1 ascendants." When the legislature requires a certain percentage of the estate passing by devise or descent to collateral kindred, it is called a collateral inheritance tax, or succession tax. It is a tax upon the civil privilege of taking the property devised or descended. Where the domicile of the decedent is in one State, and the situs of the property in another, the question arises, In which State is the tax imposed? The general rule is, that wherever the owner of the prop erty is domiciled, there a tax may be imposed on the succession, although the property may be situated in another State. But where the State has control over neither the domicile of the decedent nor his property, it cannot impose the tax. In the first of these cases, Short resided in Philadelphia, owned large sums invested in stocks of corporations of other States, in bonds of the State of Kentucky, and a bank deposit in the State of New York. This property was held liable to the succession tax in Pennsylvania, on the principle that the situs of personal property follows the domicile of the owner. In the second case, Hood was born in Philadelphia, in 1786; went to Cuba in 1814, and became established in business there; in 1817, he formed a partnership with persons residing in Philadelphia, and had correspondents there; he lived in Cuba until his death, made occasional visits to Philadelphia, and died in France, in 1850, while on a visit for his health. He had an estate in Pennsylvania, and large estates in Cuba. Legacies to a large amount were given to persons residing in Pennsylvania. The executor paid the collateral inheritance tax on all the property in Pennsylvania, but refused to pay on the legacies derived from property in Cuba. The executor was sustained, the court deciding that where neither the personal property taxed, nor the domicile of its owner is within the State at the time of his death, such property is not subject to the collateral inheritance tax. These cases do not conflict with the doctrine that the State in which ancillary administration of an estate is granted may impose a collateral inheritance tax on all property situated in the State,' which has a visible, tangible existence, or even upon debts which can only be collected by the ancillary administrator, who has the legal title to them.5 Nor do the cases last cited maintain a doctrine that would make it proper to have sustained a tax in Hood's Estate, upon the legacies derived from the property in Cuba. When the property is of such a character that 1 Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. 422; Lee, J., Id. 430. 2 Short's Estate, 16 Penn. St. 63. 4 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones Eq. 51. 3 Hood's Estate, 21 Penn. St. 106. St. Louis County v. Taylor's Administrator, 47 Mo. 594; The Attorney General v. Hope, 1 C. M. & R. 530; 8 Bligh, 44. it passes by delivery, it is subject to the collateral inheritance tax or probate duty where it is situated.1 This tax is due when settlement is made with the legatees, although the estate is not fully settled." § 45. Public Securities and Negotiable Instruments.—The State bonds and bonds of municipal bodies and circulating notes of banks, which are treated as property where they are, and pass by delivery, are the subjects of taxation wherever they are found, in the same manner as chattels. Probate duty in England is measured by the property within the jurisdiction of the court. Where a portion of the estate of the decedent was composed of Russian, Danish and Dutch bonds, which were marketable securities, transferable by delivery only, and as to which it was never necessary to do any act whatsoever out of the kingdom of England, in order to make a transfer of any of the said bonds valid, they were held liable to probate duty." Lord Abinger says: "No ordinary in England could perform any act of administration within his diocese, with respect to debts due from persons resident abroad, or with respect to shares or interests in foreign funds payable abroad, and incapable of being transferred here; and therefore no duty would be payable on the probate or letters of administration in respect of such effects. But, on the other hand, it is clear that the ordinary could administer all chattels within his jurisdiction; and if an instrument is created of a chattel nature, capable of being transferred by acts done here, and sold for money here, there is no reason why the ordinary or his appointee should not administer that species of property. Such an instrument is in effect a salable chattel, and follows the nature of other chattels as to the jurisdiction to grant probate." But where the public securities owned by the decedent, who was domiciled in England, were of such a character that they were not transferable by delivery, but only transferable in the State where they were issued, they were held not liable to such duty. The securities in the first case were called rentes, inscribed in the great book of the debt public of France; and in the second, they were registered stocks of the State of New York. The same principle is contained in those cases which hold that State or municipal 1 Attorney General v. Bowens, 4 M. & W. 171. 2 Attorney General v. Pierce, 6 Jones Eq. 144. 3 Field, J., in State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 324. Attorney General v. Dimond, 1 Cr. & Jer. 370. Attorney General v. Bowens, 4 M. & W. 190. 6 Attorney General v. Bowens, 4 M. & W. 190. Attorney General v. Dimond, 1 Cr. & Jer. 356; Attorney General v. Hope, 1 C. M. &R. 530; 8 Bligh, 44. bonds which are required by various States to be deposited by foreign insurers with the treasurer or other officer, are liable to taxation as property in the State. It is to be observed that the stocks which were held liable to probate duty in England, might have been held liable on the principle that the situs of personal property is that of its owner; but the same principle would apply in the cases in which they were held not liable. The idea upon which the decisions are based is that when the evidence of the debt is such that it passes by delivery, then the situs of the evidence of the debt is the situs of the debt, and it is taxable there. But where it is necessary that the evidence of the debt should be in the State of the debtor in order to transfer the title to it, it is taxable in the State of the debtor, which is in accord with the Missouri and North Carolina cases on the subject. This principle extends to all negotiable instruments which pass by delivery, and they should be taxed where the instruments are situated. They are chattels personal; a negotiable note payable to the order of an unmarried woman becomes the property of her husband without her indorsement, it being a personal chattel, and not a chose in action.3 § 46. Steamers and Sailing Vessels.-The domicile of a vessel is its home port, or port at which it is required to be registered by the acts of Congress, and this is the port nearest to the place where the owner or owners reside.1 The name of the vessel and of the port to which she belongs, is required to be painted on her stern, on a black ground, in white letters of not less than three inches in length. Where an ocean steamer, owned and registered in New York, was regularly plying between Panama and San Francisco and ports in Oregon, remaining in San Francisco no longer than was necessary to land and receive passengers and cargo, and in Benicia only for repairs and supplies, a tax assessed by the State of California and paid, was recovered back, upon the ground that the steamer was not property within the State of California. Nelson, J.: "Whether the vessel, leaving her home port for trade and commerce, visits, in the course of her voyage or business, several ports, or confines her operations in the carrying trade to one, are questions that will depend upon the profitable returns of the business, and will furnish no more evidence that she has become a part of the personal property within the State, 1 British Com. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioners, 4 Keyes (N. Y.), 303; People v. Home Insurance Co. 29 Cal. 533. 2 Ante, §§ 41, 42. 3 McNeilage v. Halloway, 1 B. & Ald. 218. 41 U. S. Stat. at Large, 288; Bright. Dig. 824, pl. 3. Hays v, The Pacific Mail Steamship Co. 17 How. 596. and liable to taxation, at one port than at others. She is within the jurisdiction of all or any one of them, temporarily, and for a purpose wholly excluding the idea of permanently abiding in the State, or changing her home port. We are satisfied that the State of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not property abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated with the other personal property of the State; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and commerce, with their situs at the home port where the vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested, and where taxes had been paid." A vessel registered in the port of New York, that nearest her owner's residence, one of a regular daily line of steamers between Mobile and New Orleans, is not taxable in Alabama.1 The fact that such vessel is enrolled by her master as a coaster at Mobile, Alabama, and that her license as a coaster is renewed from year to year, does not affect her registry or ownership in New York, nor make her liable to taxation as personal property in the State of Alabama. In the cases which have been noticed on this subject, the home port and residence of the owner of the vessel were in a different State from that of the vessel, and the vessel being temporarily in the State in which she was used, was not liable to taxation in such State. But where the owner of a steamer resides in the State and the vessel is engaged on the waters of a river of that State, wholly within the State, the vessel is taxable in such State, notwithstanding she is registered and enrolled as a coasting vessel under the acts of Congress; and it would seem that a vessel so engaged would be taxable in the State on whose waters she was plying, even if the owner resided in another State. The charter of the city of New Albany allowed it to tax all real and personal property within the city. Meekin, a resident of the city, was part owner of a steamboat, enrolled at Louisville, and which touched occasionally at New Albany; a tax imposed on Meekin for his share of the boat was held illegal; it was not property within the city; and in a similar case, it was held that the situs of a vessel is the place of its registration and port from and to which it regularly departs and returns. The city of St. Louis, by its charter, had precisely the same power as New Albany. The St. Louis Ferry Company was incorporated in Illinois, and had an office there; the company was Battle v. Corporation of Mobile, 9 Ala. 234; Minturn v. Hays, 2 Cal. 590. The City of New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481; s. P. Wilkey v. The City of Pekin, 19 Ill. 160. engaged in carrying passengers and freight across the river from St. Louis, Missouri, to East St. Louis in Illinois. The boats only touched at the wharf in St. Louis, as one of the termini of the voyage, and were not allowed to remain there more than ten minutes, in pursuance of an ordinance of the city. When not in actual use, they were laid up in Illinois; their pilots and engineers resided there; their real estate and warehouse on it were there. The boats were enrolled in St. Louis; the company had an office there; its president, vicepresident and principal officers lived there; the stockholders mainly resided there, and none of them in Illinois; the ordinary meetings of the directors were held, and its moneys received and disbursed, and corporate seal kept in St. Louis. The company paid to the city of St Louis an annual ferry license; it erected, by permission of the city, wharf-boats at its wharf or public landing; it paid wharfage to the city at a stipulated annual amount; it was assessed and paid taxes on the value of the wharf-boats within the city limits. The city of St. Louis also laid a tax on the value of the ferry-boats, which was refused, on the ground that these boats were not property "within the city." The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the company was liable for the tax on the ferry-boats.1 This decision was overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States. The latter court held that a corporation is a citizen of the State which created it; that jurisdiction of either person or property is necessary to the exercise of the taxing power, and while it is true, as a general rule, that personal property follows the person, yet this doctrine does not stand in the way of the taxing power in the locality where the property has an actual situs. The enrollment of the vessel throws little light upon the question of actual situs, because she is required to be registered at her home port, and where her home port is depends upon the locality of the owner's residence, and not upon the place of employment. Swayne, J.: "The owner was, in the eye of the law, a citizen of Illinois, and from the inherent law of its nature could not emigrate or become a citizen elsewhere. As the boats were laid up on the Illinois shore, when not in use, and the pilots and engineers who ran them lived there, that locality, under the circumstances, must be taken to be their home port. They did not so abide within the city of St. Louis as to become incorporated with and form part of its personal property. Hence they were beyond the jurisdiction of the authorities by which the taxes were assessed, and the 1 St. Louis v. The Ferry Company, 40 Mo. 580. |