Wood, collector, lots of land as follows, namely, lots No. 16, 17 and 18 range, 230 acres; taxes and charges, $5.52; on Penobscot river. Daniel Wood, collector of Howland for the year 1835," does not give a sufficiently accurate description of the land, when the collector is required to return a particular account of his doings relating to the sale.1 If the return omit to state the fact of the notice of sale, or the amount for which the land was sold, it is said that these defects may be cured by parol proof made by the claimant under the tax deed.2 When the return is to be made in a limited period after the sale, this requirement must be fully complied with. In Maine and Vermont it is to be made within thirty days after the sale, and a failure to comply with this provision is fatal to the sale. The period is computed from the time-of the actual sale. Where lands were sold on the twenty-fourth of August, 1829, and for reasons not appearing the sale was adjourned to October fifth, 1829, and on the latter day no sales were made, but the collector finding that all the lands had been sold, adjourned without day, and made his return on the sixteenth of October, 1829, it was held that the thirty days must be counted from August twenty-fourth, and not from October fifth, and that the return was not made within the time limited.1 The rule was modified in Ohio. The statute required the return to be made on or before the first Monday in January following the sale; it allowed a certificate of the sale to be given, at the time, and a deed to be made to the purchaser "at any time thereafter." The land was sold on the nineteenth of December, and the deed made on that day after the sale. On the trial of the tax title, there was no evidence as to the return, but the sale was sustained on the principle, that if all the acts required by the statute, had been performed at the time the deed was executed, the title would vest, and acts to be done after that could not divest it. It is to be observed in connection with the case last cited, that the statute was of such a character as to allow the deed to be made before the return could be made, which is very unusual. Usually the return is to be made as a condition precedent to the making of the deed. In some States the return is required to be recorded in some public office, as in Vermont, where the collector is to return "a true 1 Shimmin v. Inman, 26 Maine, 228. 2 Thurston v. Miller, 10 R. I. 358. 3 Pinkham v. Morang, 40 Maine, 568; Andrews v. Senter, 32 Maine, 394; Sumner v. Sherman, 13 Vt. 609; Lane v. James, 25 Vt. 482; Giddings v. Smith, 15 Vt. 857. 4 Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49. Hollister v. Bennett, 9 Ohio, 83. and attested copy of his sales, together with his warrant, tax bill and advertisement, to be lodged with the town clerk, who is to record them." A failure to comply with this provision is fatal to the title of the purchaser.1 The certificate of the clerk to such record must be official. Where the same person is both town clerk and collector, the signature "Jonas Stone, Collector," is not sufficient. When it is required to be recorded in the proper office for recording deeds, it is not necessary that it should be recorded in the deed book; it is sufficient if it be recorded in that office though in a separate book from the deeds.3 Under the Vermont statute the record of the returns must show the time and place of the publication of the notice of sale, and a failure to show the date, or the record of contradictory dates, would invalidate the return. When notice is required to be published at the town of Windsor, and the record was that it was "published at Windsor," it is sufficient, although there is both a town and county of Windsor, "at" being appropriate for a town. And when the notice is to be published in three newspapers, if the record shows that it was copied from one of the papers, and other papers are referred to by name, date, number, volume and place of publication, with a certificate that they that they are the same, the statute is sufficiently complied with. So where the record showed that the notice was published in papers at Danville, Rutland and Windsor, but the State was not named, it was presumed that these towns were in the State of Vermont. The statute in Vermont is: "the clerk shall record the advertisements at large, and the title of the volume, the number and the date of the papers in which they were inserted, and the place where such paper was printed, and a copy of such record certified by the clerk, is made full evidence of all such facts." Under this statute, although the records just noticed were considered sufficient, yet if the record as to the advertisements is made up from the collector's books, it is not sufficient; it must be made up from the newspapers themselves." In Mississippi, where a return is to be made to the clerk of the Probate Court, who is required to keep a book called a file book containing a list of lands sold, and the names of the owners thereof, it appeared that there was no name of the owner on the assessor's roll, 1 Judevine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470. 2 Isaacs v. Shattuck, 12 Vt. 668; 19 Vt. 49. 3 12 Vt. 668. Isaacs v. Shattuck, 12 Vt. 668. 7 4 Clark v. Tucker, 6 Vt. 181; Coit v. Wells, 2 Vt. 318. Carpenter v. Sawyer, 17 Vt. 121. 6 Bellows v. Elliot, 12 Vt. 569. and none on the file book. The failure to give the name of the owner was fatal to the title.1 But a failure to file the newspaper containing the advertisement in the clerk's office within ten days after the sale is not fatal, if it be subsequently filed. Nor does the failure of the clerk of the board of supervisors to write on the record required to be kept, opposite the tract sold and not redeemed, the word sold, affect the sale, if the sale is otherwise valid.3 Whatever is required by the statute which can be of the least importance to the purchaser or owner of the land must be performed. In Connecticut, the officer is authorized to make the deed to the purchaser as soon as the sale is over, but the deed is to be lodged in the office of the town clerk for twelve months unrecorded. If the owner redeems within the twelve months, the deed becomes void. A sale of lands was made on the twenty-ninth of July, 1822, but the deed was not executed until April first, 1826. It was said that the object of the statute was to give notice to the owner, and he had a right to find the deed to the purchaser in the clerk's office at any time within the twelve months allowed him to redeem, and the spirit of the statute required that the deed should be executed with all convenient dispatch after the sale and lodged in the office of the town clerk. The sale and deed were declared void. A similar principle was applied in Missouri, where the statute directed the officer making the sale to give the purchaser a certificate showing the land purchased, which was to be recorded, and if the land was not redeemed in two years, he was to make a deed to the purchaser for the land. A sale was made June 10, 1812, the certificate made June 20, 1832, the certificate was recorded January 13, 1836, and the deed to the purchaser was executed and recorded before the certificate, to wit, on the twenty-eighth of June, 1834. The sale was declared void. The certificate must be recorded, as the record might be the means of the notice reaching the owner, but reasons were unnecessary to be given; the provision was considered mandatory to record the certificate before making the deed. The language of the court in this case is a fair sample of that used by courts in enforcing a strict compliance with the provisions of the tax laws as to the sale of lands for taxes: "He wishes to obtain an estate worth thousands for less than ten dollars, and under and by virtue of law is not to be permitted to ask why he should be required to do this or to do that. It is an answer Green v. Craft, 28 Miss. 70. 3 Playter v. Cochrane, 37 Iowa, 258. Smith". Messer, 17 N. H. 420. 4 Ives v. Lynn, 7 Conn. 505. that it is required by law. Ita lex scripta est. He claims by the law, then by the law let his pretensions be judged."1 3 § 115. Acts to be done by the Purchaser-Surplus Bond.-The proceedings by which lands are sold for taxes, divesting title in a summary mode are construed with strictness. Whatever is directed by the statute must be done. This principle applies with as much force to the purchaser as to the tax officers, each must follow the statute. In Pennsylvania, the lands are sold for cash enough to pay the taxes, interest and costs, and as to the residue of the price paid for the tract sold, a bond is given payable to the owner of the land, called a surplus bond. This bond is to be filed "forthwith" with the treasurer of the county. The construction given to the statute is that the delivery of the deed to the purchaser, and the filing of the bond should be concomitant acts, and where the bond was not filed until two years after the execution of the deed, the sale was declared void. The purchaser takes upon himself the onus of proving the execution of the surplus bond, and if there be no evidence on that subject his title is worthless. The deeds in that State for such lands usually contain a printed receipt of the treasurer for the surplus bond. The receipt of the treasurer for the bond is prima facie evidence that the bond was executed and duly filed. So, the recital in the deed of the execution of the bond makes a prima facie case for the purchaser. And where a purchaser has been for thirty years in possession of land bought at a tax sale, the recital in the deed as to the costs of the surplus bond is sufficient to raise the presumption of the execution of the bond. Its common-law execution is not necessary to be proved, and if the bond is found filed in the proper office, as required by the statute, its execution is presumed; and where the bond is executed and delivered to the purchaser, but is lost or mislaid for seven years, the title of the purchaser is not affected. It is the duty of the purchaser to give the bond, and then his duties cease. It is the duty of the officer to file the bond in the proper office, and the purchaser having performed his duty is not affected by the failure of the officer to file the bond or his carelessness in misplacing or losing the bond. Mr. Blackwell considers the cases just cited-the case from Ohio, where there was no return, and the cases from New En 1 Reeds v. Moulton, 9 Mo. 878. 2 Sutton v. Nelson, 10 Serg. & Rawle, 238. 3 McDonald v. Maus, 8 Watts, 364; s. P. Donnell v. Bellas, 10 Barr, 341. 4 Fager v. Campbell, 5 Watts, 287; Robinson v. Williams, 6 Watts, 281. Devinney v. Reynolds, 1 Watts & Serg. 328. 6 Lackawanna v. Failes, 55 Penn. St. 90. 'Burns v. Lyon, 4 Watts, 363. 8 White v. Willard, 1 Watts, 42. gland, cited in § 114, where the tax title wassustained notwithstanding irregularities-as faulty in principle. He claims that the purchaser has it in his power to compel the officer conducting the sale or charged with any duty in reference thereto, to perform his duty, and if he does not see to it that everything required by the statute is done, it is his fault, and he should suffer for his neglect. But when we consider that the course of decision in cases of tax titles has been so strict, and that so few sales were sustained, that the legislature has been compelled to interfere and make the deed to the purchaser prima facie evidence of the regularity of the previous steps taken, it would seem that but little weight should be given to the sugges tion, even of this distinguished author; and in the Pennsylvania cases, the questions decided were rather questions of evidence, as to what facts would constitute a prima facie proof that the acts required by the statute had been performed, rather than a dispensing with their performance. The payment of the money is not a substitute for "the surplus bond." The bond must be given as required by the statute, and must contain a description of the land, for the statute makes it a lien upon the land, and the lien would be of no avail unless there was such a description as to identify the land.3 Redemption Notice.-In many of the States the purchaser, before he obtains a deed, or before his title becomes absolute, is required to serve a notice on the person in possession of the land, or upon the owner of the land or the person taxed with the land, stating when the period of redemption expires. The service of this redemption notice is absolutely essential to the validity of the title of the purchaser. In Illinois, the provision as to this notice forms a part of the Constitution of that State. The provision requires as a prerequisite to a deed for land sold for taxes, whether due the State, county, city or town, that the purchaser, three months before the period of redemption expires, shall serve a written notice of the time of its expiration on the person in possession of the land at the time. A like notice is to be served on the person in whose name such land is taxed, if he resides in the county in which the land is situated; and if such person does not reside in the county, the notice is to be published in some newspaper printed in the county; and if there is none published in the county, then in the newspaper published in the State nearest to the county in which the land is situated. The purchaser, in his notice, is to state when he purchased the land, the description of the 1 Blackwell on Tax Titles, 339, 340. 2 Connelly v. Nedrow, 6 Watts, 451. |