Luzerne Co. Ransom Township Poor District v. Jenkins Township Poor District. into another, was taken sick and cared for at a A pauper chargeable to one district wandered private house and died; the poor directors of the place where she died notified those of her settlement; the latter buried her. In the suit against the district to which she was chargeable. for expense of nursing and preparation for burial HELD, that said district was liable for reasonable cost of care and undertaker's bill. Rule on defendant to show cause why it should not pay the costs and expenses incurred by plaintiffs in maintaining Sarah Barrett during her last sickness and prepairing her body for burial. W. I. Hibbs for plaintiff. tion does not set forth that the land, or Q. S. of any part thereof, proposed to be annexed, adjoins Lehman. It does appear, by the draft attached to and forming part of the Pauper-Settlement. report of the viewers, that a part of each of the farms of John W. Rodgers and Alonzo Wolfe adjoins the township of Lehman, and the said report sets out that all the lands "form a contiguous body," but neither petition, report or draft shows that all the lands proposed to be annexed adjoins Lehman. The act of 1876 provides, when "so annexed the applicant shall pay his school taxes and be includ ed within the school district to which it" (the land) "is so annexed for educational purposes, etc. A reading of the act leaves the impression that, in the same proceeding, but one person only can se cure the benefits of the law. It is true that in annextion to Elk Township School March 23rd, 1896. LYNCH, J.-The District, 246 Pa. 1. three resident land husband of the pauper resided with his owners presented their petition under this family-wife and three sons-in the townact. and the court confirmed the report ship of Jenkins, county of Luzerne, for in favor of annexation, which decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court, but this ed in the mines at that place. About question was not there raised or passed fifteen years ago he was killed in the upon. In other words, the law is intend-mines in said township and left to sured to give relidf in each particular case, vive him his widow and three sons. and not allow any number of resident far as the testimony shows the family land owners to combine for the purpose continued to live in Jenkins until 1886, of adding strength to their case, even when the widow was sent to the poor though their lands do "form a contiguous house of defendant. After this time Mrs. body." If this were not so the disrup: tion of school districts would be controlled by the will of the petitioners and the discretion of the court. I can not believe that such was the intention of the legis lature. This case, however, is not rulled on the number of applicants joined here. The petition does not set forth that the lands proposed to be annexed, adjoins the township to which the court is asked to annex them. In this respect the petition is fatally defective, and must be dismissed; In Re Petition Heidler, 122 Pa. 653. many years. He was a miner and work So Barrett, the poor person, had no home. She at times visited her old place of residence, but, I am inclined to believe, spent most of her time in the said poor house or a wanderer from place to place. In the early part of December, 1891, she was suddenly taken with what shortly thereafter proved to be her last sickness. Upon going to the house of Mr. Wood, a farmer, in Ransom township, Lackawanfor until she died, on the fifth-Saturday na county, she was cared and provided night. On Sunday one of the overseers of Ransom was notified of her death, the The case made out by the petitioners, circumstances of the poor person, and if presented to the directors of Lake, how she came to the house of Mr. Wood. under the provisions of section 2, clause The overseer thereupon drove to Pittson IX of the act of May 8, 1854. Purd. 352, and communicated the facts to two of the pl. 123, will no doubt receive due consid- directors of the defendant district. After eration. If the circumstances, conditions consultation, it was agreed that a coffin of the roads, distances to schools, etc., should be procured, which defendant are shown to be true, and the directors would pay for, and that the remains should fail to act, the petitioners have a remedy. be brought to the defendant's poor farm, The petition is dismissed at the costs of which was done by Mr. Richards, one of the persons applying for the change. the overseers of Ransom. Afterward the body was buried in Pittston. On The counsel fees are allowed for the January 27, 1892, an order of relief was issued to the Ransom overseers by two justices. I am satisfied that the evidence shows Mrs. Barrett had gained a legal settle ment in the township of Jenkins, part of the defendant district, and that the defendant recognized their obligation to provide for her by maintaining her in their poor house at different times, by directing her body to be brought to the dis trict for burial and paying for the coffin. The poor person went out of her own district but a few days before she fell ill. It is quite evident that in the interval between leaving the poor house and going to Wood's she was wandering aimlessly reason that it was at the request of the defendant the Wood bill was contested, and because it was agreed by the parties, plaintiff and defendant, that the defendant would retain counsel to contest the said claim or pay counsel selected by plaintiff; 163 Pa. 183. The rule is made absolute, and the costs and charges above enumerated, as well as the cost of this proceeding, are directed to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff district. Abstracts of Recent Decisions. (Cases not otherwise designated are Su about the country. If not a legal duty, preme Court cases.) it was certainly an act of charity on the part of Mr. Wood to take this unfortunate old woman into his home and pro Partition-Adverse prosecution-Juris vide for her. Unless the stern mandate diction-Practice. An adverse holding of the law forbids, this court will not say he did a wrong in providing for her and now asking to be properly compensated therefore. by one tenant in common, for any length of time, however short, previously to the institution of an action of partition will bar recovery in such form of action. A Under the evidence Mrs. Barrett had court of equity has no jurisdiction in such not gained a settlement in Ransom town- a case, the title being in dispute. When ship She came out of the defendant's it appears on a petition for a division of district, and suddenly fell sick and died an intestate's estate that the intestate did at the house of Mr. Wood. She could not die seized, but that the premises are not have been removed. Her condition in possession of another, claiming to hold was evidently too serious to do more than adversely, it is the duty of the court to permit her to die in peace. Notice was refuse the prayer of the petitioner, and promptly given to the defendant of the put the party to an action of ejectment to name, circumstances and condition and recover the possession. The court will death of the poor person. The defend- not undertake to examine the validity of a title when it is contested, for possession alone gives jurisdiction. -Kelly et al v. Thomas, (Lackawanna C. P.) 2 Lackawanna Legal News 37. ants, on request made, have neglected and refused to pay the moneys expended in maintaining and burying the poor person. The only question, therefore, which remains to be decided is, what expenses should the defendant pay. The following are allowed: Oliver Wood, maintenanceduring Dr. Cooper, medical services, J. W. Carpenter, attorney, &c, Attorney, services before the justice, Promissory note-Suit by endorser against prior endorser.-An endorser on a protested promissory note, in order to hold a prior endorser, must give such prior en$12 00 dorser notice not later than the day fol4 00 lowing that on which he received notice. 4 00 Where, in a suit by a subsequent against a prior endorser of a promissory note the affidavit of defence sets forth that the 23 50 plaintiff received due notice of the pro4 00 test, but did not give notice thereof to the 80 defendant for eleven days after the pro10 00 test, the affidavit is sufficient.- Wolf v. Jacobs & Co., (Lancaster C. P.) 13 Lan$48 30 caster Law Review 201. 1893, May 25. 142 The black figures refer to these syllabi. isfied.-Server v. Oreland Baptist Church, 112. 2. If the defendant is unable to say whether AGENT, 97-9, 104, 120, 143-4. AMENDMENT, 24-5, 75-6, 111. ANNEXATION, 170. APPEAL, 119. RECOGNIZANCE. 3. A recognizance on appeal from a judgment 4. It is different when the statutory obligation SUPERSEDEAS. 5. Exceptions having been filed to the ac- twenty days, as required by the terms of the 6. The verbal notice was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the Act of May 19th, 7. The recognizance not having been entered within twenty days the appeal was not a supersedeas.—Ib. APPRAISEMENT, 95-6. ASSAULT AND BATTERY, 164. POSSESSION OF REAL ESTATE. 8. Section 3 of the Act of February 17, 1876, to enable a purchaser of real estate from an assignee for the benefit of creditors to gain possession of the same, applies not to judicial sales only, but also to sales by authority of the deed of assignment.-Kegerreis' Assigned Estate, 41. 9. In proceedings under the Act of 1876 for possession of real estate bought from an assignee, the Court cannot pass upon the question of the legal title of the assignor, but can only examine into the regularity of the sale and the mere right to possession of the purchaser.—Ib. 10. The assignor and his wife remained in possession after the sale of his real estate by his assignee, claiming that the property belonged to the wife by a resulting trust, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to decree possession under the Act of 1876, as the sale was not a judicial one. HELD, that the Court had jurisdiction and would decree possession, the proceedings of sale being regular and the evidence produced against the husband's title being insufficient even if the Court could go into the merits. -Ib. ASSIGNMENT. INSURANCE, 100-3. OF STOCK, 26-8, ASSUMPSIT, 24-5. ATTACHMENT. FRAUD. 11. An attachment under Act of 1869, based on affidavit alleging that the debt was fraudulently contracted, will be dissolved where the only proof of fraud is that a minor son of defendant, without defendant's knowledge, and without having been authorized to do so, made a false statement to gain credit for the defendant.-Hooven Mercantile Co. v. Backley, 4. WHAT MAY BE ATTACHED. missory note, accompanied by a letter mentioning the note, currency and checks. On the following day he received from defendant a communication, returning his letter and note, on the letter being written "Note not endorsed by you. Endorse and return." He never received credit for the currency or checks. The affidavit of defence denied the receipt of the currency or checks, and claimed that the letter sent by plaintiff to the bank contained no reference to the currency or checks. The jury found for the plaintiff, subject to a reserved question of law, which verdict the court subsequently overruled and entered judgment for the defendant for the reason that no formal demand had been made by the plaintiff before suit brought. HELD, to have been error.-Miller v. Western National Bank, 129. 14. The principle that no action can be brought by a depositor against a bank until a formal demand has been made by him or received by the bank is not applicable to this case, where the defendant bank has persistently denied that there ever was a deposit of the currency and checks, and the plaintiff's right to recover is based on the sole ground that the bank while receiving his checks and currency refused to credit him therewith or recognize him as a depositor of the same.—Ib. 15. But even if this principle is applicable to a case like this, it would have been an utterly vain and useless thing for the plaintiff to have made a formal demand on defendant bank before bringing suit, and the necessity for such demand was clearly obviated by the unequivocal acts and declarations of the bank in positively and repeatedly denying plaintiff's right to make any claim upon it in respect of the currency and indorsed checks in controversy.—Ib. BLANKS, 149. BOND, 3, 4, 57, 58, 120, 163-4. BOROUGHS. CONTRACT. 16. A contract between a borough and private corporation, some of whose officers and stockholders are members of the borough council, is absolutely void.-Kennett Electric Light Co. v. The Borough of Kennett Square, 65. 17. The validity of such a contract is not affected by the fact that the members of council who are also members of the private corporation may have voted against the contract.-Ib. COUNCIL. 12. Where an attachment was issued under the Act of May 8, 1874, and served upon the garnishee who answered that he had in his hands a sum exceeding plaintiff's claim and costs, and 18. The "rules of order" of a borough set it appearing that the said sum was a simple forth that the presiding officer should call a debt due by the garnishee. HELD, that a chose special meeting of council "only on the request in action is not such specific or tangible prop-in writing of four of its members," the number S., a member, wrote to erty as the act contemplates and hence is not of members being six. subject to levy under the attachment.-Mum- councils his resignation, to take effect on the ford & Co. v. Deyoe & Co., 52. election of his successor. On the same day a written request for a special meeting to meet BANK. that evening and elect his successor was signed by S. and four other members, including the president, and handed to the burgess, who took no action in the matter. At the time specified in the first call, S. and three of the four other signers including the president met, sent word ACTION BY DEPOSITOR. 13. Plaintiff's statement averred that he sent by mail to defendant $745 in currency and $640 in checks for deposit, together with a pro to the other members, who did not, however, attend, drew up and signed another call, addressed to the president and elected M. as S.'s successor. HELD, that the first call for a special meeting constituted an acceptance of S.'s resignation and his membership then ceased, and he was therefore disqualified from voting at any meeting, that the other three members who at tended the special meeting did not constitute a legal majority or quorum, and the special meeting was held without due and legal notice, and was therefore irregular, and the election of M. was illegal and void.—Com. ex rel. McVey v. Lefevre, 161. INHABITANT. 19. An inhabitant of a borough has no such privity in a contract between the borough and a water company under which water is furnished to a borough as will enable him to sustain an action against the water company for a loss by fire, upon the ground that the failure of the company to supply water prevented the extinguishment of the fire.-Stone v. Uniontown Water Company, 179. OBSTRUCTION. 20. Plaintiff planted a tree at the edge of the sidewalk in front of his house. Subsequently the municipal authorities widened the pavement, which threw the line of the sidewalk three feet beyond the tree. The space between the tree and the building line is nine feet seven inches; but the tree is an obstruction to passage to the extent of the space it occupies. The Borough authorities adopted a resolution that plaintiff's tree is a nuisance and ordered its removal, threatening to have it removed in case of non-compliance with the resolution. Plaintiff filed his bill to restrain, and the injunction was made permanent.-Gitt v. Borough of Han over, 53. 21. If this tree, by its position within the sidewalk, were in contravention of any borough ordinance of general application, the legal right of the borough to direct its removal would be indubitable.-Ib. 22. Boroughs are clothed with ample power to prohibit and remove obstructions in street or sidewalk; but this authority must, as a general rule, be exercised by virtue of ordinances of general application.-Ib. 23. The resolution condemning the tree as a nuisance, and ordering its removal, was not of general application nor adopted for the enforcement of any general borough ordinance or regulation, and therefore ultra vires and void; hence the cutting down of the tree in pursuance thereof was properly enjoined.-Ib. BREWERS, 134. BUILDING ASSOCIATION. holder of ten shares in the plaintiff Association. 27. The Clerk was an officer and stockholder of the Association, who had a right to purchase the stock of another stockholder without any action of the board of directors. He bought the stock and was obliged to take it cum onere to pay the dues and interests on that borrowed as well as any further liability which it might carry with it and he being the debtor to the Association, the bond would not protect him against any such liability.—Ib. 28. The Association either formally or in fact by the acceptance of dues from the Clerk recognized him as the owner of the stock; they thereby released petitioner from liability on her bond.-Ib. LIABILITY OF BORROWER. 29. Petitioner was the holder of eighteen shares of stock in the plaintiff Association. Subsequently he borrowed the full amount of his stock, and gave bond therefore, on which judgthe bond was "And further, I, the above named One of the conditions of ment was entered. Jacob Swartz, do hereby expressly agree that all money heretofore paid or hereafter to be paid by me into said Association on the stock I now hold in the same shall be taken and considered as payments on and in liquidation of this bond." Petitioner paid his dues and weekly interest on his stock so borrowed until December 31, 1895, when he paid plaintiff the amount yet claimed to be due on the stock loaned, and received a receipt "in full for repayment of 18 shares in 29th series." The attorney of the Association neglected to satisfy the judgment, and after the appointment of a Receiver for the Association defendant filed his petition to have the same satisfied. On the argument it was admitted that on December 31, 1895, the Association was insolvent. HELD, that the petition must be refused.--Mechanics' and Workingmen's Building and Loan Association v. Swartz, 173. 30. The insolvency of the Association is a matter not contemplated nor provided for by the 25. The form of action may be amended from law governing building associations, and when trespass to assumpsit.-Ib. PLAN, 81. BREACH OF PROMISE. FORM OF ACTION. 24. Damages for breach of promise of marriage were recoverable in an action of assumpsit. It follows that under the Procedure Act of 1887 the action is still assumpsit" and not "trespass."-Donovan v. Foley, 140. insolvency is once shown it is said the contracts. |