new matter or newly discovered evidence. Bills of the last class cannot be filed as a matter of right but are only allowed in the sound discretion of the court; and the same rule obtains where a bill for either of the first two causes is joined with one to review a decree on account of new matter arising since the decree was entered. (Schaefer v. Wunderle, 154 Ill. 577; Cole v. Littledale, 164 id. 630; Elzas v. Elzas, 183 id. 132; Harrigan v. County of Peoria, 262 id. 36.) Bills of this character will not lie until after the close of the term at which the decree was entered, and when based upon newly discovered matter must be accompanied by a showing that such fact was not discovered until after the original decree had been entered and by the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been discovered before that time. (Griggs v. Gear, 3 Gilm. 2; Schaefer v. Wunderle, supra; Elzas v. Elzas, 183 Ill. 160; Watts v. Rice, 192 id. 123; Harrigan v. County of Peoria, supra.) Their function is to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and they will be allowed only in furtherance of that object. Hopkins v. Hebard, 235 U. S. 287.

In the case before us no showing was made of any fraud practiced upon the court, and appellant's right to relief rests solely upon the fact that knowledge of the death of Mary Bushnell came to him on the evening of the day the decree was rendered. The claim made does not go to the merits of the controversy, which had been fully heard and considered and substantially disposed of long before her death. The delay in entering the written decree was due largely, if not entirely, to the unnecessary reference to the master. Five hundred pages of testimony were taken by the master on the question of fees. Such practice can not be approved. This reference was made over the protest of counsel for Mary Bushnell, who urged the court to fix the fee. The court had heard the case and could easily have determined a reasonable fee. Appellant desired the reference and ought not benefit by his own request. The

only effect permission to file the bill could have would be to relieve appellant from an obligation he is otherwise legally and equitably bound to pay. He bases his right to file the bill solely upon the circumstance of the death of Mary Bushnell, cross-complainant in the divorce proceeding, on the day the decree for separate maintenance was rendered, and seeks relief on a technicality entirely too refined to commend itself favorably to a court of equity, which ordinarily does not concern itself with fractional parts of a day. (Levy v. Chicago Nat. Bank, 158 Ill. 88.) It affirmatively appears from his petition that he learned of Mary Bushnell's death, and of the hour of her death, about nine o'clock on the evening of June 9, 1916, and that he took no steps to bring such fact to the attention of the court until after the term had expired. In law a term of court is regarded as but a single day or unit of time, and all acts done within that term are regarded as contemporaneous. During the term at which a decree is entered the record remains in the breast of the court, and the decree may be amended or set aside as justice or right may require, (Krieger v. Krieger, 221 Ill. 479; People v. Wells, 255 id. 450;) but after the term has expired it cannot be altered or amended except in the manner pointed out by the statute or by a bill of review. (Mooney v. Valentynovicz, 255 Ill. 118.) No satisfactory reason is shown why the fact of Mary Bushnell's death was not brought to the attention of the court at an earlier date. Had the proper motion been made at the June term, the court, undoubtedly, would have granted appellant ample time to present the facts to support it. No such motion was made and appellant slept on his rights until that term expired. The failure to make such motion was due entirely to his own negligence, and under such circumstances such new matter cannot be made the basis for a bill of review. (Schaefer v. Wunderle, supra.) Where it affirmatively appears that the matters relied upon as newly discovered came to the party's knowledge in ample

time to have been availed of in the original cause, by motion or otherwise, they cannot be made the basis for a bill of review to set aside the decree. (Griggs v. Gear, supra; Boyden v. Reed, 55 Ill. 458; Harrigan v. County of Peoria, supra.) Such is the situation presented by this case, and the court was right in denying leave to file the bill. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12344.-Reversed and remanded.)

THURLOW H. PRATT, Admr. Appellee, vs. LUCY WING

SKIFF et al.

(THE WOMAN'S BOARD OF MISSIONS OF

THE INTERIOR, Appellant.)

Opinion filed October 27, 1919.

1. WILLS codicil must be construed with will. The purpose of a codicil is to alter, enlarge or restrain or to explain, confirm and re-publish the provisions of the will, and the codicil does not supersede the will but is a part of it and is to be construed with it as one entire instrument.

2. SAME-power of disposition is not larger than estate devised unless clearly indicated. Where a power of disposal accompanies a bequest or devise of a life estate the power of disposal is only coextensive with the estate which the devisee takes under the will, and means such disposal as a tenant for life could make unless there are other words clearly indicating that a larger power was intended.

3. SAME remainder may be limited after life estate in personal property. A testator may bequeath a life estate in personal property to another and limit a remainder after it.

4. SAME-life estate in money requires security from life legatee. Where a life legacy consists of money, courts of chancery require security from the life legatee although he is a responsible party and there is no showing that there is danger of the money being wasted, and the money will not be paid to the life tenant without security unless the will clearly discloses that such was the testator's expressed intent.

CARTWRIGHT and THOMPSON, JJ., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Judge, presiding.

WORTHINGTON, REEVE & GREEN, for appellant.

WILSON & BUTLER, for appellee.

JULIAN P. LIPPINCOTT, for Daisy Emrich Charlesworth.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: Thurlow H. Pratt, administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Addie Wing Williams, deceased, filed a bill in chancery to the April term, 1918, of the Morgan county circuit court against the heirs, devisees and legatees of the testatrix for the purpose of obtaining a construction of her will.

The testatrix, Addie Wing Williams, died December 3, 1916, leaving as her only heirs-at-law her sisters, Lucy Wing Skiff and Nellie Wing Hemenway; her nephews, Jewett F. Wing and Harold E. Wing, and her niece, Edith M. Wing. She also left surviving her Daisy Emrich Charlesworth, a foster-daughter, whom she and her husband had taken at the age of ten or twelve years and who lived with her at her death. They had talked of adopting her but had never done so. The testatrix died seized of her homestead in Jacksonville, Illinois, and also a house and lot in Chapin, Illinois, worth about $2000. She left household goods of the value of mortgages and other assets of the value of $17,800. The will was dated March 31, 1915. She first gives and bequeaths, after the payment of her debts, funeral expenses and other expenses, the following legacies to her cousins: To Arthur Ames Woodward the sum of $3000; to Nellie Bean Woodward, Stella Bean, Emma Bean and Nellie Wing Lewis, $1000 each; to Abbie S. Wing $1000, to be given at her death to the Congregational (Vermont) Home

about $120, and notes,

Missionary Society, to be applied to the endowment fund of said society. To Elizabeth Meyers she bequeathed the sum of $300; to the Woman's Board of Missions of the Interior, (Congregational,) incorporated under the laws of Illinois, $1000, to be used as an endowment fund for foreign missions; to the Deaconess Home in Pana, Illinois, $500, to be used by the Congregational trustees of the home for the deaconesses in Pana; to the trustees of Concord, Illinois, cemetery $100 in trust, the interest on said sum to be used to care for "the Williams lot in said cemetery;" $50 "in trust by the trustees," the interest of said sum to be used to keep up the J. F. Wing lot in the Bridgeport, Vermont, cemetery; to Thorsby Institute $300 for a piano. The devise and bequests to Daisy Emrich Charlesworth are in the following language: "I give and bequeath to my adopted daughter, Daisy Emrich Charlesworth, the sum of three thousand dollars ($3000); the house and lot No. 238 Westminster street, Jacksonville, Illinois, and the furniture in the house, after my sisters, Nellie Wing Hemenway and Lucy Wing Skiff, have taken what they want. I give and bequeath my piano to Daisy Emrich Charlesworth."

On August 30, 1915, the testatrix executed her second codicil to her will, which she called codicil No. 3, and it reads thus: "The property which I have given to my daughter, Daisy Emrich Charlesworth, three thousand dollars ($3000); the home and lot on 238 Westminster street, Jacksonville, Illinois; the piano; the household goods that my sisters, Lucy Wing Skiff and Nellie Wing Hemenway, do not want, to be used by the said Daisy for her lifetime. Should she leave the whole or part of this property, I want it given at her death, one-half to the Woman's Board of Missions of the Interior as an endowment fund under the laws of the State of Illinois, the interest to be used for foreign missions; the last half to be given as an endowment fund to the American Missionary Association, office 287 Fourth avenue, New York, for the education of the