INCOME, 62, 197.
INDICTMENT, 145.
INFANT, 11, 186.
INHERITANCE, 64.
INJUNCTION, 34.
INSOLVENCY, 29–31, 45.
INSURANCE.
97. The policy contained the same stipula-
tions relative to occupancy as in the preceding
case. (See 105.) A, who procured the insur
ance, being unable to place it in his own comp-
any, offered it to other agents who placed it in
defendant company, whose agents they were
HELD, that the representations or statements
made by the first agent could not bind the de-
fendant company.-Louck v. The Orient Insur-
ance Co, 170.*
ment, and the contract will be construed more
strongly against the insurer and in favor of the
insured.-Ib.
104. When, on certiorari of a suit brought
before a magistrate against an insurance comp-
any, there is nothing in the proceedings to
show that the defendant was a foreign insur-
ance company, the judgment will not be set
aside on the ground that the service of the sum-
mons on the local general agent was not a
proper service.-Levy v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co., 138.
105. The policy of insurance contained a
proviso that "No officer, agent or other repre-
sentative of this company shall have power to
waive any provisions or condition of this policy
except such as by the terms of this policy may
be the subject of agreement indorsed hereon or
98. Presumably defendant company had added hereto, and as to such provisions and con-
made no inquiries as to A's character or compe-ditions no officer, agent or representative shall
tency, and had no opportunity to decide whether
it would put any part of its business into his
hands.-Ib.
have the power or be deemed or held to have
waived such provisions or conditions unless
such waiver if any shall be written upon or at-
tached hereto, nor any privilege or permission
If a company is to be bound by the re-affecting the insurance under this policy exist
presentations and conduct of every person
through whose hands a policy of insurance may
pass, it is certain that its responsibility will be
vastly increased by the conduct of persons of
whom it has no knowledge and with whom it
has no relation.—Ib.
or be claimed by the insured unless so written
or attached." HELD, that a parol waiver of
any of the policy's conditions by the company's
agent will bind the company.-Louck v. The
Reading Fire Insurance Co., 169.*
106. A proviso of the policy was that the
policy "shall be void if the subject of insurance
100. When a a clause in a perpetual policy be a manufacturing establishment and cease to
of fire insurance provides that in case any in- be operated for more than ten consecutive
sured shall assign or transfer his or her policy, days.' The property was a manufacturing es-
such assignment or transfer shall be brought to tablishment, but was unoccupied at the time of
the office of the company to be entered and al- insurance, and continued so unoccupied till its
lowed within thirty days next after such assign-destruction by fire. HELD, that as the defend-
ment or transfer, and in default thereof the ant's agent knew that the premises were vacant
benefit of the insurance and all claims upon the at the time the insurance was taken, and were
company shall be lost," it is not a matter of dis- likely to remain so for an indefinite period, the
cretion with the company whether or not they plaintiff was entitled to recover, notwithstand-
shall approve such transfer, and the refusal to ing the conditions of the policy.—Ib.
do so without legal cause is a breach of contract
for which the transferee has his remedy at law.
-Logan A. Marshall v. The Franklin Fire In-
surance Co., 189.
101. In such case the transferee may bring
an action in assumpsit in his own name either
for damages for the breach of contract or for the
amount paid, rescinding the contract.—Ib.
102. The transferee having brought suit for
damages, the measure thereof is an amount the
interest of which will annually pay for the same
amount of insurance on the property, it being
impossible to procure a similar perpetual policy.
-1b.
103. Parties making a contract of insurance
will be held to mean and intend what the lan-
guage used commonly imports as ordinarily
used in reference to the subject matter of the
contract, and not what either party may have
intended or meant. When in doubt the inten-
tion must be gathered from the whole instru-
*Reversed in Loucks' Appeal, 10 YORK LEGAL RE-
CORD 25.
107. If the company deliberately insured an
idle establishment, well knowing the extent of
the hazard, it is estopped from complaining be-
cause the hazard continued until the happening
of the loss.-Ib.
INTEREST, 60-2, 102.
INVESTMENT, 60-3.
JUDGMENT.
OPENING OF.
108. The wife of the defendant presented
her petition, showing separation between her-
self and husband, and alleging that the judg-
ment was part of a collusive and fraudulent
scheme to deprive her of her dower interest in
her husband's lands, in case she should survive
him. The answers filed by the plaintiff and de-
fendant denied these allegations, averring that
the note was given for money actually paid to
Neff by Taylor. The testimony showed that
Neff had repeatedly tried to sell his real estate,
*See Lucks' Appeal, 10 YORK LEGAL RECORD 25.
JURY.
CASE FOR, 2.
FINDING OF, 70-1.
but that his wife always refused to join in the JURISDICTION, 10, 119, 121, 122, 125.
conveyance, and that this judgment was given
for the purpose of conveying the real estate
clear of dower. HELD, that while the judg-
ment could not be opened, as prayed for, a rule
will be granted to show cause why an issue
should not be framed to determine the character
of the judgment, all proceedings thereon to be
stayed until the determination of the rule.-
Taylor v. Neff, 5.
109. The judgment cannot be opened to let
defendant into a defence, since he admits that
he owes the money.-Ib.
110. The proper practice in proceedings to
set aside collusive or fraudulent judgments is
not to open them and let the defendant into a
defence, but to direct an issue to determine the
validity of the judgment as against those in-
juriously affected by the fraud.-Ib.
117. Though a verdict seem somewhat too
large when the plaintiff's testimony supports it
and the defendants offered no evidence other-
wise, the court will not interfere with the find-
ing of the jury.-Murray v. Vaughn et al., 195.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.
118. In an action against a justice of the
peace and constable for illegal arrest, where it
appears that no notice was given as required by
the Act of March 21, 1772, and that the con-
stable had acted strictly within his warrant and
that he had had no notice to exhibit his war-
rant, there can be no recovery.- Ward v. Short-
lidge et al., 92.
111. Petitioner, after taking depositions,
and argument of the rule, asked to have the
rule amended because of a clerical error, so that
the petitioner could appear and defend in the
trial, upon the judgment being opened. HELD,
that the amendment was asked for too late.-Ib.
112. When it appears to the Court, upon a
rule to stay fi. fa., that sufficient is shown to
raise the question of alteration, an issue will be
granted. In such case a rule to open the judg--Ripple v. Keast, 172.
ment is the proper procedure, as a rule to stay
the execution of the judgment admits the valid-
ity of the judgment and only goes to present
enforcement.-Anderson v. Woodworth, 87.
113. A note with warrant of attorney to con-
fess judgment was given as collateral security to
secure A as endorser on a note drawn by B &
C., and discounted at bank. Subsequently,
while the latter note, or one of its renewals,
was unpaid, B and C. dissolved partnership, and
A and B went into business. B and C testified
that their stock went into the new firm and was
accepted by A in exoneration of C's liability.
This was denied by A. The last note of B and
C was taken up by a new note, drawn by A, and
endorsed by Band D, and finally paid by money
borrowed from E by B on A's endorsement.
HELD, that the judgment will be opened and C
let into a defence.- Martin v. Reiley et al., 93.
114. Petitioner asked to have judgment en-
tered on a note with warrant of attorney opened
on the ground that at the time of its execution
defendant was in his last illness and incapable
of transacting business. The weight of the
evidence was against the petitioner's view
HELD, that the rule to open must be discharg-
ed.—Sechrist v. Sechrist, 21.
115. The mere fact that about the same
time defendant assigned notes to his wife's
children without consideration is no evidence of
his incapacity to provide for his wife's main
tenance after his death.-Ib.
116. The court, being satisfied that defend- |
ant was not mentally incapable to execute the
judgment note at the time he signed it, that he
knew the nature, character and consequences of
the act, and that he did so of his own free will
and accord, with the intelligent purpose of
properly providing for the comfort and main-
tenance of his wife in her widowhood, will not
open the judgment.-Ib.
119. On an appeal to the Common Pleas from
the judgment of a justice of the peace, the
question of want of jurisdiction of the justice
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
CERTIORARI, 93.
EXEMPTION, 93.
JURISDICTION, 119, 121, 122, 125.
120. The receiving of money from a defend-
ant by a justice of the peace, and after judg-
ment entered, is not in its nature a judicial act.
but is rather a ministerial duty imposed by the
statute, which he is not prevented by law from
performing by another. When a payment,
therefore, is made to the authorized clerk of the
alderman, it is payment to the alderman, and
he and his sureties are liable on their bond for
the failure of the former to pay over the money
to plaintiff.—Commonwealth to use of Walter v.
Ziegler et al., 59.
tiff claims in trespass $40 for a colt, which colt
121. The record of a justice showed plain-
that the record showed a claim for consequen-
was killed by negligence of defendant." HELD,
tial damages and not trespass vi et armis, and
therefore the justice had no jurisdiction.—Rip-
ple v. Keast, 172.
122. After the time for suing out writ of
certiorari has passed, no presumption of want
of jurisdiction can arise from informality in the
statement of the cause of action. Every reason-
able presumption will be in favor of the juris-
diction.-Cooke v. Shoemaker, 198.
123. A claim for "balance due for money
collected and goods received not accounted for,"
is sufficient docket entry.—Ib.
last named," the record showing the time, is
124. A judgment publicly given at "hour
125. On a certiorari to a Justice of the Peace,
the defendant claimed that the subject matter
for which plaintiff had sued should have been
presented as a set-off in a previous suit brought
by the defendant before another justice against
134. Lessees of an owner of licensed pre-
the present plaintiff, and not having been so
mises, whose tenant has a license revoked for
presented the Justice in this suit had no juris- violations of law, being brewers and bottlers
diction. The proceedings before the Justice in themselves, and holding a license therefor, have
the second suit showed no plea to the jurisdic-such an interest under the Act of Assembly "in
tion, no transcript of the former suit was pro- the profits of the business conducted at any
duced before the justice, and no testimony was other place" as disqualifies them from asking
presented to the Court on the argument of the for a transfer of the revoked license to their ap-
exceptions to show that plaintiff's demand was
really a cross-demand which was a legal subject pointee.-In Re License Transfer, 71.
of set-off in said action. HELD, that the ex-
ceptions must be dismissed and the judgment
affirmed.-Krug v Walter et al., 13.
126. The Court cannot assume, in the ab-
sence of evidence, that the demand sued upon
in the second suit was in existence on the day
of the hearing of the first suit.- Ib.
127. A summons from a justice of the peace
which states that the justice is "one of the
justices of the peace in and for said county,"
but does not state where his office is, or that he
has an office. is fatally defective.-Skinner v.
Morrow, 128.
128.—A summons issued by a justice to "C.
J. Shoemak" with sufficient penmanship after
the "k" to indicate that it is not the final let-
ter, is good against "Shoemaker."-Cooke v.
Shoemaker, 198.
LABOR CLAIMS, 91-2, 185.
LACHES, 154, 159, 184.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
FORCIBLE ENTRY.
129. An outer door cannot be opened forci-
bly in order to execute a landlord's warrant of
distress.-Murry v. Vaughn ət al,, 195.
130. Some conflict of authority exists on the
question whether the landlord may lift the latch
of a door which is shut but not locked, or may
turn a key purposely left in the lock upon the
outside, or may draw a bolt fastened to the outer
wood work.-Ib.
131. If a man merely latches his door, or if
he purposely leaves the key in the lock upon
the outside, he may perhaps be regarded as in-
viting all persons to enter his house who have
132. If he locks the door and carries the
key away in his pocket, he certainly is not ex-
tending an invitation to enter, but is doing all
that he can to prevent an entrance.-Ib.
133. When a tenant locks the door of his
house and carries the key away in his pocket
and his landlord afterwards picks the lock, or
avails himself of another key which happens to
fit, the landlord does a legal wrong as com-
pletely, and of the saine kind, as if he broke
down the door with a hammer.-Ib.
LEGISLATURE, 37, 65.
LEGACY, 60-3, 188-99.
135. A creditor of a firm whose license is
revoked has no legal standing in court to ask
for a transfer of said license.—Ib.
LIFE ESTATE, 198.
136. The erection of conservatories and the
conversion of a grass and grain farm into a
truck garden, with suitable barns and sheds to
carry on business, is such a permanent improve-
ment, when located in Wyoming Valley, as
justifies a court in mortgaging one portion of
the farm in aid of the life tenant, by the life
of the increased revenue arising out of the lease
tenant, stipulating to satisfy the mortgage out
of the truck farm.-Dorrance's Estate, 69.
137. In this case improvements had been
made before the loans were applied for. HELD,
that the court, in such a clear case, is justified
in approving the improvements made, and au-
thorizing a mortgage on another portion of the
property in order to reimburse the life tenant
for his expenditures, until such time as the
increased revenue from the improvements should
satisfy the mortgage. HELD, that a life tenant
holding the premises under a spendthrift trust,
might pledge the increased revenue from his
improvements in satisfaction of the mortgage.
-Ib.
LIMITATION, 68.
LOCATION, 175.
MARRIAGE, 24.
MARRIED WOMEN, 56, 94, 108.
138. In a suit brought by a married woman
against her husband's execution creditors, claim-
ing property that had belonged to him, it is in-
dispensably necessary for her to show a pur-
chase of the property by herself, valid in char-
acter, made exclusively upon her own money
or credit, and followed by an open exercise of
acts of ownership over it.-Bollinger v. Galla-
gher and Johns, No. 3, 77.
139. On an issue between a married woman
and the execution creditors of her husband to
determine the ownership of property levied
upon as the property of the husband, where the
evidence for the wife tends to show that the
goods were bought on the credit of the wife at
a time when the husband was insolvent; that in
payment for them a note was given signed by
the wife, her sureties and her husband; that all
the parties supposed that the husband's signa-
ture was necessary in order that the note should
bind the wife, and that the payee of the note as
well as the sureties regarded the wife as the real
purchaser, it is proper for the court to leave to
the jury, to decide as a question of fact, the pur-
pose for which the husband's signature was
placed upon the note.-/b.
MECHANICS' LIEN.
DEFENCE, 1.
PURCHASER.
140. A purchaser of property long after a
mechanics' lien has been filed, and an affidavit
of defence made thereto may be allowed to in-
tervene in the case and defend on any ground,
although he was the attorney who drew up the
original affidavit of defence for the contractor.
-Grove v. Lewis, 199.
MISTAKE, 128, 144.
MORTALITY TABLES, 84.
MORTGAGE, 136, 193.
MURDER, 64.
NEGLIGENCE.
BEFORE JUSTICE, 121.
141. The Supreme Court will not reverse a
judgment on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
in an action against a city to recover damages
for personal injuries suffered by a fall on a de-
fective sidewalk, where it appears that the city
authorities knew of the defect, and had refused
to repair the sidewalk, and the court below
properly submitted to the jury the evidence of
plaintiff's contributory negligence tending to
show his knowledge of the condition of the
sidewalk, his manner of passing over it on the
night of the accident, and his acquaintance
with other streets and sidewalks in the neigh-
borhood.-Campbell v. City of York, 141.
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143. The condition on the back of a tele-
gram limiting the responsibility of the company
to repeat messages applies only to the sender,
and will not affect its liability to the receiver for a
mistake in an unrepeated message, although the
sender was the agent of the receiver.-Hoffman
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 61.
144. The agent of a tobacco dealer telegraph-
ed to his principal, the plaintiff, an offer by a
third party to buy a lot of tobacco at a certain
rate per pound "actual," meaning at actual in-
stead of marked weight, and explaining to the
operator that "actual" was the most important
word in the message. The plaintiff received
the telegram with the word "actual" omitted,
and in consequence wired his agent to sell, sup-
posing that marked weight was referred to,
which was greater than the actual weight.
HELD, that the company was liable for the dif
ference between the price received and the
marked value.—Ib.
NEW TRIAL.
AFTER-DISCOVered evidence, 89.
NOT CAUSE FOR, 70, 141.
145. The refusal of the Court to quash an
indictment is no ground for a new trial.-Com.
v. Still, 73.
146. To authorize the Court to set aside the
verdict and grant a new trial because the ver-
dict was against the evidence there must be a
clear case of finding against the evidence.—Ib.
147. The Courts favor verdicts, and new
trials will not be granted without other cause,
where the evidence is conflicting and contra-
dictory.-Ib.
148. While, in a certain sense the marginal
figures are not part of a promissory note, yet if
the note is ambiguous they belong to it suffi-
ciently to be used as a help in ascertaining its
meaning, or if the note is incomplete they may
be used to limit the holder's right to supply the
missing term.- Weaver's Administrator v.
Paul, 57.
149. It is well known that if the maker of a
promissory note signs it while the amount is in
blank, both in the body of the note and in the
holder to insert any sum he pleases, or if, when
margin, he thereby authorizes an innocent
and remains unaltered, he authorizes such hold-
he signs, a sum is named in the margin only
er to insert any amount not greater than is in-
dicated by marginal figures. As between maker
and payee, the authority is to insert the amount
agreed upon or any not exceeding the marginal
figures. These being the rules as to negotiable
paper, there is no good reason to refuse to ap-
ply them to a judgment note.-16.
PAYABLE AFTER DEATH.
150. A promissory note, under seal, payable
after death of the maker, is both in law and
equity a gift of money. While it may be post-
poned as to creditors, it is good as against the
maker, bis heirs and legatees. Such a note is
the rule of Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215.—
not testamentary. The principle falls within
Brown's Estate, 70.
NOTICE, 5, 6, 18, 118.
NUISANCE.
BOROUGH, 20 3.
INDICTMENT FOR.
151. An indictment alleging the mainten-
ance of a public nuisance near a public highway
need not name the highway nor describe par-
ticularly the place where the nuisance is main-
tained.-Com. v. McCormick et al., 205.
152. If an indictment charges defendant
with maintaining a public nuisance in a high-
way it should describe particularly the road,
giving its name and termini.—Ib.
153. It is not necessary that the locus in quo
of the nuisance on private grounds should be
described with sufficient particularity to enable
the sheriff to abate it, the proper sentence be-
ing that the defendant shall abate the nuisance
at his own cost.-Ib.
OFFICE, 127.
OCCUPANCY, 106.
PARENT AND CHILD, 186-7.
PARTITION.
INTEREST OF EXCEPTOR.
154. In proceedings of partition the share
of the recognizor in the dower fund is ex-
tinguished by operation of law, unless reserved
by some act susceptible of clear proof. Such
reservation is too late after the entry of judg.
ments against the purpart, if such subsequent
reservation destroy the security of the prior lien
creditors of the recognizor.-Grubb v. Grubb, 14.
PARTNERS, 92, 169.
LIABILITY FOR SUPPort.
155. Under the Act of April 15, 1857, P. L.
191, the Court has jurisdiction, upon the peti-
tion of the poor person himself, to make an
order for his support upon the person liable. It
is not necessary that the proceedings should be
by the guardians of the poor.-Clement's Peti-
tion, 203.
156. The petitioner was the adult son of a
mother possessed of considerable means. He
had spent in four years some $6,000, had a com-
fortable home in the family of a relative by mar-
riage, and had, when sick, received the atten-
tion of a capable physician. HELD, that the
circumstances did not show such a case within
the law as would warrant the Court in making
an order upon his mother for his support.-Ib.
157. A pauper chargeable to one district
wandered into another, was taken sick and cared
for at a private house and died; the poor direc-
tors of the place where she died notified those of
her settlement; the latter buried her. In the
suit for expense of nursing and preparation for
burial against the district to which she was
chargeable, HELD, that said district was lia-
able for reasonable cost of care and undertaker's
bill.—Ransom Township Poor District v. Jen-
kins Township Poor District, 207.
PAVEMENT, 20-3.
PAYMENT, 168.
POST-MORTEM, 150.
PRACTICE, 110-12.
DECLARATION.
159. The mere fact of a delay of nine years
in the filing of a declaration is not sufficient to
refuse a rule to plead.-Marshall v. Insurance
Co., 189.
160. When a proceeding is not according to
the course of the common law, but is statutory,
the requirement of the statute must be strictly
complied with.-Sunma v. Retteg et al., 60.
161. The Act of June 24, 1885, providing for
a rule upon the defendant to bring his action of
ejectment within ninety days or show cause, etc
requires the rule to be made returnable upon a
return day and to be served as a summons is
served.-Ib.
162. Where such a rule is made returnable
to some other day than a return day, or where
it is served by a person not an officer who has
authority to serve judicial process, the rule will
be discharged.--Ib.
QUORUM, 18.
RAILROAD, 81, 86.
REAL ESTATE.
POSSESSION, 8-10.
RECOGNIZANCE.
APPEAL, 3, 4.
CONDITIONS, 3, 4.
FORFEITURE.
163. Where the surety on a bail bond takes
out a bail piece and goes to some expense to
produce the man, but does not succeed, the for-
feiture will not be remitted; but the expense of
the effort to produce the defendant will be de-
ducted in settlement of the recognizance.--Com.
v. Bilski, 98.
164. Where the parties settle a case of as-
sault and battery and so inform the bail, the
latter will be relieved upon making the ex-
pense of the default good to the county.-Com.
v. Saloton, 99.
SUPERSEDEAS, 5.
REPLEVIN, 38.
RESULTING TRUST, 10, 183, 184.
RETURN, 161-2.
ROAD LAW.
165. The report showed that the proposed
road ended in a "road," and the draft called it
a "private road." On exceptions, it was ad-
mitted that this "road" had never been laid
out as a public road, or recognized or adopted
claimed to be such by dedication and use.
as such by the township authorities; but it was
There was evidence of use, but there was also
evidence of a gate across it, showing the owner's
control. HELD, that the exception must be
sustained and the report set aside.-Road in
Hellam Township, 152.
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