having invoked a ruling upon such ground by the court, which ruling was adverse to the plaintiff, it will not be heard to urge in this court that it does not appear that the fact stated in such ground is true, in other words, that it does not appear that the defendant was discharged in bankruptcy. Such admission in the motion for a new trial will be considered as a judicial admission, dispensing with the rule of practice otherwise necessary to be followed in bringing up the evidence where a motion for a new trial has been made and overruled. 3. Considering the certificate of discharge in bankruptcy as being in evidence, it was conclusive in favor of the bankrupt of the fact and regularity of such discharge. The language of Bankrupt Act of 1898, e. 541, sec. 17 (30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428]), in so far as is applicable to this case, is as follows: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as ✦ have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy." The contention of the plaintiff in the present case was that it had no notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy whereIn the defendant was discharged. As will be seen from the portion of the bankrupt act just quoted, the mere fact that a creditor holding a provable debt had neither notice nor actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy would not prevent the discharge from releasing the bankrupt from such debt, but it would have to further appear that the name of the creditor and the debt were not duly scheduled. There was no pretense in the present case that the name of the plaintiff and its debt were not duly scheduled as the bankrupt act requires. See, in this connection, In re Monroe (D. C.) 114 Fed. 398. As the debt sued on was shown to have been in existence at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, it follows that the verdict in favor of the defendant was demanded under the evidence, and therefore it is unnecessary to deal with alleged errors in the charge of the court.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices con

cur.

(127 Ga. 68)

KENNEDY v. MEARA et al. (Supreme Court of Georgia. Dec. 12, 1906.) 1. STATUTES-TITLES-CODIFICATION.

Even if the act of 1894 (Acts 1894, p. 80). now contained in the Civil Code 1895, § 2372 et seq., is subject to the objection that the body of the act contains matter different from what is expressed in the title, or that it refers to two subject-matters, such act having been incorporated in the Code of 1895, became, by the adoption of that Code, a valid law of this state. without reference to any defects of the character above

referred to that might have existed in the original act.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Statutes, 215.]

2. SAME-SPECIAL LAWS.

The act above referred to is not subject to the objection that it is a special law enacted in a case for which provision has been made by an existing general law.

3. COURTS-INFERIOR COURTS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.

The special courts created by the act in question are all of the same grade and class, the presiding officer in each being the judge of a given municipal court in the particular municipality, and the act is not subject to the objection that it is violative of that provision of the Constitution contained in the Civil Code 1895, 5859.

4. SLAVES-ABOLITION OF SLAVERY-CONSTI

TUTIONAL PROVISIONS.

When the state, as parens patriæ, in a proper case, through its constituted officers or agencies, takes under its control an infant, the law authorizing such child to be bound to service under proper instructions is not a violation of those provisions of the Constitution of this state and of the United States which prohibit slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime after conviction thereof. 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS OF LAW-CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

The act in question provides for a hearing before the child is finally taken from the custody of the parent and a reasonable notice before such hearing, and, when the terms of the act in reference to the hearing are construed in the light of the Constitution and general laws of this state regulating the procedure of inferior judiciatories, there is nothing in the act which deprives the parent of any right without due process of law.

6. INFANTS CUSTODY-STATE INSTITUTIONS.

The General Assembly has authority to authorize benevolent institutions of the character indicated in the act under consideration to bind out to service a child committed to its care, such institution reserving the right of supervision to see that the child is properly cared for.

7. JUDGMENT-MATTERS CONCLUDED-COMMITMENT TO STATE INSTITUTION.

The judgment of commitment to the benevo lent institution under the act in question is a judgment made by a court of competent jurisdiction, and, so long as it stands unreversed, it is binding upon the parties. It was, therefore, not erroneous to reject evidence tending to impeach the validity of this judgment.

8. HABEAS CORPUS-CUSTODY OF CHILD-DETENTION IN STATE INSTITUTION.

When a child has been committed to a benevolent institution under the provisions of the act under consideration, the parent may apply to any judge having the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the conditions have changed since the commitment was made, and that the parent is now a fit person to have the custody of the child, and is willing and able to maintain and educate it, and, if the judge is satisfied that such is the truth, he is authorized to restore the child to the custody of the parent. The remedy given in the act to the parent applying for the return of the child by application to the authorities of the institution is merely cumulative, and does not oust the jurisdiction of the court. The court erred in not admitting evidence tending to show that the conditions had so changed since the judg ment of commitment that the parent was entitled to the custody of the child.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from City Court of Atlanta; H. M. Reid, Judge.

by reason of the neglect, habitual drunkenness, or other vicious habits of the parents or lawful guardians, or the person having the custody of such child, that it is a proper obJect for the care and instruction of such institution located in such county, such mayor, recorder, or other magistrate, instead of committing such child to the almshouse, or such other place, if any, as many have been provided by the city or county authorities of such county, may, in his discretion, by warrant in writing under his hand, commit such child to such institution, to be and remain under the guardianship of its managers until therefrom discharged in the manner prescribed by law.

"Sec. 7. Be it further enacted, that any order so made by any such mayor, recorder or magistrate may be executed by any policeman or constable to whom it shall be delivered by the official using it, by conveying the child named therein to such institution, and such child shall be detained in such institution until discharged or removed therefrom in the manner hereinafter provided.

"Sec. 8. Be it further enacted, that imme dlately upon the making of any such order, the officer making the same shall deliver to the policeman or constable a notice in writing addressed to the father of such child, if its father be living and resident within the county, and if not, then to its mother, if she be living and so resident, and if there be no father or mother of such child, then addressed to the lawful guardian of such child, if any, or to the person with whom, according to the examination of the child and the testimony, if any, received by the mayor, recorder, or magistrate, such child may reside; in which notice the party to whom the same is addressed shall be informed of the commitment of such child to said institution, and shall be notified that unless taken therefrom in the manner prescribed by law with. in ten days after the service of such notice, the child therein named shall be deemed legally surrendered to the institution for the purposes and within the true intent and meaning of this act.

"Sec. 9. Be it further enacted, that such notice shall be served by the officer to whom it shall be delivered by delivering the same to the party to whom it shall have been addressed personally, or by leaving it with some person of sufficient age, at the place of residence or business of such party; and it shall be the duty of such officer immediately to report the fact and the time and the manner of such service to the officer issuing the notice.

"Sec. 10. Be it further enacted, that if the party to whom such notice shall have been addressed, or any person shall, within the time specified therein, prove to the satisfac tion of the officer issuing the same that the circumstances of want and suffering, or other clrcumstances under which said child shall have been found, have not been occasioned

by the habitual neglect or misconduct of the parents or legal guardian of such child, then it shall be the duty of such magistrate, by order in writing addressed to the directors or managers of said institution, to direct such managers to deliver such child to the custody of the party named in such order, who shall thereupon be entitled to take such child away from said institution.

"Sec. 11. Be it further enacted, that if such proof shall not be produced within the time above prescribed, it shall be the duty of the officer, by whom such child shall have been committed to said institution, to make and transmit to the directors or managers thereof a notice in writing to that effect.

"Sec. 12. Be it further enacted, that if any child who has been previously arrested and delivered to the parent or guardian, as hereinbefore provided, shall again be found in either of the conditions hereinbefore described, the officer before whom such child is brought, upon proof thereof, may afterward make a final order committing such child to the care and instruction of the institution, without giving the notice hereinbefore provided for.

"Sec. 13. Be it further enacted, that at any time after the child shall have been committed to said institution, as above provided for in this act, it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the directors or board of managers of said institution that such child was, on insufficient cause, false or deficient testimony, or otherwise wrongfully or improvidently so committed, the said directors or board of managers shall, on the application of the parents, guardian, or protector; and also, if, after the child shall have been properly committed to said institution by virtue and in pursuance of the provisions of this act, any circumstances shall occur, which in the judgment of the directors or board of managers of said institution, would render expedient and proper the discharge of such child from the guardianship of said board, having a due regard for the welfare of such child and the purposes of the institution, the said directors or board of managers, on the application of the parents, guardian, or protector of such child, may, in their discretion, deliver up the child to its parents, guardian, or protector, on such reasonable condition as the said directors or board of managers may deem right and proper; provided, the consent of the ordinary shall be first obtained.

"Sec. 14. Be it further enacted, that the sald directors or board of managers shall have power, and it shall be their duty, whenever any child entrusted or committed to their charge shall, by the commission of any infamous crime, or by confirmed habits of vagrancy, have become so degraded and debased as to be an improper subject for their care and management, to return such child to the committing officer or other proper au

thority, to be disposed of in due process of law.

"Sec. 15. Be it further enacted, that if any party to whom the directors or board of managers of said institution shall have entrusted a child shall be guilty of any cruelty, misuse, and refusal or neglect to furnish the necessary provisions or clothing, or of any other violation of the terms of indenture or contract, to any such child so indentured, such child, or any reliable person, may make complaint thereof to any justice of the peace of the county in which such child is so indentured, or to the mayor, recorder, or other judicial officer of any city in the county in which such child is bound to service; and it shall be the duty of such officer to summon the parties before him and to examine into, hear, and determine the said complaint; and if, upon such examination, the said complaint shall appear well founded, such officer shall, by certificate under his hand, discharge such child from his obligation of service and restore him or her to the charge and management of such institution in the same manner and with like powers as before the indenture of such child.

"Sec. 16. Be it further enacted, that the directors or board of managers of such institution shall be the guardian of every child Indentured by virtue and in pursuance of the provisions of this act, to the extent that they shall take care that the terms in the contract be faithfully fulfilled, and that such ward be properly treated; and it is hereby made their special duty to inquire into the treatment of every such child and redress any grievance in the manner prescribed by law; and it shall be the duty of the person to whom any such child shall be indentured, and he shall by the terms of the indenture, be required, as often as once in six months to report to said directors or board of managers the conduct or behavior of said apprentice and anything of special interest pertaining to his welfare.

"Sec. 17. Be it further enacted, that all laws in conflict with this act be, and the same are, hereby repealed."

Acts 1894, pp. 80-84.

After the passage of the act, it was embodied in the Civil Code of 1895, and the Civil Code, by act of the General Assembly, was adopted as a Code of Laws. See Acts 1895, p. 98. Upon the trial of the case before the habeas corpus court, it was insisted by the plaintiff in error that the act was unconstitutional, for the following reasons: (1) That it referred to more than one subject-matter, and contained matter different from what was expressed in the title. That it was special legislation. (3) That it was contrary to the provision requiring that the jurisdiction, powers, etc., of courts of the same grade should be uniform. (4) That it was contrary to the provision prohibiting slavery. (5) That it authorized the deprivation of one's liberty without due process of

(2)

law. The court was of the opinion that the act was not unconstitutional for the reasons assigned, and admitted in evidence the authenticated proceedings from the court committing the child into the custody of the Home for the Friendless, which were under authority of, and in pursuance of, the act. The plaintiff excepted, and assigned error. In addition to these assignments of error, several others were made, only two of which need be noted: (1) That the court refused to allow the plaintiff to prove "that the facts stated in the commitment as aforesaid do not now exist, and that the plaintiff is now able and willing to provide for her child a good home, good clothing, plenty of good food, and proper care, and that she is not now a woman of vicious habits and guilty of habitual drunkenness." (2) That the court refused to allow plaintiff to prove that the child's grandmother was a woman of good moral character and was willing and able to take care of the child. After hearing all of the plaintiff's contentions, the court passed an order denying the writ, and remanding the child to the custody of the Home for the Friendless. The plaintiff excepted, and assigned error upon that ruling.

LA R. Ray, for plaintiff in error. Jas. L Mayson, W. P. Hill, and W. R. Hammond, for defendant in error.

ATKINSON, J. 1. The first objection raised to the act in question is: Is it in violation of that provision of the Constitution which declares that no law shall pass which re fers to more than one subject-matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof? Civil Code 1895, § 5771. The act has been embodied in the Code of 1895, and became a part of the law of this state upon the adoption of that Code, and the contents of the title of the original act are now immaterial. Central Railway Company v. State, 104 Ga. 832, 31 S. E. 531, 42 L. R. A. 518 (5).

2. The act in question is not subject to the objection that it is a special law enacted in a case for which provision has been made by an existing general law. In Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 11 S. E. 1018, it was held that the generality spoken of in this clause of the Constitution was territorial generality, and that there was no way to convert a statute territorially general into one territorially special; that the statute must live all over the state with equal vigor, and can be excluded from no nook or corner in which there is subject-matter for its operation. In Union Savings Bank v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 34 S. E 217, it was stated that a law is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution when it operates in every part of the state and upon every person or transaction embraced within its terms. The right of the General Assembly to classify subjects for legislation was recognized in