all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States:

2. To borrow money (6) on the credit of the United States:

3. To regulate commerce (c) with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes:

4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, (d). and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies (e) throughout the United States:

5. To coin money, (ƒ) regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures: (g)

6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting (h) the securities and current coin of the United States:

7. To establish post offices and post roads: (i)

8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries: (j)

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court:

10. To define and punish piracies (k) and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations:

11. To declare war, (1) grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water:

12. To raise and support armies; (m) but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years:

13. To provide and maintain a navy :

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces: (n)

15. To provide for calling forth the militia (0) to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, (p) and for governing such part of them

as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress :

17. To exercise exclusive legislation (9) in all cases whatsoever, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to exercise like authority (r) over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; and,

18. To make all laws which shall be necessary (s) and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

General Principles.

The Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316.

The Constitution is one of enumeration, and not of definition. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150; M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316.

The Federal Government is one of delegated powers. All powers not delegated to it, or inhibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people. Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257; S. C. 7 J. J. Marsh. 349.

The sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150.

The Federal Government, though limited in its powers, is supreme in its sphere. M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316.

The Federal Government can only exercise the powers granted to it. M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316; U. S. v. Bailey, McLean, 234.

A Constitution to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code,

7

and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of those objects themselves. M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316.

The theory of the Constitution is that a few great and leading subjects of control and administration, belonging to and inherent in all sovereign states, and which are of interest to all the States, are singled out and placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the general government. This government, unlike the confederation of States which acted mainly through the State governments, is constituted with its legislative, judicial and executive departments to act directly upon the people, without the intervention of the State governments, and is organized in such manner as to make, administer and execute all laws necessary or incidental to the full and complete exercise of the sovereign power upon the subject placed within its administration. Ex parte Alexander Stephens, 70 Mass. 559.

The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor if retained by himself, or which can inure solely to the benefit of the grantee, but is an investment of power for the general advantage in the hands of agents selected for that purpose, which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents or lie dormant. There is no rule for construing the extent of such powers other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they are conferred. The powers are not to be construed strictly. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I.

In a general sense, the Federal Government does not possess an omnipotence equal to that of the Parliament of Great Britain. But in respect to all subjects of legislation, which are either expressly or impliedly delegated to it, complete sovereign legislative power is conferred upon Congress, and that body possesses an omnipotence in these things equal to that possessed by the British Parliament or any other supreme legislative body. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400.

In construing the Constitution and determining the extent of one of its important grants of power to legislate, no distinction can be made between the nature of the power and the nature of the subject on which that power was intended practically to operate, nor can the grant be considered more extensive by affirming of the power what is not true of the subject in question. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299.

To understand the nature and extent of the powers conferred by the Constitution, whether substantive or ancillary, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which the Constitution was adopted, and for which its powers were granted. When the general purpose of the instrument is ascertained, its language is to be construed, so far as possible, as subservient to that purpose. Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Penn. 9.

Whenever a particular object is to be effected, the language of the Constitution is always imperative, and can not be disregarded without violating the first principles of public duty. On the other hand, the legislative powers are given in language which implies discretion, as, from the nature of legislative power, such a discretion must ever be exercised. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.

The powers granted to Congress must be construed and applied with reference to the purposes for which the Constitution was made. It is not a mere abstraction to sharpen men's wits upon, but a practical scheme of government, having all necessary power to maintain its existence and authority during peace and war, rebellion or invasion. McCall v. McDow. ell, I Deady, 233; S. C. I Abb. C. C. 212.

The existence of a power should not be denied because it may be unwisely exercised, nor should it be presumed that abuses will take place. Kneedler v. Zane, 45 Penn. 238; s. C. 3 Grant, 465; Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.

Questions of power do not depend upon the degree to which it may be exercised. If it may be exercised at all, it must be exercised at the will of those in whose hands it is placed. Brown v. State, 12 Wheat. 419; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400.

No

That is a very narrow view which regards any of its specified powers independent of its relation to the others, or to them all aggregated. Each must be considered as but part of a system, a constituent of a whole. single power specified is the ultimate end for which the Constitution was adopted. It may be an intermediate end, but it is itself a means for the accomplishment of a single and higher end. Shollenberger . Brinton, 52 Penn. 9.

When Congress have the power to do the same act by virtue of distinct powers, they may exereise which they please, and when they profess to act under one power, there is no necessity to resort to any other. Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713; S. C. 1 Hopk. 150; Thayer v. Hedges, 23 Ind. 141; Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Penn. 9.

The exceptions from a power mark its extent, for it would be absurd as well as useless to except from a granted power that which was not granted that which the words of the grant could not comprehend. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150.

Some powers that usually belong to sovereignties were extinguished, but they were not extinguished by implication. When it was intended that governmental powers universally acknowledged as such should cease to exist, they were expressly denied, not only to the States, but to the Federal Government. Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Penn. 9.

Where a substantive power is granted in a given form, and to an exactly defined extent, or is thus withheld, the grant or prohibition can not be exercised or contravened by a power claimed as incident to some other substantive power. Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282.

No power, in itself a substantive one, can be exercised or contravened by action under an incidental power. Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282.

It is not indispensable to the existence of any power claimed for the Federal Government, that it can be found specified in the words of the Constitution, or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified powers. Its existence may be deduced fairly from more than one of the substantive powers expressly defined, or from them all combined. It is allowable to group together any number of them, and infer from them all that the power has been conferred. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

The powers conferred upon Congress must be regarded as related to each other and all means for a common end. Each is but part of a system, a constituent of one whole. No single power is the ultimate end for which the Constitution was adopted. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

Power over a particular subject may be exercised as auxiliary to an express power, though there is another express power relating to the same subject, less comprehensive. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

There is no ground for any such distinction as express and implied powers. The terms are used merely for convenience. In fact, the auxiliary powers, those appropriate to the execution of other powers singly described, are as expressly given as any other powers. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

When investigating the nature and extent of the powers conferred by the Constitution, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which those powers were granted. If the general purpose of the instrument is ascertained, the language of its provisions must be construed with reference to that purpose, and so as to subserve it. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

An act of Congress passed for the direct and primary purpose of annulling a contract or impairing its obligation would be void, but if the primary object of an act is within any of the granted powers it is valid, although it may incidentally impair the obligation of contracts. Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb. 427; Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400; George v. Concord, 45 N. H. 434; Shollenberger v. Brinton, 32 Penn. 9; Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C. 323; S. C. 3 Wheat. 454; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

Although Congress can not enable a State to legislate, it may adopt the provisions of a State on any subject. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150.