article, that "the corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, town and villages, may be vested with the power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same."

The courts have decided that § 5 is a limitation on the power of the legislature to grant the right of corporate or local taxation to any other persons than corporate or local authorities. An act was passed fixing the boundaries of Lincoln Park, in the city of Chicago. It provided for its improvement, and the means of paying for the land to be taken for the park; it required the mayor, comptroller, and clerk of the city to issue bonds on the requirement of the park commissioners appointed by the act. This requirement was absolute, not submitting the question of the creation of such a debt to the people of the city or its corporate authorities. It was held that the act was invalid, that § 5 was a limitation of the taxing power in local taxation to the corporate authorities, which were said to be those elected directly by the people, or appointed in some mode to which they have given their assent. While it was admitted that the legislature had complete control over municipal corporations, which exist only for public purposes, and which might be altered and modified at pleasure, yet it was claimed that the power could not be so used as to compel any one of the cities of Illinois to issue its bonds against its will, to erect a park, or for any other improvement. The court reserved the question as to what extent § 5 was to be construed as a limitation on the power of the legislature over local taxation, where it acts directly upon the people of the locality, for such purposes as paying the expenses of suppressing an insurrection in the locality.1 So where an act incorporated certain persons for the purpose of leveeing and draining a district designated, the whole matter being under the control of the corporators, and never having been submitted to a vote of the people to be affected by it; it was held a violation of § 5 of the Constitution. But this provision of the Constitution does not prevent the legislature from creating districts by the union of two or more towns in the county for any special township purpose common to the towns, such as building a bridge, improving a river on which they may be situated, or constructing a canal, with the consent of these towns, and erecting over such districts an authority, likewise

1 People, &c. v. Chicago, 51 Ill. 17. As to last point, see authorities in § 35; and as to want of power to compel issuing of bonds, § 38.

Howard v. St. Clair Drain Co. 51 Ill. 130

with their consent, to which shall be granted all the necessary power of taxation for the construction of these improvements, and for their government and control. An act of this kind was passed to provide a park for the towns of Lake, Hyde Park and South Chicago; park commissioners were appointed, and the act was accepted by a vote of the people of the towns.1 Town officers under the township system making an appropriation to a railroad in pursuance of an enabling act of the legislature, upon a vote of the majority of legal voters of the town, are corporate authorities in the sense of the Constitution.2

An act was passed allowing certain portions of a county to create a debt in aid of a railroad. It was held a violation of the Constitution as to the power of the legislature in reference to local taxation. The court say of § 5: "It is a limitation on the taxing power of the State; it restrains the legislature from imposing a tax on municipal corporations, unless it be for a debt created by such body. We have held in several cases, that the legislature has no power to impose such a tax, or to authorize individuals to impose the same; and the same is true of the power to create a corporate indebtedness. The district upon which it is proposed to place this burden not being a corporation, the legislature could not authorize its citizens to create the debt, and they are not liable; as authority was not given to the county to create the liability, it could not impose the burden on the county, or empower the citizens of a fraction thereof to impose such a liability." In Indiana, where the statute confines taxation for city or town purposes to incorporated cities and towns, having authority to levy and collect taxes, a tax in aid of a railroad was held to be void, the tax not being for a municipal purpose in the sense of the statute. And in Tennessee, where a board of commissioners, under an act of the legislature, was appointed by the governor, with power of taxation for a county, such appointment was held void, although there was no express provision in the Constitution on the subject. The ground of the decision was, that the County Court is recognized in the Constitution as one of the institutions of the State, and the powers conferred upon the justices of the peace in their collective capacity were intended to be exercised in the county court, and that taxation by the County Court preserves the principle of taxation by the representatives of the tax-payers, which the other system infringes.5

1 People v. Talman, 51 Ill. 37; Lovingston v. Wider, 53 Ill. 302, in which previous cases on this subject were reviewed and affirmed.

Chicago, Dan. & Vin. R. R. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268.

3 Madison v. People, 58 Ill. 456.

5 Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 683.

Root. Endlemeyer, 37 Ind. 225.

§ 58. Arkansas, Michigan and Nebraska, as to Limitation of Local Taxation.-The Constitution of Arkansas, art. 6, § 9, provides that "the County Court shall be vested with jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes, disbursement of moneys for county purposes, and in every other case that may be necessary for the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties." An act of the legislature in 1845, prohibited the use of a billiard table or tenpin alley without paying twenty-five dollars into the State treasury, and contained a similar provision as to counties. A person was indicted for a violation of this act. The indictment had two counts, one for a violation of the act as to the State, and the other for its violation as to the county. The act was regarded as a tax on the privi lege of keeping a billiard table and ten-pin alley. The court reaffirmed the decisions cited in § 55, so far as State revenue was concerned, under the provision of the Constitution quoted in that section, but overruled the case of County of Pulaski v. Irwin,1 as to counties, and took the view of the dissenting chief justice, that $9 of art. 6, as to county taxation, conferred a power different from that in the case cited in § 55, which was held to apply to State revenue alone. This decision announces a principle which will be found in the case next to be cited, that provisions in the Constitution limiting the power of taxation, are not to be taken as referring to county or local taxation, unless the intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication.

The Constitution of Michigan contains these provisions: art. 14, § 6, "The credit of the State shall not be granted to or in aid of any person, association, or corporation." § 8, "The State shall not subsubscribe to or be interested in the stock of any company, association, or corporation." § 9, "The State shall not be a party to or interested in any work of internal improvement, nor engage in carrying on any such work, except in the expenditure of grants to the State, of land or other property." Art. 15, § 13, "The legislature shall provide for the incorporation and organization of cities and villages, and shall restrict their powers of taxation, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit." The township of Pine Grove, under an enabling act, after a vote of the people in accordance therewith, issued its bonds in aid of a railroad running through the township from Kalamazoo to South Haven, both places being in Michigan. The act was held void by the Supreme Court of Michigan, the court taking

1 4 Ark. 473.

9 Washington v. State, 13 Ark. 752.

3 Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, 504.

the view that what the State was prohibited from doing directly by §§ 6, 8 and 9 of article 14, it could not authorize the townships, cities and villages to do for it. The provisions of this Constitution came under review in the Supreme Court of the United States, where a different view was taken of them, and the bonds issued by the township of Pine Grove were held valid.' Swayne, J., "The case as to the Constitution, is a proper one for the application of the maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The instrument is drawn with great ability, care and fullness of details. If those who framed it had intended to forbid the granting of such aid by the municipal corporations of the State, as well as by the State itself, it cannot be that they would not have explicitly said so. It is not to be supposed that such a gap was left in their work from oversight or inadvertence." The Constitution of Nebraska, in the article on Finance, has the following section: "The State shall never contract any debt for works of internal improvement, or be a party in carrying on such works." Under an enabling act, a county issued its bonds in aid of a railroad. Such action was held valid, and not in conflict with the foregoing provision of the Constitution. This provision refers to the State considered as a sovereign corporation, not to its subdivisions. The maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, was considered as furnishing the proper rule for the construction of the Constitution. The court say: "To contend that the counties, precincts, and cities shall not engage in works of internal improvement, is to forbid the construction of roads, bridges, ferries, streets, waterworks, and gasworks."

§ 59. Provisions in Iowa and Virginia Constitutions.-Article 8, § 2, of the Constitution of Iowa provides, that, "The property of all corporations for pecuniary profit shall be subject to taxation the same as individuals." The legislature enacted a law, directing the property of all express and telegraph companies, doing business in the State, to be included in the valuation of personal property of the company, in the town or city where such company shall have an office for the transaction of business. The amount of such property was to be ascertained by requiring the agents of such company to report to the assessor a sworn statement of the gross receipts of the office or agency, for the year ending on the first of January next preceding. The assessor was required to deduct sixty per cent. from this amount, and return the remaining amount as the personal property of such

1 Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 675.
Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Nebr. 377, 399.

company, to be assessed at the same rate as the personal property of private individuals. The act was held valid, as the rate was the same as on the property of individuals, and the act simply provided the method whereby the amount of personal estate or moneys, and credits of these companies should be ascertained, and it was likened to the method of ascertaining the value of depreciated bank notes and stock in corporations.

The Constitution of Virginia (1870) contains these provisions : Art. 10, § 1, "Taxation, except as hereinafter provided, whether imposed by the State, county, or corporate bodies, shall be equal and uniform, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as prescribed by law. No one species of property, from which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value." § 4, "The General Assembly may levy a tax on incomes in excess of six hundred dollars per annum, and upon the following licenses, viz., the sale of ardent spirits, theatrical and circus companies, menageries, jugglers, itinerant peddlers, and all other shows and exhibitions for which an entrance fee is required; commission merchants, persons selling by sample, brokers and pawnbrokers, and all other business which cannot be reached by the ad valorem system," &c. The legislature imposed a specific license tax for the privilege of keeping a billiard table, and an additional tax of fifty dollars for each additional table kept. Lockhart had eight billiard tables. The tables and furniture of his saloon were valued at $11,000. He was assessed with a license tax of $580, and claimed that his business was one which could be reached by the ad valorem system, and should have been so taxed. The tax was held valid. Moncure, J.: "The legislature must, in the nature of things, have a large discretion in determining the question as to what business can be reached by the ad valorem system, within the meaning of the Constitution. The subject is indefinite in its nature, and although the instances enumerated in the Constitution afford material aid in ascertaining the meaning of its framers in the use of the general words which follow the enumeration, still, much room is necessarily left for the exercise of legislative discretion in the matter; and we certainly cannot say that such discretion has been so exercised in this case as to make the laws in question unconstitutional." And a special license tax being imposed on the business of "keeping a junk shop, and dealing in second-hand articles, junk, rags,

1 U. S. Express Co. v. Ellyson, 28 Iowa, 370, 376.

2 Lewellen &c. v. Lockhart, 21 Gratt. 570, 572.