lands not used, or necessary in operating the road. Such an exemp tion extends to warehouses necessary to be used by a railroad for storing grain received to be transported, or which has been transported and is held for transhipment to some other carrier, but it does not extend to grain elevators, which are used after the relation of the railroad as a common carrier has ceased in reference to the grain transported. The test applied in this case was that mentioned at the beginning of this section, thate land for the warehouse could be condemned under the power of eminent domain, while for the land on which the elevators stood this power could not be exercised.? $74. Of Corporations.-In Connecticut, by statute, "the real estate of corporations above what may be required and used by them for the transaction of their appropriate business," is taxable in the towns in which it is situated. A company had such wharves and docks as would accommodate its business when most abundant and pressing; they were not at all times in use by the company; to some extent they were used by vessels with freight, not intended for the railroad company, and in which it had no interest, and for which it charged wharfage; but such use was at times when they were not needed by the company for its own freight, and in subordination to the use of the company. The court held that such use did not render the property taxable as above what was needed for the appropriate business of the company. The same company was authorized to run a line of steamboats in connection with its road. Instead of doing this, it made an arrangement with a steamboat company to run its boats from their wharves, freight being way-billed through and divided in certain proportions. It was claimed that the whole wharf property of the company was liable to be taxed. The court was inclined to think that this was an indirect mode of exercising the right conferred by the charter, but held that if the premises used by the steamboat company were liable, it did not render the whole wharf property liable to local taxation under the statute. An interesting question arising in the exemption of corporations from taxation is, whether corporations fulfilling the objects of their erection may embark in other undertakings, however various, if the object be to increase the profits of the corporation. The English courts hold that they cannot; that contracts as to such matters are 1 Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527. ? Milwaukee &c. R. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 271. 3 Osborne v. New York & New Ilaveu R. R. Co. 40 Conn. 498. ultra vires, and cannot be enforced. The rule in New Jersey is that whatever is not expressly granted, or necessarily implied, is impliedly forbidden, and exemptions do not apply to property used in such enterprises beyond the scope of their chartered powers. A hotel on the line of a railroad has been claimed as exempt, on the ground that it was a proper appurtenance to the road for the accommodation of its passengers. The claim was not allowed in that case, but the court say that there are circumstances in which a hotel might not only be convenient, but necessary to the purposes of the road, as for example on the Pacific road passing through the American Desert; here a hotel owned by the company, and operated for its benefit, would come fairly within the rule. We have heretofore seen that some of the States exempt the property of railroads from taxation because of its public character. On the same principle many of the States hold that property of the State is not liable to taxation, nor is property of a municipal corporation liable to taxation for municipal purposes.* Land purchased by a county, to protect itself on a judgment in its favor, is devoted to the public use, in the sense of the statute, and exempt from all taxes.5 § 75. Municipal Corporations.-Upon the plainest principles of political economy, no burden should be laid on the property of the State or any of its subdivisions, as the tax is for the support of the government; a tax on the property of the government gives it no additional revenue; it takes what it had before, its own revenue. Consequently no court in construing a tax law will so construe it as to make it apply to the property of the State or any of its subdivisions, but the State in its want of wisdom may enact such laws, and if plain in their intent, such laws would be valid. It is evident, therefore, upon the principles just enunciated, that the exemption of public property from taxation, is a question simply of policy. As to the property of a municipal corporation, which is not held for public use, but which is held for profit or sale, perhaps such property may be liable to taxation for State purposes. Many of the courts hold that municipal corporations have a dual nature, one for public uses, or governmental purposes, the other of a private nature, similar to that of all individuals or private corporations, and that property held in the first character is not liable to be seized in execution for a debt 1 The East Anglian Railway Co. v. The Eastern Counties Railway Co. 73 Eng. C. L. R. 775; The Mayor, &c. of Norwich v. The Norfolk Railway Co. 82 Id. 396. Where a of the corporation, while property held in the latter may.1 statute exempted "all real estate of a city held for purposes connected with the works for supplying the city with water," real estate acquired under this statute, for the purpose of constructing water-works for the city, although not in actual use for purpose of water supply, was exempt, provided it was held in good faith, as being reasonably necessary to carry into effect the purposes of the act, and not for purposes of speculation or as a matter of mere incidental convenience. An exemption of a corporation from all further tax, in consideration of the payment of a special tax, extends not only to the property of the corporation, but to the stock of the corporation in the hands of its stockholders; the stock represents and is the title to the property of the corporation. The converse of the proposition is equally true; an exemption of the stock of a corporation extends to all the property of the corporation. Capital stock exists only nominally; the money or the property it represents is the tangible reality. If the stock and the property it represents are both taxed, such taxation is double, and it will never be presumed that the legislature intended such taxation unless it appears by clear and express words. Where the charter of a railroad provided that "the property of said company and the shares therein shall be exempt from any public charge or tax whatsoever," it was held that this exemption extended not only to the shares and the ordinary property of the company, but also to the franchise of the company, and that a tax imposed upon the franchise was void. The franchise of a railroad is the privilege of running it and taking fare and freight; this is property of a valuable kind, and comes within the terms of the exemption." The line of railroad between Baltimore and Philadelphia originally belonged to several distinct corporations chartered by the States of Maryland, Delaware and Pennsylvania; these were consolidated into one company, vested with "all the powers, privileges and advantages then belonging to the former corporations." One of the original corporations was exempt from certain taxes, and the new company claimed this exemption as one of the privileges acquired by it. But the court held that 1 Sedgwick's Const. & Stat. Law, 2d ed. p. 582 n.; Darlington v. Mayor of New York, 31 N. Y. 192, 193. State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J. Law (5 Vroom), 131–133. 3 State v. Brannin, 3 Zabr. 484; State v. Powers, 4 Id. 400; Bibb Co. v. Cent. R. R. & Banking Co. 40 Ga, 646. 4 Hannibal & St. Jos. R. R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo. 580; Mayor, &c. of Baltimore v. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. 6 Gill, 288. See an exemption of capital stock applied to a future increase of stock, in State v. Norwich & Worcester R. R. Co. 30 Conn. 290. ' Wilmington Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264. the privileges of the original corporations enjoyed by the new company were to the extent of the road to which these privileges applied before the cession, and that it was to stand in their place and enjoy the powers they had severally enjoyed in the portions of the road which they had owned respectively. So where a railroad which is granted an exemption from taxation for a limited period is consolidated with another road, which becomes invested with all its property, rights and privileges, and the latter road before the cession had in its charter a perpetual exemption from taxation, it was held that the limitation to the exemption of the first road accompanied its property, and the perpetual exemption of the second road did not attach to it without express words, or necessary intendment to that effect. But where a railroad was by its charter, in 1855, exempt from "all taxation during the continuance of the present charter of the said company," a railroad company which had been chartered in 1849, but had not built its road, was, in 1863, consolidated with the first road by an act which provided that "all the powers, rights and privileges granted by the charter of the first road are granted to the second road," it was held that the property of the second was made by the act of 1863 exempt from taxation. This case was not a consolidation of roads, each of which had certain property and privileges attached thereto which passed to the new company, but it was an amendment of the charter of a road, by vesting in it the powers and privileges granted to another road, where neither of the roads had been built, and may come within the proviso to the previous cases, of a grant of the privilege of exemption by express words or necessary intendment. The principle which is universally applied in the construction of statutes, to ascertain if possible the intention of the legislature, solves many of the questions relating to exemptions. The legislature, in chartering a railroad, imposed a specific tax in lieu of all other taxes, reserving the right to alter or repeal the charter. Subsequently, by the act of 1862, all corporations, except those which "by virtue of an irrepealable contract in their charters, or other contracts with the State are expressly exempt from taxation," were to be assessed as other corporations and individuals. The railroad claimed to be exempt, but was held liable; the words or other contracts with the State, do not Philadelphia & Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Maryland, 10 How. 376 (Cond. U. S. 425); Minot v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore K. R. Co. 2 Abb. Cir. Ct. R. 323. Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460. The principle that each corporation retains, after consolidation, the privileges which it had before, and no more, is well settled. Cent. &c. R. R. Co. v. Georgia, 22 Wall. 665; Branch v. City of Charleston, 22 Wall. 677; Evansville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush, 438. refer to contracts which are repealable, and there can be no irrepealable contract in a charter subject to alteration and amendment.1 In 1866, the tax law was amended so as to read "except banking institutions, and except those which by virtue of any contract in their char ters, or other contracts with this State, are expressly exempted from taxation." The same railroad under this act claimed exemption under their charter, and it was held that the specified mode of taxation in the charter was in lieu of all other taxes. Beasley, J.: "In strictness the defendants have no contracts with the State exempting them from taxation, but the question is one of intention. Under the act of 1862, it was held in State v. Miller, that those exempt were those only who held irrepealable contracts; the legislature, in the act of 1866, leaves out the word irrepealable,' showing an intention to extend the exemption." A corporation with an irrepealable charter containing an exemption from taxation may consent to other taxation, or a different mode of taxation, without impairing the original exemption.3 § 76. When Exemption extends to County and City Taxation.— The question arises frequently whether an exemption from taxation in the charter extends to city and county taxation, or only to taxation for State revenue. Where by its charter a corporation pays a specific tax, with provision that no further tax shall be imposed on the said company, or that all its property shall be exempt from taxation, it cannot be taxed by either cities or counties for its property. The charter of a railroad provided that "no tax by or under authority of this State shall be imposed upon any property purchased, held or owned by said company for the purposes of their charter, except the one and one-half per centum on the cost of the road required to be paid in lieu of all other taxes." The road owned a parcel of land adjacent to the depot grounds of the company at Hoboken, which was purchased to obtain increased accommodations for their passengers and for coal. The tract had been reclaimed from overflow, and the part reclaimed and capable of use was for tracks and slidings and other purposes connected with the business of the company. These lands were held exempt from taxation by the city in which they were located. On the other hand, where the charter provides for a report 1 State v. Miller, 30 N. J. Law (1 Vroom), 388; affi'd in State v. Mayor of Jersey City, 31 Id. 565. Douglass v. The State, 34 N. J. Law (5 Vroom), 485. 4 Gardner v. The State, 1 Zabr. 557; Farmers' Bank v. Commonwealth, 6 Bush (Ky.) 127. 5 State ex rel. Morris & Essex R. R. Co. v. Haight, 35 N. J. Law (6 Vroom), 40, |