old metals and like commodities," a person engaged in that business was held liable to pay that tax although he also was taxed on his capital as a general merchant, in addition thereto, and had paid such tax, the court saying: "We cannot say that the junk business is any more within the reach of the ad valorem system than the business of selling ardent spirits, the business of an itinerant peddler, a commission merchant, or a sample merchant, all of which are embraced in the express enumeration." 1

For several years after the adoption of this Constitution, merchants other than commission merchants, sample merchants, and junk dealers, were taxed on their capital invested in business, according to the ad valorem system. In 1874, an act was passed taxing merchants in proportion to the amount of their sales, without reference to the amount of capital invested. It was decided that this did not violate this provision of the Constitution, that there was no express prohibition against this license tax, nor did it appear by necessary implication that the framers of the Constitution intended to restrain the license tax to the cases enumerated. Such a construction would deprive the State of a large revenue, and will not be adopted unless it clearly appear to be the intention of those who made the Constitution. It is not clear that they did so intend.2

§ 60. Limitations in reference to Internal Improvements.—The Constitution of Ohio, in art. 8, § 6, provides, that "the General Assembly shall never authorize any county, city, town or township, by vote of its citizens or otherwise, to be or become a stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation, or association whatever; or to raise money for, or to loan its credit to or in aid of any such company, corporation or association." The legislature of Ohio passed a law allowing cities with a population of over 150,000, whose council deemed it to be essential to the interests of such city that a line of railroad, having one of its termini at the city, should be constructed, to issue city bonds to aid in its construction. Cincinnati issued its bonds. under this law in aid of a railroad from Cincinnati to Chattanooga, Tennessee. The bonds were held valid, and the act under which they were issued not in conflict with art. 8, § 6. Scott, J.: "The mischief which it interdicts is a business partnership between a municipality, or subdivision of a State, and individuals, or private corporations, or associations. It forbids the union of public and private capital or credit in any enterprise whatever. They may neither be

'Hirsh's Case, 21 Gratt. 785, 789.

2 Commonwealth v. Moore & Goodson, 25 Gratt. 951.

come stockholders, nor furnish money or credit for the benefit of the parties interested therein. If we hold that these municipal bodies cannot do on their own account what they are forbidden to do on joint account of themselves and private partners, it follows that they are powerless to make any improvement, however necessary, with their own means and on their sole account. We may be sure that a purpose so unreasonable was never entertained by the framers of the Constitution." 1

The legislature of the same State enacted a law in reference to railroads, appointed commissioners for the counties through which the road was located, and directed an election to be held in the counties to determine the amount to be appropriated to the road, and to fix the termini of the road. If the electors approved of the road, the commissioners were to issue the bonds of the county for the amount decided upon, at twenty years, carrying eight per cent. interest, the credit of the county to be pledged for their payment. The commissioners were to make the contract for building the road, and were also authorized to lease the road so constructed, before or after its completion, or to sell the same, upon terms to be agreed upon between the lessee or vendee and the commissioners. This act was held to be in conflict with art. 8, § 6, and void, and was characterized as an attempt to accomplish by indirection what it would be a plain violation of an express provision of the Constitution to do directly. The case was distinguished from Walker v. City of Cincinnati, the court saying, that, "where public credit or money is furnished to be used in partly constructing a work which under the statute must be completed, if completed at all, by other parties out of their own means, who are to have the beneficial control and management of the work when completed, the public money or credit thus used can only be regarded as furnished for or in aid of such parties." In answer to the suggestion that, under the act, the road might neither be leased or sold, it is said that the mere expenditure of public money in building a part of the railroad, without any authority to complete it or use it, can serve no public purpose, and taxes can only be levied for such a purpose. No doubt, the court, in the case of Walker v. City of Cincinnati, gave the proper construction to this provision of the Constitution, that the mischief intended to be prevented was a partnership between the subdivisions of a State and individuals or a private corporation. But it is difficult to see the difference between

1 Walker v. City of Cincinnati et al. 21 Ohio, N. S. 14.

Taylor v. Ross, Comm'r, 23 Ohio, 22.

the aid given by the city of Cincinnati and that proposed to be given by counties in the case cited, for it does not appear that the counties proposed to become stockholders in the road, unless we say that a lessee or vendee of the road would become a partner of the lessor or vendor. The Constitution of Indiana, art. 10, § 6, provides: "That no county shall subscribe for stock in any incorporated company, unless the same be paid for at the time of such subscription, nor shall any county loan its credit to any incorporated company, nor borrow money for the purpose of taking stock in any such company, nor shall the General Assembly ever, on behalf of the State, assume the debts of any county, city, township, or corporation whatever." An act of the legislature of Indiana authorized counties to subscribe for stock in railroads, to be paid for at the time of subscription. It was held valid, and to be no violation of the section of the Constitution just quoted.1 Where the Constitution provides that, "until the bonds of the State shall be at par, &c., and the General Assembly shall have no power to give or lend the credit of the State in aid of any person, association or corporation, except," &c., an act requiring the treasurer of the State to subscribe for stock in a railroad, and to pay for the same by issuing bonds of the State, was held to be a gift of the credit of the State, and void.2

enabling act, subscribed to a Interest on the bonds was not directing the auditor to ascer

§ 61. Other Limitations, Illinois, New York, California, &c.The second clause of art. 9, § 5, of the Constitution of Illinois provides: "The General Assembly shall require that all of the property within the limits of municipal corporations, belonging to individuals, shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority of law." The town of Dayton, under an railroad, and issued $12,000 in bonds. paid, and the legislature passed an act tain the amount of interest that would accrue upon the registered bonds of any county or township, and transmit a certificate of the estimated per centum required to meet such interest to the clerk of the county or township. This per centum is thereupon deemed and added to, and becomes a part of the per centum which may be levied for purposes of State revenue, is to be so treated by the clerk in making his estimates, and issuing his books for the collection of taxes, and is to be collected with the State revenue. This act was held valid. The clause in question not only confers an express authority, but makes it the duty of the legislature to cause such taxes to be col

lected. It gives them no choice in the matter, nor does it limit their power as to the instrumentalities to be employed. It does not require the levy for such purposes to be made through the corporate authorities, but leaves the legislature free to select such agents as they may deem proper to assess and collect the tax. This case is distinguished from cases in § 57, which were questions of the power of the legislature over local taxation, as modified by the first clause of art. 9, § 5, requiring such taxation to be through the instrumentality of corporate authorities.

New York and Michigan.-The Constitutions of these States provide: "Every law which imposes, continues, or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax, and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object." An act which merely enacts that the cost of laying out and constructing an avenue shall be paid as provided in another act, without specifying or limiting the amount to be raised, is invalid. In New York, in arranging the fiscal affairs of the State, it has been found convenient to distribute the revenues into distinct and independent funds, according to the source from which they are derived, and the purpose to which they are to be devoted, such as the common school fund, the canal fund, the general fund, &c. An act which states the rate of tax, and directs the money raised to be paid into the treasury to the credit of the general fund, sufficiently complies with the constitutional provision cited. It is not necessary, in order to comply with such a provision, to appropriate in the act all the taxes raised to specific objects. The Constitution of Michigan, in addition to the provision under discussion, has also a provision that "All specific taxes," with certain exceptions, "shall constitute a part of the primary school interest fund." The legislature imposed a specific tax of one per centum on the gross amount of current business of express companies, without stating the object to which it was to be applied. It was held that the specific taxes having already been appropriated by the Constitution, the act was not in conflict with the Constitution, or rather that the constitutional provision did not apply to a case where the Constitution itself states the object to which the taxes are to be applied.

California. The Constitution of this State declares: "Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. All property in the

State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained by law; but assessors and collectors of town, county, and State taxes shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district, county, or town in which the property taxed for State, county, or town purposes is situated." The legislature created a State board of equalization, to be appointed by the governor, to equalize the valuation of the property of the several counties in the State. They were authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to govern supervisors when equalizing, and assessors when assessing taxes; when they found property assessed above or below its cash value, they were to add to or deduct from the valuation such per centum as would raise or reduce it to the full cash value. It was held that this act violated the Constitution, and was void; it would constitute the board assessors, in lieu of the assessors elected by the people, as required by the Constitution. The power given to the board to fix such rate of taxation, after allowing for delinquencies in the collection of taxes, as would be sufficient to raise the specific amount of revenue directed to be raised by the legislature for State purposes, was held to be a delegation of legislative power to the board, and void. And where a statute created a district out of a part of the county of Santa Clara, and authorized a tax to be assessed upon property along a road in that district, to defray the cost of the construction of the road, to be assessed by the assessors of the county, it was held to be a violation of the Constitution, which requires the assessment to be made by assessors of the district elected by the people.2

Nevada. The Constitution directs that "the legislature shall provide for the payment of an annual poll-tax of not less than two dollars, nor exceeding four dollars, from each male person resident in the State between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years, one-half to be applied to State, and one-half for county purposes." An act imposing a tax of four dollars annually, or two days' labor, on each person residing in a road district, for the use of that district, was held to be a violation of this provision. The levy of service upon an individual for road purposes is an emanation of the taxing power, and the tax levied by the act, whether regarded as a levy in money or service, is a capitation or poll-tax. The Constitution requires such poll-tax, not in excess of four dollars, to be paid one-half to the State, and the other half to the county; but the act appropriates the tax to the road district.

1 Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646. 3 Hassel v. Wallis, 9 Nevada, 387.

2 Williams v. Corcoran, 46 Cal. 553.