Supreme Court of the United States. BILL ILL in equity, "The State of New York, one of the United States of America, by Josiah Ogden Hoffman, the attorney-general of the said state," filed this bill in consequence of the rejection of the motion, to grant writs of certiorari, for the removal of Fowler, et al v. Lindsey et al. and Fowler et al. v. Miller, (3 Dal. Rep. 411,) from the circuit court of Connecticut into the supreme court. The plaintiffs in those suits were made defendants to the present bill; and the complainant, after setting forth the title of New York to the lands in question, prayed (inter alia) for an injunction against them. The notices to the defendants, that the injunction would be moved for, were delivered on the 25th and 26th of July; but, on the 6th of August, Ingersoll, who appeared for the individuals, though not for the state, referred to the act of congress, which provides, that "no writ of injunction shall be granted, in any case, without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party, or his attorney, of the time and place of moving for the same: 2 vol. 228. 8. 5. Swift's edit. And he contended, that reasonable notice had not been given in this case. 2*] *Hoffman, (the attorney-general of New York) contended that the notice was reasonable in relation to its present object; though it might not be sufficient for requiring the defendant to put in an answer, or demurrer, to the bill. The injunction prayed for, is not a perpetual one, but only till answer, and further order of the court. Nor ought the section of the act of congress to be extended by construction; for, a universal application of the rule, would be unreasonable, and, in many cases, enable the party to defeat the very purpose of an injunction. It is questionable, indeed, whether the section at all relates to a motion, 1.-The term commenced on the 5th of August, but a quorum of the judges did not attend till the day following; and CUSHING and IREDELL, Justices, were prevented by indisposition from taking their seats on the Bench, during the whole term. either in the supreme court, or the circuit court, for an injunction; since its only object seems to have been, to vest in a single Judge the same power that the courts previously possessed, to grant the writs of injunction and ne exeat. But, at all events, if the court shall think notice of such a motion necessary, they will construe the shortest notice to be reasonable notice, for the purpose of preserving peace, and effectuating justice. Ingersoll, in reply. With respect to the state of Connecticut, it is a fact, that since the decision on the motion for a certiorari, at the last term, there has not been a meeting of the legislature; so that it is impossible to ascertain what course she will adopt on the occasion; and with respect to the individual plaintiffs in the circuit court, it is a matter of great importance that a trial on their rights should not be suspended, by the interposition of a state, whose interests cannot be affected by any decision that may be given below. It is enough, however, that by the positive provisions of the act of congress, it is contemplated, that no injunction shall issue, in any case, unless satisfactory reasons are assigned; and that, therefore, reasonable notice of an application for the writ, must be given to the adverse party. The opinion of the COURT was delivered by the Chief Justice. ELLSWORTH, Chief Justice. The prohibition contained in the statute, that writs of injunction shall not be granted, without reasonable notice to the adverse party or his attorney, extends to injunctions granted by the supreme court, or the circuit court, as well as those that may be granted by a single Judge. The design and effect, however, of injunctions, must render a shorter notice, reasonable notice, in the case of an application to a court, than would be so construed, in most cases of an application to a single Judge: and until a general rule shall be settled, the particular circumstances of each case must also be regarded. Circumstanced as the present case is, the notice, which has been given, is, in the opinion of the court, sufficient, as it respects the parties against whom an injunction is pi yed. and prayed a discovery, relief, and injunction | right of soil, which, in relation to a great part to stay the proceedings in the Connecticut eject of New York, results from the right of jurisdicments. 3 Dall. 411. As the state had not ap- tion; so that deciding the latter, is virtually a peared, the question of injunction was the only decision of the former. In this respect New one now argued. York is, perhaps, distinguished from her sister states, whose claims of territory are, generally, founded upon positive grant; while her claim of soil is a mere incident of the sovereignty and jurisdiction, with which the revolution invested her.2 between the states, might here be revised, and authoritatively declared; and "suits in equity cannot be sustained in any court of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate, and Hoffman (the attorney-general of New York) in support of the prayer for an injunction, and the general merits of the bill, urged various points, with great force and ability. 1st. It is necessary to execute the special agreement between the states. It is a principle of equity, that Ingersoll, against granting the prayer for an wherever there is an agreement, as to a right, injunction. In the suits below, the state of whether it is a mere franchise, or a right of New York is not a party, and cannot be affected soil, it shall be enforced, and rendered conclu- by their decision; while the defendants below sive upon the parties, by the interposition of are not parties to the present bill, though they the court. The agreement admits that the are the persons most likely to be injured by tract of land belonged to New York; and the those suits. But no part of the bill states, that bill states that notwithstanding this admission, any of the land belongs to New York; so non Connecticut has since undertaken to grant a constat that she is interested in the question of part of it to the plaintiffs in the ejectments. soil; and the question of state boundary cannot Hence, it became necessary (or the bill would be decided, as between the states, in the circuit have been incomplete) to make those plaintiffs, court. There is no instance of the interposiparties to the present suit. The agreement, tion of a court *of equity, by way of injunc- [*5 indeed, only gives the equitable title to New tion, unless upon the application of a party imYork; while the plaintiffs below possess the mediately interested in the subject of the comlegal title, and must, of course, recover in the mon law suits, or there is property likely to be ejectments. A specific performance of the withdrawn. 1 Ch. Prec. 186, 7. Gilb. Ch. 19. agreement being decreed against Connecticut, 2 Dall. 402. 5 Bot. Car. Canc, 459. Hind. would not be an adequate and complete remedy; Ch. 585. Besides, there is a regular course, in and all parties in interest, however remote, which the judgment of this court, independent must be brought before the court, or 'hey can- of its equity character, may be obtained; as by not be affected by its proceedings. 2d. It will a writ of error, on a demurrer to evidence, the prevent a multiplicity of suits. The bill is em-construction and effect of the alleged agreement phatically a bill of peace; since, considering the character of the parties to the principal controversy, without this remedy, the consequences upon the public tranquillity can hardly be conjectured. It is true, however, that the right of the state of New York cannot be affected by a decision in the circuit court; but till that right is lawfully settled, the number of suits, by individuals, must be indefinitely great; and merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits, to cut off, by one decision, various sources of strife and litigation, is a substantive ground for the exercise of a chancery jurisdiction. 1 Atk. 282. 2 Atk. 484. 3d. It is a bill for the discovery of title, which parties in interest, as well as parties 4* in possession, may certainly maintain, 1 Vez. 249.1 4th. It is a bill to settle a question of boundary between two states. Of this question the court can, incontestably, take cognizance; and it will not allow the decision of the principal matter to be interrupted, or prevented, by collateral considerations; particularly, when the decision of the principal, will settle all the inferior matters in dispute. In Penn. v. Baltimore, 1 Vez, 454, the bill was sustained upon similar principles; and the jurisdiction there assumed upon principle, in a case of contested provincial boundary, may surely be exercised here under the additional sanction of the constitution. 2 Dall. 442, 415, 419, 3 Dall. 1. 412. But it is not simply a bill to settle a question of boundary between two states: it involves the 1.-WASHINGTON, Justice.-Does the bill state, that the plaintiff is ignorant of the defendant's title? Hoffman.-Yes, expressly. WASHINGTON, Justice. Then you are aware, that if the injunction should be granted upon that ground, it must, of course, be dissolved, as soon as the discovery is obtained. 2-PATTERSON, Justice. Generally speaking, the proposition is true, that, as to states, jurisdiction and the right of soil, go together. 3. ELLSWORTH, Chief Justice. If the bill contains no averment of a right of soil in New York, I think it must be defective, and lays no foundation To have the benefit of the for an injunction. agreement between the states, the defendants below (who are the settlers of New York) must apply to a court of equity as well as the state herself; but, in no case, can a specific performance be decreed, unless there is a substantial right of soil, not a mere political jurisdiction, to be protected and enforced. Besides, is not the bill, likewise, defective for want of making the defendants below parties to it? CHASE, Justice. The validity of the grant of either state must depend upon the question of boundary; for, neither New York, nor Connecticut, could grant land, which it did not own. Hence, I think, the question of boundary must necessarily arise in the suits below. PATTERSON, Justice. On the question just prothat some difficulty would occur in sustaining a posed by the Chief Justice, it may be remarked, bill in this court, at the suit of the defendants below. But it does not appear to me, that any of the cases in the books apply to the present case. What ries between two states; and the question of soil, does the bill present? A case of disputed boundaon their conflicting grants, must be decided by the question of jurisdiction. The state of Connecticut has granted out the Gore. The state of New York has, also, granted out the Gore. The grantees of Connecticut have brought suits in Connecticut against the grantees of New York, and will obtain possession of the land. If the grantees of New York are thus evicted, they will bring suits in New York, and, in their possession. But where will this feud and litigation end? It is difficult and painful to conjecture, unless this court can, under the constitution, lay hold of the case to decide the question of boundary, which will be a decision of all the appendages and consequences. |