cafe, though a Man be not bound to believe that one of them is a truer way than the other, yet is he obliged in prudence to take the safest.

Nay I add farther, if the Probabilities on the one hand fhould fomewhat preponderate the other, yet if there be no confiderable hazard on that fide which hath the leaft probability, and a very great apparent danger in a miftake about the other: In this Cafe, Prudence will oblige a Man to do that which may make most for his own fafety.

These are thofe preparatory Principles which I thought fit to premife, as a neceffary foundation for any debate with captious Men about the first grounds of Religion. And they are each of them (I think) of such perfpicuity, as to need little more than the bare Propofal of them, and the Explication of their Terms, to evince the truth of them.

Concerning the Existence of a Deity, Arguments for it. The I. Argument, From the univerfal Confent and Agreement of Mankind; and the Objections answered.

TH

Hefe Things being premifed, I betake my felf to that which was at first propofed as the chief defign of this Book, namely, to prove the Reasonableness and the Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion.

By Religion, I mean that general Habit of Reverence towards the Divine Nature, whereby we are enabled and inclined to worship and ferve God after fuch a manner as we conceive most agreeable to his Will, fo as to procure his Favour and Bleffing.

I call that Natural Religion, which Men might know, and fhould be obliged unto, by the mere Principles of Reafon, improved by Confideration and Experience, without the help of Revelation.

This doth comprehend under it, thefe three principal Things.

1. A Belief and an Acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence. 2. Duc

2. Due Apprehenfions of his Excellencies and Perfections.

3. Suitable Affections and Demeanor towards him.

Concerning each of which I fhall treat in

order.

I. There must be a firm Belief of the Divine Nature and Existence. Primus eft Deorum cultus, Deus credere, faith Seneca. Anfwerable to that of the Apostle, He that Heb.11.0. comes to God, must believe that he is. Now that this is a Point highly credible, and such as every fober rational Man who will not offer violence to his own Faculties, muft fubmit unto, I fhall endeavour to evince by the plaineft Reason.

In treating concerning this Subject, which both in former and later times hath been fo largely difcuffed by feveral Authors, I fhall not pretend to the Invention of any new Arguments, but content my self with the Management of some of those old ones, which to me feem most plain and convincing. Namely, from

1. The univerfal Consent of Nations, in all Places and Times.

2. The Original of the World.

3. That excellent Contrivance which there

is in all natural Things.

4. The Works of Providence in the Government of the World.

* Ariftot. Top.

Var. Hift.

1. From the Univerfal Confent of Nations in all Places and Times, which must needs render any thing highly credible to all fuch as will but allow the Human Nature to be rational, and to be naturally endowed with a Capacity of distinguishing betwixt Truth and Falfhood.

It is laid down by the * Philofopher as the proper way of Reasoning from Authority, That what feems true to fome wife Men, may upon that account be efteem'd fomewhat probable; what is believed by most wife Men, hath a further degree of probability; what most men, both wife and unwife, do affent unto, is yet more probable: But what all men have generally consented to, hath for it the highest degree of Evidence of this kind, that any thing is capable of: And it must be monftrous Arrogance and folly for any fingle Perfons to prefer their own Judgments before the general Suffrage of Mankind.

It is obferved by Elian, that the Notions lib.2.c.31. concerning the Existence and Nature of God, and of a Future State, were more firmly believed, and did ufually make deeper Impreffion upon the illiterate Vulgar, who were guided by the more fumple dictates of Nature, than upon several of the Philofophers, who by their art and fubtilty were able to invent difguifes, and to difpute themselves into Doubts and Uncertainties concerning fuch things as might bring difquiet to their Minds.

That

That all Nations of Men now do, and have formerly owned this Principle, may appear both from present Experience, and the History of other Times and Places. And here I might cite abundance of the beft Authors that are extant, concerning the truth of this in all other Ages and Nations. But for brevity's fake I fhall mention only Two, Tully and Seneca. Quæ gens eft, aut quod genus Nat. Deor hominum, quod non habeat fine Doctrina, an- lib. 1. 32. ticipationem quandam Deorum, quam appellat wear Epicurus. What kind of Men are there any where, who have not of themselves this prenotion of a Deity? And in another place: Nulla gens eft, neque tam De Legib. immanfueta neque tam fera, que non etiamfi lib. 1. ignoret qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum fciat. 'Amongst all Mankind

.

there is no Nation fo wild and barbarous, "who though they may mistake in their due Apprehenfions of the nature of God, do not acknowledge his Being.' And elfewhere: Nulla eft gens tam fera, nemo om- Tufc. Qu. nium tam immanis, cujus mentem non imbu- lib. 1. erit Deorum timor. There is no Nation fo immenfely barbarous and favage, as not to believe the Existence of a Deity, and by 'fome kind of Services to express their Ado<ration of him.' So Seneca, Nulla gens uf- Epift. 118 quam eft, adeo extra leges morefque projecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat. There is no where any Nation fo utterly loft to all things

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