Opinion of the Court.

1869, authorizing the plaintiff to issue the bonds for the erection of an alms house. As respects the proceeds of these bonds, it may be said a risk and liability has been cast upon the defendant which could not have arisen under any law in existence at the date of the bond. But the building of an alms house was a necessary county purpose. At the date of the bond, it was by law made the duty of the board of supervisors to build one, and the legal intendment must be, that it was in the contemplation of the surety when he executed the bond, that such an alms house might be built during his principal's term of office, and that the necessary means therefor might come into his hands, and that he assumed his obligation in reference to such a contingency. Upon this subject, as to affecting the liability of the surety of an officer by imposing additional duties upon him by subsequent legislation, the well settled principle is thus declared in the case of Governor of Illinois v. Ridgway, 12 Ill. 14:

"The sureties of an officer, upon his official bond, are liable for the faithful performance of all duties imposed upon such officer, whether by laws enacted previous or subsequent to the execution of the bond, which properly belong to, and come within the scope of the particular office, and not for those which have no connection with it, and can not be presumed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the time the bond was executed."

See, also, Compher v. The People, 12 Ill. 290; The People v. Leet et al. 13 id. 268; The People v. Villas, 36 N. Y. 459.

We hold it no ground of legal objection, that a portion of these moneys came into the hands of the treasurer in consequence of this subsequent legislation.

We consider that all these funds belonged to the county, and came into the hands of the county treasurer for necessary county purposes; that they were derived from no extraordinary source, but by means of the necessary and proper exercise of the administrative powers of the county through its board of supervisors; it was, by law, made the duty of the

Opinion of the Court.

county treasurer to receive all moneys belonging to the county, from whatever source they might be derived, and liability, in respect to these moneys, was within the true scope of the bond.

The question upon this liability was presented in the forms of pleas, objections to evidence, and instructions, and it is sufficiently disposed of in all these respects, by saying, that the demurrers to all the pleas setting up this branch of the defense, were properly sustained.

It is objected, that the summary statements of the various accounts made by the witness West, the deputy county clerk, were improperly admitted in evidence.

The original books kept by Shaver himself, in his capacity as treasurer, and the books of the county court, his settlements with the board of supervisors, and all the original books and papers from which these statements were made, were given in evidence. The books and accounts were voluminous, and so far as the statements were the results of mere computations from the books and papers, having been verified by the oath of the witness, we think they were properly admitted in evidence. They were of great use to the court and jury in determining, with greater dispatch and convenience, the true condition of the books and accounts; in fact, it would have been almost impracticable to have done so without such aid.

Mr. Phillips, in his work on Evidence, with Cowan & Hill's notes, 5th Am. Edit. vol. 1, p. 491, under the head of "Inquiry as to general mode of dealing," lays it down thus: "Inquiry has been allowed in some cases, as to a general mode of dealing, or as to the general result of an examination of accounts, and such other matters where the evidence is the result of voluminous facts, or of the inspection of many books and papers, the examination of which could not conveniently take place in court." And on the next page it is stated, that "a witness may give evidence of a general balance of ac

counts."

Syllabus. Opinion of the Court.

up

But so far as any statement was made from the reports of the finance committee, without any evidence of Shaver's assent to their correctness, it was incompetent evidence.

One such report was made after his term of office had expired. The repeated use of the word "defalcation," too, in the statement, was objectionable, as tending to the prejudice of the defendant.

For errors which have been indicated, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

FAUNTLEROY F. FRANS

v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel.

HARRISON B. FRANS et al.

WRIT OF ERROR TO A COUNTY COURT-whether it will lie. A writ of error will not lie from this court to a county court to bring in review an order of that court removing a party from his office of administrator of an estate, and requiring him to pay over a sum of money found to be due the estate.

WRIT OF ERROR to the County Court of Knox county; the Hon. DENNIS CLARK, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. HANNAMAN & KRETZINGER, for the plaintiff in

error.

Messrs. BAILEY & COLE, and Messrs. CRAIG & HARVEY, for the defendants in error.

Per CURIAM: This is a writ of error to the county court of Knox county, to bring in review an order of that court, of removal of the plaintiff in error from his office of administrator of the estate of Peter Frans, deceased, and requiring him to pay over a certain sum of money.

Does this writ of error lie?

Syllabus.

In the case of the Unknown Heirs of Langworthy v. Baker, 23 Ill. 487, a writ of error to the county court was entertained to review an order of that court for a sale of real estate at the instance of the administrator, for the payment of debts. The county court had been given jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit court, in applications of that character, and as no appeal was allowed from such an order to the circuit court, it was held to follow, necessarily, to prevent a failure of justice, that error should lie to this court.

In Hobson et al. v. Paine, 40 Ill. 25, a writ of error to the county court of Warren county was brought, to bring in review the action of that court in appointing an administrator of an estate; and for the reason that in that case an appeal could have been taken to the circuit court, the court refused to entertain the writ of error.

And for the same reason that an appeal from the order in the present case might have been taken to the circuit court, this writ of error, as in the last cited case, must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Writ of error dismissed.

THE OMAHA NATIONAL BANK

v.

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ST. PAUL.

1. LETTER OF CREDIT-extent of liability thereon. A bank gave a letter of credit to a person, guaranteeing the payment of drafts which might be drawn by the latter on a firm named in the letter, to the amount of $14,000, the letter providing that endorsements might be made thereon The person to whom the letter was given, made a draft for $6000, which was endorsed on the letter. He then drew for $2000, which was also endorsed on the letter. This draft was forwarded for collection to the bank giving the guaranty, which was advised by letter that it was drawn under the letter of guaranty. The holder of the letter then made a draft for $4000,

Syllabus. Opinion of the Court.

which was not endorsed on the letter, nor, in sending the bill for collection to the same party as before, was any reference made to the letter of guaranty; but the draft was paid by the drawees. He then drew for $6000, the draft purporting on its face to be drawn against the letter of credit, which was returned to the bank which gave it, with this draft, for collection. This last draft was protested. All the drafts except the first were drawn in favor of the same party. In a suit by the latter upon the guaranty, to recover the amount of the draft for $6000, which was protested, it was held, the defendant was not liable, because, on the payment of the previous drafts, amounting to $12,000, it was exonerated from liability on its guaranty, except to the extent of $2000, the residue of the amount guaranteed.

2. However different the rule might have been had the last draft been sold to a person who had no knowledge of the prior draft for $4000, which was not endorsed on the letter of credit, and who should purchase on the faith of that letter, yet, in the case of the plaintiff, who had knowledge thereof, the omission of such endorsement could not avail to charge the guarantor beyond the amount specified in its letter of credit.

3. RECOVERY under the common counts. In such case the plaintiff could not recover, on the common counts, even to the extent of $2000, the residue of the amount named in the letter of credit. The defendant's liability arose only from the guaranty, and that should have been declared upon specially.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOSEPH E. GARY, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. FULLER & SMITH, for the appellant.

Messrs. THOMPSON & BISHOP for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court:

On the 14th of September, 1868, the First National Bank of St. Paul issued to C. W. Nash the following letter of guaranty:

"FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ST. PAUL, MINN.,

"To whom it may concern :

Sept. 14, 1868.

The bearer, Chas. W. Nash, Esq., whose signature is herewith, may wish to draw drafts upon Messrs. Merriam & Wilder