ on effect on contempt proceedings.

4. That a writ of injunction is served on a legal holiday does not prevent punishment of its violation by contempt proceedings.

Contempt violation of injunction - service by other than sheriff.

5. Parties to a suit who know of an punishment for contempt in violating injunction against them cannot avoid it, because it was not served by the sheriff or his deputies.

[See 14 R. C. L. 471; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 237; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 904.]

Messrs. Carl M. Distler and Frederick H. Hennighausen, for appellees: The order and the writ issued thereupon are valid, binding, and effective as fully and to the same extent as though they had been respectively passed and issued upon a day other than one designated as a legal holiday.

Handy v. Maddox, 85 Md. 547, 37 Atl. 222; 25 R. C. L. § 45, p. 1446.

Mere knowledge or notice of the existence and effect of an injunction order is all that is necessary to bind the recipient thereof, whether the same be personally served upon him or not..

22 Cyc. "Injunctions," p. 1013, ¶ C; Rapalje, Contempt, § 46, pp. 60, 61; 1 Beach, Inj. § 248, p. 261; Cape May & S. L. R. Co. v. Johnson, 35 N. J. Eq. 422; Re Lennon, 166 U. S. 554, 41 L. ed. 1113, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658; Re Rice, 181 Fed. 217.

It is not necessary that a person be made a party defendant before an in28 A.L.R.-3.

junction becomes binding on him. An injunction must be respected and obeyed by all who have knowledge thereof.

Re Lennon, 166 U. S. 554, 41 L. ed. 1113, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658; 22 Cyc. "Injunctions," p. 1012, ¶ E; Chisolm v. Caines, 121 Fed. 397; People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 88 App. Div. 422, 84 N. Y. Supp. 965.

An appeal will not lie from an order of a court of equity punishing by fine a party adjudged to be in contempt of court.

Eakle v. Smith, 27 Md. 467; Miller, Eq. Proc. § 314; Owings v. Worthington, 10 Gill. & J. 283; Jacobs v. Bealmear, 41 Md. 484; Crane v. Judik, 86 Md. 63, 38 Atl. 129, 131; Zimmer v. Miller, 64 Md. 296, 1 Atl. 858; Gottschalk v. Mercantile Trust & D. Co. 102 Md. 522, 62 Atl. 810; Forbes v. Warfield, 130 Md. 397, 100 Atl. 630; Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U. S. 121, 26 L. ed. 95; Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. ed. 391; New Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co. 20 Wall. 387, 22