(a) If it be chattels, which have a tangible existence, they are taxed in the locality in which they are situated.

() Evidences of debt, such as State stocks and bonds of municipal corporations, transferable by delivery, and indeed all negotiable instruments which are of a chattel nature, are taxable where the evidence of the debt is actually situated.

(c) But chattels which are in transit from one State to another, seeking a market, or which are in the hands of a consignee for sale merely, are not subject to taxation in the State where they are actually situated, but in that of the owner.

(d) Debts not negotiable are taxable where the owner resides; they follow his person.

(e) But where it is necessary, in case of the death of the owner, to have administration in the State of the debtor, the legal title being in the ancillary administrator or executor, the assets of the estate recoverable in the ancillary forum may be taxed by that State. But legacies, the proceeds of property not situated in the domiciliary forum, although passing to legatees through the hands of the ancillary administrator, are not taxable in the State of the ancillary forum.

(f) Stocks of corporations follow the person of the owner, and are taxed at the place of his residence.

(9) Ships are likewise taxable at the residence of the owner, which is generally that of the home port, or place of registry; although when they are in different States the residence of the owner governs.

(h) The rule as to debts not negotiable being taxed at the residence of the owner is modified, to the extent that where a person residing in one State, has an agent in another, who loans or invests money for him, holds the evidences of debt, and so invests the proceeds of the loans when collected in the same State, it is held then to be taxable at the residence of the agent.

CHAPTER V.

LIMITATIONS ON THE TAXING POWER BY PROVISIONS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AS TO TAXATION AND FINANCE.

§ 51. Equality and Uniformity.-The constitutions of many of the States contain provisions enforcing this principle. In some the provision is that "taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State." In others, that "the legislature shall provide a uniform rule of taxation," or, "the rule of taxation shall be uniform." The same provision is found in others in different phraseology; and in connection with these provisions is found another, that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, and sometimes the additional provision, that no one species of property shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value.

The principle contained in these provisions is the same which was discussed in chapter 3, in its application to the apportionment of the burden of taxation among the several subdivisions of a State. The limitation then arose from the encroachment upon other constitutional provisions securing private rights; here it arises from express limitations placed upon the taxing power. The general idea conveyed by these provisions is that taxes shall be assessed according to some ratio or rule of apportionment, so that A. shall pay upon a piece of property of a certain value the same amount as B. upon a similar piece of property of equal value. To compel individuals to contribute money or property for the public use without reference to any common ratio, and without requiring the sum paid by one piece of property, or by one person, to bear any relation whatever to that paid by another, would be a forced contribution, not a tax, within the sense of that term as applied to the exercise of powers by an enlightened government. The rule of uniformity does not apply to local assessments, in the sense which would require all property in the same political or territorial subdivision to be assessed for such im

1 Texas, California, Louisiana, and Virginia.

2 Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio.

3 Illinois, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Massachusetts.

4 Christiancy, J., in Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 301.

provement. But even in local assessments, although not reached by these provisions, the assessment must not be arbitrary. There must be some rule applicable to all whom the assessment reaches, and bearing upon all in the same ratio.2

Whether these provisions apply to anything except property has been doubted, and where they occur in connection with the provision that all property shall be taxed according to value, this view has great weight. The Supreme Court of Ohio says: "Taxing is required to be by a uniform rule-that is, by one and the same unvarying standard. Taxing by a uniform rule requires uniformity not only in the rate of taxation, but also uniformity in the mode of assessment upon the taxable valuation. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation, and this equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the mode of assessment, as well as in the rate of taxation. But this is not all. The uniformity must be co-extensive with the territory to which it applies. If a State tax, it must be uniform all over the State. If a county or city tax, it must be uniform throughout the extent of the territory to which it is applicable. But the uniformity in the rule required by the Constitution does not stop here. It must extend to all property subject to taxation, so that all property may be taxed alike-equally-which is taxing by a uniform rule." 3

All the authorities sustain the doctrine that these provisions apply to county and municipal taxation as well as State, except a case in Virginia, arising upon the Constitution of 1851, which provides that "taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the commonwealth, and all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value," in which it was decided that this provision did not apply to taxation by counties for their local purposes, but only to taxation by the State for the purposes of State revenue. The case arose upon an act of the legislature authorizing counties and cities to impose a tax upon the offices of sheriff and sergeant, and might well have been rested upon the principle that equality and uniformity apply only to property, and not to privileges. The point decided may not only be considered as obiter

'Ibid.; and Williams v. Mayor, &c. of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; 2 Dillon on Corporations, $ 599, 604, and authorities cited; Cooley on Const. Lim. 499, and authorities; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wisc. 242; Roundtree v. Galveston, 42 Texas, 612.

2 Newark v. State, 13 Am. Law Reg. July No. 1874, p. 441.

3 Ex. Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio, O. S. 1; s. P. Swayne, J., Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 675.

Gilkerson v. Frederick Justices, 13 Gratt. 577.

dictum, but if it had been necessary to the decision of the case, as erroneous.1

§ 52. Cases which Violate Equality and Uniformity.—The city of Sheboygan was authorized to levy a tax upon all real estate in the limits of the city, to pay bonds issued in aid of a railroad. This was a discrimination in favor of personal property, and void. The city of Janesville included within its territorial limits not only land embraced within the recorded plat of the city and its additions, but also a large quantity of the adjacent farming or agricultural lands. The legislature passed an act taxing the lands not used as city lots, but only for farming purposes, at a less rate than city lots. It was held to be void as not equal and uniform. The cases as to extension of city limits, in 34, are in conflict with this decision, but it is to be observed that the Wisconsin court regards the question of extension as depending alone upon the power of the legislature to annex adjoining territory to a city, and if it is extended, under the Constitution all must be taxed alike. The Kentucky and Iowa decisions are based upon the equality in the burden of taxation, without reference to any express provision of the Constitution on the subject of taxation, and are cases in which the inequality was regarded as so great as to violate the fundamental provisions of the Constitution for the protection of private rights. The legislature of Illinois, by an act, exempted the inhabitants of the town of Shawnee from all State taxes for twenty years, and directed a levy to be made on the inhabitants of that town equal to that released by the State, to be used exclusively in constructing a levee to protect the town from overflow. The court held it violated art. 9, § 2, of the Constitution, which provides that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property. So an act allowing portions of a county to aid a railroad, if it is regarded as a county debt, is not equal and uniform. In Louisiana, where the police jury is composed of representatives from the whole parish, and is the body for the management of all affairs relative to the internal police of the parish, and have ample powers in the construction of levees, roads and canals, and to impose all taxes to defray all such expenses, the legislature passed an act authorizing the police jury to levy a tax on the inhabitants of a certain portion of the

1 The Constitution of 1869 (art. ix, § 1) expressly extends the rule to counties and corporations.

Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, U. S. 510; s. P. Hale v. City of Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599. 3 Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 410; Cooley on Const. Lim. 501.

'Paine, J., in Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, 262.

Parish of Rapides, to pay the whole amount of the expense of certain embankments and other works constructed to protect a portion of the parish from overflow by the waters of Red River. The act was held to violate the rule of uniformity, as the tax should have been upon the whole parish. The court suggests that if the power by which the tax was imposed were lodged in the hands of the representatives of the people from the district subject to overflow, and they, exercising the power delegated to them as a subordinate political body, should impose a tax upon such district, it would be free from constitutional objection, because it would be equal and uniform within the limits of the exercise of such delegated power.1 Where an act of the legislature authorized the council of the city of Covington to improve the streets or alleys of the city with Nicholson pavement, at the cost of the property owners, "whenever the owners of the larger part of the front feet of the ground fronting on the street shall petition therefor," and at the same time authorized the council, by a unanimous vote, to require the northern portion of Madison street in that city to be paved with the Nicholson pavement at the cost of the owners fronting thereon, it was held unconstitutional for want of uniformity in the manner of assessment. So an act taxing three-fourths of the value of the products of mines is not equal and uniform, the whole value should be taxed, or taxing railroads at a higher rate than individuals.1 And where the collector is empowered to add five per cent. additional amount to the tax for delay, the act violates the principle of uniformity required by the Constitution, and is void. The charter of B. provides that the council may divide the city into districts, for the construction of sewers, and may levy and collect a special tax on real estate within the district drained. This discriminates as to districts. and property. The tax should be uniform as to persons and property, and all property within the limits of a district must be taxed. A

1 Cumming v. Police, 9 La, 503.

2 Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush (Ky.) 493.

3 State v. Eastbrook, 3 Nev. 173; State v. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178.

4 Bureau County v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 44 Ill. 229; Chicago & N. W. R. R. v. Boone Co. 44 Ill. 240.

5 Scammon v. Chicago, 44 Ill. 269; Clayton v. Chicago, Id. 280; contra, Louisville City R. R. Co. v. Louisville, 4 Bush, 478. The case is distinguished from Bristol v. The City of Chicago, 22 Ill. 587, which was a case of local assessment; if the owner failed to pay before the collector filed his list of delinquents, or application for an order of sale, 10 per cent. was to be added as additional costs. Here a judgment of the court is rendered for the penalty as costs, labor has been performed and expense incurred by the city on faith of the assessment; the penalty is to cover the costs of collection. Breese, J.: "That the legislature may authorize the courts to impose and render a judgment for such a penalty, we have no doubt, but we do not believe that such a power can be conferred upon a mere ministerial officer, without any opportunity of being heard.”

Prim v. City of Belleville, 59 Ill. 142.