reason to treat this selective prosecution claim differently than we would treat any other claim of selective prosecution. Accordingly, the writ is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. So ordered. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. I believe that a criminal trial of the petitioners under this Ohio obscenity law will violate the Constitution of the United States. See, e. g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 275 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); ibid. (opinion of STEWART, J.); Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 982, 988 (dissenting opinion); Splawn v. California, 431 U. S. 595, 602 (STEWART, J., dissenting). It is clear to me, therefore, that "identifiable... constitutional polic[y]" will be "undermined by the continuation of the litigation in the state courts." Ante, at 622. Accordingly, I think that under the very criteria discussed in the opinion of the Court, the judgment before us is "final for jurisdictional purposes." Ante, at 620. Believing that the Ohio trial court acted correctly in dismissing the complaints, and that the state appellate courts were in error in overturning that dismissal, I would reverse the judgment. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. The decision of a federal question by the highest court of the State is final within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257 "if a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal policy." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 483. In the Court's view, this ground does not support reviewability in this case because the Court can discern "no identifiable federal policy that will suffer if the state criminal proceeding goes forward." Ante, at 622. In my opinion, the interest in protecting magazine publishers from being prosecuted criminally because state officials or their constituents are offended by the content of an admittedly nonobscene political cartoon is not merely "an identifiable federal policy"; it is the kind of interest that motivated the adoption of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioners publish Hustler, a national magazine. The trial court dismissed the criminal complaint against them after hearing evidence tending to establish that Ohio's decision to bring this prosecution was motivated by hostility to a political cartoon that is constitutionally indistinguishable from the rather trite depiction held to be protected by the First Amendment in Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U. S. 667. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, and that court's decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio over the dissent of Justice Brown. Because the Court has decided today to dismiss the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction, I will not comment on the merits beyond indicating that they concern the standards that a court must apply in determining whether an exercise of prosecutorial discretion has been based on an impermissible criterion such as race, religion, or the exercise of First Amendment rights. Because I place a high value on the federal interest in preventing such prosecutions and because the reinstatement of this criminal complaint may seriously erode that federal interest, I respectfully dissent. Per Curiam BELTRAN v. MYERS, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 80-5303. Argued March 24, 1981-Decided May 18, 1981 Held: The Court of Appeals' decision upholding, as not in conflict with governing federal law, a California statute that denies Medicaid benefits to "medically needy" persons because of their previous transfers of assets for less than full consideration is vacated, and the case is remanded. After this Court's grant of certiorari, Congress amended the Social Security Act to alter significantly the federal standards governing state Medicaid plans with respect to transfer-of-asset rules. This change, which may require some modification of the California rule, makes it inappropriate for this Court to decide the merits of the underlying dispute as considered by the Court of Appeals. Instead, the recent statutory amendment requires reconsideration of the decision below by the Court of Appeals. 622 F. 2d 1304, vacated and remanded. Gill Deford argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Neal S. Dudovitz. Richard J. Magasin, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Thomas E. Warriner, Assistant Attorney General, and Anne S. Pressman and Donald A. Robinson, Deputy Attorneys General.* PER CURIAM. We granted a writ of certiorari, 449 U. S. 951 (1980), to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, holding that California's "transfer-of-assets" *Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Shirley Adelson Seigel, Solicitor General, Clifford A. Royael, and Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, filed a brief for the Attorney General of New York et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Per Curiam 451 U.S. statute applicable to "medically needy" recipients of Medicaid benefits does not conflict with governing federal law. Dawson v. Myers, 622 F. 2d 1304 (1980). Petitioner is an individual considered "medically needy" under California's Medicaid plan,' who represents the class of all such persons who have been denied Medicaid benefits because of previous transfers of assets for less than full consideration. She argues that this exclusion is impermissible because it is based on a rule applicable only to "medically needy" recipients, and could not apply under federal law to "categorically needy" recipients.3 After our grant of certiorari on November 3, 1980, Congress passed § 5 of Pub. L. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3567 (Dec. 28, 1980) 1 "Medically needy" persons are included in the categories of Medicaid recipients aged, blind, disabled, or dependent children-which are derived from Social Security welfare programs. They have income levels, however, that are too high to qualify for regular income assistance under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Aid to Families with Dependent Children programs, and for this reason are distinguished from "categorically needy" recipients. 42 CFR § 435.4 (1980). 2 The California rule is set out in Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 14015 (West 1980). This statute provides in part: "[A]ny transfer of the holdings by gift or, knowingly, without adequate and reasonable consideration, shall be presumed to constitute a gift of property with intent to qualify for assistance and such act shall disqualify the owner for further aid for a period determined under standards established by the director, and in no event for less than half of the period that the capital value of the transferred property would have supplied the person's maintenance needs based on his circumstances at the time of his transfer plus the cost of any needed medical care." See n. 1, supra. The categorically needy receive Medicaid benefits merely by virtue of their eligibility for income assistance under the SSI or AFDC programs. Since that eligibility has not, until recently, been conditioned on a person's retention of existing assets, States could not apply a transfer-of-assets disqualification to the categorically needy. Petitioner's claim here is that she must be accorded the same treatment under the terms of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396a (a) (10) (C), (17) (B). See also 42 CFR § 435.401 (1980). Per Curiam BELTRAN v. MYERS, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 80-5303. Argued March 24, 1981-Decided May 18, 1981 Held: The Court of Appeals' decision upholding, as not in conflict with governing federal law, a California statute that denies Medicaid benefits to "medically needy" persons because of their previous transfers of assets for less than full consideration is vacated, and the case is remanded. After this Court's grant of certiorari, Congress amended the Social Security Act to alter significantly the federal standards governing state Medicaid plans with respect to transfer-of-asset rules. This change, which may require some modification of the California rule, makes it inappropriate for this Court to decide the merits of the underlying dispute as considered by the Court of Appeals. Instead, the recent statutory amendment requires reconsideration of the decision below by the Court of Appeals. 622 F. 2d 1304, vacated and remanded. Gill Deford argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Neal S. Dudovitz. Richard J. Magasin, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Thomas E. Warriner, Assistant Attorney General, and Anne S. Pressman and Donald A. Robinson, Deputy Attorneys General.* PER CURIAM. We granted a writ of certiorari, 449 U. S. 951 (1980), to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, holding that California's "transfer-of-assets" *Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Shirley Adelson Seigel, Solicitor General, Clifford A. Royael, and Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, filed a brief for the Attorney General of New York et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. |