an intelligent designer of nature. Kant replies as follows: Even granting that the world exhibits the design of beauty, goodness, and purpose in its construction, such a beautiful, good, and purposeful world would only prove the existence of an architect and not the existence of a creator. Kant points out, however, that this proof is the oldest, clearest, and the most popular; and he thinks it deserves to be treated with respect on that account. The wonder and magnificence of nature must free man from the oppression of any subtle argument against the significance of nature. Nevertheless Kant feels that this proof lacks intellectual cogency; for it is possible that nature is freely acting and has power within itself.

The conclusion of the Dialectic, in which the Reason attempts through his Ideas to soar beyond experience, is that such speculation has never added to our knowledge. Mere conceptual thought cannot be knowledge. of the reality of the soul, God, and the world. Still, the Ideas of the reason are an integral part of the human mind, and they must have their purpose. They cannot be verified by experience, in which alone is truth, but they can regulate experience. They are "regulative Ideas" in that our experience is better governed if we act as if there were a soul, as if God existed, and as if the world were a totality of related things. Moreover, while speculation cannot prove the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, atheistic speculation is unable to prove the contrary of all these propositions. The Ideas of the Reason clear the way for faith based on morality.

Conclusion. The Critique of Pure Reason is what its name implies,—a criticism of our conscious powers. It points out the limits and extent of human knowledge.

In one sense, it is constructive; for it establishes against skepticism the conclusion that knowledge has a validity within its own limits. In another sense, it is destructive; for it shows against dogmatism how futile our intellectual striving is to explore many regions that have been considered the proper realm of knowledge. No knowledge is possible that is transcendent - no knowledge beyond the limits of experience. Experience ties our mental powers to itself Experience is the boundary of the understanding. Reality, the Things-in-Themselves, are unknown and unknowable. But transcendental knowledge is possible. Within experience there are the transcendental factors that on the one hand transform sensations into phenomena, and on the other give to these phenomena a validity for all mankind. These transcendental factors make knowledge reliable, but they add not one whit to its content. On account of these transcendental factors we can be rational with one another and members of one world of humanity. The value of knowledge is not lessened, but is defined. Our world of phenomenal existence is now accurately assessed as a world of relative reality. It is placed in its proper perspective. It is seen as our own interpretation of what is really real. This is very important; for although the restricted form of our mental powers withholds us from knowing reality, we may nevertheless think it. The pure intellection of reality will be of value, if in some other way its contents can be assured. Kant now points out that this assurance is found in the moral will.

The Problem of the Critique of Practical Reason: The Ethics of Kant. "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener

and the longer we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within." In this classic sentence Kant showed that he had no desire to humiliate the theoretical reason, which is the understanding. He was merely assigning it to its place among the powers of man, in order that it might do its proper work more efficiently. The world of morality and the starry heaven impressed Kant equally. Kant would not have the understanding chasing will-o'-the-wisps. After his criticism of the understanding he turned to the will, or as he calls it the practical reason, and criticized its functions and scope. This ethical teaching of Kant appears in his Metaphysic of Morality and in the Critique of Practical Reason. His early Pietistic education, his reading of Rousseau, his study of the English moralists, influenced his theory of morals; while his investigations into the history of civilization, his theoretical philosophy, and his independent analysis of the ethical feeling marked the route which his ethical development took. The world of morality to Kant has primacy. In his theory it is the real world, for compared to it the world of scientific phenomena, the world of the theoretical reason, is relative.

The central idea in Kant's theory of morals is that rational spontaneity is exactly the same as freedom. This contrasts his theory with Hedonism. The value of man's life depends on what he does spontaneously, not on what happens to him. This idea of freedom is the central thought in all Kant's discussions of society. In his theory of government the republic is to be preferred to the monarchy, because of the opportunity to its citizens of spontaneous freedom; in religion the true church is composed of free beings worshiping God freely; in

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education self-activity is the sole principle of growth. Ethics is a system of the pure rational laws of freedom, just as science is a system of the pure rational laws of nature. If ethics has real validity its laws must be, as in science, a priori or derived from the reason itself, and synthetic or applicable to experience everywhere. If the moral law be valid it must be indifferent as to its content, and yet valid for all content irrespectively. The source of the principle of morals is thus the same as that of science: it is a priori. The principle of morals is universal in its application to experience, just as the a priori synthesis of knowledge is. However, just at that point the difference is to be seen between the foundation of science and that of morals-between the reason as pure and the reason as practical. Reason in the form of knowledge is restricted to experience; but reason in the form of the will, while applicable to experience, is not restricted to experience. If the understanding is without the content of experience, it is empty and useless. The understanding must always be a synthesis of a manifold. On the other hand, the practical reason needs no content. It is sufficient in itself. It need not be obeyed anywhere nor have any concrete content in the phenomenal world. It has no reference to what is but to what ought to be. The world of morality and the world of phenomena are different worlds. The world of morality is absolute reality, while the world of knowledge is only relative. The world of morality is the unconditioned, while that of knowledge is conditioned by experience. Morality applies not only to human beings, but to all rational beings, if any other rational beings exist. Knowledge, however, belongs to human beings alone. The moral law has not its home in

the empirical, but in the transcendent, intelligible world, which to knowledge would be the world of Things-inThemselves.

The Moral Law and the Two Questions concerning It. The questions of the Critique of Practical Reason are the same as those of the Dialectic: (1) Is there any a priori synthesis? This is not the question of the Analytic, which is, How is an a priori synthesis possible? (2) Can the human being be moral and still be a part of the world of phenomena and necessity? We shall now comment on the first of these problems. If the will has validity, it must be the expression of some universal and necessary principle. Can we find any such a priori principle in our consciousness?

1. The First Question concerning the Moral Law. If we search our consciousness, we shall find that there are two classes of incentives to action. The first are called the inclinations, or perhaps better the impulses. We may will because we desire to gain something, of use, pleasure, perfection, etc. Such an act of will is dependent upon the object that arouses it. Such an act of will would not be an example for any one else; for the circumstances that called it forth would be likely to be different in each case. For example, there is no consensus as to pleasure among individual men ; and what is pleasant to one is unpleasant to another. The same is true about objects of use and ambition. In all these matters judgment does not help us in making our selection, for people who are the most discriminating often are the most unhappy and useless. All these things are indeed goods, but they are goods for the moment -goods that are dependent on something else, and not goods in themselves. They are legitimate ends enough,