CRIMINAL LAW (Continued).

30. PREPARATION OF PLACE FOR HANDLING ABORTION CASES-StateMENTS OF DEFENDANT TO OTHER DOCTOR ADMISSIBLE.-In such prosecution, testimony of a doctor to the effect that defendant had discussed with him the preparation of a place "down the peninsula" for the handling of "long time [abortion] cases" was admissible, if the securing of such place entered into the particular offense for which defendant was being prosecuted, notwithstanding such evidence tended to prove that defendant was preparing to commit abortions generally.

OF

31. EFFORTS OF ACCOMPLICE TO AVOID DETECTION-ADMISSION STATEMENTS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.-In such prosecution, the admission of testimony of police officers as to the actions of an accomplice of defendant on the night the latter was arrested and of the statements she made in her efforts to avoid detection did not constitute error prejudicial to defendant where such accomplice did not say anything which had any relation to the defendant or that could have prejudiced him in any way. (Id.) 32. PERFORMANCE OF OTHER ABORTION OPERATIONS EVIDENCE OF ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW INTENT.-In such a prosecution, evidence of the performance of other abortion operations by the defendant is admissible to show the intent with which the operation for the performance of which the defendant is being prosecuted was performed in order to negative the possibility that it was a legal operation necessitated by reason of the health of the woman. (Id.)

33. ERROR IN NAME OF DECEASED-WAIVER OF VARIANCE.-On an appeal from the judgment of conviction in such prosecution error may not be predicated upon the fact that by inadvertence the given and middle names of the deceased were reversed in the information where a sister of the deceased connected the two names in her testimony and, further, the defendant did not make any motion in the trial court based upon the alleged variance, when it might have been readily explained and corrected. (Id.)

34. VOID SENTENCE UNDER INDETERMINATE SENTENCE ACT-VALIDITY OF SECOND SENTENCE.-Where the sentence imposed by the trial court, under the Indeterminate Sentence Act, is void because the crime was committed before the provision of the code authorizing such a sentence became effective, the proper procedure, on habeas corpus, is to remand the defendant to the custody of the sheriff to be resentenced by the court to a definite term; and such second sentence is not void because it was not passed within a reasonable time after the first sentence or because it was pronounced without proper arraignment proceedings; nor is the defendant thereby twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. (People v. Gibson, 770.)

See Prisons, 1-3.

CROPS. See Contracts, 8; Negligence, 42; Sales, 6.

DAMAGES. See Appeal, 8; Attachment, 1; Building Contracts, 4; Claim and Delivery, 3; Common Carriers, 1-3; Conversion, 1; Corporations, 10, 11; Employer and Employee, 8; Negligence, 6, 11, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 42, 43; Sales, 7.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Claim and Delivery, 2; Corporations, 2; Trusts, 1.

DECEIT. See Trade-marks, 5, 6.

DEEDS.

1. RESTRICTIVE

COVENANTS - REVERSION - VESTED ESTATE-RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.—Under section 768 of the Civil Code, where the covenants in a deed limit the use of the premises to residence purposes, prescribe the nature, quality, and cost of the buildings to be erected thereon, and provide, as to the grantor therein, that "the breach of any of the foregoing conditions shall cause said premises together with the appurtenances to be forfeited to and to revert to the said grantor, his heirs, successors, and assigns, each of whom shall have the right of immediate entry upon said premises in the event of any such breach," the estate reserved by the grantor is in the nature of a reversion or vested estate which is not within the rule against perpetuities. (Strong v. Shatto, 29.)

2. RESERVATION OF CONDITIONAL FORFEITURE-REMOTENESS-VALIDITY. Where a deed, after limiting the use of the premises to residence purposes, and prescribing the nature, quality, and cost of the buildings to be erected thereon, provides, as to the grantor therein, that "the breach of any of the foregoing conditions shall cause said premises together with the appurtenances to be forfeited to and to revert to the said grantor, his heirs, successors and assigns, each of whom shall have the right of immediate entry upon saiu premises in the event of any breach," this latter conditional orfeiture reserved is not void for remoteness. (Id.)

3. CHANGE OF CONDITIONS-QUIETING TITLE-EQUITY.-The rule that equity will not enforce restrictions on the use of property where the reason and justification for them has failed through changed conditions does not go to the extent of permitting parties whose land is subject to the legal restraint of such limitations to bring an action to quiet their title against such contractual obligation, because of changed conditions. (Id.)

4. INCREASED VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES-ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS.-The mere fact that the property has

DEEDS (Continued).

become more desirable or valuable for business than for residence purposes will not necessarily defeat an application for equitable relief where the restriction, notwithstanding the change of conditions, still is of substantial advantage to the dominant property. (Id.)

5. TRUSTS CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY-FAILURE TO STATE PURPOSE. A deed which attempts to convey certain real property to a named person "as treasurer" of a given organization, "or his successor," without designating any purpose to which the property should be put, while clearly indicating the intention of the grantor to create a trust in favor of such organization, does not conform with the requirements of the code relating to the creation of trusts in real property. (Union Trust etc. Bk. v. Ishkanian, 347.)

6. LANGUAGE OF DEED-ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSEQUENT CONVEYANCE -NOTICE.-The language of such a deed is in itself sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to whether it was an absolute grant to the named person or a conveyance in trust for the uses and purposes of the organization referred to therein; therefore, one who accepts a deed to the property from the person named as grantee in cancellation of an indebtedness due from the organization referred to therein cannot be said to be an innocent purchaser. (Id.)

7. INTENTIONS OF PARTIES-PAROL EVIDENCE-WHEN ADMISSIBLE.Where parol evidence is offered to explain the intentions of the parties as to whether a conveyance was a deed absolute or in trust, it is admissible unless such evidence would prejudice a third party who, in good faith and without notice, has become a purchaser. (Id.)

to

enforce

8. CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT-WAIVER-PAROL EVIDENCE.-In an action certain forfeiture clause in a deed executed by plaintiff's decedent to a corporation and conditioned upon the payment by the corporation to her of a specified sum monthly, evidence of the statements, acts, and conduct of such decedent subsequent to the making of the deed are admissible as tending to show a waiver by her of the requirements of such condition subsequent. (Fox v. California Fruit Co., 475.)

OF

9. EXECUTION AND DELIVERY ABSENCE OF FRAUD RIGHTS INNOCENT PURCHASER ESTOPPEL.-Where the owner of real property signs and delivers to another a deed to the property, in the absence of any showing whatever that trick or device has been practiced, she will be estopped to set up her title as against an innocent purchaser of the property for value from her grantee. (Shannon v. Aagaard, 733.)

prerequisite that the delivery of a deed must be accompanied with

DEEDS (Continued).

the intent that the deed shall become operative as such, in the absence of a showing that the deed was obtained through trick or device, it will be presumed that the deed was so delivered, and the deed itself will be prima facie evidence of complete execution. (Id.)

11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS AT EXPENSE OF PROPERTY OWNERS - PRIMA FACIE CHARACTER OF DEEDS EXECUTED- -QUIETING TITLE EVIDENCE.-By the provisions of the Park and Playground Act of 1909, the Street Improvement Act of 1909, and the Street Opening Act of 1903, a deed executed pursuant thereto is made "prima facie evidence of the truth of all matters recited therein, and of the regularity of all proceedings prior to the execution thereof, and of title in the grantee," and in an action by the grantee to quiet title, unless the defendant's evidence impeaches the deed, or the regularity of the proceedings pursuant to which it was executed, the admission in evidence thereof entitles the plaintiff to a decree in his favor. (Calkins v. Doolittle, 776.) 12. NOTICE TO REDEEM-INCLUSION OF IMPROPER ITEM-SUBSEQUENT

DEED INEFFECTIVE.-Where a thirty-days' notice to redeem given under such acts includes in the sum necessary to effect a redemption the three dollars that the statute requires to be paid by the redemptioner for serving such notice and making affidavit thereof, such notice is ineffective, and the deed given thereunder conveys no title. (Id.)

13. QUIETING TITLE RIGHTS OF GRANTEE AND OF OWNER OF LEGAL TITLE. Although the grantee under such deeds does not acquire the legal title to the property and cannot, therefore, maintain a suit to quiet title against the owner of the legal title, if such action is brought, the owner of the legal title is not entitled, by cross-action, to have his title quieted as against the plaintiff's claim, until such owner of the legal title shall have redeemed his lot from the lien created by the proceedings pursuant to which plaintiff obtained the void. (Id.)

See Estates of Deceased Persons, 1.

DEEDS OF TRUST.

1. FORECLOSURE OF TRUST DEED-WANT OF NOTICE OF LEASE.Where a trust deed to secure a loan is taken without notice of a lease of the premises, the lessee's interest under such lease is foreclosed by the foreclosure of the deed of trust. (Tropical Investment Co. v. Brown, 205.)

2. ACCEPTANCE OF ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF RENT-FAILURE TO DISCLOSE RECEIPT ESTOPPEL.-Where a lessee accepts the lessor's order to pay certain rents to the lessor's creditor, who is secured by a deed of trust to the leased premises, without disclosing to such

DEEDS OF TRUST (Continued).

creditor that she holds a receipt for such rent, she will be estopped to assert such receipt for more than she has actually paid, as against the lien of the trust deed. (Id.)

See Mortgages, 8, 9, 15.

DEFAULT.

1. MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT-DISCRETION-APPEAL.-A motion to set aside a default is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and while appellate courts will listen more readily to an appeal from an order refusing to set aside a default, the determination of the trial court will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. (Nohl v. County of Del Norte, 306.) 2. FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER-NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL-PROPER DENIAL OF MOTION.-Where plaintiff's attorneys, weeks prior to the entry of the default of the defendant, had several times demanded in open court that answer be made and filed, and the defendant's attorneys were willfully, grossly, and inexcusably negligent in their failure to prepare and file an answer prior to the time default was entered, defendant's motion to set aside its default was properly denied. (Id.)

See Appeal, 4; Bill of Exceptions, 1, 2; Judgments, 6. 7.

DELIVERY. See Deeds, 9.

DEMAND. See Conversion, 2; Municipal Corporations, 4.

DESCRIPTION. See Vendor and Vendee, 2, 3.

See Appeal, 11; Criminal Law, 19; Default, 1; Divorce, 6-8;
Injunction, 2, 5; Mortgages, 12; New Trial, 5, 8; Unlawful
Detainer, 3.

DISMISSAL. See Appeal, 9, 13; Bill of Exceptions, 3; Criminal Law, 4; Guardian and Ward, 2.

DIVORCE.

1. BONA FIDE RESIDENCE-ESTABLISHMENT IN SISTER STATE.—In order to entitle one to maintain a divorce action the residence must be bona fide; and going into another state with the intention of returning to this when the divorce has been procured is not the establishment of a bona fide residence or domicile. (Anthony v. Tarpley, 72.)

2. LEGAL DOMICILE MERE RESIDENCE INSUFFICIENT.

As distin

guished from legal domicile, mere residence within a particular