received after that date; but no evidence of such identification was introduced. The plaintiffs asked the court to give to the jury eight several charges, which are set forth in the margin, "but the court severally refused to give each of said charges, and to each such refusal the plaintiffs duly excepted. Each of said charges was separately asked and separately refused, and each refusal separately excepted to by the plain 'Charges asked by the plaintiffs and refused: "(1) That if the evidence shows that the complainants were the manufacturers of the machinery in question, that would constitute them the owners until by some complete act of sale the title passed to some other person. And there is no complete act of sale until there has been, between the buyer and the seller, a full agreement of their minds, on the part of the vendor to part with his ownership of the property, and of the vendee (or buyer) to accept and receive the property as a full compliance on the part of the seller with his agreement. When this agreement of the minds of the buyer and the seller takes place in any given instance is a question of intention, to be determined by a consideration of the situation and surroundings of the parties and the subjectmatter of the contract, and the stipulations to be observed and performed by the parties with respect thereto. The burden of showing satisfactorily that the title has passed from the original owner to a buyer rests upon the buyer, if he affirms that a sale has taken place; and when the contract is for articles to be manufactured, or for articles in existence at the date of the contract, with or about which the seller, under the terms of the contract, was to do something to put them in such condition as he could insist upon an acceptance by the buyer, or, as is commonly said, in a deliverable state, the property does not pass from the vendor to the vendee unless it is shown satisfactorily that there was a specific intent of the parties that it should do so contrary to the ordinary course of business. The presumption is against such intent under such circumstances, and must be shown by the party asserting it. "(2) In a case of doubt, the construction which the parties themselves have put upon a contract is of great assistance in arriving at its true meaning. If the contract in this instance was for the purchase of certain cotton-seed oil-mill machinery as a complete mill, which was to be transported to a given place and to be put up by the vendor, or for the putting up of which he was to do anything, such as furnishing mechanics, etc., and which machinery was to be of a given capacity, the presumption of law would be that the property would not pass from the vendor until the latter had completed the mill as a whole and the vendee had unconditionally accepted it as a fulfillment of the contract; and such acceptance must be notified to the vendor. The doing of secret or fraudulent acts by the vendee in transactions with third persons which might estop him from saying he was not the owner as against the person with whom he dealt would have no operation whatever against the vendor; and in this case the making of a mortgage by Belser & Parker to Lehman, Durr & Co. cannot be regarded as of any force as evidence to show the necessary agreement of the minds of E. Van Winkle & Co. and Belser & Parker as to the relinquishment of the right of property by one and the full acceptance of the property by the other as a compliance of the contract; and, until such mutual agreement of the minds of the vendor and vendee is shown, the property would remain with the vendor, notwithstanding the buyer should in the mean time execute mortgages or make absolute sales of the property. In such case the vendee cannot alone elect to regard the property as passing, and certainly not by any Mr. Justice SHIRAS was not a member of the court when this case was argued, and took no part in its decision. secret or perhaps fraudulent act. The vendor must also agree to the relinquishment of his right of property, which right may be of importance to the vendor to secure the performance of contemporaneous acts to be done by the buyer, such as making payments falling due before the 'contract has been fully completed. "(3) In the present instance, no right of property passed to the vendees (Belser & Parker) at the time of making the contract. The contract itself contemplated certain things to be done by both the buyer and the seller before any property could pass under the contract to the buyer, and the law is (unless a specific intent is shown to the contrary by the party alleging it) that the property will not in such cases pass until each party has done all that the contract requires to be done before the property is in that condition in which it may be tendered as a full compliance with the contract, and there must be such a tender or delivery of the property to the buyer and such full acceptance by the buyer, and such acceptance and tender cannot in either case be by secret acts. The law contemplates notice to each party, and the mutual assent of their minds to the act of relinquishment of the property by the vendor and its acquirement by the buyer. "(4) The payment of installments prior to or during the progress of the acts to be done by either or both of the parties before the property is in a deliverable state under the contract is not inconsistent with the retention of the property in the vendor. "(5) When machinery is to be put up on the premises of the buyer, and is to be of a certain quality or capacity under the terms of the contract, the possession and use of the machinery by the buyer, with the consent of the seller, for the purpose of testing its quality or capacity prior to the full acceptance of the machinery as a compliance with the contract and the relinquishment of the vendor's right of the property, is not inconsistent with the property being with the vendor, notwithstanding such possession. Neither party would be estopped by such a possession. "(6) That the jury are to determine under all the evidence whose property the machinery in question was, by mutual understanding of Belser & Parker and E. Van Winkle & Co., up to the 11th of December, 1885, and if they find that up to that time there was no mutual agreement or understanding between them whereby it vested in Belser & Parker, or that they (Belser & Parker) refused to accept it as a fulfillment of the contract up to that time, and only accepted it at that time, and then gave the plaintiffs the notes in evidence, the plaintiffs' right is superior to that of Lehman, Durr & Co., and to that of any of the defendants. "(7) That the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such property as was furnished after the 11th of December, 1885. "(8) That it is a question of intention of the parties as to when the property in the machinery passed to Belser & Parker, and the jury are the judges as to when they both intended that it should pass, and if they believe that they did not so mutually intend that it should pass until the settlement and adjustment on the 11th of December, 1885, the plaintiffs' rights are superior to those of Lehman, Durr & Co. and to those of any of the defendants. " (146 U. S. 82) CROSS v. BURKE, Jail Warden. (November 14, 1892.) - No. 1,105. SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION APPEAL FROM 1. Act March 3, 1885, (23 St. at Large, p. 437,) provides that an appeal from the circuit to the supreme court shall lie in cases where the prisoner is alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution or any law or treaty of the United States. 23 St. at Large, p. 443, of the same date, provides that no appeal shall lie from the supreme court of the District of Columbia, or of any territory, unless the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000. Held, that habeas corpus proceedings are civil cases, and under the latter act no appeal therein lies from such courts. Wales v. Whitney, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1050, 114 U. S. 564, overruled. 2. Rev. St. D. C. § 846, giving the same right of appeal from the supreme court of the District as is "provided by law" for appeals from circuit courts, does not render applicable to that court the provisions of subsequent acts regulating appeals from circuit courts. 3. Where the question of jurisdiction does not appear to have been contested in a previously adjudicated case, the court is not bound by the view expressed therein. Appeal from the supreme court of the District of Columbia. Appeal dismissed. •Statement by Mr. Chief Justice FULLER: William D. Cross was found guilty for the second time upon an indictment for murder in the supreme court of the District of Columbia holding a criminal term, and sentenced to death, the time of his execution being fixed for January 22, 1892. He prosecuted an appeal to the court in general term, which, on January 12, 1892, finding no error in the record, affirmed the judgment rendered at the criminal term, (20 Wash. Law Rep. 98,) and on January 21, 1892, a writ of error from this court was allowed by the chief justice of the supreme court of the district, citation was signed and served, and the time for filing the record enlarged. On the same day the execution of the sentence of death was postponed until the 10th of June, 1892, by order entered by the court in general term. That writ of error was dismissed May 16, 1892. Cross v. U. S., 145 U. S. 571, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 842. May 28, 1892, Cross filed his petition in the supreme court of the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus, which petition was heard in the first instance by that court in general term. The application was denied June 4, 1892, and the petition dismissed. 20 Wash. Law Rep. 389. On June 8, 1892, the court in general term allowed an appeal to this court. C. Maurice Smith and Joseph Shellington, for appellant. sol. Gen. Aldrich, for appellee. Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court. It was not denied in the supreme court of the district that the time and place of execution are not parts of a sentence of death un less made so by statute. Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483, 495, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143; Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442, 451, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525. But it was insisted that in the District of Columbia the time has been made a part of the sentence by section 845 of the Revised Statutes of the District, which is in these words: "To enable any person convicted by the judgment of the court to apply for a writ of error, in all cases when the judgment shall be death, or confinement in the penitentiary, the court shall, upon application of the party accused, postpone the final execution thereof to a reasonable time beyond the next term of the court, not exceeding in any case thirty days after the end of such term." And it was contended that the time fixed by such a postponement is to be regarded as a time fixed by statute, and that the power of the court to set a day for execution is thereby exhausted. The supreme court of the District of Columbia, speaking by James, J., held that "the subject-matter dealt with in this provision was not the powers of the court at all. It related simply to a right of the accused in postponement of the time of executing his a particular instance; that is, a right to a sentence in case he should apply for it in order to have a review of alleged error. With the exception of this restriction in the matter of fixing a day for execution, the power of the court was not made the subject of legislation, but was left as it had been at common law. The whole effect of the statute was to declare that, in case of an application for the purpose of obtaining a review on error, the day of execution should not be set so possible reversal;" that the power of the as to cut off the opportunity for review and court to set á day for execution was not exhausted by its first exertion; and that, if the time for execution had passed for any cause, the court could make a new order. We have held that this court has no jurisjudgments of the supreme court of the Disdiction to grant a writ of error to review the trict in criminal cases, either under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, (26 St. p. 826, c. 517,) or under the act of congress of February 6, 1889, (25 St. p. 655, c. 113,) or any other. In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 615; Cross v. U. S., 145 U. S. 571, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 842. Have we jurisdiction over the judgments of that court on habeas corpus? Under the fourteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, (1 St. p. 73,) the courts of the United States, and either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as the judges of the district courts, had power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment; but this extended in no case to prisoners in jail, unless in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or committed for trial before some court of the United States, or necessary to be brought. into court to testify. By the seventh section of the act of March 2, 1833, (4 St. p. 634,) the power was extended to all cases of prisoners in jail or confinement, when committed or confined on or by any authority or law for any act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree of any judge or court thereof. By the act of August 29, 1842, (5 St. p. 539,) the power was further extended to issue the writ when the prisoner, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, "shall be committed or confined or in custody under or by any authority or law, or process founded thereon, of the United States, or of any one of them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption set up or claimed under the commission or order or sanction of any foreign state or sovereignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations, or under color thereof." By the first section of the act of February 5, 1867, (14 St. p. 385,) it was declared that the courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges thereof, should have power "to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States;" and it was provided that "from the final decision of any judge, justice, or court inferior to the circuit court an appeal may be taken to the circuit court of the United States for the district in which said cause is heard, and from the judgment of said circuit court to the supreme court of the United States." March 27, 1868, an act was passed (15 St. p. 44) to the effect that "so much of the act approved February five, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, entitled 'An act to amend "An act to establish the judicial courts .f the United States," approved September twenty-fourth, seventeen hundred and eighty-nine' as authorizes an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the supreme court of the United States, or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said supreme court on appeals which have been or may hereafter be taken, be, and the same is, hereby repealed." Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318; Id., 7 Wall. 506; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85. These various provisions were carried forIward into sections 751-766 of the Revised Statutes. By section 763 it was provided that an appeal to the circuit court might be taken from decisions on habeas corpus (1) in the case of any person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution or of any law or treaty of the United States; (2) in the case of the subjects or citizens of foreign states, as hereinbefore set forth. And by section 764 an appeal to the supreme court from the circuit court was provided for, but limited to "the cases described in the last clause of the preceding section." The Revised Statutes of the United States and the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia were approved June 20, 1874. Section 846 of the latter, which was taken from section 11 of the act of March 3, 1863, (c. 91, 12 St. p. 764,) is as follows: "Any final judgment, order, or decree of the su. preme court of the District may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States upon writ of error or appeal in the same cases, and in like manner, as provided by law in reference to the final judgments, orders, or decrees of the circuit courts of the United States." By act of congress of March 3, 1885, (23 St. p. 437,) section 764 of the Revised Statutes was amended in effect by striking out the words, "the last clause of," so that an appeal might be taken in all the cases described in section 763. It was to this act that Mr. Justice Miller referred in Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 565, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1050, as restoring "the appellate jurisdiction of this court in habeas corpus cases from decisions of the circuit courts, and that this necessarily included*ju-* risdiction over similar judgments of the supreme court of the District of Columbia." But the question of jurisdiction does not appear to have been contested in Wales v. Whitney, and, where this is so, the court does not consider itself bound by the view expressed. U. S. v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 317, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609; U. S. v. More, 3 Cranch, 159, 172. We have pointed out in Re Heath, 144 U. S. 92, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 615, that to give to this local legislation, extending the appellate jurisdiction of this court to the District of Columbia, a construction which would make it include all subsequent legislation touching our jurisdiction over circuit courts of the United States, is quite inadmissible, (Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet. 524;) and that no reference was made in Wales v. Whitney to the act of congress approved on the same 3d of March, 1885, entitled "An act regulating appeals from the supreme court of the District of Columbia and the supreme courts of the several territories," (23 St. p. 443.) The first section of this act provided "that no appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, or in the supreme court of any of the territories of the United States, unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars;" and the second section, that the first section should not apply to any case "wherein is involved the validity of any patent or copyright, or in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or authority exercised under the United States; but in all such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute." The act does not apply in either section to any criminal case, (Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 253; U. S. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609,) but is applicable to all judgments or decrees in suits at law or in equity in which there is a pecuniary matter in dispute, and it inhibits any appeal or writ of error therefrom, except as stated. Clearly, the act of March 3, 1885, amending section 764 of the Revised Statutes, in respect of circuit courts, cannot be held to give a jurisdiction in respect of the supreme court of the District denied by the act of March 3, 1885, relating to the latter court. It is well settled that a proceeding in habeas corpus is a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding. Farnsworth v. Montana, ubi supra; Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 871; Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148. The application here was brought by petitioner to assert the civil right of personal liberty against the respondent, who is holding him in custody as a criminal, and the inquiry is into his right to liberty notwithstanding his condemnation. In order to give this court jurisdiction under the act of March 3, 1885, last referred to, the matter in dispute must be money, or some right, the value of which in money can be calculated and ascertained, (Kurtz v. Moffitt, ubi supra;) and as, in this case, the matter in dispute has no money value, the result is that no appeal lies. It may also be noted that under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, (26 St. p. 826,) appeals from decrees of circuit courts on habeas corpus can no longer be taken directly to this court in cases like that at bar, but only in the classes mentioned in the fifth section of that act. Lau Ow Bew v. U. S., 144 U. S. 47, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517; Horner v. U. S., 143 U. S. 570, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522. 1. Under the tariff act of October 1, 1890, "finished gunstocks with locks and mountings" are dutiable at 45 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 215, as "manufactures, articles, or wares not specially enumerated," "composed wholly or in part of iron, steel," etc., and the fact that the finished gun barrels are imported separately by another firm, under an arrangement with the importer of the stocks with intent that they shall be brought together here, does not render the importation dutiable at the higher rate prescribed by paragraph 170 for all double-barreled, sporting, breech-loading shotguns, when it does not appear that the stocks had ever formed part of completed guns in Europe. 45 Fed. Rep. 349, affirmed. Robertson v Gerdan, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119, 132 U. S. 454, followed. Falk v. Robertson, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41, 137 U. S. 225, distinguished. 2. Act Jan. 29, 1795, (1 St. at Large, p. 411,) § 2, providing that where any article is made subject to duty, the parts thereof, when imported separately, shall be subject to duty at the same rate, was limited to duties imposed by laws then existing, and does not apply to subsequent tariff acts. 3. The prosecution of an appeal against a firm instead of against the individual partners is a defect which may be cured by amendment in the supreme court. Estis v. Trabue, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58, 128 U. S. 225, followed. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. This was a proceeding to review a decision of the board of general appraisers, affirming the action of the collectors in imposing certain duties on gunstocks. The circuit court reversed the judgment of the appraisers, and sustained the claim of the importers, (45 Fed. Rep. 349,) and the United States was thereupon allowed an appeal to this court. Affirmed. Sol. Gen. Aldrich, for the United States. Albert Comstock, for appellees. *Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. On the 20th of October, 1890, the firm of Schoverling, Daly & Gales, composed of August Schoverling, Charles Daly, and Joseph Gales, imported into the port of New York, from Europe, articles described in the entry as "12 finished gunstocks, with locks and mountings." The collector assessed a duty upon them of $1.50 each, and, in addition thereto, 35 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 170 of the act of October 1, 1890, c. 1244, (26 St. p. 579,) in Schedule C of that act, entitled "Metals and Manufactures of Firearms:" "170. All double-barreled, sporting, breech-loading shotguns, valued at not more than six dollars each, one dollar and fifty cents each; valued at more than six dollars and not more than twelve dollars each, four dollars each; valued at more than twelve dollars each, six dollars each; and in addition thereto, on all the above, thirty-five per centum ad valorem. Single-barrel breech-loading shotguns, one dollar each and thirty-five per centum ad valorem. Revolving pistols valued at not more than one dollar and fifty cents each, forty cents each; valued at more than one dollar and fifty cents, one dollar each; and, in addition thereto, on all the above pistols, thirty-five per centum ad valorem." The importers, on November 15, 1890, filed with the collector, under section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890, c. 407, (26 St. p. 137,) a notice in writing, addressed to him, objecting to the decision of the collector, and stating their reasons for so doing. That notice in writing, called a "protest," claimed that the articles were only parts of guns, and were dutiable at 45 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 215 of Schedule C of the act of October 1, 1890, (page 582,) which reads as follows: "215. Manufactures, articles, or wares not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, composed wholly or in part of iron, steel, lead, copper, nickel, pewter, zinc, gold, silver, platinum, aluminum, or any other metal, and whether partly or wholly manufactured, forty-five per centum ad valorem." The protest stated that the articles in question were simply parts or accompaniments intended for use in the manufacture of guns or muskets, were not guns or muskets, and could not be classed as such completed commodities. or, signed by all three of its members, it is said that, if the importation was simply one of gunstocks, without the gunbarrels required to make a complete firearm, and the case rested there, the articles could not be regarded as completed guns, so as to be dutiable under paragraph 170; that the testimony of Daly disclosed the facts that the firm of Schoverling, Daly & Gales had imported the gunstocks in question, and had made an agreement with another firm by which the latter were to order the barrels, with the mutual expectation that the stocks and bar put together so as to make complete guns; that Schoverling was a member of both firms thus colluding together; that such a mode of evading the payment of duties could not be tolerated; and that the decision of the collector was affirmed. Under section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890, the collector, on the 16th of December, 1890, transmitted to the three general appraisers on duty at the port of New York the invoice, entry, and protest. The assistant appraiser had reported to the appraiser, November 28, 1890, that the articles in ques-rels, after arriving at New York, were to be tion were "gunstocks, with mountings complete, ready for attachment to the barrels, which arrived by another shipment," and that "the gunstocks and barrels, when attached, make double-barreled breech-loading shotguns, complete." The collector, in his communication to the general appraisers, referred to the foregoing report of the assistant appraiser, and stated that the merchandise was returned by the appraiser upon the invoice as "breech-loading shotguns," invoiced at a value not over $6 each, and that he had assessed duty on them, under paragraph 170, at the rate of 35 per cent. ad valorem and $1.50 each. The board of general appraisers took the testimony of Mr. Daly, one of the importing firm, on December 19, 1890, and it is set forth in the margin.1 In its report to the collect 'Protest in the matter of importation of certain gunstocks by Messrs. Schoverling, Daly & Gales. Statement of Mr. Daly. Examined by Gen. App. Somerville: "Question. You are a member of the firm of Schoverling, Daly & Gales? Answer. Yes, sir. Q. Where are you doing business? A. In New York. Q. This importation, as I understand you, consists of this item marked 225 here,' finished gunstocks, with locks and mountings? A. That is it. Q. Shotguns? A. They are parts of shotguns,-parts of breech-loading shotguns. Q. When did you make this order for this importation? A. I telegraphed for it a short time before this invoice. Q. How many of these are there here? A. Twelve of these finished gunstocks. Q. Did you at the same time order the other parts of these guns to be sent? A. I did not. That is all we received. We never received the barrels. Q. You made no order for the barrels? A. No, sir. (Reference made in the special report of the appraiser to protests of Schoverling, Daly & Gales against the assessment of duty at the rate of 35 per cent., etc.) Q. What we want to know is whether the barrels of these guns have arrived by another shipment, within your knowledge. A. As a member of the firm of Schoverling, Daly & Gales, I do not know it, because we have never received any invoice. Q. Never made any order? A. No, sir. Q. Have you any agreement with any other firm that they were to order the barrels of these guns? A. Yes; we have. Q. With the expectation on your part that they were to be put together here? A. Yes, sir. Q. Have those other importations been received by the other firms? A. A good many of them, I guess, are in bond. Q. What firms did you have an understanding of this nature with? A. With A. Schoverling. Q. Is he a partner in your house? A. Yes, sir; he is a partner in the firm of Schoverling, Daly & Gales, and also runs a separate business. Mr. Tichenor. Q. Do you think the trade generally adopted this plan A. I think they all have received goods in the same way. We have imported those stocks with the intention of putting them with the other parts imported by these other parties." On the 6th of January, 1891, the importers, under section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, applied to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York for a review of the questions of law and fact involved in such decision of the board of general appraisers, by filing in the office of the clerk of said court a statement of the errors of law and fact complained of, which were that the duty had been assessed on the articles at $1.50 each and 35 per cent. ad valorem, while it should have been assessed, under paragraph 215, at 45 per cent. ad valorem, only. On the filing of the application, the circuit court made an order that the board of general appraisers return to the court the record and the evidence, with a certified statement of the facts involved and their decision thereon. *On the 22d of January, 1891, the board of general appraisers filed in the court their return, embodying the protest of November 15, 1890, the assistant appraiser's report of November 28, 1890, the collector's communication of December 16, 1890, the testimony of Daly, and the opinion and decision of the board. The case was argued before the circuit court, held by Judge Lacombe, which entered an order, on March 20, 1891, reversing and setting aside the decision of the collector and that of the board of general appraisers, and adjudging that the merchandise should have been classified and assessed with duty at the rate of 45 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 215 of the act, as "manufactures, articles, or wares not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, composed * * * in part of iron or steel." opinion of the circuit court is reported in 45 Fed. Rep. 349. It stated that there was no evidence that the articles were ever assembled or brought together with the gunbarrels on the other side; that there was no finding to that effect by the appraisers; that, if there were such a finding of fact, the court would be constrained to reverse it, because there was no evidence in the record to support it; that, for all that appeared, the gunstocks might have been bought from one manufac The |