"The second cause of the disorganization of Europe appears, according to Mr. Hauterive, on the part of Prussia.

"This gentleman says, it is not for him to trace by what means the successor of a prince rose, who acted a subordinate in the treaty of Westphalia, who wrote in terms of respectful distance, to the ministers of one of the principal powers, and from whom those ministers withheld the title of highness in their letters. But to the elevation of this house of Brandenburgh is owing a consider able share of the disorganization of Europe. The treaty of Westphalia had for its objects the reconciliation of the protestant and catholic interests. France declared herself the protector of the rights of the protestants. But the rise of Prussia in the empire changed the motives of regard previously entertained for the necessary guardianship of France. Piussia had its own interests in view, sometimes foreign, sometimes opposed to the interests of the German confederacy. Hence Prussia by its rise rendered appeals to France for its intervention between the head of the empire and its members, in cases of rupture, less frequent. Hence Prussia by its rise caused disputes between the empire and its members to be more frequently the occasions of war. Hence Prussia by its rise rendered France almost a stranger to the interests of Germany, and Germany to the interests of France. Hence Prussia by its rise causing disputes on the constitution of the empire to be no longer determined by France, they were resolved by violence, and by the pleasure of the strongest. Hence Prussia by its greatness made the protestant confederacy to disappear, even to the name which indicated a community of rights and interests; and usurping the place of France by its protection, identified the cor federacy with itself, under the title of the Prussian party. Prussia however did not and could not acquire territorial resources proportionate to its ambition. Prussia did not found its rise upon conquest: this would have unmasked the désigns of aggrandisement. Prussia dissembled its ambitious plans under the plausible forms of the improvement of tactics and its system of finance; and thus rousing emulation rather than fear, the consequences have been fatal. Taught by Prussin, princes have adopted the opinion, that gold circulates in their countries only to enrich the treasury, and that nature has produced men only to be

come soldiers. But in the hands of met ministers, the former has proved the chimera of the Danaides, whereas the latter was a ruinous reality. And hence Prussia by its rise, by its systems, and by the influence of Europe-weakened the springs of govem these systems, bowed down every state ef ment-rendered intolerable to every people the yoke of the authority that galled themmultiplied the pretexts for hostility-dispos ed princes to seck every occasion of wafurnished the means of rendering wars more general, more lasting, and more bloody-a finally aggravated the political disorganize tion, of which the war of the revolution is the last, and one of the most important effects.

“Thus Prussia stands arraigned betw the great tribunal of the world, as guilty the disorganization of Europe. Such is substance of this charge; of which the tw predominant features are, 1st. Prussia, di sembling her plans of ambition under pl sible forms, first taught to princes, that n ture only furnished men to be formed in soldiers, by the example of her military tem; and 2d. Gold circulated in their cou tries only to enrich their treasuries by t example of her financial system. Let now examine on what grounds these accu tions stand. For, on these two points causes, in like manner as on the exem last of conquest imputed to Russia, all subsidiary reasoning, and detailed asserti of Mr. Hauterive are built. But we sta soon find that all this gentleman's causes a consequences, have neither cement, fecr tion, nor existence whatever, save in t conception, or in extreme historica diplomatic misinformation.

"During the sixteenth and seventee centuries, Europe was alternately mens with a great revolution and an unite monarchy, by the houses of Austria Bourbon. The vast possessions, and ponderant power of these monarchs u them on to enterprizes ambitious andunj Chiefy Lewis XIV. by his standing. numerous armies, menaced the rights of neighbours whose military power was moderate.

adi

"This ambitious monarch was the f der of the military system, according to taire, and was the first who est numerous armies. He instituted grat introduced the use of the bayonet; mented dragoon cavalry; settled the m in which the artillery was served; fon academies for the artillery; formed ham magazines of military stores; raised ments of bombardiers; established reg of militia at the expence of the comman maintained and instructed compa cadets in most of the frontier towns; corps of engineers; perfected the art tification under Vauban; constructed, ed, and formed one hundred and fitte fications which were rendered almost

nable; appointed inspectors general, and afterwards directors, for the strict maintenance of military discipline; instituted mili. tary honours, which are more desired than pecuniary rewards; and to crown his mililary system and his endeavours to be well served, he instituted the hospital for invalids. "Thus his armies became through the arrangements of this great military system, the astonishment of all and the terror of many of the nations of Europe! Such numerous troops had never before been seen. He kept in pay, says Voltaire, 450,000 men. From the time of Mazarine's death to that of his own, he was engaged in a course of wars, which lasted nearly thirty years. His navy consisted of 780 ships, of which there were 110 of the line. But by the good policy and valor of Britain, Sweden, and Prussia, the balance of power was, notwithstanding, preserved to annihilation. In order to meet the magnitude of the danger, and to guard against meditated surprise, Prussia beheld at once her sole security, and the true basis of peace in the strength of her armies. Hence therefore the remedy was proportioned to the evil; but the necessity of this conduct was forced upon her from the quarter where the example originated. The system had been even perfected in France before it had been thought of in Prussia. So vast, so complete was the military systein of Lewis, that Voltaire says, the troops of all his enemies were not so numerous; they certainly were not so strongly united, and thus he had always great successes or great resources. The genius of the sovereign of Prussia, did content itself however with forming a at military machine; he contemplated and he discovered the modes of making it act with new energy in war and advantage in prace. His improvement in tactics followed, of which his enemies can tell the efect. The burden, which results from the support of armies, he made these armies compensate by their utility, not merely with pect to the repulsion of external danger, the support of internal security. But his army, which was not disproportioned to his ordinary revenues, for his treasures accumuted by an annual surplus, was divided in the provinces, and not in the towns, or on he frontiers. His great object was to render army truly national, and thereby invincible, and without interfering with rural Cultivation. He sent them therefore to their lations, and to their homes, to devote emselves to agriculture during ten or cleven ths of the year. Thus his army emed between the sword and the ploughar, became soldiers renowned in war, nd agriculturists useful in peace, and did prove burthensome to the country.

"

Mr. Hauterive, therefore, has fallen at more than one great error on this head. First, Prassia did not set the example of the tary system and its numerous standing nies: it was France. And, next, in ANS. REV. VOL. II.

France, it certainly proved an evil of the most mischievous magnitude. Whereas in Prussia it proved a good of the first importance, not solely with respect to Prussia itself, but to Germany and Europe. For under the military system divested of its poison by the sagacity of the monarch, the Prussian nation has grown and prospered, and has not declined into disorganization and revolution. Mr. Hauterive, however, asserts that this greatness of Prussia became pernicious to Germany and to Europe; and that by its influence and example it created wars in the one, and disorganization in the other. History informs us, on the contrary, that from the period of the establishment of Prussian greatness to the present one, it did not create wars in the empire; for there have been no wars amongst the princes, as Mr. Hauterive affirms. And it is the growth and preponderance of Prussia which prevented these wars. They must have infallibly arisen out of the internal dissentions of the empire, had it not been for the intervention of this power.

"Let us now examine how far this gentleman is likewise erroneous, when he asserts that Prussia first taught to the princes of Europe that gold circulated in their countries only to enrich their treasury. The historical panegyrist of Lewis XIV. informs us, that when this monarch lay on the bed of death and held his successor in his arms, he uttered these remarkable words to him, which could have proceeded but from his revolving within himself all his military and financial operations: I have been too fond of war— imitate me not in that-no more than in my too great expences.' He, to whom they were uttered, preserved them in writ ing at the head of his bed. But let Mr. Hauterive direct his researches a little further, and he will perceive the history of France informing him that the system of finance, which gave in France such a pernicious facility to answer any sudden demand. for war, was introduced by Catherine de Medicis, abolished under Henry IV. revived under Lewis XIII. and so fatally enfeebled the latter times of Lewis XIV. that about the years 1691 and 1692 the finances were in extreme disorder. And on this occasion the historian observes, it is only war that impoverishes a state. Since the time of the ancient Romans, I know of no nation that has enriched itself by its victories. Italy in the sixteenth century, owed its wealth entirely to its commerce. Holland would have subsisted but a very short time, had it looked no farther than the seizure of the Spanish plate fleets. The Algerines, who support themselves by their piracies, are a very wretched people. Among the European nations, war, after a certain term of years. reduces the conqueror to the same distress with the conquered."

A better defence of the maritime sys-
X

tem might have been drawn up than is contained in the fourth chapter. Compare the acknowledged laws of maritime armaments with the acknowledged laws of territorial armaments; and it will be found that moderation has been a distinguishing virtue of the framers of the maritime code. The Frederics or Bonapartes have not shewn such respect for the rights of neutrals, as the admirals of Britain; yet further derelictions of claim would still be expedient. The northern popularity of Great Britain is not consulted by any of those arrogant claims, which our pretenders to statesmanship seek a low applause by asserting. A minister of talent would choose to renounce them all, conscious that the claim is a barrier to friendship; and that all such claims amount, at the moment of practical enforcement, to nothing at all. The right of strength and the right of wit will ever be used in an emergency contraband of war will always be seized by the powerful, and always furnished by the dextrous, during a blockade. The agreements do, indeed, guide the decisions of courts of justice, concerning the legality of prizes; but who would wish not to predispose our courts of admiralty to consult the interests of foreigners as well as of natives? because equity is most favourable to an increase of commercial inter

quoted as a proof of increased wealth: it only proves that bullion of late years has often been worth more than coin; and that a great deal has occasionally been melted down for exportation. The increased rental of the country is also adduced; but if the pound sterling has diminished in value, this proves little. New inclosures are vauntingly said to have taken place; they always abound during a cycle of dearth; and during the first cycle of cheapness, half of them will probably be abandoned again to sheep-walks. It is not at all desirable to wind up rents very high; or to culti vate every acre of the country: corn should be grown where it can be grown cheapest, in North America, and in such countries as have no rents to pay. By attempting to force the growth of corn here, we render a vast portion of our prosperity dependent on the dearth of food, which is always a public misfortune.

In order to prevent the land-owners from losing their rents, our houses of parliament, which consist of land-owners, grant one another, by law, a monopoly of the home-market, and prohibit, at certain prices, the importation of corn; thus taxing the whole community, to accommodate themselves with unnecessary rent. The result of our author's sanguine estimate is, that every man, woman, and child is worth, on the average, two hundred pounds; that eighty millions is the yearly value of their industry; and two thousand millions the value of the whole British nation. Lucian turns auctioneer to the philosophical sects; our author to the European nations; but his Britain is above the bidding even of a Didius Julianus.

DURING the infancy of agriculture Egypt was an important country.Lands, which could be brought into cultivation without manure, or the spade, or the plough, might well astonish early society by their fertility and produce. But now that the art of husbandry is improved, and the conquests of tillage immeasurably extended, the strip of oose between the granite mountains of Egypt is scarcely important to the corn-merchants of Europe. The Delta, it is true, bas larger dimensions than ever; but

the perpetual addition of alluvion-soll has lifted much of it above the reach of regular inundation. So that the sum of arable surface is probably not greater than of old. What does Egypt produce beside corn and natron, which premises to commerce any sensible acces sion? The productions of tropical agri culture might indeed be naturalize there; but it would be a speedier pro cess to raise them on the Zaire, th Coanza, the Orange-river, or on th Oronoko, by means of creole coloniza

tion, than to undertake the discipline of the present Egyptians into such planters as the West-Indians. It is, therefore, not worth while to covet or envy this acquisition: it would rather be a glorious than a useful prize. Only inasmuch as Egypt is the best road to the interior of Africa, could it be worth the while of the British nation to occupy it; but the river Zaire is probably this best road. It has been said that Égypt is a stepping stone from Europe to Hindostan: yet it has constantly been neglected, since the establishment of a ferry by the Cape of Good Hope. Where has it a port in the Red Sea? Where has the Red Sea forests of ship timber? And if a naval station were to be occupied in the Isle of France, or Bourbon, or Madagascar, how should any Red Sea fleets escape squadrons stationed there? It would be wise then to let the French over-run Egypt; if for that they would evacuate the European Hol

land.

It

Nor is it very clear that the memoir of Leibnitz, of which a neat and interesting analysis is here given to the public, was not drawn up with this very view. In order to divert Louis XIV. from the conquest of protestant Holland, the pious Leibnitz suggested to his ambition an attack on infidel Egypt. was likely to prove a perpetual drain of men and treasure; for it had always been the grave of its conquerors. Cambyses lost there the empire of Persia ; Perdiccas, the empire of Macedon; Pompey and Anthony, the empire of the world. The conquest of Egypt under (mar gave occasion to the partition,

And that under Saladin to the dissolution of the califate. With the reign of Selim, the acquirer of Egypt, begins the declension of Turkish power. The udgment of Leibnitz cannot possibly have credited the Arabian tales of Egyptian opulence and populousness; yet he describes it with all the enthusiasm of Amrou's exultation, oculus regionum, ter frugum, sedes commerciorum. He es up with his panegyric all those glorious motives of conduct, which were likely to operate on the sympathetic vanity of Louis XIV. and of his subjects. He offers to the monarch, whom he Would seduce, the titles of emperor of the east, advocate of the church, and arbiter of the universe. He describes the Egyptians as seditious, which is true; likely to side with the Christians,

which is very questionable; as easily retained when once conquered, which is notoriously erroneous; and as defended by an insignificant force of janissaries and mamelukes, which is a somewhat treacherous misrepresentation. If this memoir, as is likely enough, really influences the proceedings of the modern French, let it spur them on; let them follow their ninth Louis to Damietta, and win new victories at Massour; pestilence will again blast the palms of victory.

There is surely a sensible tincture of irony in the following passage:

"A war with Christian states can only lead to the acquirement of small accessions of territory; a tedious process for those who aspire after great things. And expe rience proves, that every encrease of power proportionally encreases suspicions and confederacies. Hence, a prince, aiming, like the most Christian king, at great achievements, will be cautioned by his wisdom to abstain as much as possible from seeking his aggrandisement by these means. For, to proceed in that course would be at once to prescribe the "non plus ultra" of his progress; and, for a trifling consideration at hand, to part with the greatest and the best founded hopes.

"Such objects are to be far more easily and certainly acquired by elections and successions, and that which gives origin to all successions, matrimonial alliances. It was thus the house of Austria grew in power, and thus the house of Bourbon will likewise grow, if it persists in the course in which it began. Since, therefore, there are these three methods of aggrandisement--war, elections, and successions; and since the stability of the monarchy, and the internal happiness of the people, are best consulted and promoted by cultivating the several arts and relations of peace with our neighbours in Europe, it follows, that war ought to be exclusively employed against the barbarous nations. And, among these, it is incontestible, that by one fortunate blow (for striking which the French are most peculiarly formed by subverted and founded. There indeed will nature) whole empires may be at once both be found the materials for supreme power, and glory incredible; by which the most Christian king will find himself exalted to the authority of general or chief of Christendom, and France become the military school of Europe, the academy for the confluence of the most distinguished talents, and the Mediterranean Sea. And if honour, and inemporium at once of the ocean and of the disputable right to high prerogative be sought for, the titles and rights of emperor of the east, recovered from the violation of the Turks by the exertions of the French (who,