merely as the result of our own thoughts and inquiries. Nor, all things considered, do we suppose that Singapore holds out greater advantages than some other places for new colonies. We have said nothing of Java, because the principles of the Dutch government militate against the system we advocate; as do also those of the Spanish government with reference to Luçonia. But whenever those governments shall see fit to adopt the line of policy already proposed by the legislative council of British India, then will Java and Luçonia, with their rich and extensive territories, afford great advantages for Christian colonies.

ART. II. Notices of modern China: officers of the inferior magistracy and police; domestics of the principal officers; malversations of the police; extortions and cruelties of inferior officers; &c. By R. I.

EVERY officer of government,* from the first to the ninth rank, must be previously qualified by a literary or military degree; but the clerks and other inferior attendants are not considered to have any rank, or to be permanently distinguished from the rest of the community. The ninth rank includes, however, village magistrates, inferior treasurers, jailers, &c. Subordinate to the great officers of the provinces already enumerated, are the heads of the several foo and heen districts. Some of the largest of the heën, as those of Nanhae and Pwanyu, which constitute the city of Canton and suburbs, are said to contain each about 1000 unpaid police; the middle sized ones to have 300 to 400, and the smallest from 100 to 200.

The duties of some of the higher grades of the above enumerated officers are pointed out in the Repository.§ The others muy be generally surmized from the nature of their offices. It does not appear what salaries are paid to them; but it is probable that they are very small, and in some cases, as with the police, none at all. In the latter case the perquisites of office must, of course, supply the place of salary. We have already stated that bribery, with respect to the higher departments of government is connived at, if not sanctioned by the emperor: we are not surpised, therefore, to find that it is publicly advocated even by his officers, as will be seen in referrence to a document issued by the fooyuen of Canton quoted in this work.

Staunton's Penal Code, note to section 7th.

+ Morrison's View of China for philological purposes. pnge 100. Canton Register, Aug. 2d, 1830. Chinese Repository, vol 2. "Chinese Repository, vol. 1, page 384

page 207

"All the appointments and removals of officers, (according to section 48 of the penal code,) whether civil or military, shall depend solely on the authority of the emperor. If any great officer of state presumes to confer any appointment upon his own authority, he shall suffer death by being beheaded, after remaining in prison the usual time." A note by the translator of this prescript adds; "that the viceroys and commanders-in-chief of provinces are constantly in the habit of filling up the various civil and military appointments under their respective jurisdictions, when they become vacant, but it is always done expressly by virtue of the authority conferred by the emperor, and generally stated to be only ad interim, until his majes ty's pleasure is known." For confirmation of the fact stated in the note, and to learn how the appointments are filled up, we refer to a memorial of a censor presented to the emperor in 1829,* in which he praises his majesty for his intense desire to attain good government, but adds, that it is defeated by the infamous conduct of the provincial rulers. He requests the emperor to prohibit several abuses; such as, magistrates quitting their districts to dance attendance on governors, to look for promotion. On public holidays, as on the anniversary of the governor's birthday, or of his wife or mother, away go the country magistrates to town to pay their respects, whilst the affairs of the people and the revenue are left to underlings, or neglected altogether. Some carry this practice so far, the censor says, as to absent themselves altogether from their districts, in order to get placed on a profitable commission of inquiry, or to seek promotion. Another abuse, is that governors appoint these magistrates to be their own secretaries. "It is the governor's duty," he says, "to pay his own secretaries, but he takes his majesty's servants who do the work for nothing, so far as money payment goes;" but they look to repay themselves at the peoples' cost, or by getting a higher appointment through the governor's influence. A third abuse is, that the governors put their own creatures from mere lictorships into respectable offices pro tempore. But these low people fail not to fleece the people, during the short time they hold the situations. The last evil he complains of, is that governors impose on the emperor by recommending unfit persons for promotion and rewards.

Although the censor thinks it necessary to require the emperor's prohibition of these abuses, they are already provided for in the code, and they afford additional examples, to those already quoted, of the opposition of the theory and practice of the law. The section which prohibits the great officers to nominate to official situations is already cited. Section 54 is headed "officers of government quitting their stations without leave ;" and section 173 prohibits the officers of the tribunals to leave the walls of their respective cities to attend on even an imperial commissioner on his route through their districts.

The secretaries of the governors and fooyuens spoken of by the censor, the clerks of the courts, the szeyo or jailer, and the policeCanton Register, May 18th, 1819.

runners will be found to stand very prominent in the imperial maledictions against abuses. The first not so often indeed, since they are not recognized officers of his majesty; but they seem to be the instruments of extortion throughout the provinces, and to become thus qualified to preside in their turns over similar machinery. "We have lately seen," says an article in the Canton Register of Ap. 15th, 1830, ་་ an account of the order of mandarin domestics, written by themselves, and giving a brief outline of their rise, progress, and duties. The domestics of a governor or fooyuen, says the writer, are complimented by the title of mandarins of the court,' and now the domestics of the lower officers get the title of changsuy, which a former emperor conferred on his own faithful servants. These domestics (keajin) hold a middle place between the mandarins and the people, and assist in the manage ent of public business: they are well dressed, and carry themselves loftily.

"There are several grades among them. The first class consists of the descendants of poor officers, who neither having been educated for any learned profession, nor brought up to a trade; and having no property to live on, go forth to other regions, and there endeavor to throw themselves into some great family, and to make themselves indispensable in it by pleasing every one. Others are the sons of once opulent, but now bankrupt, merchants, who have learned something of the ways of the world; but being left without property, are glad to become mandarin servants. A third class consists of those whose education has been neglected, and who in a course of gambling and debauchery have acquired knowledge of life, and the forms of good breeding. A fourth class consists of those who have learned some trade in their youth, but through idleness and a fondness for roving, have neglected it. There is another class of very low dissipated men, who have never had any regular occupation, nor listened to the instruction of their parents: but are fond of good eating, fine clothes, and many friends, singing songs, and acting plays. These men aspire also to the respectability of the mandarin domestics, and when they get employed, they lend themselves to everything base, perhaps for the sake of gain, conniving at their wives living with their masters. Then extortion, theft, usury, and every mischief, is the consequence: for there are drunken, debauched mandarins who employ such fellows. These mandarins have eyes without pupils; they cannot distinguish a common stone from a precious gem, and they are often ruined by such servants."

The employment of some of the above classes of persons, who, by the way, are not peculiar to China, has most likely another end, which section 82 of the code is intended to guard against. It is there enacted that, "all citizens who, not being obliged to labor for their own support, place their unemployed sons, grandsons, brothers, or nephews, in the suite of an officer of government, in order to evade the performance of the personal services due by them to the state, shall (being masters of families,) be punished with one hundred blows;

and the officer of government conniving at such evasion, shall be liable to the same punishment, or in the event of his having received a bribe, to such greater punishment as he might be liable to, for taking a bribe to such an amount, for an unlawful purpose." This section of the code, which is classed with others relating to the collection of taxes, and performance of personal services, seeins to imply that the domestics of the officers of government are exempt from those dues.

Having seen of what stuff the lower classes of the governmental scrvants are composed, we proceed next to inquire into the manner in which they perform their duties. The notices on this subject in the Peking gazette confound the duties and responsibilities of the magistrates and their inferiors so continually together, that it is difficult and perhaps unnecessary to separate them. The malversations of the former too, like those of the higher ranks, are to be gathered by implication, rather than by direct charges against them, except in a few instances of very flagrant injustice.

To begin then with the capital and its environs. We find in the Peking gazette for the 10th of February, 1824, the memorial of a censor concerning the malversations prevalent among the clerks and ofcial assistants in the governmental offices of the province of Cheible. "The clerks in the large and small offices of Cheile province," says the censor,* “ being assisted by their own friends in the prosecution of public business, the latter make use of their official influence in the commission of every species of iniquity. I the censor have turned my whole attention to the examination of these abuses. Truly there is none to whom they will not vend their services! But this province, being the place of imperial residence, ought to be governed with more especial probity, as an example to all others. It appears that in the offices of the treasurer and judge there are, in addition to the regular assistants, persons who call themselves keŎchoo (heads of departments), who, dividing themselves into two bodies, those who manage internal, and those who manage external, affairs, monopolize all the business of the chow and heen districts; and in the progress of the ratification or reversal of the decisions of the inferior courts, are guilty of all kinds of false and criminal combinations. The official friends of the chow and heën magistrates, having formerly been clerks in the higher courts, have a secret correspondence with the above keŏchoo, and in all matters of judgment consult together with them, for the purposes of deceit and plunder. When the business of government falls into such hands as these, they prove, in fact, the destructive insects of the soil. This evil practice," concludes the censor, "since it exists to such an extent in Cheible province, must also prevail in others."

In the Peking gazette of April, 1819, we find similar complaints of neglect in the administration of justice in the following report of another censor. "A censor has presented a document to the empeTransactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 1. page 381.

+ Indochinese Gleaner, January, 1820, page 236.

ror, complaining of flagrant neglect in the administration of justice, even in the province of Cheihle. He says, 'the magistrates of the chow and heen are none of them diligent and vigorous in the execution of their duty; and even in the province of Cheihle, there are many who, without the least fear or shame, connive at robbery and deceit. Formerly, horsestealers were wont to conceal themselves in some secret place, but now they openly bring their plunder to the market for sale. When they perceive a person to be weak, they are in the habit of stealing his property, and returning it to him for money. On reporting this to the officers, they treat it as a trivial affair, and blame the sufferer for not being more cautious. There have been instances of thieves being apprehended, and on their persons have been discovered governmental warrants, which showed that they had taken advantage of being sent out to apprehend thieves, to steal for themselves. Formerly, constables were forbidden to harbor thieves, but now they themselves adopt these nefarious practices. When a matter is reported to the officers, they lay it by and do not inquire into it; and on its being carried to the higher courts, and orders issued that the affair be attended to, they just apprehend a few thieves, and after a few days let them go again. In the districts of Tinghing heen, Sinching heën, Chuh chow, Leängheäng heen, and Koongan heën, justice is administered in this remiss and careless manner. And what is still more flagrant, at a village between Wanping and Fangshan, (close to the imperial residence,) there are very many thieves concealed, and some Mohammedans mixed with them, who go out by night in companies of twenty or thirty persons, carrying weapons with them; and in the district of Fangshan, they frequently call up the inhabitants, break open their doors, and having satisfied themselves with what food and wine they can obtain, they threaten and extort money, which if they cannot procure, they steal their clothes or ornaments, oxen and horses, and depart. They also frequently go to shops, and having broke open the shutters, impudently demand inoney, which if they do not get, they set fire to the shop with the torches which are in their hands. If the master of the house apprehends a few of them, and sends them to the magistrate, he inerely imprisons and beats them, and before half a month allows them to escape, giving out that they have run away, when the fact is that they have been purposely released.

"Now in my opinion, the magistrates of the districts are the shepherds of the people, and they ought, immediately on the first report of a robbery, to proceed to apprehend the criminals, aud then they would fulfill their duty; but now their allowing the people to report of flagrant as well as clandestine robberies, without proceeding to a strict examination, is first, because they are weak and hindered by their fears; and secondly, because their sluggishness prevents them: not knowing that thus the evil has already risen to a height too great, and it will at length be like fattening the ulcer, till misery is completed.' I intreat that an order may be issued, that at the approaching triennial examination, these useless and worthless magistrates