any property, of whatsoever kind or description," which is lawful subject of prize and capture, and liable to be seized, confiscated, and condemned? We answer that it is manifestly any property, of whatsover kind, which is capable of being used or employed in aiding, abetting, or promoting the insurrection. The only question, then, is whether real estate can be so used or employed; for if it can, there is no more reason why it should not be seized and confiscated than any other description of property. Certainly the mischiefs to result from such use of it would be as great as those from the use of property of any other kind. Suppose that a person, with the avowed purpose of aiding the insurrection, should purchase a piece of ground suitable for his object, and proceed to erect upon it the necessary buildings and machinery for the manufacture of guns and other small arms, and he does proceed, in accordance with his previous intent, to the manufacture of such weapons of war, to supply the rebel army, can it be contended that such property-real estate, if you choose is not used, and as effectually used, in aiding, abetting, or promoting the insurrection, as any movable property whatever? And if so, why should it not be as much a subject of confiscation as any other? All property used in its ordinary and legitimate mode is exempt from the operation of the act, but the moment it is purchased or acquired, sold or given, with intent to use or employ it in aiding the insurrection, or if the owner knowingly or intentionally uses or employs his property for such a purpose, it immediately becomes the subject of seizure and condemnation under the act, whether it be real or personal property. The words "prize and capture" in the act were intended to have the same meaning which is given to the word "seizure" in the act of July, 1862, and to apply as well to real as personal property. # * * * * Upon the whole, I am of the opinion that the information filed in this case ought not to be quashed. I concur in the foregoing opinion of the District Judge. J. ČATRON, Associate Justice. The Constitutionality of the Acts.-The question of the constitutionality of the act of 1861 was disposed of by Judge Trigg in the opinion in the case of the "Republican Banner," as follows: The question raised by claimant's counsel in the closing argument, as to the constitutionality of the act, was not made upon the original motion as the same was entered, and was not argued on behalf of the United States. No authority, however, was produced, and it seems to me that the arguments relied on to sustain its unconstitutionality would be as applicable to any other law of Congress imposing the penalty of forfeiture, as to the act we are considering. The constitutionality of the act of 1862 was brought directly in question in proceedings instituted in New Orleans in December. No decision was given during the year, but the following points were made on either side. M. F. Day, Esq., on behalf of the United States, said: When we find terms in that instrument which are not clearly defined in the Constitution itself, we must go to the common law to ascertain the meaning of those terms; and any technical terms in the Constitution, which have a known signification in the common law, are to be understood in the Constitution in the same sense in which they are used in the common law. Section 3, of Article III., of the Constitution, declares that "the Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." Now, it has been contended that this provision is a limitation upon the power of Congress for the punishment of treason. This is an error. This word attainted is not a limitation of the power given by that "The Con portion of the sentence which precedes it. gress shall have the power to punish treason." The whole question turns upon the meaning of the word attainder. There is nothing in the Constitution or laws of the United States that tells us what attainder is. When we fix the meaning of the term it will be easy to fix the power of Congress. Attainder is the resulting consequence of a conviction and sentence of death. Then it was a consequence just as certain to follow, as death is certain to follow when the head is severed from the body. The power is given Congress to declare the punishment of treason, except that no resulting consequence shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the party attainted. The consequences of attainder are the corruption of blood and the forfeiture of estate. On the whole, I conclude that the Constitution means just as though it read: "You may punish treason as you please, but if you make any provision for its punishment, no mere sentence of death shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate beyond the life of the person attainted." The joint resolution in no way limits the operation of the act, except as to any resulting consequences. The next position taken by the claimants is on the right of trial by jury. They rely on the constitutional provision that a man cannot be deprived of life, property, or liberty, without "due process of law," and claim that due process of law means a trial by jury. There are two answers to this argument: First, this proceeding can in no case be considered as a criminal proceeding. It is merely a proceeding to enforce a forfeiture, and the universal practice in these cases has been to enforce forfeitures without trial by jury. There is another position that is impregnable-that is the war right. We are in a state of war-a public war on the part of the United States, and a private war on the part of the rebels. The statutes put it on that ground. The property is to be condemned as enemy's property. Congress. There is no power on earth that can dicThe whole war power is vested in the President and tate to Congress what disposition they shall make of the property of enemies, and even when the power is left to the discretion of the President there is no power on earth that can question it. Who is to say to Congress what course they shall pursue, not only toward the rebels themselves, but toward their property, or to attempt to control that body in the exercise of the means which it shall use to prosecute the war. They have an unlimited discretion to do all things necessary to carry out the power given them by the Constitution of the United States, and they are the sole judges of the means necessary to accomplish these purposes, and their judgment is final and supreme. There is no power in the judiciary to limit the discretion of Congress in this matter: whether it is a wise direction or not, they are not responsible to the judiciary. The representatives are only responsible to the people. This grant of power to Congress to conduct the war is as broad as a grant can be. Courts have no power to say how a war should be conducted. On behalf of the claimants Mr. C. Roselius followed: The protection of life, liberty, reputation and property is, or at least ought to be, a preeminent purpose in every government. The powers of the Government are separate and distinct. Those powers which belong to one department are exercised by officers belonging to that department, who exercise their powers independent of any of the others. Each department is separate, co-ordinate and equal. In this admirable system no majesty is recognized but the majesty of the law. And no man can exercise any power except such as has been delegated to him merely as the servant of the people. Man, individually, is without any power, except that power which under the law he has the right to enjoy and exercise. Under such a government one of the first principles which strikes the reflecting mind is, that no person can be deprived of life, liberty, reputation, or property, without due process of law, or by the law of the land, for these terms are clearly convertible. We hold that everything that belongs to us by the law of the land, is secured to us by the law of the land, and can only be taken away from us by the law of the land, by due process, judgment, and execution. What is the due process of law? That is the point; the whole case turns upon this single inquiry. In criminal proceedings, the Constitution tells us the prosecution can only be by presentment or indictment of the Grand Jury, and the trial must be by the peers of the party accused, collected in the vicinage where the offence was committed, or in certain other localities where the crime has been on the high seas. The Constitution itself has determined what is due process of law in a criminal prosecution. [Art. 5 of amendments to Constitution.] The constitution provides that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, and defines due process of law, in a preceding part of the same article, to be presentation and indictment by a grand jury. When we refer to the Constitution, as originally adopted, we find that "all trials shall be by jury." Is this in reality a criminal proceeding?—The answer is found, in the first place, in this paper, which is called a Libel of Information, and which has been presented to this honorable court as if it was sitting in admiralty. Now, if it does declare such a case as can be proceeded against by the law of nations in an admiralty court, my objections are groundless. It is the facts discovered in the libel that call the court into action to enforce the law, and for this reason the state of facts in this libel impresses its character on the proceedings, I care not by what name he or anybody else may call it. The ground on which we claim is, that they have endeavored to evade the Constitution by giving a wrong name and directing a wrong process to issue in the case. There is no offence against the law of nations set forth in the case. The United States have passed a law for the punish ment of traitors and rebels who have been in arms against the legitimate authorities of the best Government that ever existed. They had a right to do it. No one will question the right of a government to make laws for inflicting condign punishment on traitors, but it does not follow that they have a right to proceed against them with a libel of information. Congress is subservient to the behests of the Constitution. It cannot do any act in violation of the Consti tution. Its powers have been restricted in order that it may afford protection to life, liberty, and property, just as the powers of the other departments of the Government have been restricted. You may prosecute traitors before a grand jury and find an indictment. It is not necessary that they should be before the court. It is only necessary that the offence should have been committed within the jurisdiction of the court. My learned friend argues that the clause in the Constitution providing that “no attainder shall work corruption of blood," was intended to prevent the resulting consequences under the common law, of the conviction of treason. By that law, the moment a person was convicted of treason, he forfeited his estate and his blood was corrupted, his children could no longer inherit, and his property went to the crown. The United States goes to the common law for the definition of technical terms and to determine the rules of evidence in criminal cases. It is idle to say that this is intended to guard against the consequences of a conviction at common law, as my friend has attempted to show. It does not fortify the position he has taken. It refers to an offence created by statutes under the Constitution, not to an offence against the law of nations. I do not invoke the law of nations to establish that this offence was against that law. I claim that this offence which has been transcribed in this libel is the very offence to which the Constitution refers, and, therefore, that it is an offence against the laws of the United States, and not against the law of nations. That law had nothing to do with the law of nations. It was enacted for the punishment of treason and the suppression of rebellion. That is a subject of general legislation; a subject regulated by the Constitution in express terms. The Confiscation Act is, in reality, an act for the punishment of treason and rebellion, and every line of the act shows it. Is it not clear that the act is punitive and nothing else, and that is what is limited by the clause in the Constitution providing that “no attainder for treason shall work corruption of blood," etc. He next proceeded to the argument that had been adduced on the ground that this was a Proceeding in rem,—and argued that a proceeding in rem could only be instituted when a jus in re had been acquired by the act of the thing itself, which, by the use that had been made of it, was forfeited, and that unless it was forfeited by some use to which it was put, it could only be forfeited by the act of the owner, and the proof of that act was the record of his conviction. The Government might confiscate enemies' property. The right existed, but had not been exercised for 260 years. Belligerents had the abstract right and were respon-` sible to the civilized world for its exercise. It was claimed by his opponents that, by virtue of this law, the property in question was liable to confiscation. But to be liable under the law of nations, as enemy's property it must have been in the enemy's country at the date of the enactment, or it must be the produce of the enemy's country. But the act was passed on the 17th of July, 1862, two months after the United States authority had been reestablished here, therefore, it could not be held under the law of nations, for it was not the produce of the enemy's country, and at the time of the passage of the act it was in New Orleans, which was a part of the United States not under the jurisdiction of the enemy. his argument presented the following propoThe District Attorney, Rufus Waples, in sitions: By the law of nations all the property of enemies is confiscable, including lands in fee simple. Civil wars are governed by the same rules as international wars concerning confiscation of enemies' property; the sovereign-belligerent has the right to confiscate the property of the subject-belligerent. As the right to confiscate enemies' property found on land had grown somewhat into disuse, it was necessary for Congress to pass a law expressive of the will of the sovereign to exercise the right, and to "make rules concerning the capture" of this species of property, in order to enable the courts to take judicial proceedings. Congress made such rules in the acts of August 6th, 1861, and July 17th, 1862, sections 5, 6, 7, 8; the former act being against property which obtains its enemy character by use; the latter, against property which obtains that character by ownership. Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the act of July 17th, 1862 (bringing into exercise the right of the Government as sovereign-belligerent against subjects-belligerent), are clearly authorized by the Constitution. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the confiscation of enemies' property in the manner and to the extent provided for in the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th sections of the act; that is, absolute forfeiture of all the "right, title, and interest" of the enemy-owner by proceedings in rem. 1. The act does not deny trial by jury in any case in which the Constitution secures it. The first four sections relate to crime, and its punishment is to be by indictment and jury trial, as a matter of course. Con., Art. 3, section 2d and 7th. All forfeitures are to be by "due process of law," but not all by jury trial. 2. No attainder, there being no death or outlawry. 3. No corruption of blood-the capacity of the heirs to inherit is not affected. 4. No remainder or reversionary interest of the heirs forfeited. 5. No working of corruption or forfeiture. 6. No forfeiture after death. Forfeiture, like a sale, is an instantaneous act, and must take place while the owner is alive, if its enemy character is caused by ownership. As the act (sec. 5, 6, 7, 8) provides, without ambiguity, for the absolute forfeiture, the Joint Resolution passed with reference to the act cannot affect it. The belligerent right of the Government to treat rebellious subjects as though they were alien enemies and thus to confiscate their property absolutely, is a constitutional right. Late decision of the Supreme Court in proof sheets of 1 Black's U.S. Supreme Court reports. See PROVISIONAL COURT FOR LA. CONGREGATIONALISTS, TRINITARIAN. The "Congregational Quarterly" for January, 1864, contains full statistics of the Orthodox Congregational churches, as collected in 1863. The number of churches reported is 2,729. Of these 610 are not specified, 830 have pastors, 768 have stated supplies, and 495 are vacant. Of the 2,594 ministers of the denomination, 632 are not in active service. The total church membership (including ministers) is 253,200, of whom 90,163 are males, and 164,037 females; 31,178 are represented as "absent," 6,487 have been received by letter, and 5,576 have been dismissed by letter, leaving an excess favorable to denominational growth of 910. There have been admitted by profession 7,999, while 4,288 have died, and 680 have been excommunicated, leaving 2,931 as an increase, and which, with this 910, will make a total increase in the year in the 2,729 churches of 3.841 members, with no deduction for the 31, 178 absent. An interesting case of doctrinal controversy was tried in July, before a mutual board called by a petition of about one half of the male members of the Congregational church at Georgetown, Mass. The letter of call set forth that the Rev. Charles Beecher, the pastor, did not, in the view of the petitioners, preach according to the creed of the church and of the Orthodox churches generally of New England, especially in presenting his views of the preexistence of man, the condition of souls after death, the atonement and divine sorrow. With regard to the preexistence of souls, Mr. Beecher was reported to profess to the following effect: "We were all created in a previous world, and were drawn into apostasy by the fallen angels. God then proposed to create this world as a hospital for our race, introduce us here, and heal us of sin. It was proposed to Lucifer to become our redeemer. He refused. God then chose a younger brother, who proved willing. To him was added the divine nature, and he became among us the Christ. As it seemed doubtful whether Christ could do this work that Lucifer refused to do, he, Lucifer, remained in heaven after his refusal till Christ's resurrection. Lucifer was not expelled while he could raise a doubt whether this redemption could be accomplished." The council adopted, by a vote of 16 yeas VOL. III-15 A against 5 noes, the report of a committee, which found Mr. Beecher guilty of heretical preaching, and recommended the dissolution of pastoral relations between him and the congregation of Georgetown. The latter, however, by a vote of 27 against 21, refused to accept the doings of this ecclesiastical council. Toward the close of the year, Mr. Beecher resigned the pastoral charge of the church. The Canada Congregational Union, at its annual meeting, held in Montreal, on June 15th, passed the following resolution: The ministers and delegates of the Congregational Union of Canada, in annual session of the Congregational Union, beg to express their deep and heartfelt sympathies with brethren in the neighboring republic in the dire calamities of civil war with which their country is afflicted, and their homes desolated. gladly welcome among us, and recognizing, as we do, With them we love to fraternize, their delegates are that slavery is the chief cause of the fearful struggle in which they are involved, our prayers are to the Father of mercies, the great Ruler of the universe, that he . would bring hostilities to a speedy and righteous termination, by which the principles of civil and religious liberty, the rights of humanity and universal freedom may be advanced and perpetuated. At the 24th autumnal session of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, which commenced at Liverpool, on October 12th, an interesting paper was read on the bicentenary movement in commemoration of the ejection of Non-Conformist ministers from the Church of England in 1662. It appeared that the Congregational churches up to that time had subscribed £251,568 for the objects in view. Out of the thirty chapels, contemplated by the Lancashire churches, eight capable of accommodating 6,000 persons, had been opened; others were in progress, and sites for thirteen more had been secured. A large educational establishment had been opened at Farnworth, and another at Ashton, involving a large expenditure. Lancashire intended, as it appeared, to expend £150,000 upon these measures; Wales was determined to collect £20,000, to tion of chapel debts, and for other denominafound a college, and £30,000 for the liquida tional purposes. The "English Congregational Yearbook" of 1864, gives the following summary of Congregational statistics of England and the Colonies: Number of Congregational Churches. In Great BritainIn ColoniesEngland..........1,818 Wales.... 93 The Canadas...... 637 103 28 1 2,651 Australasia Total........... 248 To these may be added 203 mission churches among the heathen, in connection with the London Missionary Society, making a total throughout the world of 3,102. This number does not include the numerous village chapels, out-stations, schoolhouses, &c., in connection with the foregoing churches, amounting probably to double the number of those churches, making a total of some 10,000 places where, statedly or occasionally, the Gospel is preached. In addition to the above, a considerable number of independent churches exist in London and throughout the country, known generally as "High Calvinist," but which, having no organized associations themselves, not being in fellowship with the Congregational body, are not included. Number of churches vacant: in England, 155; Wales, 79; Scotland, 14; Ireland, 4; Colonies, 27-total, 279. Number of Congregational ministers: In England, 1,737; Wales, 361; Scotland, 99; Ireland, 30; Colonies, 216; heathen lands, 168-total, 2,611. Number of students in England, 320; Wales, 90; Scotland, 16; Colonies, 30-total, 456. Of the 2,612 ministers, there are at present without pastoral charges: in England, 387; Wales, 35; Scotland and Ireland, 17; Colonies, 41-total, 480. There are on the Continent of Europe 148 independent churches, in Belgium, France, Geneva, Holland, and Switzerland." (See CONGREGATIONALISTS, UNITARIAN.) CONGRESS, CONFEDERATE. The proceedings of the Congress * at Richmond were so generally conducted in secret session, that their action on only a few subjects of interest is known. In the House on the 19th of Jan. Mr. Clopton, of Alabama, offered a series of joint resolutions relating to the conduct of the existing war and the late proclamation of the President of the United States. Mr. Foote, of Tennessee, preferred in lieu of retaliatory measures, as suggested by the resolutions, that an attempt should be made to stop the shedding of blood by a movement to bring about peace. It would strengthen the friends of peace at the North, and perhaps have the *The following were the members of Congress at the second session convened in Richmond on the 1st of December, 1863. For the list of members convened at the first session in December, 1862, 866 ANNUAL CYCLOPÆDIA, 1862. SENATE. ALEXANDER HI. STEPHENS, of Georgia, President. J. H. NASH, of South Carolina, Clerk. Alabama-Clement C. Clay, Robert Jemison, Jr. Arkansas-Robert W. Johnson, Charles B. Mitchell. Florida-James M. Baker, Augustus E. Maxwell. Georgia-Benjamin H. Hill, Herschel V. Johnson. Kentucky-Henry C. Burnett, William E. Simms. Louisiana-Thomas J. Semmes, Edward Sparrow. Mississippi-Albert G. Brown, James Phelan, Missouri-John B. Clark.. North Carolina-George Davis, William T. Dortch. South Carolina-Robert W. Barnwell, James L. Orr. Tennessee-Landon C. Haynes, Gustavns A. Henry. Texas-William 8. Oldham, Lewis T. Wigfall. Virginia-Robert M. T. Hunter, Allen T. Caperton. HOUSE. THOMAS 8. BOCOCK, of Virginia, Speaker. Florida-James B. Dorkins, Robert B. Hilton. effect of producing a state of things so much desired notwithstanding the opposition of the abolition party. Mr. Dargan, of Alabama, took the ground that Powers at war must retaliate. The resolutions contemplated the turning over of captured officers to State Governments, and to let them be punished according to the laws. He did not think that was correct, but he suggested that the Government should take the responsibility itself. Mr. Lyons, of Virginia, suggested that the Government had no power to turn these captured officers over to the States. Nor was there any necessity for the resolutions, since the President has said in his message he will do it unless prevented by Congress. He favored the passage of a law prohibiting such a course, and to repose the power of retaliation entirely in the hands of the Government. When an officer was captured, if there was cause for retaliation, we might retaliate upon him; if not, we were bound to exchange him. They could not, by any law of nations, when captured by one Government, be turned over to another Government for trial. He would prefer that any officer captured in any State after the promulgation of that proclamation should be instantly hung; not subject him to the uncertainties of a trial by jury. Mr. Kenner, of Louisiana, called the attention of the House to the fact that this portion of the President's message was referred to the Committee of Ways and Means. The committee was now prepared to report. He moved, as instructed by the committee, that the House now go into secret session for the purpose of receiving that report. The motion was agreed to. Subsequently the subject came up in the Senate, when Mr. Yancey, of Alabama, offered the following resolution: Keenan, David W. Lewis, William W. Clark, Robert P. Trippe, Lucius J. Gartrell, Hardy Strickland, Augustus R. Wright. Kentucky-W. B. Machen, John W. Crockett, H. E Reid, George W. Ewing, James S. Crisman, T. L. Burnett, H. W. Bruce, G. B. Hodges, E. M. Bruce, J. W. Moore, R. J. Breckinridge, John M. Elliott. Louisiana--Charles J. Villers, Charles M. Conrad, Duncan F. Kenner, Lucien J. Dupre, Henry Marshall, John Perkins, Jr. Mississippi-J. W. Clapp, Reuben Davis, Israel Welch, H. C. Chambers, O. R. Singleton, E. Barksdale, John J. McRae. Missouri-Thomas A. Harris, Casper W. Bell, A. H. Conrow, George C. Vest, L. W. Freeman. North Carolina-Wm. H. N. Smith, Robert R. Bridges, Owen R. Keenan, F. D. McDowell, A. H. Arrington, J. R. McLean, Thomas S. Ashe, William Lander, Burgess 8. Gaither, A. T. Davidson. South Carolina-John McQueen, W. Porcher Miles, L. M. Adger, W. D. Simpson, James Farran, W. W. Boyce. Tennessee-Joseph T. Heiskell, William G. Swan, W. B. Tibbs, E. L. Gardner, Henry 8. Foote, Meredith P. Gentry, George W. Jones, Thomas Mences, J. D. C. Atkins, John V. Wright, David M. Currin. Texas-John A. Wilcox, Claiborne C. Herbert, Peter W. Gray, F. B. Sexton, Malcolm D. Graham, William B. Vaughn. Virginia-M. R. H. Garnett, John R. Chambers, James Lyons, Charles F. Collier, Thomas S. Bocock, John Goode, Jr., James P. Holcombe, D. C. De Jarnette, David Funsten, Alexander R. Boteler, John R. Baldwin, Waller R. Staples, Walter Preston, Samuel A. Miller, Robert Johnston, Charles W. Russell. Resolved, That the Committee on Judiciary be instructed to inquire into and report whether an officer of the army of the United States, acting under the authority of that Government, can be made liable and punished as a criminal for the violation of the criminal laws of a State, by a State tribunal, when turned over to State authorities by order of the President. Mr. Yancey said he was in favor of retaliation, but inasmuch as that involved "counter retaliation," and jeoparded the lives of officers, it was well to consider whether, on the whole, the retaliatory measures recommended had better be adopted. Mr. Yancey said that this counter retaliation had already commenced, and that Confederate officers are already "suffering inconvenience" from it. He was sure, however, that even though the proposition of President Davis was adopted, there would be no retaliation, for, he added: * * * When these officers shall be turned over to State tribunals, under the judgment of these State tribunals they will be declared as not liable, as criminals, to the State laws. We recognize the United States as a public enemy, and public enemies are not liable, in my opinion, to the criminal laws of the country with which they are at war. If amenable to one State law, he is amenable to all State laws; and surely it would not be held for a single moment that an officer of the United States would be held liable to the law of trespass. In my opinion, no one law is more sacred than another law, and the very same principle of construction, which would make him liable for exciting an insurrection, would make him amenable to all other laws of the State which would be violated by him in the conduct of war. Mr. Yancey then proceeded to meet the argument that the United States were violating the law of nations, and very distinctly took the ground that the public enemy might stir up an insurrection or do any act to weaken the power of his foe without violating the law of nations or military law. Mr. Yancey was willing to have the policy established that every officer of the enemy shall be killed in the field of battle, but he thought it was the duty of the Confederate Government to take the matter in hand, and not to shift the responsibility upon the local laws of the separate States. The following are the joint resolutions as adopted: Resolved, by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, in response to the message of the President, transmitted to Congress at the commencement of the present session, That, in the opinion of Congress, the commissioned officers of the enemy ought not to be delivered to the authorities of the respective States, as suggested in the said message: but all captives taken by the Confederate forces ought to be dealt with and disposed of by the Confederate Govern ment. Sec. 2 That, in the judgment of Congress, the proclamations of the President of the United States, dated respectively September twenty-second, eighteen hundred sixty-two, and January first, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and the other measures of the Government of the United States and of its authorities, commanders, and forces, designed or tending to emancipate slaves in the Confederate States or to abduct such slaves, or to incite them to insurrection, or to employ negroes in war against the Confederate States, or to overthrow the institution of African Slavery and bring on a servile war in these States, would, if successful, produce atrocious consequences, and they are inconsistent with the spirit of those usages which in modern warfare prevail among civilized nations; they may, therefore, be properly and lawfully repressed by retaliation. Sec. 3. That in every case wherein, during the present war, any violation of the laws and usages of war among civilized nations shall be, or has been, done of the Government of the United States, on the perand perpetrated by those acting under the authority sons or property of the citizens of the Confederate States, or of those under the protection or in the land State of the Confederacy, the President of the Confedor naval service of the Confederate States, or of any erate States is hereby authorized to cause full and complete retaliation to be made for every such violation, in such manner and to such extent as he may think proper. Sec. 4. That every white person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such, who, during the present war, shall command negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate States, or who shall arm, train, organize, or prepare negroes or mulattoes for military service against the Confederate States, or who shall voluntarily aid negroes or mulattoes in any military enterprise, attack, or conflict in such service, shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection, and shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court. Sec. 5. Every person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such in the service of the enemy, who shall, during the present war, excite, attempt to excite, or cause to be excited servile insurrection, or who shall incite or cause to be incited a slave to rebel, shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished, at the discretion of the court. Sec. 6. Every person charged with an offence punishable under the preceding resolutions shall, during the present war, be tried before the military court attached to the army or corps by the troops of which he shall have been captured, or by such other military court as the President may direct, and in such manner, and under such regulations as the President shall prescribe, and, after conviction, the President may com. mute the punishment in such manner and on such terms as he may deem proper. Sec. 7. All negroes or mulattoes who shall be engaged in war or be taken in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid or comfort to the enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate States, be delivered to the authorities of the State or States in which they shall be captured, to of such State or States. be dealt with according to the present or future laws The section of the conscription law which exempted one person as owner or overseer of each twenty negroes was repealed. A resolution was adopted in favor of free navigation of the Mississippi river, as follows: Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, That the Confederate States again repeat the principles above set forth, and declare the free navigation of the Mississippi river to be the natural right of. the people of all the States upon its banks, or upon the banks of its navigable tributaries. In the House, on the 3d of March, a resolution was adopted to inquire into the expediency of repealing the resolutions declaring that a neutral flag covers an enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband goods. A bill, introduced into the Senate, placed all telegraph lines under the control of the Postmaster-General. A tax bill was also passed at this session, which levied a tax of eight per cent. on the value of all naval stores, salt, wines, spirituous liquors, tobacco, manufactured or unmanufactured, cot |