CHANCERY. REFERENCE TO THE MASTER. Continued.

24. The exceptions in the circuit court are always based on, and
confined to, the objections urged before the master. They are re-
garded as in the nature of a special demurrer, and must specifically
point out the grounds of objection. This court will not, as a general
rule, consider any objection to a master's report, unless exceptions
were taken in the court below. Hurd v. Goodrich, 450.

25. When the master reports the facts correctly, but misapplies the
law, in such a case it is not necessary that exceptions should be filed;
but this is an exception to the rule. Ibid. 450.

PRESERVING EVIDENCE IN CHANCERY.

26. Of the manner thereof. Where the evidence in a chancery pro-
ceeding is not preserved, but it appears from the decree that the court
found, upon the evidence, certain facts, upon which the decree is based,
it is sufficient-it is not necessary that the decree should contain a re-
cital of all the evidence heard. Durham v. Mulkey, 91.

REMEDY OF AN EQUITABLE ASSIGNEE.

In the matter of the holder of an order from a railroad company for
municipal bonds issued on subscription to the stock of the company. See
SUBSCRIPTION, 4.

CREDITOR'S BILL.

What constitutes. See SUBSCRIPTION, 4.

MAKING NEW PARTIES.

Necessity of amending bill for that purpose. See PARTIES, 2, 3.

PARTITION OF LANDS OF INFANTS.

A court of chancery the guardian of infants, in that respect. See
PARTITION, 1, 2, 3.

PROOF REQUIRED AS TO INFANTS. See INFANTS, 2.

PROOF ON FORMER HEARING.

Effect of agreement in respect thereto. See EVIDENCE, 13.

OF JOINT RIGHTS AND INTERESTS.

Joint purchases for purposes of sale—rights of the parties and how ad-
justed. See JOINT RIGHTS AND INTERESTS.

AMENDMENT OF DECREE.

Within what time allowable. See AMENDMENTS, 1, 2, 3.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES. See MORTGAGES, 1, 2.

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. See JUDGMENTS, 1, 2.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS.

1. Neither can interfere with the process of the other, The State courts can not enjoin proceedings in the courts of the United States, nor the latter in the former courts. Logan v. Lucas et al. 237..

2. The defendant in an execution issued upon a judgment rendered in the circuit court of the United States, upon a bill filed in a State court, sought to enjoin, not directly, the plaintiff in the judgment, or the United States officer charged with the execution, but only a third person, who, it was alleged, caused the execution to be issued, and controlled the same, and asked that he might be restrained from any further action in respect to the execution, or in the collection of the judg ment, and that he be required to command the officer having the execution, to take no further proceedings under it. This was regarded as an attempted interference with the execution of process from a United States court, and within the rule prohibiting such interference by a State court. Ibid. 237.

CONSIDERATION

INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION.

As a ground for equity to set aside a sheriff's sale of land.
CHANCERY, 11.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CREATING A DEBT AGAINST A CITY.

See

1. Validity of the act of 1867, "to establish a police force for the city of East St. Louis." The decisions in the cases of Lovingston v. Wider et al. 53 Ill. 302, and The People ex rel. Wider et al. v. Canty, 55 Ill. 33, holding that the police commissioners of the city of East St. Louis, appointed under the act of 1867, had no power to create a debt against the city, re-affirmed. City of East St. Louis v. Witts, 155. TAXATION FOR CORPORATE PURPOSES.

2. Application of the rule of uniformity-constitutionality of the charter of the city of Belleville. See TAXATION, 1 to 4.

RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY.

3. On taking private property for public use. See JURY, 1.

CONSTRUCTION.

CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. See CONTRACTS, 9 to 12.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. See STATUTES, 2 to 13.

CONSTRUCTION OF DECREE FOR DOWER. See DOWER, 4. 36-59TH ILL.

CONTRACTS.

OFFER TO SELL LAND.

1. And what constitutes a payment thereon. Where one party agrees to sell another a piece of land, at a stipulated price per acre, on which a sum of money is paid, and the vendor gives to the vendee thirty days preference to buy, one half of the price down and the balance payable within one year, with eight per cent interest, and, in addition thereto, to pay a fair valuation for the dwelling house and stables on the premises, at the time the purchaser should want possession, which he could have at any time within sixty days after the first payment, and the written offer to thus sell was executed and delivered to the purchaser: Held, that the payment, when the written offer to sell was executed, was a payment on the purchase. Estes v. Furlong, 298.

2. That this writing was sufficiently clear and explicit in its terms to constitute, when accepted, a binding agreement to sell the land. Ibid. 298.

3. Condemnation of the land for public use-no change in the rights of parties. Notwithstanding a law was passed four days after the agreement, authorizing commissioners to condemn lands for park purposes, and after the bill was filed for a specific performance of the agreement, the land was so condemned, and valued at double the price at which the offer was made to sell, and as the purchaser elected to take the land, and had tendered the money, and by agreement the appraisement put on the house and stabling by the commissioners was stipulated to be taken for the purposes of the suit, and their value paid to the owner, and they conveyed to the commissioners, and $5100 of the condemnation money was also paid to him, and $4900, the residue, it was agreed should abide the event of the litigation: Held, that these transactions did not affect the rights of the purchaser. Ibid. 298.

OF A UNILATERAL CONTRACT.

4. When a contract is in anywise unilateral, the court will regard any delay on the part of the purchaser with especial strictness, and will exercise its discretion with great care, but an agreement of the character of that in this case will not be regarded as invalid, or as one which will not be enforced. And the payment of the $300 when the agreement was executed formed a sufficient consideration to support the contract, and the prompt tender of the money was the exercise of the right of election. A party who has not signed a contract for the sale of land may enforce it against one who has, although he could not be compelled to perform it; the want of mutuality may be waived by filing a bill to enforce it, and thus the remedy became mutual. Ibid. 298.

CONTRACTS.

WHERE A VALUATION IS REQUIRED. Continued.

5. Where a contract to sell property stipulates that there should be
a fair valuation of a portion of the same, it is implied that it is to be
at a reasonable estimate made by the parties, or if they are unable to
agree, then to be determined by the court. In such a case the specifi-
cation of the mode of ascertainment is not an essential ingredient of the
contract, but is entirely subsidiary. When, in such a case, no means
of ascertaining the value of property thus sold is pointed out, any
means adapted to the purpose may be employed. Estes v. Furlong, 298.
CONTRACT BY AN ILLITERATE PERSON.

6. Where a party can not read writing, but his wife is a fair scholar,
and they examine the agreement, and it was fairly explained to him by
the purchaser, and there was no fraud or misrepresentation, it would
be a dangerous precedent to permit such an instrument to be defeated
on loose and indefinite testimony of the maker that it was not the same,
when read on the trial, as when he executed it. Ibid. 298.
ALTERATION-FILLING BLANKS.

7. In an action on a school treasurer's bond, it appeared the bond
was written by the treasurer, and he left a blank for the names of his
sureties and the amount of the penalty. The sureties filed a plea of
non est factum, and it appeared on the trial that the sureties signed
the bond, and the blank for the amount of the penalty was subse-
quently filled up by the treasurer and delivered to the board, who had
no notice that the blank had been filled after the bond was signed.
The sureties never gave notice to the board that the bond had been
altered, and the treasurer received large sums of money by virtue of
having given the bond, and afterwards became a defaulter: Held, that
if not a fraud perpetrated by the sureties, it is unfair and unjustifiable
in morals, and would, if allowed, be an ungracious defense, and that
the bond did not become void. Bartlett et al. v. Board of Education,
364,

8. When commercial paper and unsealed agreements are signed
with blanks, and thus delivered, and the blanks are subsequently filled,
the law presumes that authority to fill them was given at the time of
their delivery. Ibid. 364.

CONTRACTS CONSTRUED.

9. And herein, of the certainty required. A party executed a bond
to a railroad company, covenanting therein to convey to the company,
in consideration of the construction of their road, depot and station
house, in a certain locality, the right of way through a certain tract
of land belonging to him, "and also seven acres of land in said sec-
tion, tract and orchard, adjoining to said right of way on either side
thereof:" Held, the instrument was not so uncertain in its terms as
for that reason to be declared a nullity, and that the bond must have
been understood by the parties as requiring a conveyance of the right

CONTRACTS. CONTRACTS CONSTRUED.

Continued.

of way wherever the company might choose to establish their track,
and a strip of land of uniform width extending along the railway
through the entire tract described in the bond, and having three and
one half acres on each side of the right of way. Chidester et al. v.
The Springfield & Illinois Southeastern Railway Co. 87.

10. But the company having so constructed their road as to leave
a tract containing but nine-tenths of an acre on one side of the right
of way, it was held, erroneous, in a suit for the specific performance
of the contract, to decree to the company the nine-tenths of an acre
on that side, and six and one-tenth acres on the other. The company
were at liberty so to locate their road as to entitle them to seven acres,
and not having chosen to do so, they can not claim an equivalent on
one side of the right of way for what they have voluntarily abandoned
on the other. Ibid. 87.

11. Of parol conditions with third persons. Upon its being con-
tended that the bond was delivered by the obligor therein to a third
person, to be held by him until the citizens of the town, in which the
tract of land was situated, should raise and pay the sum of $350, as a
further consideration for the conveyance, estimated to be one-half the
value of the land, which was never done, but of which condition the
company had no knowledge, it was held, the bond having been deliv
ered to the company, they, having acted in good faith upon its terms
had the right to insist upon their performance without reference to
any parol conditions or agreements made with other parties, and of
which they were ignorant. Ibid. 87.

12. In regard to fencing, breaking and cultivating a tract of land. A
and B entered into a contract, by the terms of which A was to break
and fence eighty acres of land. For the breaking, B was to pay $3
per acre, and for the fencing, $6 per hundred rails, A doing the work
and furnishing the materials. After specifying the details in regard
to this part of the transaction, the contract provided that A should
put in a crop of wheat in the fall of that year-1869-B furnishing
the seed, and the proceeds of the crop to be equally divided. The con-
tract then provided as follows: "The said A further agrees, that he
will thoroughly prepare the ground of the said eighty acres, and sow
the same in wheat, in the fall of the year 1870, upon the same terms
and conditions as aforementioned for the year 1869:" Held, A was
not entitled to $3 per acre for preparing the land for wheat in the fall
of 1870, but was to prepare the ground and sow the wheat on the
same terms as specified for the preceding year, that is, an equal divi-
sion of the crop. Silvers v. Chitwood, 193.

13. Construction of a contract as to the duration of an agency. See
AGENCY, 1.