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character; for every other disposition is direct, and nothing is left to implication. These suggestions are sufficient to show that the theory of a limited, not an absolute, interest will harmonize the whole will, and give expression to the manifest testamentary intent.

This matter came on to be heard upon petition and answer and was argued by counsel, at this term, and thereupon upon consideration thereof said petition is hereby dismissed at the cost of the petitioner.

O. C. of

Reynold's Estate. Will-Life estate.

Luzerne Co.

A devise “of all my estate, real, personal and mixed, wherever situated, I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife for and during her natural life," gives the widow only a life estate in the decedent's real estate.

The fund arising from a judicial sale of the decedent's real estate was distributed by the court to the guardian of the only son and heir of the decedent, subject to the widow's right to the income thereof.

Rule to show cause why the fund aris ing from the sale of real estate of Sheldon Reynolds, deceased, and now in court, should not be paid to Annie B. D. Reynolds, his widow.

A. H. McClintock for widow.. H. A. Fuller for guardian. February 21st, 1896. DARTE, P. J.Sheldon Reynolds, a member of the bar of Luzerne county, died testate February 8, 1895. He left to survive him a widow, Annie B. D. Reynolds, the petitioner, and one child, a minor son, named Dorrance Reynolds. The portion of the will pertinent to this issue reads as follows:

"Saranac Lake, N. Y., Feb. 6, 1895. "I. Sheldon Reynolds, of the city of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, do make and publish this my last will and testament. All my estate, real, personal and mixed, wherever situated, I give and be queath unto my beloved wife, Annie B. D. Reynolds, for and during her natural life."

The will was filed and probated February 15, 1895. This is really a distribution audit, but the main point arises from the proper construction of the will. The question is, what estate do the following words convey: "All my estate, real, personal and mixed, wherever situated. I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife,

Annie B. D. Reynolds, for and during her natural life."

The fund for distribution is a real estate fund, derived from a private sale under an order from the Orphans' Court of Luzerne county. A. H. McClintock, Esq., attorney for the widow claims that the will conveys a fee simple in the real estate, and that the proceeds should be dis ributed to his client. H. A. Fuller, Esq., attorney for Benjamin Reynolds, guardian of Dorrance Reynolds, the only child of decedent, claims that the will gives the widow simply a life estate, and thus she is entitled to nothing but the interest upon the fund in hand. In support of his proposition, Mr. McClintock refers us to section 9. Act of April 8, 1833. P. L. 250 which reads as follows:

"That all devises of real estate shall pass the whole estate of the testator in the premises devised, although there be no words of inheritance or of perpetuity, unless it appear, by a devise over or by words of limitation or otherwise in the will, that the testator intended to devise a less estate."

It would have helped us very much in the construction of this will if we had been informed as to the estate left by the decedent, and the age and financial condition of his widow and son. In a small estate the whole might not be sufficient for the proper support of the widow; in a large one the income would often be more than was needed. In default of such information we will dispose of the case upon the face of the papers.

In support of the petition we have been referred to numerous authorities, which we will now consider. Several of the cases are upon the construction of wills prior to the act of 1833, when a devise without words of inheritance gave only a life estate, unless the contrary intention appeared in the will; Clayton v. Clayton, 3 Bin. 476, useful to show what was then required to change the result of a devise, without the words of inheritance, and by analogy to show what is necessary under the act. Each will must be construed by itself; what has been done in others does not bind us, unless the circumstances are identical, but may suggest constructions.

In Boyle v. Boyle, 152 Pa. 108, testator, after giving all his estate to his wife for life, speaks of the disposition of the remainder, thus showing that he intended

to give her the entire estate. In Re- tor gives for life and in fee to will, inconformed Church v. Disbrow, 52 Pa. 219, sistent with a life estate. the devise to testator's wife was "to have and to hold and enjoy during her lifetime and dispose of the same as shall seem best unto her," and afterwards spoke of the part remaining, which implied that some of it might be exhausted, thus making the devise inconsistent with a life estate, and was held to give a fee simple.

In Snyder v. Barr, 144 Pa. 278. control was given for life, but it was followed by power to order the executor to sell and power to dispose of the proceeds by bequest or as she directs; held to give a fee. In Bowlby v. Thunder, 105 Pa. 173, the controversy was largely as to the effect of preparatory words following a complete devise, and it was held that they did not change it In Gronis's Estate, 58 Pa. 429, testator gave all his estate for life, but gave power, after some legacies were protected, to dispose of the residue by will, also gave power to sell real estate, but in that must protect the legacies; held to give a fee simple.

In Dice v. Shaffer, 3 W. & S. 419, and Culbertson v. Daley, 7 W. & S. 195, there is nothing to indicate that the testator intended to devise less than a fee simple.

McIntyre v. McIntyre, 123 Pa. 329, was a case construing a will probated before the act of 1833, and the words, "I will and bequeath to my daughter A. the one-half of the land I possess above the road, that is the north end; she will not have the power to sell, but may lease the same to her children." Held, that the precatory words did not defeat the evident intention to dispose of his entire es

tate.

We have carefully examined the references and many other cases going to the construction of the act of 1833, and conclude that the testator intended just what he said, to give his wife all his estate for and during her natural life.

It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed, that under the will at bar, of Sheldon Reynolds, probated February 15, 1895, his widow, Annie B. D. Reynolds, the petitioner, take only a life estate in the defendant's real estate, and that the fund at hand, arising from a judicial sale of a portion thereof by virtue of an order of this court, be distributed to the guardian of the son, Dorrance Reynolds, subject to said widow's right to the income thereof.

QUARTER SESSIONS.

Philadelphia Co.

Clement's Petition.

We do not find anything in above authorities to extend the devise in the case at hand, beyond what the testator so Q. S. of plainly stated, "for and during her natural life." Postlethwaite, 72 Pa. 42, and Rockwell v. Eddinger, 81 Pa. 553, in support of Under the Act of April 15, 1857, P. L, 191, the. the proposition that "if words in a will court has jurisdiction, upon the petition of the leave it doubtful whether the testator in-poor person himself, to make an order for his tended restricting a devise to less than a fee, the doubt must be resolved against the restriction." But we do not think this testator left his intentions in

We are referred to Shirey v. Paupers-Statutory liability of relatives for support-Method of enforcing.

doubt. In Schriver v. Meyers, 19 Pa. 87, and Wood v. Hills, ibid, 513; Shinn v. Holmes, 25 Pa. 142; Walker v. Walker, 28 Pa. 40, it was the plain intention of the testator to dispose of the entire estate. In Willard's Appeal, 68 Pa. 331, testator said: "As to the residue of my estate. I want one-half secured to the benefit of my wife," and in the same clause gave her a house and lot for life, thus showing that he did not intend to limit the first devise.

support upon the person liable. It is not necessary that the proceedings should be by the guardians of the poor.

The petitioner was the adult son of a mother He had spent possessed of considerable means. in four years some $6000, had a comfortable home in the family of a relative by marriage, and had, when sick, received the attention of a capable physician. HELD, that the circumstances did not show such a case within the law as would warrant the court in making an order upon his mother for his support.

Citation for support.

C. Oscar Beasley for petitioner.
Francis Rawle for respondent.

May 11, 1896. YERKES, P. J., 7th judicial district, specially presiding. The In Mutter's Estate, 38 Pa. 314, testa- Act of June 13, 1836, provides that "the

father and grandfather and the mother Our legislation is founded upon the and grandmother of every poor person poor laws of England. As Justice Reed not able to work shall, at their own declared, they originated in the statute charge, being of sufficient ability, relieve of 43 Elizabeth, c. 2, which specified the and maintain such poor person, at such class entitled to relief as "poor, old, rates as the court of Quarter Sessions of blind, lame and impotent persons, or the county where such poor person re- other poor persons not able to work;" sides shall order and direct." Wertz v. Blair Co., 66 Pa. 18.

The solicitor for the guardians of the poor raised the objection that the petitioner was without standing to resort to this proceeding, which he claims can only be invoked at the instance of those having charge of the poor in their respective districts, and states that such has been the uniform practice in this county. It was so decided prior to the passage of the Act of April 15, 1857, and ever since that enactment some courts have intimated that the proceeding should be by the poor authorities.

Wherever our Acts describe the persons entitled to relief, invariably they are of this class; thus the Act of 1836 mentions "poor persons," the Act of June 6, 1893, "needy and indigent poor," and the 29th section of the Act of June 13, 1836, refers to the desertion of children, "leaving them a charge upon the district."

Hence, in Luzerne county, his honor, Judge Rice, now the learned president of the Superior Court, held, that in a proceeding of this nature, the allegation and proof that the person for whom relief is claimed was and is a pauper, is essential. The mere fact that he is a son of the defendant, it not appearing that he is a minor, would not be sufficient to make

We regard the Act of 1857 as settling every question as to the right of any other person having an interest in the support of such poor person to institute the proceeding. The Supreme Court have declared that the individual poor the defendant liable; Central Poor Disperson himself may proceed by petition, trict of Luzerne Co. v. Horner, 5 Kulp he being a person interested; Connor's 265. Appeal, 104 Pa. 437; Smith v. Overseers, 42 Leg. Intell. 345. It follows that the petition in this case confers upon this court jurisdiction to make the order if the case, in other respects, is deemed a proper one.

"A pauper is one who is so poor that he must be supported at the_public_expense," is the definition we find in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, and we have no doubt that the references to poor persons in our Act all have regard to and concern for such alone.

The objects of the legislation referred to is the relief of paupers and to prevent It appeared from the evidence that the them becoming a charge upon the public. petitioner, during the last four years, had It would be against public policy to per- received some $6,000, which, according mit a lazy or worthless child to filch to his testimony, he has spent. There is money out of an industrious or provident nothing in his appearance to indicate parent or grandparent, simply because that he is likely to become a public such parent may have money and the charge. He has now a comfortable home child have none. If the law should go in the family of a relative by marriage, so far, all inducement for the children of and when sick, it is shown, received the the well-to-do to care for themselves as a attention of a capable and skilled physinecessity for support would be lost, and parental effort to impart habits of industry and thrift to children would be neutralized. The result to the social condition would be serious, as there would grow up a large class of the population dependent upon others, and, in the hour when such support should fail, utterly incapable of self-support. Logically, crime would appear the easiest road to relief, and society would pay the penalty.

cian. It is true the respondent is a person of means, but it does not follow that she is required, upon demand, to share it with a son who, while giving his testimony upon the stand, betrayed such want of respect for his parent as to warrant the inference that if abundance was withheld from him, she understood better than he his undeserving. It is the mother's nature that the obedient and faithful child will never suffer so long as

The petition is dismissed and the order of relief refused

Q. S. of

Delaware Co.

Com. v. McCormick et al. Criminal law-Indictment-Public nuisance-Sufficiency of description in indictment.

she has the means to relieve. Perhaps the said Commonwealth, then and there if this lesson is observed in this case, the situate, did unlawfully and without suffirelief will be ample. The evidence has cient cause, place in a certain messuage failed to show such a case of need within or tenement and in the appurtenances the law as will warrant the court in mak- thereto, and in certain sheds and pens, ing an order. and in the land adjoining thereto, a great number of hogs, to wit: one thousand, and the said hogs then and there, to wit: on the first day of November, as aforesaid, and on divers other times and seasons, unlawfully and injuriously did feed and cause to be fed with slop and other filthy means, whereof diverse, noisome and unwholesome smells and stenches during the time aforesaid, and unwholesome smoke and vapors * * then and there were emitted, sent forth and issued from said buildings and appurtenances and from the said land adjacent thereto; and the air in the neighborhood thereof, and for a great distance round on the days and times aforesaid, were thereby greatly impregnated with noisome, offensive and unwholesome stinks and stenches, and has been corrupted and rendered very unsalubrious to the great damage and common nuisance not only of all the inhabitants of the said township of Tinicum, but of other good citizens of the ing and laboring, etc., etc." Commonwealth, passing, repassing, rid

An indictment alleging the maintenance of a public nuisance near a public highway need not name the highway nor describe particularly the place where the nuisance is maintained.

If an indictment charges the defendant with maintaining a public nuisance in a highway it should describe particularly the road, giving

its name and termini.

It is not necessary that the locus in quo of a nuisance on private grounds should be described with sufficient particularity to enable the sheriff to abate it, the proper sentence being that the defendant shall abate the nuisance at

his own cost.

Indictment for maintaining a common or public nuisance.

Sur demurrer to indictment and rule for a new trial.

While it would have been advisable to have more specifically described the premises where the pig styes were kept, and

The facts are sufficiently stated in the the roads near which they were maintainopinion of the court.

Wm. I. Schaffer for Commonwealth. John B. Hannum and W. S. Sykes for defendants.

ed, yet we are of opinion the description is sufficient. There is marked distinction between the indictment for an obstruction to or nuisance in a public highway and an indictment for a nuisance so near to a public road as to annoy passengers thereon. In the former case the road ought to be described by its name and termini. In the latter case it is only necessary to locate the premises where the nuisance is maintained and allege and prove the proximity of the place to a public road. In WharThe Part of the indictment demurred ton's Precedents of Indictments, page to reads as follows:

May 6, 1895. CLAYTON, P. J.-The defendant demurred to the indictment upon the ground that the locus in quo is not sufficiently described to enable the Sheriff to abate the nuisance should the Court so direct.

"That the said John McCormick, late of said county, yeoman, on the first day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, at the county aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, with force and arms, etc., near to divers public high ways, in the township of Tinicum, in said county, being the common highways of

402, a form is given for a nuisance in a public highway, and it gives with great particularity the name of the road with its termini.

The argument that the description of the place is insufficient because, if the Court should order the nuisance abated, the Sheriff could not execute the writ, is certainly premature. Non constat, the Court may not order an abatement of the

nuisance by the Sheriff. We may order constitute the only change, or amendthe defendant to abate it, and would ment to the act of 1867, hence the prohardly receive his excuse if it were that ceeding under the original act and its rehe could not find his own pig sty. quirements are not altered.

I

Tinicum is one of the smallest townships in the State. It will not be diffi It is not necessary to inquire, at this cult for the Sheriff to locate the place of time, whether the act of 1876, which any person living upon the Island. amends the act of 1867, and extends the remember when it had but nine voters. provisions thereof by its title only, or, at We will decide what the proper course least, is not re-enacted and published in will be after the defendant or the Sheriff the usual and well recognized way, is shall have made their return to the writ constitutional; Constitution. article 3. section 6. for the abatement of the nuisance, if we The act of 1876 directs the should conclude to make such an order. court shall proceed in the manner and act approved April 15, 1834, with its supunder the restrictions provided under the the lines of any two or more adjoining plements, in regard to the alterations of townships.

The Court did not charge the jury that the defendant could be convicted if he co tributed a nuisance. The charge was that if the defendant's pig sty was a nuisance in itself. then the mere fact that other persons committed independent nuisances of the same kind, making the common nuisance still worse, should not relieve him for the independent nuisance committed by him.

The remark of the Court, that a bill in equity to enjoin this nuisance would not be entertained until after a trial by a jury, was harmless and correct. It was an answer to the argument of counsel that the proper remedy was not by indictment, but by bill in equity.

We are satisfied with the verdict; in deed we do not see how the jury could have done otherwise.

The rule for a new trial is discharged.

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Where a petition under act April 17, 1876, P. L. 38, or April 13, 1867, P. L. 82, praying that land of petitioners in one township be annexed, for educatinal purposes, to the school district of another township, etc., fails to set forth that the land proposed to be annexed adjoins the township to which it is desired to annex it, the proceeding is fataly defective.

Edwin Shortz for exceptions.

The petition in this case was filed on September 11, 1894. It is signed by twenty nine persons who represent themselves as being residents of Lake township, and then set out that Alonzo Wolfe, Frank Rodgers, John W. Rodgers and Judson Sickler, now living in said township, labor under great inconvenience by reason of the school house to which they send their children, at outlet of Harvey's Lake, a distance of one and a fourth to one and a half miles, over a road very lightly traveled during winter season, being in such a condition part of the time that small children cannot attend school. That

the school house in Lehman township is only about a half mile distant and a great deal more convenient for schooling their children, and closes by praying the court to appoint proper persons as viewers, etc.

On the same day the court appointed three persons to inquire into the propriety of granting the prayer of the petitioners to report in accordance with the act of April 17, 1876, the viewers to give notice, etc. The viewers, or jurors, reported that, in their opinion, the prayer of the petitioners should be granted, and

Hon. E. Osborne, R. D. Evans and J. their lands lying in Lake township, L. Lenahan for petition.

"forming a contiguous body," be annexed to Lehman.

January 4, 1896. LYNCH, J.-This is a proceeding under the provisions of the I have set out, at length, the whole of act of April 17, 1876, P. L. 38, which is the petition for the purpose of showing an amendment to the act of April 13, two things: First, that there is real merit 1867, P. L. 80. The words, "or city in the case presented and sustained by containing not more than ten thousand the depositions taken on the part of the inhabitants," and the last two provisos petitioners; and lastly, because the peti

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