cessively came to the assault. A battery of six guns placed in the gorge poured death and slaughter into them. They charged within a few yards of the pieces, but our grape and canister, and the leaden hail of musketry, delivered in sparing but terrible volleys, from cartridges taken in many instances from the boxes of their fallen companions, was too much even for Longstreet's men. About sunset they made their last charge, when our men, being out of ammunition, moved on them with the bayonet, and they gave way, to return no more. In the mean time the enemy made repeated attempts to carry Gen. Thomas's position on the left and front, but were as often thrown back with great loss. At nightfall the enemy fell back beyond the range of our artillery, leaving Gen. Thomas victorious on his hard-fought field."

During the night, Gen. Thomas fell back to Rossville, leaving the dead and most of the wounded in the hands of the enemy. Gen. Sheridan, who had been cut off by the advance of the enemy, as he was upon the extreme right, gathered his brigades and struck across Missionary ridge, directly to the west. The enemy were in possession of the country north of him. As he reached the top of the ridge, he caused the "assembly" to be blown, and picked up all the stragglers from the other divisions that he could find. He had lost three pieces of artillery, but in his progress met a whole battery which had been abandoned, and took it in charge. Passing the enemy's flank, and regaining the road on the ridge, he turned east through Rossville, and, without halting, reenforced Gen. Thomas at midnight. The position near Rossville was held during Monday without serious molestation from the enemy, and in the night the entire force was withdrawn to Chattanooga.

On Monday, Gen. Bragg first sent out detachments to the battle field to gather the arms and banners. The former were sent to the rear, and the latter to Richmond. The prisoners were then counted and sent to the rear. The troops were then ordered under arms, and marched down the Chattanooga road until they came near to Rossville, when they filed to the right and moved down the Chickamauga valley, to be in good position to move upon Gen. Burnside or to flank Gen. Rosecrans. On Wednesday, Gen. Bragg moved again up to and over Missionary ridge.

The loss of Gen. Rosecrans in these battles was 1,644 killed, 9,262 wounded, and 4,945 missing, which, with a cavalry loss of 1,000, makes 16,851. In material, his loss was 36 guns, 20 caissons, 8,450 small arms, and 5,834 infantry accoutrements. He captured 2,003 prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and missing was reported at 18,000.

After Gen. Rosecrans's retreat to Chattanooga, he withdrew his forces from the passes of Lookout mountain, which covered his line of supplies from Bridgeport. These were immediately occupied by the enemy, who also

sent a cavalry force across the Tennessee above Chattanooga, which destroyed a large wagon train in the Sequatchie valley, captured McMinnsville and other points on the railroad, and thus almost completely cut off the supplies of Gen. Rosecrans's army.

The line of the railroad at this time was well defended. The enemy's cavalry were attacked by Col. McCook, at Anderson's cross roads, on the 2d of October; by Gen. Mitchell, at Shelbyville, on the 6th, and by Gen. Crook, at Farmington, on the 8th, and were mostly captured or destroyed.

On the 2d of October, Gen. Rosecrans issued the following order:

Orders No. 3.

CHATTANOOGA, October 2d, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CU MERLAND, } Army of the Cumberland: You have made a grand and successful campaign; you have driven the rebels from Middle Tennessee. You crossed a great mountain range, placed yourselves on the banks of a broad river, crossed it in the face of a powerful, opposing army, and crossed two other great mountain ranges at the only practicable passes, some forty miles between extremes. You concentrated in the face of superior numbers; fought the combined armies of Bragg, Johnston's army from Mississippi, and the tried vetwhich you drove from Shelbyville to Tullahoma, of erans of Longstreet's corps, and for two days held them at bay, giving them blow for blow, with heavy interest. When the day closed, you held the field, numbers, to occupy the point for which you set out from which you withdrew, in the face of overpowering Chattanooga.

You have accomplished the great work of the campaign; you hold the key of East Tennessee, of Northern Georgia, and of the enemy's mines of coal and nitre. Let these achievements console you for the regret you experience that arrivals of fresh hostile troops forbade your remaining on the field to renew the battle; for the right of burying your gallant dead, and caring for your brave companions who lay wounded on the field. The losses you have sustained, though heavy, are slight, considering the odds against you, and the stake you have won.

You hold in your hands the substantial fruits of a victory, and deserve and will receive the honors and plaudits of a grateful nation, which asks nothing of even those who have been fighting us, but obedience to the Constitution and laws established for our own common benefit.

The General Commanding earnestly begs every officer and soldier of this army to unite with him in thanking Almighty God for His favors to us. He presents his hearty thanks and congratulations to all the officers and soldiers of this command, for their energy, patience, and perseverance, and the undaunted courage displayed by those who fought with such unflinching

resolution.

Neither the history of this war, nor probably the annals of any battle, furnish a loftier example of obstinate bravery and enduring resistance to superior numbers-when troops, having exhausted their ammunition, resorted to the bayonet, many times, to hold their positions, against such odds-as did cur left and centre, comprising troops from all the corps, on the afternoon of the 20th of September, at the battle of Chickamauga, (Signed)

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General Commanding.

When it was known at Washington that Gen. Longstreet's corps had probably gone to the aid of Gen. Bragg, the authorities ordered to Tennessee the forces of Gen. Grant at Vicks

burg, and also appointed him to the command of the forces in the field in Tennessee. Before information was received in reply from Gen. Grant, who was at New Orleans, Gen. Hooker was on the 23d of September sent to Tennessee, in command of the eleventh and twelfth corps of the Army of the Potomac, which were detached for that object. They were assigned to protect Gen. Rosecrans's line of communication from Bridgeport to Nashville.

On the 18th of October, Gen. Grant, having arrived at Louisville, Ky., assumed command of the Departments of Tennessee, Cumberland and Ohio, by order of the President. MajorGen. G. H. Thomas was placed in the immediate command of the Department of the Cumberland, and Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman in that of the Department of Tennessee. Gen. Rosecrans was relieved. Gens. McCook and Crittenden were ordered to Cincinnati, and their corps consolidated into one.

At this time the army was at Chattanooga, which is situated in a bend of the Tennessee river. The flanks rested on its banks-the right at Chattanooga creek, near the base of Lookout mountain, and the left at Citico creek. The picket lines followed these two creeks for a distance, and then passed across the low grounds between, which lie also between the foot of Missionary ridge and the high grounds about the town upon which the defensive works were constructed. These works were connected by a strong line of rifle pits. Behind this line and around the town the greater portion of the army was bivouacked, for very little camp equipage was to be had. This was the only point held by a Federal force south of the river, while the north side was occupied entire, with troops stationed to guard the points above. The base of the army at Chattanooga was at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and was supplied from depots at Louisville and Nashville by a single track of railroad. The south side of the river from Lookout mountain to Bridgeport was in possession of the enemy, and the river road on the north side was rendered impassable by their sharpshooters stationed on the opposite bank. It was thus necessary to bring all supplies to the army over a distance of fifty or sixty miles, taking the road from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie valley, over the mountains into the Anderson road, thence to Chattanooga. The Tennessee was crossed by pontoon bridges, constructed from such materials as the forest and the town could afford. The storms rendered the roads nearly impas sable, and the army was in danger of starvation.

Gen. Hooker had arrived at Bridgeport with the eleventh and a portion of the twelfth corps, and Gen. Sherman was on the route from Memphis. The first movement was to open the river, and secure a shorter land communication with the base. For this purpose the boats for a new pontoon bridge were filled with armed men at Chattanooga, and floated down in the

VOL. III.-9 A

night past Lookout Point, to a place known as Brown's Ferry, where they landed on the south side of the river and took possession of two hills, after only a slight skirmish with the picket at the point of landing, and a feeble resistance from a brigade of infantry and regiment of cavalry stationed in the valley beyond the hills. The boats then crossed the river, and brought over more troops to hold possession, by whom a bridge was immediately constructed, about nine hundred feet in length, in five hours. The distance between this bridge and the one at Chattanooga was one and a half mile by land, and about eight miles by water. On the next day, Gen. Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport, and moved up, uniting with the force at Brown's Ferry. This opened the river, the road to Kelly's Ferry, and the direct road to Bridgeport, as well as the river road on the north side around the bend. This successful movement is thus explained by a spectator in the camp of the enemy:

The enemy were several miles distant, and the smoke of their bivouac fires resting above the tree tops indicated a halt. Subsequently the column redark, thread-like line of troops became visible, slowly sumed its motion, and during the afternoon the long, wending their way in the direction of Chattanooga. On Lookout Peak, gazing down upon the singular spectacle-a coup d'ail which embraced in curious of art, the blessings of peace and the horrors of warcontrast the beauties of nature and the achievements were Gens. Bragg, Longstreet, and others, to whom this bold venture of the enemy opened at once new vistas of thought and action. Infantry, artillery, and tocini in a panorama, until, among all the "sundown's cavalry, all glided silently by, like a procession of fansumptuous pictures" which glowed around us, there was not one like that of the great, fresh, bustling camp, suddenly grown into view, with its thousand twinkling lights, its groups of men and animals, and its lines of pearls around the bosom of the hills. The Federals white-topped wagons, now strung like a necklace of had succeeded in effecting a junction with the army of Chattanooga.

The question which naturally arises is, 'why did not columns and check the movement? Gen. Bragg throw his army in front of the advancing The answer is in the shape of one of those stolid facts which even strategy cannot always stir. On Monday night, Gen. Thomas-or perhaps Grant, for he is now in Chattanooga-crossed a force of six thousand men, first over the Tennessee at the edge of the town, then over the neck of land known as the Moccasin, and finally over the river again at Brown's Ferry, in rear of Chattanooga, where, after a brief skirmish with one of our regiments, they took possession of the hills and commenced the work of fortification. Simultaneously with this movement, a column at Bridgeport, consisting of the eleventh corps, Gen. Howard, and twelfth corps, Gen. Slocum, the whole under command of Gen. Joe Hooker, started up the valley.

forces across the valley would in the first place have Under these circumstances, an interposition of our required the transfer of a considerable portion of our army from the east to the west side of Lookout mountain, thereby weakening our line in front of Chattaondly, it would have necessitated a fight on both our nooga, while the enemy reserved his strength; secfront and rear, with the flanks of the Federals protected by the mountains; and, finally, had we been successful, a victory would only have demoralized two corps of the Yankee army, without at all influencing the direct issue involved in the present investment of Chattanooga.

Gen. Longstreet, however, who from the peak had

The attack thus proposed was made during the night, and the result was that, at five o'clock the next morning, the enemy had abandoned the entire country west of Lookout creek. These operations saved the army from starvation, for the situation of affairs was such that Chattanooga must be held at all hazards.

A steamboat had been built and another had been captured. The latter was now loaded with two hundred thousand rations. It ran the blockade of Lookout mountain, and arrived safely at Brown's Ferry. The point of Lookout mountain between Chattanooga and Lookout creek was still held by pickets and an infantry force of the enemy, while their batteries on the top commanded some distance each way. The steamboat passed to the pontoon bridge ground until the battle of Missionary ridge, thus covering the line of communication, and then in connection with the other boat ran regularly to Kelly's Ferry from Bridgeport, reducing the wagon transportation to ten miles over good roads. An interior line of defence, sufficient to hold Chattanooga with a small force, was now constructed, and the plans were matured for accomplishing the main object of the campaign, which was the clearing of East Tennessee of the enemy.

When Gen. Sherman reached the vicinity of Bridgeport with his corps, Gen. Longstreet had been detached with his command from the army of Gen. Bragg, and sent on an expedition against Knoxville. This weakened Gen. Bragg and exposed Gen. Burnside to danger. The plan therefore adopted by Gen. Grant was to attack Gen. Bragg, and to follow it by a movement in the rear of Gen. Longstreet. The forces of Gen. Bragg held Missionary ridge, the Chattanooga valley, and Lookout mountain, with their left resting on the latter, and their right on the ridge near the tunnel of the Knoxville and Chattanooga railroad. Their pickets occupied the south bank of the Tennessee river for miles above, and their supplies were brought by the railroad from Atlanta and Dalton. The mass of Gen. Bragg's force was in the Chattanooga valley, between Lookout mountain and Missionary ridge, and on that slope of Lookout, thus being very nearly on his centre. The ridge was heavily posted with artillery. The plan adopted by Gen. Grant for the attack, and the manner in which it was executed, were thus described by a spectator: "A division of Gen. Sherman's troops were to be sent to Trenton, threatening the enemy's left flank. Under cover of this movement, Gen. Sherman's main body was to march up by Gen. Hooker's lines, crossing the Brown's Ferry bridge mostly at night, thence into a concealed camp on the north side of the river, opposite South Chickamauga creek. One division was directed to

encamp on the North Chickamauga; about 120 pontoons were to be taken under cover of hills and woods, and launched into the North Chickamauga; these were to be filled with men, to be floated out into the Tennessee and down it, until opposite the South Chickamauga (about three miles below), to effect a landing on that bank, and throw up works; the remainder of the command were to be taken across in the same boats, or a portion of them; the Tennessee and South Chickamauga were to be bridged, and then the artillery crossed and moved at once to seize a foothold on the ridge, taking up a line facing the enemy's right flank near the tunnel. Gen. Howard's corps of Gen. Hooker's command was to cross into the town by the two bridges, and fill the gap between Gen. Sherman's proposed position and the main body of Gen. Thomas's army. Gen. Hooker, with the remainder of his force and the division sent to Trenton, which should return, were to carry the point of Lookout, and then threaten the enemy's left, which would thus be thrown back, being forced to evacuate the mountain and take position on the ridge; and then the Federal troops, being on both flanks, and upon one flank threatening the enemy's communications, were to advance the whole line or turn the other flank, as the chances might dictate. Then a part of the force was to follow as far as possible, while Gen. Sherman destroyed the railroad from Cleveland to Dalton, and then pushed on to relieve Knoxville, and capture, disperse, or drive off Gen. Longstreet from before it.

"Gen. Smith, chief engineer, took personal charge of the preliminaries necessary for the move on the left flank. The pontoons were put in the Chickamauga; the men encamped; the bridge trains ready to debouch at the proper point; and so completely was every thing arranged that no confusion whatever occurred. Artillery was posted on the side of the river to cross fire in front of the point of landing, and force the same, if necessary.

"On Monday, November 24th, an armed reconnoissance was made by Gen. Thomas on his left, which developed the enemy's lines and gave to Gen. Thomas a line of battle in advance of his picket lines, at the same time allowing the eleventh corps (Howard's) to come into the position assigned it. At midnight the men entered the pontoons, floated down, and effected a landing. At daylight the pontoniers were at work, and at noon the Tennessee river was bridged by a pontoon bridge 1,400 feet long, and the rest of Gen. Sherman's troops crossed with his artillery. He then pushed out to the ridge and took up his position, and Gen. Howard communicated with him, his force having marched to its place. Gen. Hooker's forces formed a line of battle running up and down the side of the mountain and sweeping around the point, and, at night of the same day (the 24th), held what he had gained and

communicated with Gen. Thomas's right. That night the enemy evacuated Lookout Mountain top, and fell back from his front to the ridge. Thus, on Tuesday night, Gen. Bragg was threatened on both flanks, and with a heavy line of battle in his front. It was difficult for him to determine what the Federal move would be. His railroad must be held at all hazards from Gen. Sherman. The amount of Gen. Hooker's force he could distinctly see. He reënforced his right very heavily, leaving enough to hold his left and front, as he supposed. On the 25th, Wednesday, Gen. Sherman commenced to move. Two hills were taken. From the third he was several times repulsed, and he moved around more force, as if to get in rear of Gen. Bragg's fine, and the latter then commenced massing against him. The critical moment had now arrived. Gen. Hooker moved his columns along the Rossville road toward Gen. Bragg's left, and this drew still more force from the latter's centre.

"General Grant now ordered Gen. Thomas to advance and take the rifle-pits at the base of the mountain. The Army of the Cumberland, remembering Chickamauga and impatient by reason of remaining spectators of the operations of Gens. Sherman and Hooker for two days, went forward with a will; drove the enemy in disorder from his lower works; and went on, heedless of the heavy artillery and musketry hurled against them from the crest of the ridge. Half-way up they seemed to falter, but it was only for breath. Without returning a shot they kept on, crowned the ridge, captured thirty-five out of the forty-four pieces of artillery on the hill, turned some of them against the masses in Gen. Sherman's front, and the routed line fell back, while the rest of Gen. Bragg's army, including Bragg and Hardee, fled, routed and broken, toward Ringgold. Thousands of prisoners and small arms and quantities of munitions of war were taken. Gen. Hooker took up the pursuit, and that night Mission Ridge blazed resplendent with Union camp-fires. The next day Gen. Hooker pushed the enemy to Ringgold, where he made a show of stubborn resistance, but was forced to retire. Gens. Sherman and Howard pushed for the railroad, which they smashed completely. About sixty pieces of artillery and a thousand prisoners were captured." When the attack was planned, orders were sent to Gen. Burnside to lure Gen. Longstreet as far away as possible, and fall back to a position where he could stand a siege and subsist from the country. Some skirmishes with the enemy still in East Tennessee, had previously taken place. On the 21st of September, one occurred between Col. Foster and a body of the enemy near Bristol, and on the 10th and 11th of October a sharp engagement took place at Blue Springs. The enemy was defeated with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one hundred and fifty prisoners. The Federal loss was about one hundred. Subsequently Gen. S.

Jones, who had held a threatening position with a small force of the enemy near the Virginia_line, moved down on the north side of the Holston river to Rogersville, with some three thousand five hundred cavalry, and surprised the garrison at that place, and captured four pieces of artillery, thirty-six wagons, and six hundred and fifty men.

Previous to the advance of Gen. Longstreet into East Tennessee, Gen. Burnside had occupied Philadelphia, and other points on the south side of the Holston river with small garrisons. Some of these forces were surprised and six or seven guns captured, with forty wagons, and between six and seven hundred prisoners. The remainder retreated to Loudon. Upon receiving the orders from Gen. Grant, Gen. Burnside moved from Knoxville toward Loudon, to meet Gen. Longstreet. The latter placed his main force on the north side of the river Holston, but sent his cavalry up the south side, expecting that it would slip into Knoxville during Gen. Burnside's absence, and thus compel him to make a flank retreat. But the cavalry of Gen. Burnside was also on the south side of the Holston with a small force of infantry, and they fell back into the works, thus covering the town on that side. Gen. Burnside also fell back to Campbell's Station, and made a stand. A contest ensued for several hours in which Gen. Longstreet was repulsed. Gen. Burnside then withdrew to the neighborhood of Knoxville, and fortified his position. Gen. Longstreet then came up and commenced a siege. Knoxville was surrounded by Gen. Longstreet on the 17th and 18th of November. A constant fire was kept up on the line of Gen. Burnside until the evening of the 28th, when an attack was proposed on a small fort mounting six guns, on a hill near the town, and commanding the approaches to it on that side of the river. The fort was occupied by the 29th Massachusetts, the 79th New York and two companies of the 2d, and one of the 20th Michigan. On its front and flanks was once a thick field of pines, which had been cut down with the tops falling in all directions, making an almost impassable mass of brush and timber. A space around the fort was cleared. The ditch in front was about ten feet deep, and parapet nearly twenty feet high. The assault was made near daylight, on the 29th, by the Confederate brigades of Gens. Bryan and Humphrey, with a party from Wolford's. The enemy advanced in three lines and made the attack fiercely, but all attempts to scale the sides of the fort failed, and they were finally repulsed with a loss of two hundred killed and wounded, and several hundred made prisoners. Meantime the force of Gen. Burn-, side was closely pressed, and provisions became so scarce, that his troops were put on half rations of bread.

After the battle of Chattanooga, the pursuit of the enemy was discontinued through want of strong animals to draw the artillery