decreased, is yet to be decided by the future. In the past there is certainly nothing that clearly warrants a change.

From the foregoing remarks, however, it may be gathered that as this diversity of dispositions and interests of the community becomes more and more diversified, whether from vice and its natural tendency to division and strife, from increase of territory or numbers, from difference of climate, occupation or education, or any cause whatever, so to the same extent the check now fixed will become less and less effective. Because the greater this diversity, the more difficult it will be to combine and harmonize it to the requisite degree of concord and unity.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that governments are free only in proportion as they approximate to unanimity. For instance, the larger the controlling majority, the smaller must be the controlled minority. If then the controlling majority now fixed be reduced, the controlled minority would necessarily be increased, and the government just as certainly become less free. The question as to the increase or decrease of the majority now required, when thus reduced to its elements, assumes a more important and imposing aspect, and is properly presented in the following form. Whether is it better to encourage and increase the causes of diversity, reduce the controlling majority in consequence, and thereby make the government less free-or to unite and harmonize the diversity into unanimity, that the government may not only remain as free, but continue to progress toward that happy position from which our first progenitor has fallen, until at

last we attain that perfect state of freedom where God alone shall reign supreme; our only law, his holy will, and his greater honor and glory our only end and aim? Some, high in station and renowned before the world, have deemed the first most proper-but for myself, more humble far, my object shall be loftier, and my answer be for freedom and my God.

THE EXECUTIVE.

WHAT is the best constitution for the executive department, and what are the powers with which it should be entrusted, says the most eminent and able legal writer of the age, are problems among the most important, and probably the most difficult to be solved of all which are involved in the theory of free governments. There is a striking and peculiar force in these remarks, apparent to all who have made political science a study. How true they seem to those too who have acquainted themselves with human nature, who know the frailty, the depravity, the inordinate passions and desires of the human heart-who know its inward workings, and contemplate that seal of selfishness with which it is impressed, that longing after power, stamped upon it by that foul spirit which, urged by a hellish ambition, sought to exalt itself even above the government of heaven. How perplexing is the problem to him whose mind has dwelt upon the records of the past; how intricate to him who has examined attentively the political history of those

mighty empires on which human depravity has done its work, gnawing their constitutions till, diseased even unto death, their spirit has vanished away, and their institutions, together with the mighty ends attained thereby, almost forgotten, have crumbled in inglorious decay. It is a question far too perplexing for me to attempt its examination. Its solution is far beyond the power of my feeble efforts, and I shrink from it with an overwhelming sense of amazement, in view of the importance, the intricacy, and stupendous magnitude of the subject. Upon one so perplexing, it was but natural there should have existed much diversity of opinion in the convention. It occupied much of their attention, and was elaborately investigated and discussed and, though experience has not as yet shown any great error in the result of their labors, there are some who would persuade us it is very erroneous, and stamped with defects glaring and dangerous. Whether this is the effect of sinister motives, of unfounded fears, a mere wish to find fault, or a restless desire for change, I shall not undertake to determine; but believe, with the Federalist, that "There is hardly any part of the system the arrangement of which could have been attended with greater difficulty, and none which has been inveighed against with less candor, or criticised with less judgment."

The first clause of art. 2d declares that "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years," &c. Under the old confederacy all the powers of government were vested in the Congress, and there was no distinct national

executive. The want of one was generally admitted to be a great defect, and in the convention there was not the least objection to the establishment of one. It was determined, by a vote of seven states against three, that it should consist of a single person, and the term of his service was first fixed at seven years, by the vote of five states against four, but was subsequently altered to four years, by the vote of ten to one.

The subjects presented by the clause for consid

eration, are, first, the necessity of the executive department; secondly, its unity; thirdly, the term of service. Having previously examined the first subject, in discussing the necessity of separating the three great departments of government, and it being so clear and universally admitted, it becomes unnecessary further to discuss it. As it regards the unity of the office, while it is necessary for energy and despatch in the execution of laws, it affords a great security against an improper exercise of its functions, and so contributes much to the safety of the community. Though it is not doubted by any that its unity is well calculated to secure vigor, yet it is the opinion of some that this is not a proper ingredient for the executive of a republic. Such opinions, however, have but few advocates at present, and are advanced only by those termed "closet philosophers," who, from their ignorance of the world as it is, indulge the belief of human perfection. Mostly upon this ground have these opinions (like most of their theories) been based. The history of man, however, in every age and clime, has taught us a far different lesson. And, indeed, quite a superficial glance at even the most virtuous societies, will be fully sufficient to

prove the foundation on which they are reared to be as visionary and unsubstantial as the airy phantom of a may-day dream. There are others, again, hostile to vigor in the executive, who found their objections on exactly the contrary theory, namely, the total depravity of man and his absolute and complete unworthiness of any degree of confidence whatever. These extreme opinions, it may easily be seen, like all other extremes, lead to the same end. While the truth of the first would altogether abrogate the necessity of government, that of the last would argue the impossibility of its establishment from the non-existence of trustworthy depositories for its requisite powers. Rejecting both these theories, we deem it more in accordance with reason and experience to consider enlightened man a compound of good and bad; and, though liable to err, there are still some traits in his character which point to the Author of all good as his Creator, and form a basis for quite extensive confidence. Under these circumstances, we deem him a worthy depository of power, and more especially in a government all the departments of which, being under the check of its sovereign constituents, are moreover so constituted in themselves as to serve as checks upon one another.

Vigor in the executive we consider essential for these checks, and moreover for protection against faction, anarchy, and all the various ills of ambition. Roman history is filled with many sad examples which fully attest the correctness of such an opinion.

Under the government of the two consuls, superseded at times by that of military tribunes, the executive of the republic being weakened from its plu