Opinion of the Court. As we have already remarked, the actual stock of this company, and the lines which have been constructed, belong to the persons by whose money the work has been done. They are entitled to such protection as the courts can give them. To that end the decree of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause remanded. That court will render a decree setting aside all the contracts made between the company and Selah Reeve. It will ascertain what amount of money has been paid by the subscribers to stock. It will direct the company to issue certificates of stock to all subscribers who have paid their money, for as many shares as they are entitled to by the money paid, reckoning forty per cent paid upon $25, as giving title to a share. It will direct the president and secretary of the company to call an election of a new board of directors by such stockholders, at such time and place, and on such notice, as the court shall think proper, at which election only the holders of actual stock subscribed and paid for, will be allowed to vote. Unless such newly elected board shall make an amicable settlement with Selah Reeve, and one satisfactory to the court, it will ascertain, as nearly as possible, the cost of the lines constructed or partially constructed by him, and after allowing him such cost, and a reasonable compensation for his time and labor, will enter a decree against him for any excess of money he may have received from the company, to be paid to the treasurer appointed by the new board of directors. It will direct the president and secretary of the company to produce all books and papers that may be required, before the master or in court, and if these officers, or the company as now organized, interpose any obstacles or difficulties in the way of carrying the orders of the court into execution, the court will appoint a receiver to take charge of the books, papers, affairs and business of the company, requiring such bonds as may be necessary. The costs in this court will be taxed against Selah Reeve, David A. Gage and Josiah Snow. Decree reversed. Syllabus. 59 261 URI OSGOOD บ. JAMES W. BLACKMORE. 1. JUDGMENT-jurisdiction. Where a court of general jurisdiction receives the confession of a judgment, the presumption will be indulged that the court heard evidence that the claim was due, and proof of the execution of the power to confess the judgment. Such evidence need not be preserved in the record. 59 261 8279 186 59 261 189 59 2. POWER OF ATTORNEY-description of the note. When a power of 187 attorney is written on the same paper and below the note, and refers to the "foregoing note," and describes it correctly except as to the time when it was to begin to draw interest, the description is sufficient to identify the note, and the presumption is, the judgment was confessed on the note as authorized by the power of attorney. Such a case is not the same as where the judgment is confessed on a note entirely different in date from that described in the power of attorney. The case of Chase v. Dana, 44 Ill. 262, considered and distinguished. 3. JURISDICTION-presumption of. The presumption is in favor of the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction, without the facts appearing in the record; on the other hand, there is no presumption in favor of the judgment of a court of inferior and limited jurisdiction; but the facts must appear in the record, showing the jurisdiction. Nor can the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction be attacked in a collateral proceeding by extrinsic evidence. If it appear from the record in the case that the court did not or could not have had jurisdiction of either the subject matter or the person of the defendant, then the presumption in favor of the judgment would be overcome. 4. SHERIFF'S SALE-land-its division. When the sheriff sells lands en masse, which could have been divided without injury to the parties, it is au irregularity that would enable the defendant to avoid the sale, on motion or otherwise, before the time for redemption expires, but it does not render the sale void. 5. SHERIFF'S SALE OF LAND-notice. Where a sheriff sells lands under execution on a defective or insufficient notice, the sale is not void, or even voidable, unless the purchaser has notice of the irregularity. And bona fide subsequent purchasers, without notice, can not be affected by such noncompliance with the statute. 6. SAME-postponement of sale. Where the sheriff published the notice of the sale, as required by the statute, and subsequently inserts under it: "The above sale is postponed until the 30th day of November, 1861," $121 261 205 3172 106a 7254 Syllabus. Opinion of the Court. which was not signed by the sheriff, but was, with the notice, published in three weekly issues of the newspaper: Held, that the notice of postponement of the sale thus made was sufficient, and the fact that it was only thus published sixteen days, did not render the sale void, but voidable, by the defendant, if urged in apt time. 7. SHERIFF'S RETURN. The return of the sheriff that he had made the sale, even if it showed a defective notice of the sale, could not affect the rights of the purchaser. The statute has not made such return evidence of any fact, nor is it a link in the chain of title, and neither immediate nor remote purchasers can be affected by it. 8. PRACTICE-of specific objections. Where a sheriff's deed was read in evidence, and only a general objection was interposed at the time, the objection can not be urged for the first time on error that the deed was not acknowledged before a proper officer. Had that objection been made on the trial, it could have been obviated by proving the signature of the sheriff. APPEAL from the, Circuit Court of Woodford county; the Hon. S. L. RICHMOND, Judge, presiding. Mr. GEORGE S. HOUSE, for the appellant. Messrs. WILLIAMS & THOMPSON, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court: This was an action of ejectment, brought by appellant, in the Woodford circuit court, against appellee, to recover eighty acres of land. The cause was tried by the court, without a jury, by consent of parties, when the issues were found for the defendant, and a judgment for costs was rendered in his favor, and the record is brought to this court, and errors are assigned. On the trial, appellant introduced in evidence a patent from the United States, for the land in controversy, dated the 15th day of October, 1855, conveying the land to him. The defendant then read in evidence a judgment rendered by the Superior Court of Chicago, in favor of Martin C. Bissell, against appellant and sixteen other persons, dated the 7th day of August, 1861, for the sum of $4577. An execution was issued by the clerk on the same day, under the judgment, Opinion of the Court. directed to the sheriff of Woodford county, which came to his hands on the 9th of the same month, and was, on that day, levied on the premises in controversy, together with other lands. Notice was given that the sale would be made on the 25th day of November, 1861, but it was postponed until the 30th, when this, with the other land, was sold, and the judgment and costs were paid, and the execution returned satisfied. At this sale, Giles Heath became the purchaser, who, on the 4th day of October, 1862, assigned the certificate of purchase to Martin C. Bissell, to whom the sheriff, after the time for a redemption had expired, made a deed for the premises in controversy. Appellee then read a deed for the premises from Bissell to Harper and Barfoot, dated November 14th, 1867, and a deed from them conveying the premises to himself, dated January 15th, 1868. Several other deeds for other portions of the quarter of which this was a part were read in evidence, but as they in nowise relate to these premises, they are not referred to here. Appellee then read in evidence a deed from appellant, for these premises, to Milton Philbo, dated the 3d of September, 1861. To the introduction of all this evidence, appellant objected. When appellee had closed his evidence, appellant read in evidence a deed from Philbo reconveying the premises to him, on the 5th of January, 1869. He also produced and read in evidence a complete transcript of the recorded proceedings in the Superior Court, in the case of Bissell v. Osgood, and others, under which the land was sold by the sheriff. Appellee objected to the reading of this transcript, because it was irrelevant, and because the warrant of attorney, and affidavit proving its execution, were no part of the record in confessing the judgment. He also read in evidence the notice of the sale, fixed for the 25th of November, 1861, and the sheriff testified it was duly published. But immediately under it is this writing: "The above sale is postponed to the 30th day of November, 1861." It, however, was not signed by the sheriff, Opinion of the Court. nor did it bear any date. The sheriff, however, testified that the postponement was made, and this notice of it was published before the 25th of November, the first day fixed for the sale. Appellee introduced evidence that he purchased the land in good faith, and without any notice that it was claimed there was any irregularity in the confession of judgment, the notice, or sale; that he was to pay $2200, and had paid about $1000 of that sum. The questions raised on this record are: Was the judgment valid and binding, or was it void for the want of jurisdiction in the court rendering it? And, were there such irregularities in conducting the sale as to render the sale void? The judgment was rendered while the court was in session, and was not entered by the clerk in vacation. The judgment order recites the fact that Bissell appeared by counsel and filed his declaration, and that the defendants appeared by their attorney; that his warrant of attorney was proved, and that he confessed that defendants were indebted in the sum for which the judgment was rendered, and consented that a judgment might be rendered against them; whereupon a regular formal judgment was rendered. It is believed to be a rule, without exception, that when a plaintiff in ejectment seeks to recover land against the defendant in execution, or when it becomes necessary to rely on a sheriff's deed, as a link in his chain of title, he is only required to produce a judgment, an execution thereon, and the sheriff's deed for the premises. This rule is so familiar that it requires no citation of authorities in its support. Having produced these, he has shown a prima facie transfer of the title from the defendant in execution to the person to whom the sheriff has conveyed. If, then, the other party can show that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of either the subject matter or of the ties, the prima facie case is overcome. acquire jurisdiction of the parties, has person, of the parBut the court, to only to have them |