REPORT

ON THE SUBJECT OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISES, AND THE USE OF THE BIBLE, IN SCHOOLS: MADE IN THE ASSEMBLY OF NEW-YORK, JAN. 23, 1838.

Mr. Barnard, from the committee on colleges, academies and common schools, to whom was referred the memorial of William G. Griffin and others, asking the legislature to enact a law to prohibit the practice of praying, singing, reading the Bible, and other religious exercises; in such schools, academies and seminaries of education, as receive aid from the public treasury, REPORTS:

That the committee have given to this memorial the most serious and deliberate consideration. They have been deeply impressed with the importance of some at least of the questions raised by the petitioners, and involved, directly or by implication, in the object they are pursuing, and the indispensable necessity, if possible, of having those questions settled, and settled right, in the public mind. In recommending that the prayer of the memorialists be not granted, the committee would not deem their duty faithfully done, without an effort to shew that their conclusions in the matter are sound and just; it is believed that this can be shewn to the satisfaction of the house, and, it is hoped, to the satisfaction of the petitioners and of the country.

The substance of the complaint in this memorial is, that religious exercises are tolerated in those public schools which participate in the public bounty; and this practice they regard as a violation of the law of equality and the rights of conscience, as aiding to propagate and enforce peculiar religious opinions at the public expense, and leading to, if not actually forming, a union of church and state.

In order to understand the force and effect of this complaint, it will be necessary to look, for a moment, at our system of public instruction, to consider what our schools are, how constituted and supported, and why they are sustained and regulated as they are.

It happens, unfortunately, that experience does not shew that the mass of any people are disposed to keep up and support a sufficient and effective system of instruction for themselves by voluntary contributions, and it becomes necessary, therefore, for the sake of self-preservation, that the community should make provision for the support of education by law. This necessity was early felt in this state, and it has long been, and is now, and always must be, the settled and steady policy of the state, to furnish aid in support of public instruction.

To speak of our common-school system only. A large aum is distributed aunually from the treasury in payment of the wages of teachers, and a sum equal to that which is thus furnished, and which is the income of a large fund devoted to this purpose, is raised by the compulsory process of taxation, and applied to the same object. Each district, complying with certain prescribed conditions, receives a share of these public moneys. The district taxes itself, if the majority in it so please, to provide

the proper house and accommodations for the school. It contracts, through its trustees, with a qualified instructor, and provides for the payment of any deficiency in the amount of public moneys to pay the wages of the master, by a rate-bill against those who furnish children to be instructed.

In this plan, it will be seen, that while no person, liable to taxation, is allowed to escape the duty of contribution to the support of popular education, no individual is compelled by any law to educate his children at all, much less to send them to the public schools. If he choose to violate the solemn obligation which his position as a citizen, a contractor with the community, imposes on him, to fit his offspring, by a proper course of educational discipline, for the part they are to act in the business of the common government, he is at liberty to do so. Especially is he left at perfect liberty, if he will have them educated at all, to do so in any manner he thinks fit, and under any masters whom he may see proper to employ. In regard to the support of the public schools, he stands precisely in the condition of any tax-paying citizen, who may have no children to send to those schools. He has the same interest in the school fund, and, like them, he contributes to the amount raised by taxation, according to his ability. Further than this the law does not oblige him to go. He is taxed for the support of an indispensable public institution, and, if he have children to be educated, this institution is open to him as to all others, and he is free to avail himself of its direct advantages or not, according to his pleasure.

Now it is to these schools, as we are to suppose, that the children of the petitioners are accustomed to resort,

and in some cases, it is fair to presume, that it is found exceedingly inconvenient, perhaps impossible, for these parents to furnish their children with the means of instruction any where else. They are, therefore, obliged to resort to these schools, or take the alternative of keeping their children in utter ignorance; and it is, under these circumstances, that they come before the legislature with the complaint, that, on resorting to these schools, they find there a practice introduced—that of indulging in devotional exercises-which they deem highly offensive and objectionable. The grounds of objection to this practice, as far as we can gather them from the memorial, are two:

1. That the christian religion is thus supported, or aided, at the public expense.

2. That the rights of equality and the rights of conscience are thereby invaded, inasmuch as the unguarded minds of their children are thus exposed to be contaminated.

In regard to the first of these positions, the committee would only say, that it is a mere error in fact. It is simply untrue. These teachers are paid for teaching, and not for praying. No part of their wages is for this service, or any other religious exercise. And this must be evident enough from the fact, that the wages of teachers are not in the least affected by the consideration whether they pray or do not pray.

In regard to the other ground of objection presented by the petitioners, we remark: Whenever a number of persons associate together in public assemblage for any specific object, it is usual and perfectly competent for them to agree on the forms of proceeding, and the terms

on which the common object shall be prosecuted. This determination of course belongs to the majority; and it belongs essentially to the power of the majority to insist on any conventional forms of proceeding while the body is together, not inconsistent with the common object. As for example, if it be a company of Friends, or they are in the majority, they may agree to sit with their hats on; if not, they may agree to sit with them off. If the majority are Shakers, they may dance; if Jews, or Christians, they may pray. And in all these cases, it is the duty of the minority to submit. The only question for them is, whether the form or ceremony insisted on is in itself decent and becoming, and not in hostility to the main purpose of the association.

Now it is on this principle that your committee suppose the practice objected to by the petitioners is adopted. The practice is not prescribed by any state authority. It is a matter wholly referred to the decision of the towns and districts. A majority of the parents sending children to a public school, acting for their children, as they have a right to do, may rightfully agree, and direct, that the proper business of the school shall be opened or closed, or both, daily with religious exercises. Each parent has a right to pray himself and to teach his child to pray; and if one has this right, so have all, or as many as are of that way of thinking; and as each may practise acts of devotion individually, whenever they associate they may practise the like acts of devotion in a social way; and they may require the same thing of their children, whether individually or in a social assemblage. The practice is innocent and decent, and we know of no principle on which a minority, voluntarily associating with